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SUMMARY
In an attempt to understand paranormal phenomena 
more clearly, a theory has been proposed linking such 
phenomena to the process of cognition proper.
Several predictions with regard to the conditions 
required to obtain experimental validation of these 
phenomena have been proposed.
A series of three observational studies and five 
experiments was carried out to test the major hypotheses 
derived from the cognitive theory.
The results obtained from both the studies and 
the experiments confirmed these hypotheses at 
statistically very high levels of significance.
NO PORTION OF THE WORK REFERRED TO IN THE 
THESIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF 
AN APPLICATION FOR ANOTHER DEGREE OR 
QUALIFICATION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER 
UNIVERSITY OR OTHER INSTITUTE OF LEARNING.
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
It has been proposed that ESP-type phenomena (herein 
referred to as 'paranormal cognition') can best be studied 
and understood if they are seen to originate from the same 
theoretical process as normal cognition.
Several predictions were made with regard to the 
conditions under which paranormal cognition would be most 
commonly observable. A comparison was then made between 
the experimental data on paranormal cognition already 
available and these predictions. It was found that all 
present evidence of paranormal cognition could be 
accommodated by one or more of these predictions.
One of the predictions made was concerned with the 
developmental aspects of paranormal cognition. It was 
argued that when an organism's maturational level has not 
yet reached the level of complex internalised connections 
its species is capable of generating, (i.e. it is learning 
to make internalised connections) then paranormal cognition 
should be highly observable.
In a series of three observational studies and three
I.Q. experiments testing paranormal cognition ability in 
dyads of human subjects ranging between 3 and 70 years of
age it was found that:
a) Subjects aged up to 8 years of age 
obtained highly significant above chance 
scores in a paranormal cognition experiment, 
whereas all subjects older than this 
chronological age obtained chance level scores 
on the same experiment*
b) Chronological age (up to 8 years) is inversely 
proportional to paranormal cognition ability 
(i*e» the lower the chronological age of the 
subject, the higher the paranormal cognition 
score)*
c) I*Q* levels are inversely proportional to 
paranormal cognition ability in subjects aged 
up to 8 years (i*e* the lower the I*Q. of the 
subject, the higher the paranormal cognition 
score)*
d) The manipulation of either the chronological 
age or the I.Q. variable greatly affects 
paranormal cognition scores* Subject dyads 
paired for both chronological age and I.Q* 
obtained results which clearly indicated the 
inverse relation between both chronological age
and I.Q. and paranormal cognition scores. 
Subject dyads paired for I.Q. but not for 
chronological age obtained results which 
clearly indicated the inverse relation between
I.Q, and paranormal cognition scores, but not 
between chronological age and paranormal 
cognition# Group scores obtained in paranormal 
cognition were lower than those obtained when 
both chronological age and I.Q. were paired. 
Finally, subject dyads paired for chronological 
age but not for I.Q. showed a clear (but much 
reduced in terms of paranormal cognition 
score) inverse relation between chronological 
age and paranormal cognition and, to some 
extent, between I.Q, and paranormal cognition.
In none of the studies or experiments were 
there any scoring differences found between 
males and females or between dyads made up 
of two subjects of the same sex or made up 
of one subject of one sex and one subject of 
the other.
In a U  the groups studied (regardless of 
chronological age or I.Q. level) a very 
highly significant number of successful 
paranormal cognition 'hits' were obtained in 
the first and last trial of each dyad run.
In the second set of experiments, subjects paired for 
chronological age and I.Q. were given a secondary normal 
cognition task of varying difficulty which was'carried out 
at the same time as the paranormal cognition task. It was 
found that the introduction of a secondary normal 
cognition task diminished the level of successful para­
normal cognition scoring. Further, it was also found that 
the more difficult the secondary task, the lower was the 
level of successful paranormal cognition scores.
In a final set of experiments, subject dyads paired 
for both chronological age and I.Q. were given a 
'relaxation* task (i.e. listening to music.) designed to 
minimise consciously directed thought at the same time as 
the paranormal cognition task. It was found that the 
level of paranormal cognition scoring increased in relation 
to the level of 'relaxation' in the dyads.
The experimental results obtained were found to be 
in accordance with the theoretical proposals suggested 
with regard to the study and understanding of paranormal 
cognition.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness 
to Professor T.R. Lee for his continual encouragement, 
meticulous supervision and scientific open-mindedness.
The author is also extremely grateful to the 
Parapsychology Foundation, Inc., The Perrott-Warwick 
Fund and The Society for Psychical Research for their 
financial support. This thesis could never have been 
completed without this help. In addition, the author 
would like to personally thank Mr. Allan Angoff,
Dr. John Beloff and Dr. D.J. West for their personal 
encouragement and concern.
Special thanks are also due to the several under­
graduate students of the Psychology Department at the 
University of Surrey who spent many long hours working 
as my Experimental Assistants.
Finally, the author wishes to express his heartfelt 
thanks to all his Subjects for their co-operation. Most 
especially, the author wishes to acknowledge his very great 
debt to the headmistresses, teachers and children of the 
schools he worked in for their time, patience and sense of 
humour.
This thesis is dedicated to the two Peters -
one, for setting it in motion while ambling 
towards the Roman Forum; 
the other, for teaching me to see beyond it; 
and both, for their perfect friendship.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 1
AN OVERVIEW OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY 11
1. Parapsychological Theories 12
-2.0 An Overview of the Experimental
Data collected on ESP 80
3. Main Critiques of Parapsychology 120
4. Summary 129
PARANORMAL COGNITION: OUTLINE AND HYPOTHESES 131
1. The Concept of 'Extrasensory1
Cognition 132
2. Evolution and Cognition 140
3. Human Development and Paranormal
Cognition 142
4o Experimental Studies of ESP in
Children 166
5. Experimental Hypotheses 176
THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES ' 179
1. Outline of the Observational Studies 180
2. The first Observational Study 18 3
3. A Replication of the First Observational
Study 250
4. An Observational Study with Pre­
selected Random Targets 278
5. A Comparison of Scores Obtained in
the Three Observational Studies 314
• 6, A General Summary of the Three
Observational Studies 317
7• The I.Q. Variables in the Observational
Studies 319
E*ge
THE EXPERIMENTS 345
1© The I.Q. Experiments 346
2. The Effects of a Complex Task on
Paranormal Cognition 402
3. The Effects of a Relaxation Stimulus
on Paranormal Cognition 424
4. General Summary of the Experimental
Results 439
A THEORY OF BINARY COGNITION 444
1. Introduction 445
2. The Mechanics of ESP 448
3. The Mechanics of Cognition ' 453
4. ESP and Cognition 460
5. An Analysis of Cognition 464
6. Binary Cognition 474
7. Summary 478
8. Theoretical Problems 485
9. The Theory of Binary Cognition compared
to the Major Theories of ESP 501
10c The Theory of Binary Cognition compared
to the Major Observations of ESP 
Phenomena 516
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 525
FURTHER PREDICTIONS AND, CONCLUSIONS 536
REFERENCES 550
APPENDICES 561
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
It is the theoretical dictum of science to investigate 
all phenomena in nature impartially and without prejudice.
It seems to be the case, however, that the phenomena 
generally classified under the heading ’ESP1 or ’psi1 
have been largely dismissed by the majority of scientists 
as being unworthy of any serious attempt at investigation 
or understanding. It is important to note, however, that 
such phenomena, which in this thesis are labelled as 
'paranormal cognition', have been reported and considered 
'real' by all cultures since the beginning of recorded 
history. Even on this basis alone they are, therefore, 
of direct interest to the fields of anthropology, biology, 
philosophy and psychologye
In the relatively brief period of history when para­
normal events were associated with religious dogma and actively 
employed in clerical machinations, the scientist's avoidance 
and disinterest in these phenomena might have been considered 
rational. But this is no longer the case.
The whole ethos of modern science rests on the 
notion of objective, rigorously controlled and measured 
experimentation. That such an ethos might in itself be 
erroneous is not being questioned here. Rather, since 
the late 1920's experiments in parapsychology have
been conducted which are by and large impeccable in their
control of external variables, their design, execution,
statistical analysis and conclusions. They would surely
stand out as models of the scientific approach to human
problems were it not for the results obtained from them.
As C.D. Broad has stated:
"We take for granted that a person A cannot know 
what experiences another person B is now having 
or has had, except in one or another of the 
following three ways. (i) by hearing and under­
standing sentences uttered by B, or reproductions 
of such sentences, which describe his experiences; 
or by reading and understanding such sentences 
written or dictated by B, or reproductions or 
translations of them. Or (ii) by hearing and 
interpreting interjections which B makes; by 
seeing and interpreting his movements, gestures, 
facial expressions; and so on. Or (iii) by seeing 
and making inferences from certain persistent 
material objects, e.g. tools, pottery, pictures, 
etc., which B has constructed or used, or copies 
and reproductions of such objects.
We take for granted also that a person cannot 
foresee (as distinct from inferring, or being led, 
without explicit inference, to expect on the basis 
of regularities in his past experience) any event 
which has not yet happened.
We take for granted, too, that a person cannot 
directly initiate or modify by his own volition 
the movement of anything but certain parts of his 
own body."
(18, p. 3-4)
Each of these basic limiting principles - that is, 
very general principles which are mostly negative and 
restrictive in nature and which practically everyone 
brought up within, or under the influence of, industrial 
society assumes to be correct without question - is 
accepted by modern science as being essentially correct.
And similarly, each of these basic limiting 
principles have been shown to be incorrect within the 
tenets of modern science by experiments in paranormal 
phenomena.
An event which seems "prima facie to conflict with 
one or more of the basic limiting principles" (18, P*5 ) 
can be seen as an ostensibly paranormal phenomenon. And 
any such event which under investigation does indeed 
conflict with one or more of the basic limiting principles 
can be counted as a genuinely paranormal phenomenon.*
There is little doubt that we have within the existing 
framework of. science ample evidence of genuinely paranormal 
phenomena.
* This is, of course, different to "abnormal phenomena" which 
are events which seem prima facie to conflict only with a 
well-established law of nature but not with any basic limiting 
principle (as in the case of radioactive material which con­
tinually gives out energy with no apparent loss of energy 
elsewhere in the surroundings to counter-balance it.)
Parapsychology is the scientific study of ostensibly 
paranormal phenomena. Through strictly controlled, 
experimental, scientific methods it attempts to replicate 
ostensibly paranormal phenomena in the laboratory so that 
they can be classified as genuinely paranormal phenomena 
and, in some way, introduced into the scientific model of 
the universe.
An odd contradiction concerning parapsychology should 
be noted at this point. The methods parapsychology employs 
to obtain its data are prosaic, the description of these 
methods is, similarly, a "plodding, detailed account of 
procedural controls and repetitive data". (18, p. 2)*
The data itself is clear and straightforward. Yet beyond the 
methods and data, , it is the ideas that animate such research, 
and the conclusions drawn from the resulting data which give 
rise to theoretical implications of the universe which are 
so radically different to those of Western philosophy and 
science. It is, therefore,parapsychology1s ideology, not 
its methodology, which has condemned it to immediate and 
total dismissal by the majority of scientists.
It is, we would argue, mainly due to such implications 
that the mainstream of modern science,overtaken by a somewhat 
unreasoning defence of the conventional framework of 
knowledge, has either attacked psi researchers as charlatans
attempting to hoodwink the scientific and lay communities 
or, worse, turned a blind eye to all parapsychblogical data. 
The strongest of these attacks have not come, as one might 
expect, from the physical sciences but, rather, from the 
human sciences - especially psychology.
The reasons for psychology's attack on data collected 
of phenomena which "stand beside" it (for that is what 
para-psychology literally means) are unclear and unspecific. 
It must be recalled, however, that in its attempt to present 
itself as a 'respectable' science, in the first half of the 
20th centruy, psychology threw out of its "acceptable 
vocabulary" a great number of concepts - such as 'mind',
'will' and 'consciousness' - which data collected from 
parapsychological experiments would have forced it to accept. 
In its embracing of a totally mechanistic and behaviouristic 
view of man, psychology has almost fanatically rejected the 
evidence presented to it, at times even refusing to admit 
that serious research in parapsychology even exists. It is 
interesting to note that although many of the findings in 
parapsychology (say, for example, in the area of 'perception'), 
are of direct value and interest to psychologists, very few 
psychologists have ever scanned one of the major para­
psychological journals, or even heard of their existence.
This exceptional disavowal of paranormal phenomena and of 
the concepts associated with it - concepts which by and 
large brought about the study of psychology in the first
place - reached a peak in the 1950's and early 1960'.s when 
'behaviourism1 - the framework within which psychology1s 
'acceptable* guiding principles, were hypothesised and 
tested - began to undergo internal ideological conflicts 
due both to its own limitations and to the increasing 
number of observations being made by experimental psychologists 
which could not be accommodated within its framework. It 
was bad enough that by slight changes in experimental approach . 
or by innovative questioning of the validity of such an 
approach, 'behaviourism' was being attacked by its own 
followers, but it was insupportable that even by strictly 
adhering to its rigidly experimental credo, researchers in 
parapsychology were producing evidence in direct conflict with 
its tenets.
Such a state of affairs is not unique in science.
Modern day quantum physics, which rejects many of the 
concepts of classical mechanical physics, could not have 
come to such rejections without the concepts of Newtonian 
mechanics as its starting point. Similarly, when quantum 
concepts were first introduced, they created a backlash of 
protest from traditional physicists who refused to admit 
the existence of evidence in conflict with 'acceptable* 
theories.
Both in the case of Newtonian physics and in behaviouristic
psychology, the point was raised and strongly argued that 
such new evidence broke established laws of nature and had 
to be rejected as simply being nonsense.
The mistake being made in both cases was that these 
"laws of nature" were in fact basic, limiting principles 
which could and indeed had to be altered or rejected.
In the case of physics, quantum physics has now 
thoroughly established itself as the driving force in 
modern physical science.
This is not yet the case for psychology, but there 
are very strong signs that 'behaviourism1 is breaking down. 
Certainly, for the first time in its history it finds 
itself in a defensive position, with many of its adherents 
now at least willing to broaden its scope and range of 
concepts.
Just as research in 'biofeedback' (the conscious 
control and use of autonomic responses) has begun to re­
introduce the concept of 'will* into the language of 
psychology, so too has the reacceptance of cognitive psychology 
into the general framework of psychology re-introduced the 
concepts of 'mind' and 'consciousness'.
Cognition, although it is a word often employed by 
modern psychology, is very difficult to define. It is 
concerned with memory, concept formation, problem solving 
strategies, sensory experience and so on. In general, it 
is concerned with the direct awareness of one's internal 
and external environment. It is also a system of 
representations.
We all "know" what cognition is, but it seems 
impossible to find an adequate language to describe the 
cumulative interdependence of its various facets.
There is also, at present, the lack of any 
appropriate model to account for the processes by which 
cognition functions.
It is the aim of this thesis to show the inter­
relation between paranormal phenomena and the cognitive
processes in the hope that by doing so a clearer under­
standing of both will emerge.
The term we have employed to account for this inter­
relation - binary cognition - is both useful and misleading.
It is useful because it makes relatively clear what the 
subject matter of this thesis will be concerned with - 
namely, the existence of two cognitive systems which can be
termed normal cognition (or cognition proper) and 
paranormal cognition.
It is misleading because our aim will be to show that 
both systems can best be studied and understood i£ they are 
viewed as being different aspects of the same process.
Because of the lack of general scientific interest in 
parapsychology, its theories and its experimental observations 
are in the main unknown to most researchers.
It therefore becomes necessary to supply a general 
overview of parapsychological research. As any reader of 
its journals will readily agree, parapsychology deals with
i • •
far more than the specific topics of direct interest to this 
paper. As such, the summary provided is biased towards 
research relevant to cognition.
As,a starting point, we shall briefly look, at the main 
theories of paranormal cognition that have been suggested by 
various researchers.
AN OVERVIEW OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY
AN OVERVIEW OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY
1. PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES
Introduction
In direct contrast to opinions expressed by critics 
that parapsychology is merely a collection of data with 
no cohesive theory around it, there exist in fact a large 
number of theories approaching^from varying viewpoints which 
attempt to give meaning to these collected facts.
In order for a theory to be accepted scientifically 
it must, we believe, fulfil four separate inter-related 
requirements (9):
1. A theory must explain how an event occurs.
2. A theory must explain the purpose of such an event.
3. A theory must provide predictions which can be
experimentally testable.
4. A theory must be able to incorporate (and
possibly re-interpret) within it, previous 
experimentally observed events pertaining to its 
field of inquiry.
While it may be true to say that there is as yet no 
universally accepted theory in parapsychology which is
capable of fulfilling these four requirements, it is also 
true to point out to critics, especially those from the 
human sciences, that there are equally no theories in any 
area of human and animal behaviour such as, for example, 
memory, personality,and perception which would stand up 
to these criteria or which are universally accepted by 
researchers in these fields.
This does not - and by no means, should - stop research 
in these fields and neither should it prevent research in 
parapsychology from being undertaken.
It is the purpose of this section to review the major 
theories of ESP as a preparation for the presentation of 
our own theory.
Philosophical Theories
1. non-Cartesian dualism
Several British and Australian philosophers such as Broad 
(17, 18), Price (156) and Smythies (157) have argued the 
case for ESP from the viewpoint of non-Cartesian dualism.
Cartesian dualism states that the world consists of the 
physical universe extended in space and a number of individual 
minds not extended in space..
Non-Cartesian dualism, instead, suggests that the 
world consists of the physical universe extended in 
physical space and a number of substantive minds 
extended each in a space of its own. Further, the 
totality of each individual consciousness (composed of 
sense-data, images, thoughts and the ego) is located 
in its own space-time system which is a different space 
from that of the physical world.
Substantially, non-Cartesian dualism posits that 
any object is not only manifested in 4-dimensional 
space-time-, as dealt with by physicists, but that it 
also exists on another plane - the mental - which 
although not physical in the conventional sense of the 
word, is nonetheless real, existent and actual, but 
obeying different laws of nature.
Smythies (157) reports that the theory of non-Cartesian 
dualism has two slightly differing versions. Price’s (156) 
theory is that there are no spatial relations between mental 
space and physical space. The relations between these two 
sets of space are causal and temporal, but not spatial. 
Regardless of this, there is a constant flow of information
between the two since
"... the sense-data that represent the external 
world are on one side of the barrier - the ’mind1 
side - and the physical world is on the other".
(157, p. 6)
Price postulates, therefore, that information is carried 
by a non-spatial channel linking these two sides together.
Broad (17, 18), on the other hand, postulates the 
existence of one four-dimensional physical space-time as well 
as a large number of individual "mental" space-times (each 
containing the sense-data, images, thoughts and ego of the 
individual). All together, these form one single n- 
dimensional space-time continuum of which one cross-section 
is physical space-time and other cross-sections are mental 
space-time.
The source of difficulty with non-Cartesian dualism 
is our inability to imagine a non-spatial entity. This is 
because we cannot form a mental image of it; and this is 
because mental images themselves are spatial entities - 
which is the major non-cartesian criticsm of the cartesian 
criteria for distinguishing the mental from the non-mental.
However, this alleged interaction between mind and
brain does become possible to envisage if it is postulated 
that the total human organism extends in an n-dimensional 
space. One section of this space contains his physical 
body and brain; the other contains his sense-data, images, 
thoughts and ego. Thus, the two may be linked simply 
because they are different parts of the same n-dimensional 
system.
Therefore, the theory of non-Cartesian dualism states 
that there are more dimensions in the universe than the ones 
recognised in the conventional 4-dimensional space-time 
system. The acceptance of such a model would allow every 
principle of scientific materialism to remain unaltered 
and at the same time incorporate within it .the existence 
of paranormal phenomena since, in accepting hypothesised 
extra dimensions intersecting in us it becomes possible 
to perceive in ways that are neither spacially nor temporally 
confined.
"Non-Cartesian dualism suggests that one function 
of the brain is to collect in a highly 'poised* 
form (to use Eccles* phrase) a processed model 
of external reality within itself. Between this 
model and the final end product - the sensory 
fields in consciousness - some channel of 
communication must exist .... As a rule, the
input to this channel is via the brain, but on 
occasion, it mean be directly from some external 
object including someone else's brain. The 
sense organs of the physical body, the brain 
and the sensory fields in consciousness may be 
considered to be one single mechanism for the 
transmission of information - logically, a 
representative mechanism no different from, 
television except that it operates in n-space- 
time rather than 4-space-time."
(157, p.11).
The theory of non-Cartesian dualism is highly logical 
and attractive especially in that no existing laws are 
refuted and the postulation of an n-dimensional universe 
rather than a 4-dimensional one would not be very shocking 
to present day physics. Such a theory also allows for 
an immediate reply to the obvious question "But if other 
dimensions exist, why can't I experience them" by stating 
that all experience is translated into and confined to 
terms of the normal physical realm, thus we can never 
directly know of these other realms.
But if one were to ask "Why is man usually confined 
to the 'normal' physical realms?" and "How does the 
translation that non-Cartesian dualism hypothesises take 
place?" then the theory runs into problems.
A refutation of the theory of non-Cartesian dualism 
(as with all 'mentalist1 theories) would be difficult - 
if not impossible. But so would be any confirmation.
The theory leads to no specific predictions and what 
it basically says about paranormal phenomena is that they 
must be explained in terms of relatively unknown, inter­
actions - an assertion which is not especially helpful.
As a theory, it possibly answers the question of 
how paranormal phenomena could logically exist, but it 
fails to answer the question of why these phenomena should 
exist in the first place.
Similarly, while it might be able to accommodate 
paranormal phenomena, it fails to provide any testable 
predictions.
Non-Cartesian dualism is not, therefore, a scientific 
theory but a metaphysical speculation and should be judged 
as such.
2. the 'Advaita Vedanta1 of Shamkara.
Thakur (170) has argued that on the basis of the 
general viewpoint of parapsychologists and psychical
researchers, and on the conclusions drawn by experimentation, 
two basic principles must exist in a philosophical theory 
Of ESP.
Firstly, he argues that due to the positive data 
obtained from animal and plant psi experiments,’ ESP 
must in principle be a UNIVERSAL ability inherited by 
all forms of organic life.
Secondly, ESP must also in principle be a NORMAL or 
natural ability of all forms of life, which one would 
expect an organism to display and employ in coping with 
all the situations it was evolutionarily designed to 
cope with.
Taking up these two principles, Thakur first points 
out that although their acceptance might be emotionally 
difficult, if not impossible, for western men to accept, 
most of the Indian philosophies such as Hinduism,
Buddhism and Jainism, as well as Chinese Taoism include 
within their system of beliefs the possession of a 
soul* by every living creature. Furthermore, he argues 
that even in the west, vitalists like Bergson, Driesch, 
and to some extent, Aristotle have entertained similar 
views. The idea, then, that all organisms have, a mind
* "soul" is regarded by Thakur to be synonymous and, 
hence, interchangeable with "mind" or "psyche".
or psyche is not absurd or unheard of. and it would not 
therefore be reasonable to reject it on purely sentimental 
grounds•
Having discussed the feasibility of the Universality 
and Normality principlesThakur then goes on to find a 
philosophical model in which these principles might exist.
He points out that one of the fundamentals of 
Cartesianism is the belief that
"every mind is unique and distinct from every 
other. It thinks its own thoughts, enjoys or 
suffers its own experiences, and interacts only 
with Its own body. It can acquire some knowledge 
of other bodies (at least, it can hope to) 
through Its senses, but direct (non-inferential) 
knowledge of other minds is not just abnormal or 
exceptional, but impossible".
(170, p. 12)
The Normality principle, which stipulates that 
communication between minds is in principle totally natural, 
is therefore at total odds with Cartesianism, on the basis 
of the "private access" doctrine which is an inevitable 
consequence of Cartesianism. As such, any rejection of
21.
Cartesianism would bring about a rejection of the "private 
access" doctrine. Thakur is unwilling to support this, 
arguing that such a doctrine is now firmly implanted as 
essential to the way we think about minds and mental 
operations and can be said to be embodied in our conceptual 
framework.
Any account of telepathy must, to Thakur at least, 
make some concession to this doctrine. Since a mind can 
only witness (directly) its own thoughts, "for telepathy 
to occur the two ostensibly different minds in 'communication' 
must, in some importance sense, be one". (170, p.13).
Thakur, at this point, states an important paradox 
in telepathy:
"... telepathy demands, on the one hand, that 
there be distinct minds, for otherwise all 
occurrences of so-called telepathy will only 
be cases of introspection or self-analysis.
On the other hand, it demands that these . 
distinct minds can be only apparently distinct, 
for otherwise they cannot communicate or 
interact; and telepathy can then never be 
normal."
(170, p.14)
Thakur finds only one philosophical system whose 
features would allow for telepathy to exist within the 
requirements he has set for it. . This is contained in the 
Advaita Vedanta of Shamkara, the eighth century Indian 
philosopher.
Shamkara speaks of all individual souls (atman) as 
being literally part of one universal soul (Brahman).
Every living creature possesses an atman, but an atman 
without a body will not be an individual. When an atman 
becomes disanbodied, it is 'liberated' and merges into 
the universal soul or Brahman. Brahman is eternal and 
uncreated but impersonal and, as such, cannot act, will 
or desire. It simply i^s and has consciousness and bliss. 
Regardless of the cause of the "splitting" of Brahman into 
individual atmans, one consequence is the embodiment of 
atmans. Bits of Brahman get "trapped" by various bodies 
and thus separate into distinct units, though they are 
all parts of the same soul.
It is clear that Shamkara's system embraces both 
the Universality and Normality principles which are 
regarded by Thakur as being necessary within modern day 
parapsychological research.
With Shamkara's account it also becomes more appropriate
to ask why telepathy does not actually occur all the 
time. The answer, according to Thakur, is that bodies not 
only divide Brahman into many atmans but even 'insulate' 
one individual soul from another. This separation is 
not, however, final. Individual souls attain liberation 
sometimes even when they are embodied. Knowledge by the 
atman of its essential unity with Brahman "renders the 
body impotent in the exercise of its insulating function" 
(170, p.16). The breaking of the barriers imposed by 
the body becomes possible in the final state of 
liberation; but the "breaking" of such barriers for 
short periods can be achieved by the practice of yoga or 
through meditation.
Stating the theory in a partly physicalist model, 
Thakur suggests that:
"It Is as though the soul were, like air, one 
continuous substance 'extending' through the 
universe, parts of which get trapped inside 
enclosures (bodies) which normally do not let 
the outside air in or the inside air out. 
Consequently, 'perturbations' occurring in 
one part of this substance which should in 
principle have reached every other part, do 
not normally succeed in doing so because of
'insulating' function of the bodies. But under 
certain circumstances, the insulating mechanism 
fails, wholly or partly. These, it would seem, 
are the occasions when telepathy actually occurs.’1
(170, p.12)
The appeal of Shamkara's (and Thakur's) theory is 
in its seeming simplicity. However, as Thakur himself 
states, it is difficult for modern western man to 
accept a system of ideas which are at total odds with 
the ideas he has accepted and built his conceptual world 
around, even if it is unreasonable and. irrational for him 
to reject it.
Further, like the non-Cartesian dualism theorists, 
Shamkara's philosophy is impossible to refute but at the 
same time difficult (if not impossible) to prove, due 
to its imaginative but highly unscientific nature.
Certainly, a difficulty with this theory (and to 
some extent with the theory of non-Cartesian dualism) 
is that it provides no clues as to why paranormal 
cognition is 'obtained' only by specific people (or 
atmans) and not by all.
However, it does predict that telepathy would be 
more observable in a meditative state and that meditators
would be more effective telepathists. To some extent, 
these predictions have been shown to be at least partially 
correct by empirical research (see 116).
Biological Theories
1. the theory proposed by Alister Hardy
Hardy has developed the theme of biology and ESP in 
a series of papers which have been published under the 
title The Living Stream and in a paper titled "Biology 
and ESP" which appears in J.R. Smythies1 Science and 
ESP.
Hardy, after having studied the various evidence for 
paranormal phenomena, concluded that the existence of 
telepathy had been established and as such was of most 
importance to biology. He, in fact, saw telepathy as 
a clue to some more fundamental biological principle.
Throughout his papers, Hardy stresses how very close 
man is, in spite of his new qualities, to the rest of the 
animal world. He also points out that we are now in a 
period of evolution which Sir Julian Huxley has termed 
"the new psycho-social stage of evolution". This new.
phase is no longer, proceeding just by the transference 
of the physical genetical material - the hereditary 
genes - but by the handing on and development of ideas.
"Acquired knowledge is continually being passed 
on; at first it was transmitted in speech, then 
in writing, next in printed books and now in 
all manner of new means of communication. It 
is constantly being added to by experience; we 
see emerging a new element in the evolutionary 
stream - the verbal inheritance of acquired 
experience and ideas."
(157i p.145)
Evolution, Hardy argues, has passed into a phase which 
seems to have changed the main system of heredity from.a 
Darwinian to a Lamarckian* one, since, he states, it is 
the body of acquired knowledge handed on from generation 
to generation, always drawing new material from the 
environment as it goes, which is now more important than 
the DNA genetical system.
. Hardy believes that it was the development of language
* Although Lamarckian theory strictly refers to the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics by genetic 
modification, Hardy is referring here (I believe) to the 
effects of changes by the cultural environment on heredity.
which was the leading factor in bringing about the separation 
of man from his animal ancestors. Language gave rise to 
reasoning, the exchange of ideas, and the initiation and 
spread of inventions in the art of tool-making; the growth 
both of these activities and of the new life styles which 
they brought about here, through selection, led to greater 
enlargement of the lobes of the cerebral cortex of the 
brain which are the centres of association. As revolutionary 
as this development has been, there is nothing in it to 
suggest the emergence of ESP as some new faculty in man.
In fact, as has been suggested by many theorists, this may 
have had the reverse effect of repressing a possibly more 
primitive means of telepathic communication in favour of 
the new linguistic method which can transmit more precise 
information.
Hardy further states that it has also been recently 
realised that man, in his emotional aspects, is much closer 
to the rest of the animal world than had been previously 
thought. Polanyi (119) has made an important contribution 
to this thesis by pointing out that there are two kinds of 
human knowledge:
1. Explicit knowledge: that formulated in words,
maps, mathematical formulae, etc.
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and
2. Tacit knowledge: unformulated knowledge, i.e.
the knowledge of what we are 
actually in the act of doing 
before it is expressed in 
words or symbols.
The more primitive forms of human knowledge - those 
which man shares with the animals - are "situated behind the 
barrier of language" (157* p*146). Babies up to 18 months 
of age, when they begin to speak, are not much superior 
to chimpanzees of the same age, nor are adult humans 
distinctly greater in intelligence to many animals so 
long as their minds work unaided by language. Without 
linguistic clues to aid. him, man sees, hears, and feels, 
moves about and explores very much as animals do.
Tolman's thesis that rats use mental maps to find their 
way out of mazes holds true for man - unless he is 
assisted by notes remembered verbally, or sketched out 
in a drawing.
In our tac.it knowledge we are at one with the animals 
or perhaps, as Polanyi suggests, animals1 tacit knowledge 
may even be greater than our own. Explicit knowledge, on 
the other hand, which has resulted from speech and the 
development of men's reasoning mind is what clearly
separates man from animal.
If ESP were then an aspect of tac.it knowledge, there 
should be examples of this phenomenon in animals. Hardy 
points out that the most seemingly obvious example - 
that of the sudden change of direction of a flock of 
birds in flight might possibly, be brought about by some 
form of telepathic communication but that he personally 
believes that it is more likely due to the much faster 
level of reactions that animals have which might appear 
to us to be an instantaneous effect.*
Similarly, the question of homing in birds and 
animals might possibly be due to ESP but it still remains 
an open question and is much more difficult to solve than 
even the perplexing problem of migration.
Hardy does not believe that it is simply as a means 
of communication that a process akin to telepathy may be 
biologically important, but rather that*.
* At the time of his writing these papers, Hardy 
suggested that high, speed cine-cameras might answer 
this cjAestion. Very recently the BBC reported that high 
speed films show that change of direction in birds is 
not instantaneous but brought about by a series of high 
speed cues - as Hardy supposed.
"our ideas on evolution may be altered if 
something akin to telepathy - unconscious 
no doubt -was found to be a factor in moulding 
the patterns of behaviour among members of a 
species. If there was such a non-conscious group 
behaviour plan distributed between and linking 
the individuals of the race, we might find 
ourselves coming back to something like those 
ideas of subconscious racial memory of Samuel 
Butler, but on a group rather than an individual 
basis. If there were such a group habit and 
behaviour pattern it might operate through 
organic selection to modify the course of 
evolution: working through selection acting on 
the gene complex.
A still more important contribution that field 
zoology can make to evolutionary theory is to 
throw more light on the part played by organic 
selection. The gene combinations which are best 
suited to the habits of the animal may tend to 
survive in preference to those which do not give 
such full scope to the animal1s pattern of 
behaviour. This idea of Organic Selection which 
was put forward independently by Baldwin and 
Lloyd Morgan at the turn of the century, has been 
almost forgotten until quite recently. This
possible selection of structural variations by 
habit as opposed to the selection of other 
variations by the environment may indeed be a 
factor of importance. It is in effect similar 
to that postulated by Lamarck but brought about 
on Darwinian lines. External Natural Selection 
must of course be important, but if Organic 
Selection can be shown to be a really significant 
factor, it may well alter our way of looking at 
- evolution as a whole...."
(157, p.151-152)
Organic selection is an important principle in Hardy's 
theme that something akin to telepathy may be a valuable 
biological principle. Being a neo-Datwinian, Hardy 
believes that evolution, on its physical side, is 
brought about by the action of selection upon the ever- 
changing chemical genetical material which each generation 
hands down to the next. However, Hardy believes that there 
is another part of the process which is of equal, or even 
greater importance - the nature of the selective agents 
operating in this process. Natural selection is usually 
seen as an external force either of the physical 
environment or of the animate environment. But in addition 
to this force there is also another selecting force which 
is not external. This is the action of a change of habit
developing within a population of animals, which itself 
becomes a selecting agent. While it is true that change 
of habit is often brought about by changes in the 
external environment, this is not always the case.
Change of habit, as a factor of evolution, was the 
basis of Lamarckian theory. Though Hardy does not
\
believe that change of habit can influence evolution 
through a supposed inheritance of changes in bodily 
structure brought about directly by a greater use of 
some organs or a lesser use of others, he does believe 
that the way a change of habit affects the course of 
evolution is by a particular form of selection: a 
selection of the more suitable combinations of the 
random genetical mutations, but one brought about by the 
behaviour of the animal itself. ,
The ever varying hereditary material, changing through 
continual reassortment and recombination of the genes 
which from time to time undergo random mutations may be 
conveniently referred to as, the "gene complex".
"If a population of animals should change their 
habits then, sooner or later, variations in the 
gene complex will turn up in the population to 
produce small alterations in the animals'
. structure which will make them more efficient in
relation to their new behaviour pattern; these 
more efficient individuals will tend to survive 
rather than the less efficient and so the 
composition of the population will gradually 
change - a change being due initially to a change 
in habit."
(157, p. 153) ■
We can regard this behavioural system as a valid part 
of evolutionary theory as we can actually see new 
behaviour patterns spreading through animal populations 
(e.g. the opening of milk bottles by tits). The possible 
existence of something akin to human telepathy at a sub­
conscious level among animals would be most likely to 
facilitate such a process.
The mechanism whereby new habits do spread through 
populations of animals - especially invertebrate animals - 
is an unsolved problem and one which must be investigated 
experimentally.
Hardy suggests that all members of a species 
subconsciously share a psychic pool of experience by some 
method akin to what we call telepathy. Individual lives, 
animal 'minds1, come and go but this 'psychic stream' of 
a shared behaviour pattern in the living population flows
on in parallel to the flow of the physical DNA material. 
There would be, then, two streams of information - the 
DNA code supplying the varying physical form of the 
organic stream to be acted on by selection, and the 
psychic stream of shared experience.(the subconscious 
'species blueprint') which together with the environment, 
would select those members in the population better able 
to carry on the race•
Hardy*s theory is by his own admission largely 
speculative and as such cannot be seen as a convincing 
argument for the existence of ESP. It is, however, a 
rational attempt to find the explanation of a great number 
of biological and genetical problems (e.g. homology - or the 
resemblances between the limbs of different animals - : 
since homologous organs once seen as similar genes handed 
on from a common ancestor can no longer be considered as 
such due to extensive experimentation and are now known 
to be produced by totally different gene complexes in 
the different species) by the use of a.process whose 
function has been largely a mystery.
■ On its own, Hardy's theory is too vague but it does 
serve as a useful and imaginative guide to both biological 
and psychological speculation. We shall return to it when 
we discuss the "primitve faculty theories" of ESP.
2. the theory proposed by John Randall
In a paper entitled "Psi phenomena and Biological 
Theory" (126), John Randall proposes a biological theory 
of ESP which he himself admits is very close to the old 
theories of Vitalism* - with the difference that 
Vitalistic theories did not have parapsychological 
evidence to back them up.
Randall reiterates Hardy's position that mechanistic
biology leaves too many questions either unanswered or
unanswerable and at the same time largely fails to
account satisfactorily for the origin of life or for its
subsequent developments. He attacks the orthodox view
that all forms of living organisms have arisen as the
result of natural selection acting upon random mutation,
by selecting various examples (sOme identical to Hardy's -
such as homology and animal shapes) which fail to conform
to this view. He also points out that whereas Darwinian
selection accounts for many of the differences between 
.A
varrties of the same species, it cannot account for the 
emergence of entirely new species with a higher degree of 
organisation. While it is within the rights of the 
Darwinian orthodoxy to argue that new species can arise 
through the physical separation of existing ones in that
* Vitalism is the biological doctrine that life originates 
in a vital principle distinct from chemical and other physical 
forces•
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once a population is separated into two by some 
environmental barrier, random mutations and natural 
selection acting separately on each half will eventually 
cause the two to become so unlike they can no longer 
interbreed and therefore become two species, the argument 
fails totally to explain why either of the two should 
show any increase in complexity above that of the original. 
Why should a purely random process - mutation - combined 
with another presumably random process - environmental 
change - lead to a steadily increasing amount of order 
in the living world?
Further, Randall shows how the concept of an overall 
species plan to which new mutations must be made to conform 
within certain limits is the only reasonable conclusion.
He, in agreement with the suggestions made by Whyte (126), 
argues that a process of internal selection - much like 
Hardy*s organic selection - operates on mutated genes long 
before they have a chance to become (paranormally) 
established in the species, so that deleterious genes are 
eliminated or forced to back-mutate, while advantageous 
ones are permitted to survive.
With the twin arguments that (a) mechanistic theory 
fails to account for the origin and evolution of life, and 
(b) that there appears to be some overall plan for the 
development of a species so that minor derivations from the
main line of development are corrected-, Randall turns his 
attention to ESP to see if any connections can be made.
He postulates:
1. That there exists in the universe an 
entity, distinct from matter but capable 
of interacting with it, which he calls 
the psi factor.
2. When interaction with the psi factor is 
not occurring, matter obeys the second law 
of thermodynamics, that is, it does not 
spontaneously organise itself into 
increasingly complex forms.
3. It can be inferred that psi-interaction 
has taken place whenever the information 
content of a physical system shows an 
increase which cannot be attributed to 
chance or to the transfer of information 
(and therefore energy) from another physical 
system.
4. In the beginning of life,, psi-interaction 
took place with the primeval molecules in 
the seas of the cooling earth. These 
molecules had information fed into them by 
the psi-factor, thus leading them to arrange
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themselves in ordered patterns.
5. Throughout evolution, the tendency has
been to produce organisms which are self­
regulating so that the necessity for 
intervention by the psi-factor is reduced 
to a minimum. Nevertheless, psi-interaction 
may possibly occur when a structure is 
required which is so highly improbable as 
to be unlikely to occur by chance.
The exact nature of the entity behind psi phenomena 
remains unspecified by Randall but, as he points out, 
neither do we know the real nature of the electron, or any 
of the other entities of physics but we are able to set 
up equations which describe their interactions with one 
another very precisely. The problem here is that 
Randall has made a point of arguing that the psi-factor 
is not physical in. the same sense as electrons are 
physical and, as such, his argument loses much of its 
conviction.
Once again, the theory described is far-reaching but 
all too vague and open to criticism; yet, at the same time 
pertinent and full of useful insight, although in some 
ways it seems more an argument for the existence of God 
than an explanation of telepathy.
Physical Theories of ESP
It has been argued both by proponents and critics 
of ESP, that psi phenomena cannot be explained by the laws 
of physics. Their main case is that ESP, in order to be 
explained by physics in a situation analogous to radio 
transmission, must be attributed to a physical radiation, 
and that all such physical models break down. The 
arguments for this conclusion are as follows:-
1. the inverse-sguare law
The inverse-square law applies to all forms of 
physical radiation. On the physical radiation theory, 
one should find a marked decline in scoring level as the 
subjects' distance from the source of radiation is increased. 
But all investigations in psychical research are inclined 
to agree that there is no variation between distance and 
scoring level, and successful experiments have been done 
over distances of several hundred miles and. more (103).
If ESP works on the basis of physical radiation, then it does, 
so by violating one of its most established laws.
2. Physical barriers
One would expect that if ESP worked in conjunction 
with radiation theory, some types of physical barriers 
would affect it. The most thorough experiments done in 
this line were made at the Institute of Physiology at
Leningrad by L. Vasiliev (181). Vasiliev had previously 
assumed that ESP must be due to electro-magnetic, 
radiation. To verify this, he enclosed subjects in 
Faraday cages which completely blocked all electro­
magnetic. waves between 1 millimetre and 1 kilometre.
ESP ability was not impaired in the least. On this 
basis, ESP once again did not seem to conform to 
electro-magnetic specifications.
3. Brain Waves
W. Grey Walter (56), one of the leading authorities 
on brain physiology, has written with regard to the 
radiation theory of telepathy that "If we consider the 
largest electrical rhythms of the brain as ... radio- 
signals , we can calculate that they would fall below 
the noise level within a few millimetres from the surface 
of the head”.
(56, p. 87)
Taken together, these three objections seem to 
eliminate the possibility of linking up ESP and electro- / 
magnetic radiation. However, several writers (Mundle (109), 
Dobbs (33), Pozwolski (120) etc.) have pointed to incon­
sistencies within these "laws" which make the connection 
between ESP and electro-magnetic radiation more of a 
possibility, if still an unlikely one.
The inverse-square law has been shown to be 
inconsistent in at least two ways. Firstly, as any ex­
perienced operator of radio transmitters knows, "break­
through" conditions occur sporadically when loud and 
clear signals are picked up over distances far in excess 
of those their transmitters are designed to reach under 
normal conditions. Dobbs (33) reports a published 
article by G.W. Fisk wherein Fisk, being located in 
China with a 50 watt transmitter broadcasting test 
signals of 30 metres, was picked up in Argentina (15,000 
miles away) at a very loud audible strength, while he was 
not heard, at all at his closest station, Chefoo, which 
was 180 miles distant. Secondly, the recently discovered 
process of superconductivity which allows materials to 
transmit equal amounts of electro-magnetic, radiation at 
any distance away from their source has broken down the 
tenets of the inverse-square law substantially.
The second argument, that electric phenomena are 
related to brain activity and as such barriers such as 
a Faraday shield should cut down ESP transmission has 
also been shown to be less strong than it was initially 
thought to be. A Faraday cage is capable of stopping a 
large part of the spectrum of electro-magnetic waves but not 
all of them. !X' or 'Y1 rays or rays hundreds of metres 
long or above, are still capable of being transmitted.
It is very unlikely, however, that they should account for
ESP. On the other hand, Beloff (9) reports that the 
Russian physicist , Kog<an (86) has theorised that low- 
frequency electro-magnetic radiation would be a basis 
for telepathy. Similarly, John Taylor (169) in his 
book Superminds has argued the same case for certain 
hypothetical low-frequency electro-magnetic, radiations 
from the brain or body of the subject which would explain 
the "Geller-effect". Such speculations are, however, 
still highly improbable.
More realistically, perhaps, Pozwolski (120) has 
argued that although Faraday cages are very effective 
for electric fields, they are far less so for magnetic 
fields since when an electro-magnetic, wire crosses a 
conductive medium, the ratio of the electric field to 
the magnetic field becomes very small. Thus, shielding 
of an earthed Faraday cage would offer protection against 
an alternating magnetic field only if the thickness of 
the Faraday cage walls is sufficient or if the material 
is highly permeable. Whether this was so in Vasiliev’s 
experiments is unknown. On the other hand, Pozwolski 
points out that experiments on the human detection of 
water (dowsing) have shown the sensitivity of the human 
body to small vibrations of the magnetic field. This 
effect has been observed both in standing fields and 
alternating fields.
Dobbs (33) has also produced a lengthy argument 
against the physical barrier dictum in which Eccles1 
work (36) plays a large part.
According to Eccles, the cerebral cortex is the 
seat of dynamic spatio-temporal patterns of activity of 
immense complexity and delicacy. He points out that 
there are some ten thousand million neurones in the human 
cerebral cortex, each of which is a node in the network 
whose strands are woven from the numerous processes 
(dendrites and axons) that provide the. multiple synaptic 
contacts. Each of these nodes is the convergent point of 
scores of paths and each in turn projects to scores of 
other nodes. These pathways connect neurones via 
synaptic knobs which are each about one micron (one 
millionth of a metre) in length. These knobs conduct 
to each neurone the discharges from other neurones in the 
network, in synaptic bombardments which take place from 
millisecond to millisecond. Eccles postulated the 
existence of nodes in this vast neuronal network which 
are poised at 'critical levels' of excitability claiming 
that in this condition they function as "detectors" that 
have a sensitivity of a different kind and order from 
that of any physical instrument in relation.to small 
influences.
Dobbs suggests that the kind of influences which might
serve to trigger off a neuronar chain-reaction starting 
in a critically poised neurone as one conceived by 
Eccles could be explained in terms of charges involving 
mathematically 1 imaginary1 energy (imaginary energy like
p
imaginary numbers (i.e. x = -l) is in today's modern 
physical framework an acceptable and, in some cases 
necessary, concept to employ). Now, as Dobbs points out, 
all instruments used for recording, measuring and observing 
give readings directly in terms of changes of state 
involving mathematically real physical energy - not 
mathematically imaginary physical energy.
Dobbs then goes on to theorise that a series of 
experiments should be designed to test the hypothesis 
that general ESP and telepathy in particular is due to 
the stimulation of ordinary particles in the brain 
(critically poised neurones) by patterns of particles 
of imaginary rest mass, which should lead to correlated 
shifts in the phases of the relevant E.E.G. waves of two 
persons in "communication".
Be that as it may, and improbable as a theory of 
imaginary rest mass might seem to people outside the 
field of quantum physics, the second argument against 
the possible physical nature of ESP has been reduced in 
strength.
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The third objection, that electrical brainwaves 
are too weak, has been attacked in rather circumspect 
ways by both Berger (12) and Marshall (98).
Berger, the physiologist who discovered the technique 
of recording brain waves with the electro-encephalograph, 
recognised, like Grey Walter, that electrical charges in 
the brain are too weak to explain telepathy. Berger 
suggested that electrical energy in the agent*s brain 
is transformed into "psychic energy" which can be 
diffused to any distance, passing through obstacles 
without attenuation and that, on reaching the subject's 
brain is there transformed back into electrical energy 
thereby producing neural patterns and experiences 
corresponding to those of the agent. Berger, though he 
spoke of "psychical energy" was not a dualist. Rather, 
he conceived of psychic energy as a form of physical 
energy, interchangeable with the other forms.
Ninian Marshall assumed that all conscious experiences 
are determined by patterns of cortical activity. His 
theory, of ESP suggests that in telepathy, the state of the 
agent's brain affects that of the subject, without there 
being any continuous chain of intervening events or any 
transmission of energy. Instead, he offers a "Hypothesis 
of Resonance" which states that any two substances exert
an influence on each other which tends to make them 
become more alike,. The strength of this influence 
increases with the product of their complexities, and 
decreases with the difference between their patterns.
He labels this hypothetical force 1 the Eidopoic Influence" 
arguing that this influence has hitherto produced 
observable effects only in the form of ESP because the 
brain is by far the most complex structure known but 
predicting that telepathic interaction will be detectable 
between computers if or when computers become sufficiently 
complex.
Though they both meet the third argument against 
a physical theory of ESP, both Berger's and Marshall*s 
theories fail to account for clairvoyance since they assume 
that the source of information in ESP is the brain whereas 
in cases of clairvoyance there is no brain in which the 
relevant information has been recorded. Marshall's theory 
does not seem to be in the least amenable to cover 
clairvoyance, but Berger's could account for it if it 
were postulated that some overlooked form of physical 
’energy is emitted not only by brains but by all physical 
objects - again, a difficult hypothesis to prove.
Physical theories of ESP have arisen then, largely
to discount the arguments that ESP must be some non- 
physical manifestation. None of them, as Beloff (9) 
points out, have gotten beyond the initial question 
of transmission. Rather, they have pointed out the 
possibility (unlikely as it may be to some) that ESP 
can be explained physically. In that, they have 
succeeded with ingenuity and far-reaching speculations 
which unfortunately at this moment in time have failed 
to yield the precise testable predictions which seem to 
be so necessary to an emerging science.
Acausal Theories
Although it may be argued there are no strictly 
causal phenomena, the two theories discussed in this 
* section have been signified as being "acausal" in that 
they approach the problem with the common idea that a 
fundamentally different law than that of causality exists 
and is the guiding factor in ESP phenomena.
1. Kammerer's law of seriality
Paul Kammerer, the Austrian biologist and last great 
Lamarckian, believed in the significance of apparent 
circumstances. He kept a log-book of coincidences he 
either experienced or heard about from the age of 20 to
40. In 1919, he published his theory on the subject 
Das Gesertz der Serie - the law of seriality.
Koestler (84) states that the book contains one 
hundred samples of coincidences which were largely con­
cerned with trivial events. Kammerer believed that 
coincidences tend to come in series and defined a series 
as a "lawful recurrence of the same or similar things and 
events - a recurrence, or clustering in time and space 
whereby the individual members in the sequence - as far 
as can be ascertained by careful analysis - are not 
connected by the same active cause". (84, p. 84)•
Kammerer1s purpose was to.prove that coincidences, 
whether they appear singly or in a series, are manifestations 
of a univeral principle in nature which operates 
"independently from physical causation". (84, p.85).
The first half of Kammerer1s book is devoted to the 
classification of coincidental series. There is their 
typology (numbers, names, etc.) and their morphology (the 
number of successive coincidences, the number of parallel 
coincidences, and the number of shared attributes).
In the second part of the book, Kammerer develops his 
central idea that there exists along with causality an 
acausal principle "which acts selectively on form and
function to bring similar configurations together in 
space and time; it correlates by affinity" (84, p.86).
The means by which this acausal agency enters into the 
causal order of things is unknown as it functions 
outside the known laws of physics.
Being a sceptic of psychical research, Kammerer 
never made an attempt to correlate the law of seriality 
to ESP manifestations. What he did achieve, however, was 
to show in a highly skilful and scientific fashion that 
similar but otherwise independent events do not occur 
at random but tend, instead, to cluster together in 
space and time by virtue of their inherent similarity.
2. Jung's law of sync.hronic.ity .
It was C.G.Jung who took thestep of combining co­
incidental observations with paranormal manifestations.
Jung's interest in the paranormal was not only 
scientific but experiential. In his autobiography 
Memories, Dreams, Reflections, he recounts a large number 
of paranormal experiences which happened throughout his 
life. His Ph.D. treatise in 1900 was entitled "On the 
Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena" 
(77), wherein he argued that mediums entered into trance 
states and communicated words of "personalities" which
were in fact personifications of unconscious and autonomous 
psychic elements. This anticipated his concept of the 
"autonomous complexes" in the unconscious which Jung 
later argued were the most important factors in psychic 
processes. Also of high importance in his treatise was 
the discussion of the compensatory relationship between 
the conscious and the unconscious. Jung observed that:
"the personified complexes which manifested 
themselves in trances compensated for the 
conscious attitude of the medium and aimed 
at a greater completeness of her character".
: (77, p. 79).
Similarly, he concluded that somnambulistic and occult 
phenoma were most frequent in puberty and therefore 
hypothesised that they (occult phenomena) represented 
attempts at character development.
By 1919, Jung's investigations led him to the con­
clusion that:
"beyond the world of the psyche there must lie 
a ' transpsychic. reality' where time and space 
are no longer of absolute but of relative 
validity: what the psyche experiences as past, 
present and future merges "these" into an
unknowable unity of timelessness and what appears 
to consciousness as near and far combines "there" 
into a likewise unknowable spacelessness".
. (72, p. 266)
This 'transpsychic reality' is carried by the 
archetypes. The psychoid (mind-matter) nature of the 
archetype as well as the relativity of time and space in 
the transpsychic reality of the unconscious became key 
factors in Jung's parapsychological investigations.
Their characteristic incompatibility with the laws of 
time, space and causality turned him to the then rising 
branch of physics called quantum mechanics. Through his 
association with Wolfgang Pauli he learned that certain 
"laws" of nature could no longer be ascribed absolute 
validity, but rather, they were to be considered 
statistical statements of probability which held only 
for the realm of "classical" mechanics. In the realms 
of the macro - and micro - scopic., exceptions to the 
laws of causality had to be assumed.
In his parapsychological researches, Jung devoted 
himself largely to causally inexplicable events generally 
summed up as ESP. Through the available literature he 
concluded that ESP manifestations had been recorded in 
the literature and traditions of all countries and ages.
More importantly, the ESP transmitted fact can have taken 
place in the past, is taking place in the present, or will 
take place in the future, but is always perceived as 
"here and now".
He concluded that "the connection of events may in 
certain circumstances be other than causal, and requires 
another principle of exploration".( 77) He called this 
other principle of exploration "synchronidty" and defined 
it as "a coincidence in time of two or more unrelated 
events which have the same or similar meaning" (72, p.511) 
(my italics). Synchronicity then is an empirical concept 
which "stipulates the existence of an intellectually 
necessary principle which could be added as a fourth to 
the triad of space, time and causality". (72, p.511).
Jung uses the term "synchronistic" rather than 
"synchronous" because his term does not mean an astronomical 
simultaneity dependent on clock time, but rather, to the 
inner image (i.e. dream, hunch) by which the past, present 
and future real fact is experienced in the here and now.
Along with time, the "meaning" of the events is 
decisive. Synchronistic phenomena link acausally related 
facts and combine them into a meaningful experience. Such
meaning is not always expressed by the similarity or 
identity of the content (i.e. Jung's example of the 
golden scarab dream reported as a scarab beetle flew 
into his office) nor by the more or less photographic 
repetition or anticipation of an external event by an 
inner event, but rather, it is frequently expressed in 
a symbol. The meaning manifested in acausal synchronistic 
phenomena prompted Jung to postuhte a
"transcendental knowledge independent of 
human will or consciousness. It is an a 
priori, causally inexplicable knowledge of a 
situation which at the time is unknowable"
(72, p.447)
Significantly, Pauli formulated a corresponding 
hypothesis - the postulate of an order of the cosmos 
independent in our arbitrary will. It is a metaphysical 
or an "absolute" order to which both the psyche of the 
knower and the knowledge are subject.
Circumstances which seem to bring about synchronistic 
phenomena seem to occur with greatest frequency within the 
area of archetypal events such as death, danger, sickness, 
etc. Since in archetypal situations man reacts with 
powerful emotion, it seemed to Jung as though emotion itself
favoured such happenings. During, or due to, emotion 
the threshold of consciousness becomes lower and the 
unconscious and its contents, the archetypes, break into 
consciousness and may begin to prevail. Emotions are 
therefore determinant factors in ESP manifestations only 
insofar as they bring the unconscious and the archetype 
to the foreground.
Telepathy must therefore be seen, according to Jung, 
as a synchronistic phenomenon. What happens is the 
duplication of a psychic content - which appears both 
in the sender and the receiver - rather than a 
parallelism of psychic and physical (or real) facts.
From the psychological viewpoint, however, both sender 
and receiver are mere instruments of the archetype and 
of its "orderedness" in space and time.
The fact that synchronistic events are closely linked 
with the unconscious realm of the psyche, or more specifically 
with the archetype, explains their unpredictable nature. 
Regularity and predictability of events are guaranteed only 
where the concepts of space, time and causality have 
absolute validity which is not the case in the border 
area between the conscious and the unconscious. By their 
nonconformity with the law of causality, synchronistic 
phenomena remain exceptional, irregular and unpredictable.
In her summary of Jung's parapsychological research, 
Aniela Jaffe (72) states:
".... we may say that synchronistic phenomena 
point to a background reality which is by 
definition unknowable, i.e. the unconscious.
An unknowable background underlies physical 
phenomena as well. It is, as W. Pauli formulated 
it, a metaphysical order of the cosmos
(72, p. 449)
Jung's theory of synchronicity is in many ways the 
most complex theory of paranormal phenomena thus far 
available. The summary just given is far from complete 
as it fails to report or analyse at length Jung's 
successful experiment on synchronicity and gives only a 
very broad overview of some of his most important concepts 
which are closely associated to synchronistic theory 
allowing it to be a part in Jung's general theory rather 
than as an aside. The problem, of course, lies in the 
metaphysical tone of all of Jung's writing which is at 
total odds with contemporary behaviouristic psychology.
Too much of what Jung writes is scientifically untestable 
and, as such, has been ignored.
Jung's work on synchronicity is rich in ideas and 
outlook, however, and various aspects of it will be taken
up again later in an altered and hopefully more 
scientifically acceptable manner.
Psychoanalytic. Theories
1. Sigmund Freud's theory
Freud's contributions to the problems of para­
psychology were among the first written by any major 
psychologist. Between 1899 and 19 33 he published a total 
of six papers on the subject.
Freud's initial attitude to physical phenomena was 
highly, and emotionally, negative. There is little doubt 
that both Jung and Ferenzci were the prime influences in 
Freud's change of attitude to the question, although in
all his papers Freud was very cautious and selective in
what he said. In recent years, it has come to light that
the sometimes over-cautionary attitude Freud took in his
papers was more due to Ernest Jones' strong influence over 
him with regard to the possible threat that Freud's 
acceptance of psychical phenomena would have on the 
credibility of the psychoanalytic movement than to any 
continuing doubt in Freud's mind that the evidence for 
the existence of psychical phenomena was insufficient.
In his papers, Freud developed the idea that tele­
pathic. perceptions would be prone to distortions brought 
on by unconscious desires (e.g. symbolisation, censorship, 
and defence mechanisms, in general). .
In his New Introductory Lectures, Freud stressed 
the archaic and regressive character of telepathic 
phenomena. He wrote:
"Telepathy may be the.original archaic means 
through which individuals understood one 
another; a means pushed into the background, 
in the course of phylogenetic development, by 
a better method of communication, that is to 
say,, by means perceived by the sensory organs.
But these older methods of communication may 
have survived in the background and may still 
manifest themselves under certain conditions."
(157, p.141)
Freud pointed out that cases of telepathy during 
analysis in which the patient supposedly gained access 
to the therapist's thought revealed the full importance 
of emotional factors in the composition of a telepathic 
incident. These factors are not derived from the conscious
or even the preconscious emotions (i.e. fear, ambition, 
etc.) but are, instead, connected with "deep primitive 
impulses and conflicts" (i.e.: scopophilia, castration- 
complexes, fantasies, etc.). (157, p.257)•
In later years, several psychoanalysts (Fodor (47), 
Servadio (153) etc.) reported their patients’ telepathic 
dreams and fantasies (i.e* dreams which were either pre- 
cognitive or, more often, were instantly recognisable as 
being of direct relevance to the therapist alone) and 
found that the material contained something complementary 
between their patients1 problems and those troubling the 
analyst at the time.
2. J. Ehrenwald's theory of symbiosis •
Ehrenwald turned his attention to early mother-child 
relationships arguing that during the first year of life 
mother and child develop a symbiotic relationship (i.e. 
a physiologically reciprocal dependent relationship between 
two organisms beneficial for both) during which ESP is 
the -main communicative medium.
Ehrenwald points out that the general psychoanalytic . 
consensus is that in the early postpartum phase, the mother’s 
and the .neonate's ego boundaries have not yet been delineated 
such that their respective egos are merged into one - the
baby being a direct extension of his mother's body image. 
The interlocking behavioural attitudes are evidently, 
according to Ehrenwald, a direct continuation of the 
embryo1s and the maternal organisms biological co­
operation.
The question, however, is how does this reciprocity 
and unity maintain itself despite the physical separation 
of mother and child? The child, though vocal, is non­
verbal. His expressive movements are limited; he lacks 
fully functional afferent and efferent neural pathways, 
etc. And yet "the efficiency of interaction between 
mother and baby seems to exceed the limited repetoire 
of whatever conventional signalling code joins them 
together as one functioning whole". (39, p.456).
• Apart from subliminal sensory cues or unconscious 
expressive movements, the usual reply to this fact is 
that instinct or intuition or empathy allows for the 
symbiotic relationship to take place. But in this case, 
at least, such terms are largely metaphorical and seem 
to have been introduced to cover up our lack of under­
standing.
Some contemporary researchers in child development 
(e.g. Thevantien, Brewer, Schaffer) have assumed 'empathy1
to be the intuitive knowledge of. mutual signals, especially 
posture. It is important to note that these researchers 
believe they have discovered something new in pointing 
to the existence of synchrony - and its absence if 
maternal separation occurs.
Ehrenwald introd.uc.es telepathy as the process that 
will allow the preverbal and non-verbal mutual cues 
between mother and child to be understood. As such, 
telepathy can no longer be regarded as some small 
curiosity but rather as an important physiological 
function accounting for the exchange of an infinite 
variety of primitive and proto-messages, preverbal 
instructions .and injunctions. Ehrenwald suggests that 
telepathy is in effect the embryological matrix of 
communication which is later superseded by speech.
It is important to realise that telepathic, 
communication does not normally convey any clear-cut or 
well-defined cognitive content. It conveys distress or 
messages of comfort or reassurance and is simply geared, 
to influencing behaviour.
The implications of a symbiotic model of ESP suggests 
that telepathy can be regarded as a vitally important means 
of early communication "serving the integration and smooth
functioning of the mother-child unit and, thereby, its 
very survival as a viable entity". (39, p.488).
This is particularly true of human beings, whose 
period of dependency is particularly long - taking twice 
as long as apes to reach body growth, although the duration 
of pregnancy is of the same order. The human neonate is 
more completely dependent and helpless at birth than any 
other primate. Similarly, the human infant's sensory- 
motor skills and perceptual functions lag far behind those 
of other animals.
The human child, among all animals, is the most 
dependent on his parents or.parental substitutes. This 
makes the maintenance of proper lines of communication and 
interaction with his social environment (and especially 
with his mother) a vital necessity for him. And yet, 
having an absence of speech, and a deficit of alternative 
means of communication such as a highly developed sense of 
smell or social hormones available to the newborn of other 
species, the human neonate can still engage in rudimentary 
communication with his mother.
Ehrenwald theorises that this is possible through 
telepathy which occurs owing to the continued fusion of 
the maternal with the neonatal ego. Telepathy, then,
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follows the pattern of "intraspsychic. communication 
within one single, psychologically as yet undifferentiated 
personality structure r,('39 , p. 459). With the gradual 
maturation of the child's nervous system and sensory 
organisation and with the passing of the symbiotic phase, 
the child begins to delineate his ego boundaries, and 
gradually begins to speak - setting up a barrier between 
his mental processes and his mother's. As this happens, 
the sharing of psychic processes is no longer necessary 
and, indeed, largely impossible. Telepathy seems counter 
to the process of individuation and separation and, as 
such, must be discarded.
"While it is true that telepathy, like the fetal 
circulation, ceases to be operational as a viable 
means of communication .... (it) does not become 
altogether atrophic and defunctive .... .A fleeting 
tebpathic incident of the 'spontaneous' type may 
make an appearance. It should be noted, however,, 
that if it does so the reactivated function still 
tends to exhibit tell tale signs of its embryological 
origin; it may show all the characteristics of 
Freud’s primary process functioning; of symbolic 
representation; of prelogical, paleological or 
Piaget's preoperational thinking and reasoning".
(39, p. 460)
Viewed within a developmental perspective, ESP 
seems to be an intrinsic feature of the human child's 
ontogeny - a corollary of his prelogical or pre- 
operational thought, Psi phenomena carry the imprint 
of the particular time in the individual's life cycle at 
which they first made their appearance. This accounts 
for their regressive quality and, hence, its frequent 
appearance in a psychoanalytic situation.
Concluding, Ehrenwald hypothesises:
telepathy may have originally been 
little more than a makeshift expedient hit 
upon by the evolutionary process to bail men 
out from a temporary embarrassment in the early 
postnatal phase and from the difficulties 
attending the process of fetalisation. Viewed 
in the light of genetic perspective, telepathy 
and related phenomena are indeed regressive 
features of the human mind".
(39, p.461)
In many ways Ehrenwald's exposition is highly elegant 
and intriguing. Certainly, it contains a number of points 
which this paper will return to and discuss. It also 
suggests a clear experimental prediction that mother-child 
ESP would produce highly significant scores. However, it
suffers from at least three independent difficulties.
Firstly, is its extremely psychoanalytic orientation 
with regard to the ego and its processes which makes its 
acceptability by a great number of non-psychoanalysts highly 
improbable. Secondly, at no point are precognition or 
clairvoyance mentioned or discussed even though the title 
ESP - which encompasses all these phenomena is repeated 
many times. It is possible to incorporate these 
phenomena into Ehrenwald's theory at least to some 
extent, yet he has failed to do so. Lastly, the 
experimental evidence for ESP runs largely contrary to 
Ehrenwald's hypotheses in that the material contained 
therein could only with great difficulty, if at all, be 
shown to contain regressive features which were in some 
way connected to an early symbiotic relationship.
Be that as it may, Ehrenwald*s arguments are of great 
interest and importance and, as shall be seen, provide 
important clues to a, hopefully, more acceptable theory 
Of ESP.
Psychological Theories
1. J.B. Rhine's theory of psi
Although the contribution to parapsychology made by
Rhine and his associates at Duke University is of pivotal 
importance, because of the highly experimental approach 
to psi which Rhine has taken since 19 30 there has not 
been, to the author's knowledge at least, any specific 
theory laid down pertaining to the nature of the phenomena 
under investigation, A large number of specific observations 
have been made regarding the nature of ESP and these have 
been duly noted (see following section), but no clear 
cohesive statement about them seems to have been made. 
Possibly, this is due to the behaviouristic influence 
which runs throughout all of Rhine*s work and which 
possibly has cautioned him not to produce any over­
riding theory or principle until a sufficient amount of 
varying experimental data is available.
Even so, it has been suggested by Rhine in a number 
of his books and papers that ESP ability in man may most 
likely be evolutionary in origin.
For example, in New World of the Mind he writes:
••The results (of ESP experiments) just reviewed 
seem to indicate afresh, that there is being 
dealt with something not localised, not recently 
acquired, not a surface feature, but something 
very basic, something springing from far down 
the stem of psychological origins •••• Psi seems
to involve a submerged order of activity over­
laid by the later developments of evolutionary 
progress”.
(135, p.Ill)
And again, in a more recent paper (138), he writes:
one immediately suspects that the point 
of origin of psi must have been far back in 
evolutionary history, long before man himself 
arrived”
(138, p.116)
Such statements, intriguing as they may be, seem 
unfortunately to be all that Rhine has so far said about 
the nature of ESP. Taken on their own, they make up the 
barest of theories.
2. Carington's association theory
Whately Carington was one of the most original and 
inventive of the British psychical researchers of the 
1940's. It was through his suggestion that Soal stumbled 
on the “displacement effect” (i.e. the tendency for 
subjects to be influenced almost as much by targets that 
come just before or just after the contemporary target
card causing significant scores on all levels). He also 
carried out a series of unique picture drawing experiments 
(23) which formed the springboard of his association theory 
of ESP.
Carington began with the assumption that human minds 
are not completely separate and individual, but that in 
the deeper subconscious strata they become "fused" into 
one.common subconscious. The process of telepathy was 
therefore not in any way a transmission from one mind 
to another since, in his view, all minds were part of 
one and the same group mind. Telepathy, then, was simply 
a diffusion of information from the common subconscious 
to the individual consciousness.
The idea of a "group mind" is of course not a new 
one. It is an ancient.Eastern concept and is also 
featured strongly in Jung's theory of the Collective 
Unconscious, which evolved from the analysis of dreams.
Jung discovered that different peoples from all times, 
races and nations employed the same type of symbolism 
in their dreams to represent the same desires, fears or 
fantasies. Often, the dreamers would not even understand 
the symbol in their dream although it invariably, according 
to Jung, pointed directly to their ailment. Jung and, 
consequently, Carington postulated that there is a level of
the unconscious that transcends:the individual and which 
is common to the whole race, forming a repository for the 
experience of all mankind.
Carington employed the "group mind" idea to explain 
instinctive behaviour. For example, the spider's ability 
to spin a web is generally explained by scientists with 
the argument that there must be within the spider's nervous 
system, some inherited mechanism that guides its web-spinning 
ability. Carington thought that this was implausible since 
a spider will modify its instinctive reactions without prior 
learning to suit particular circumstances and, as a 
consequence, behave as though it had learned the act of 
web-spinning before.
The assumption of a Collective Unconscious was, 
however, only the first step in Carington's theory in 
that he still needed to explain how a telepathic subject 
is able to select from the great mass of material at his 
disposal in the Collective Unconscious the one particular 
thought that the agent is trying to transmit.
Carington explained this by the principfe of association 
of ideas:
"One thought calls up another in the mind because
the two have previously been linked together in
the person's experience, like holidays and the 
sea. In the case of a telepathy experiment in 
which an agent is trying to transmit the idea 
of a particular drawing, this idea is associated 
in the agent's mind with all sorts of related 
matters, such as the situation of the drawing, 
the design of the experiment, the personalities 
taking part and so forth. Some of the associations 
may exist not only in his own mind but also in the 
Group subconsciouso The subject who has the task 
of trying to reproduce the drawing will have 
present in his mind many of the same associations 
as has the agent. Some of these associations, 
being linked through the common subconscious with 
the idea of the target drawing, may cause this 
idea to come into the subject's consciousness.
This is telepathy".
(188, p. 136)
Carington found support for his association theory 
in the observation that telepathy seemed to work best 
between persons who are in close sympathy, and therefore 
had a great number of mental associations in common.
He suggested that experimental work in
telepathy might be enhanced by artificially increasing
the associations common to both sender and receiver by, 
for example, arranging that during the experiment the 5 
sender sits in a room which the receiver knows well.
Once again, however, there are several criticisms 
which can be levelled at the association theory. Firstly, 
once more, it deals with telepathy and ignores the other 
phenomena in ESP. To be fair to Carington, it must be 
noted that he died while in the process of writing a 
book (24) on these other phenomena though no coherent 
theory on them emerges in his notes. Secondly, there is 
as yet no experimental evidence to suggest that increasing 
the associations common to sender and receiver does, in 
fact, increase rates of success, although reported 
spontaneous occurrences within families or during 
psychotherapy add credence to the association theory. 
Thirdly, it is difficult to see how the association theory 
can account for success in rapid card-calling experiments 
in which the target changes every few seconds but the 
"associated ideas" remain more or less constant.
Carington's theory is important for its incorporation 
of the idea of a group mind and for its concept that there 
is no "transmission" of thought, but his actual conception 
of telepathy through common associations has, in his 
exposition of it, only limited applicability.
3# personality theories of psi
There have been in the past years various attempts 
to link ESP scoring patterns with measurements of 
personality and attitude. One such method is to enquire 
into the personality patterns of outstanding subjects.
This has not thus far proved to be profitable as the 
studies have failed to include satisfactorily objective 
personality assessment.
a) the sheep-goat studies
Gertrude Schmeidler's work (148, 149) was in many 
ways a pioneering study of the relationships between 
certain personality factors and ESP. She studied the 
rektionship between subject's belief and disbelief in 
ESP and their rate of ESP scoring. In both individual 
and group tests, "sheep" (believers) scored at significantly 
higher rates than "goats" (disbelievers). This sheep-goat 
dichotomy was used in a number of other studies to separate 
the "hitting" and "missing" subjects. Bhadra (13) 
replicated Schmeidler's experiments successfuly as did a 
number of other.researchers. Some studies, however, 
found no differences between "sheep" and "goat" scores 
(Adcock and Quartermain (l)) while others such as 
Beloff and Bate (8) found that subjects classified as
"super-sheep" (for their high belief in ESP and 
confidence in themselves to obtain high scores) obtained 
significantly lower scores than the other groups of 
subjects.
b) introversion/extraversion and psi
There are two main viewpoints regarding any possible 
interrelation between personality factors and ESP. Due 
to the lack of consistency in findings on the relationship 
between ESP and personality, Rao (130,131) has argued that 
there is probably no intrinsic relationship between ESP 
and personality traits.
"People with certain dispositions may do better 
under one set of circumstances rather than 
another. The standardised testing procedures 
that are currently used in ESP research may 
favour subjects with certain personality 
characteristics as against their opposites".
(10, p.62-63)
On the other hand, Eysenck (45) has argued in favour 
of a theory that assumes a greater .intrinsic relationship. 
Eysenck takes the view that psi is an ancient and primitive 
form of perception and that, therefore, conditions of high 
cortical arousal are unfavourable to it. He then deduces
that extraverts.would do better than introverts on psi 
tests because introverts are in a more habitual state 
of high cortical arousal than extraverts. Several tests 
(see Kanthamani (79, 80, 81, 82)) have shown this 
prediction to be correct.
c) 4-factor interaction and psi
The most successful personality/psi experiments 
to date, however, have been those made by Kanthamani 
and Rao (79, 80, 81, 82). All other tests assumed that 
ESP must be a function of one or another personality 
factor. Kanthamani and Rao, on the other hand., argued 
that ability at ESP could be a function of a number of 
interacting factors. They therefore investigated the 
possibility that a combined personality measure based 
on a number of separate factor scores would provide a 
better predictor of scoring potential than any of them 
singly. They usedCattell' s HSPQ (which is a 14-fac.tor 
personality questionnaire designed for high school 
children) taking, to begin with, the 4 Cattell factors 
that correlated best with the subjects' ESP scores and 
combined them into a single measure. Subjects high on 
this composite scale scored above chance while those low 
on the scale scored below chance. Moreover, they found 
that their new combined measure was a better discrimination
than any of its component measures taken alone. Following 
this, they took another set of Cattell factors and 
produced a composite "neuroticism" scale which proved to 
be an even more successful discrimination - a high score 
on neuroticism with psi hitting. Using another set of 
factors from the HSPQ they then produced a composite 
"extraversion,f scale. The experiments have showed that, 
in general, the extrovert is the psi hitter and the 
introvert the psi misser.
Kathamani and Rao's continuing series of experimentations 
have provided consistent results throughout. Confirmatory 
experiments using different groups of subjects have been 
and continue to be published.
The fact that combined personality measures have 
a greater predictive value than single factors is very . 
important and certainly should be .of use in obtaining more 
orderly results in ESP research. The reasons why an 
extrovert and a non-neurotic should score more highly in 
ESP tests than an introvert and a neurotic are as yet 
unknown. A possible reason discussed as part of the 
theory of binary cognition, will be proposed in a later 
section of this thesis.
The Primitive Communication System Theory
.We have now given an (albeit brief) review of the 
major theories of ESP but one. This final theory is by 
far the most widely accepted and has already appeared 
as a starting point in a number of the previous theories 
discussed.
The primitive communication system theory supposes 
that ESP is a very ancient and primitive form of 
perception possibly antedating cortical developments in 
the course of evolution.
We have already seen that Freud, Ehrenwald, Rhine, 
Eysenck and to some extent, Hardy, have all taken up 
this argument in one form or another in each of their 
theories. Furthermore, a larger number of parapsychological 
investigators would also be in agreement with such a view­
point.
The reasons for this are that a large number of 
experimental and experiential observations into the nature 
of ESP would fit in well with this argument. Further, it 
is one that easily leads to a large number of predictions 
that can be objectively studied.
The assumption that ESP is an archaic precursor to 
language proper immediately leads one to the deduction
that cortical arousal could be considered as a hindrance 
or a disadvantage to ESP, whereas relaxation or cortical 
inhibition might more easily allow for ESP to occur.
The work of a large number of researchers (Thouless (171, 
172), Schmeidler (148, 149), Rao (130, 131)) has provided 
an overwhelming amount of evidence for this argument.
Similarly, electrophysical studies of GSR and EEG- 
alpha activity such as those made by Otani (116) and 
Stanford (162, 163) have furnished further support for 
such a view.
Anthropological studies (103) of spontaneous ESP 
in primitive tribes and Hardy's (60) research on the 
learning behaviour of various species of birds have also 
tended to add to the general validity of this theory.
Lastly, in recent years, parapsychological researchers 
have turned to animal psi (anpsi) experiments because of 
their more experimentally controllable nature and have 
produced a very large number of successful animal ESP 
experiments with cats (150, 129), rats (45), dogs (193), 
gerbils (129) and all types of other animals. This 
experimental evidence has been largely argued to imply that 
ESP phenomena are all associated with some pre-language 
perception.
In connection with this last point, the highly 
controversial research of Cleve Backster (4) on 
"primary perception" in plants, eggs, human sperm, skin 
tissue and all manner of other highly primitive life 
forms has led some proponents of the primitive communication 
system theory to extend their concept of ESP towards a 
"universal" system of communication which man has somehow 
almost totally lost or replaced with language proper.
We shall look at all these observations in more detail 
in the following section, but for the moment this general 
overview of the evidence for the primitive:communication 
system theory will suffice.
Although it must be agreed that a large amount of 
experimental and experiential evidence seems to fit in 
well with such a theory, there are some insurmountable 
problems with it, as Kreitler and Kreitler (88) have 
pointed out.
Firstly, when looking at the communicative potential 
within ESP as compared to the communicative potential of 
the sense organs, ESP would certainly seem to be far superior 
in all ways. Such a viewpoint would then imply that what 
communicative abilities are available to us now are on an 
evolutionarily lower scale than those once available (accordin
to the primitive communication system theory) to us through 
ESP. This argument would then lead to an evolutionarily 
negative statement which would be very difficult to accept.
Secondly, although it may be true to say that ESP 
and normal sense perceptions may not function concomitantly, 
it is certainly not the case that they are mutually 
exclusive to each other - as is implied in the primitive 
communication system theory - and, in fact, they could 
supplement each other with great mutual benefit.
Thirdly, although it is true that anpsi experiments 
have provided strong evidence to suggest that animals 
possess and employ ESP abilities, the results and data from 
these animal experiments have been just as sporadic as in 
human experiments. This would certainly not be. expected 
by the primitive communication system theory which, 
instead, would predict that data collected from anpsi 
experiments would be more overwhelmingly in favour of 
ESP manifestations.
It would seem, therefore, that the primitive 
communication system theory, though by far the most 
productive in terms of experimental predictions and 
connection.of individual experimental evidence, contains 
within it'something fundamentally incorrect.
We would agree with Kreitler and Kreitler (88) when 
they argue that the error lies in this theory*s tacit 
assumption that the purpose of ESP is in its species 
(or even universal) survival value through quick, direct, 
communication. The evidence for such an assumption is, 
perhaps, not as overwhelming as researchers and theorists 
may have assumed.
Summary
We have now reviewed all K£l e \/J\wT theories of ESP. 
Not one of them has proven capable of standing on its 
own as being scientifically acceptable and amenable to 
prediction and experimentation. Each one, however, does 
contain various points and arguments which are of high 
theoretical value.
It is necessary to somehow connect these various 
arguments into a meaningful whole which, hopefully, will 
serve as a solid and useful theory.
Before attempting such, however, we must first look 
at the large number of experimental observations that have 
been made with regard to the nature and workings of ESP.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA COLLECTED ON ESP.
Early Research and Findings
In their initiation, both the American and British 
Societies for Psychical Research were mainly concerned 
with the collection of records of spontaneous cases of 
telepathy and apparitions, the investigation of mediums, 
and crude experimental studies of hypnosis and "thought- 
transference M. The main area of interest to the researchers 
at that time (1880 - 1927) was in the question of the 
survival of life after bodily death.
1. Rhine1s experiments
The first major scientific advance in experimental 
ESP came in 1927 when William McDougall established a 
Parapsychology Laboratory at Duke University and appointed 
J.B. Rhine as its director. Rhine gave parapsychology 
much of the terminology it employs today (including the 
term ESP or extra-sensory perception) and began the first 
of what now seems to be an endless number of standardised 
objective guessing tests usually employing cards with five 
symbols (circle, square, cross, star and two 'wavy* lines) 
which were named Zener cards after their designer. Using 
these cards, Rhine first "established" the experimental
evidence for telepathy (the awareness of another individual1 
thoughts via non-sensory means) by randomising the cards, 
then picking them up one by one and asking the subject to 
guess each time what card he (Rhine) was looking at.
Each Zener pack contained 25 cards, five of each symbol 
giving subjects one chance in five of calling out the 
correct name. Large numbers of "runs" (sets of 25 guesses) 
were collected and subject scores were compared to expected 
chance scores. In some cases various subjects persistently 
scored far above significant chance levels. Rhine argued 
that they were doing so by employing an ESP ability.
Rhine (133) very quickly established also that by 
using card-guessing experiments, the phenomena of 
clairvoyance (the awareness of events or objects by non- 
sensory means) and of precognition (the knowledge of random 
future events) were also experimentally proven to exist.
In the 1940's, Rhine (134) also produced evidence for 
psychokinesis - the influence of thoughts on the movement 
of objects - by similar series of experiments only this 
time employing dice rather than zener cards.
Although much of the criticism first levelled at 
Rhine (see section of critique of ESP p. 120) was totally 
unjustified, it is fair to say that at least some of his
early experiments were not as well controlled as one 
would today expect. However, the independent research 
of parapsychologists in universities all over the world 
using highly controlled experiments usually involving 
automated machinery for data collecting and randomisation 
of targets have reproduced time and time again all four 
of Rhine's phenomena.
The general conclusions reached by investigators of 
these phenomena were that many subjects could identify 
cards or influence the fall of dice at much higher rates 
than could be accounted for by the laws of chance - for 
short periods of time, and that a small number of 
individuals could identify cards or influence the fall of 
dice at very highly significant levels above those of the 
laws of chance for extended periods of time. It is 
important to note that of the two most famous of these 
latter subjects, Hubert Pearce was very frightened of his 
ESP abilities, and Basil Shackleton was convinced he 
possessed "powers" which he could put to use at race­
tracks and elsewhere.
Rhine also attempted various early experiments with 
drugs (133)* On three separate subjects he used a 
sedative, sodium amytal , in doses large enough to make 
them drowsy. He discovered that the scoring level in 
all cases dropped strikingly. On the other hand, large
doses of caffeine - a stimulant - had the effect of 
bringing back their scores to high levels. This finding, 
however, has never received independent confirmation.
2. Soal1 s experiments
At the same time as Rhine, Soal (159, 160). in England 
was following up W. Carington1s suggestion to study the 
so-called "displacement effect" which Carington had 
discovered in his drawing experiments. The displacement 
effect is not so much a displacement of aim from one 
target to another, but rather, as West (188) calls it,
"a scatter effect". The importance of it is that it is 
a temporal displacement of correct targets, both forwards 
and backwards in time. In Soal's tests with Shackleton, 
it was discovered that Shackleton consistently persisted 
in displacing his aim one card ahead. Looking at his 
results with this in mind, Soal discovered that Shackleton1 
guessing was at levels of inordinately high significance.
One other effect that was discovered by researchers 
was the falling off of correct hits around the middle 
rather than in the beginning or ending of runs or series 
(141). The earliest tentative explanation for this effect 
was that it represented unconscious negativism on the part
of the subject, that even though consciously the subject 
wished to score correct hits, unconsciously he wanted 
to miss them. This, however, did not fit the evidence 
as, for example, in cases wherein a subject regularly 
scored positively in the first half of the runs of a 
series and negatively in the last half. This 1psi- 
missing' effect was particularly noticeable if the runs 
were relatively long. It was therefore suggested,and 
largely upheld, that when circumstances are less than 
optimal such as the rising up of boredom through too 
many runs, the subject's "orientation" for hitting 
would become unstable or even be entirely lost.
3. summary
The findings of early research in parapsychology 
established the existence.of 4 separate but probably 
inter-related psi abilities: telepathy, clairvoyance, 
precognition and psychokinesis. Some general 
characteristics of the psi process stood out, the most 
revealing of which being the subject's lack of conscious 
control over all types of psi ability. This meant that 
psi occurred unconsciously, which would account for its 
elusive nature. Psi ability was found to be widespread 
and most probably even a specific human capacity instead 
of some rare power confined to a few individuals - though
certainly several people were clearly outstanding in 
their ability to employ psi "powers1 . Two different 
effects, that of "displacement" and of "psi missing" 
were also discovered and it was hoped would lead to 
some psychological interpretations.
The "Reclusive Testing" Period
From 1945 to the mid-1960's parapsychology seemed 
to go through a largely non-theoretical "pure experi­
mentation" period wherein hypotheses were tested and 
data analysed with no control theory at hand, no interest 
in subjective accounts of subject's state at the time of 
testing and very little attempt to correlate the varying 
observations together. I have labelled it "The Reclusive 
Testing" period because of this evident lack in trying to 
piece the findings together. Still, independent or 
"reclusive" as they may be, the findings from this period 
constitute a large body of data on ESP.
1. individual subjects
The first "discovery" made by researchers was that 
"specially-gifted" subjects such as Pearce and Shackleton 
and later Serios seemed to lose their "powers" after 
extended periods and never quite regain them. Pearce
could no longer score above chance levels after he 
received a particularly emotion-provoking letter. 
Shackleton began to "lose" his powers once he discovered 
that the fame he was expecting (or the money) was not 
going to appear. Similarly, Serios, an alcoholic and 
illiterate bellhop who could somehow project his 
thoughts on to exposed film and produce photographs (41) 
began to- lose his powers when all the adverse publicity 
and attempts to prove that he somehow cheated (all, so 
far, unsuccessful) began to upset him emotionally.
Due to these failures, and to the rarity of 
particularly gifted subjects, parapsychological research 
turned to group testing and results.
2. the sheep-goat effect
Among the most important findings were some we have 
already touched upon. Schmeidler's (148) "sheep-goat" 
experiments showed that when there is complete, 
unequivocal rejection of the possibility of ESP in a 
particular situation, ESP scores will be lower than when 
there is no such rejection. Following the success of 
these experiments, she converged this general hypothesis 
with mood or personality factors or general attitude 
which in turn related to ESP scores. A mood of eager, .
but relaxed, participation seemed conducive to ESP 
success whereas reserve seemed associated with scores 
near the chance level; negativism, active withdrawal, 
or dislike seemed associated with scores below the 
chance level. Following this, she confirmed two further 
hypotheses taken from Rorschach tests - that is, that 
socially well-adjusted 'sheep’ would have higher ESP 
scores than poorly adjusted 'sheep1., while socially 
well-adjusted 'goats' would have lower ESP scores than 
poorly adjusted ' goats'. At first, Schmeidler's 
experiments were thought to be the answer to the ever- 
recurring repeatability question (see Critiques of 
Parapsychology p.120) but, unfortunately, this has not 
entirely proven to be the case. What Schmeidler's 
studies did unarguably show was that below-chance scores 
could be as interesting and perhaps as much a clue to the 
nature of ESP as above-chance scores.
3. internal states
In England, Fisk and West (187), at the same time 
found that they could obtain significantly higher scores 
from their subjects when they (the subjects) were in a 
"pleasurableM mood rather than in an "unpleasurable" one.
Similarly, Humphrey (148) found lower ESP scores in
subjects classed as neurotic than in other subjects.
Independent tests from various other researchers 
either attempting to replicate these findings or to 
produce their own often came up with conflicting 
evidence, however.
4. physical effects
In Russia, Vasiliev (l8l) was more interested in 
the physical limitations of ESP.. As we have already 
discussed, he found that there was no change in ESP 
results obtained by subjects in a free atmosphere or 
enclosed in a faraday shield putting a virtual end to 
the "mental radio" idea of telepathy.
Similarly target distance seemed to have no effects 
on telepathic scoring (103), nor did the size of the 
target.(103). And, in a highly controlled experiment, 
Anderson (2) found no significant difference between 
scores for targets selected a few days or a year after 
the subject had called them.
5. drug effects
Experiments employing stimulants such as dexedrine 
(99) were shown to cause bigger scorings than usual in
either above or below chance scoring. A few experiments 
with depressants such as sodium amytal (99) indicated 
that they lowered ESP scores, and a few with 
hallucinogens such as LSD-25 (26) indicated that the 
subject's confidence became higher but his scores did 
not. In short, no physiological changes examined at 
the time caused average ESP scores to rise, but there 
was some indication that when body functions were sub­
normal, ESP scores were lower.
6. unconscious processes
Tart (167) and Dean and Nash (30) found separately 
that unconscious body responses to unknown targets gave 
evidence of ESP and that changes of the autonomic 
nervous system seems to be associated with changes in 
the level of ESP scores.
7. intra-personal effects .
Rao (130) introduced a crucial change in card 
guessing experiments by having subjects make up their 
own series of personal targets. Subjects' scores on these 
"choice targets" were significantly higher than their 
scores on ESP cards. In a follow-up experiment, subjects 
were allowed to make up their own targets as before, but
were not told which set of targets they were using.
Once again, the difference between targets was 
significant, but this time the direction was reversed 
such that scores on ESP cards were higher.
Research by various authors (including Stuart 
(165, 166) and Rice and Townsend (103)) confirmed the 
popular view that ESP occurs more often in close, 
intimate relationships.
8. the Anderson-White studies
Anderson and White (191), between 1956 and 1965 
completed a series of experiments that are arguably 
among the best research performed during this period. 
Their basic hypothesis was that the attitude of teacher 
and pupil towards each other would influence the way the 
pupil behaved in the classroom - and as ESP is a form of 
behaviour, such attitudes would influence classroom ESP 
scores. Their method of obtaining attitudes was by 
confidential questionnaires to find the pupil's attitude 
to their teacher and essentially self-scoring subtle 
questions to find the teacher's attitude to pupils. The 
results show that pupils with highly favourable attitudes 
toward their teachers obtained higher ESP scores than 
pupils with unfavourable ones, and that the teacher's
attitude produces a symmetrical effect, though a somewhat 
weaker one. Several of the later follow-up studies, 
however, gave no significant confirmations although 
varying conditions, as we shall see later, were probably 
the cause.
9. animal psi studies
The final series of important findings from this 
period was the initiation of animal psi - or anpsi - 
experiments. As early as 1929 (132) Rhine had studied 
a "mind-reading" horse called Lady which seemed to give 
correct answers to various questions when one of the 
humans knew it. At first, it was suggested that the 
animal was reacting to slight facial or body movements 
as in a number of other animal cases. In this case, 
however, this explanation did not appear to hold, for 
when steps were taken to exclude visual cues, the 
successes continued and the experimenters finally 
concluded that ESP was involved.
In 1952, Osis (113) put cats into T-shaped mazes 
and had human agents "will" them to turn right or left 
according to randomised target orders. The agent was 
enclosed in a cubicle with a one-way window so that he
could not be seen by the cat. . Statistically significant 
results were obtained. This experiment was later re­
designed (114) in order to test for clairvoyance in the 
cat by having the cats determine which pair of cups 
contained food, the target cup being unknown to both 
experimenters present. Electric fans were used to have 
air flow over the cups always away from the direction 
of approach so that the cats could not locate the target 
cup by smell. There was also a mild electric shock as 
punishment for failure. Once again, statistically 
significant results were obtained.
Wood and Cadoret (193), conducted a set of highly 
imaginative psi experiments with a mongrel dog named 
'Chris'. The dog had been taught to answer numerical 
questions by pawing at his master’s sleeve the required 
number of times. Wood and Cadoret used zener cards; 
converting the five symbols into numbers according to 
a predetermined code. An extensive series of tests 
concluding in a situation where 'Chris' was guessing 
targets correctly even when they were sealed in black 
envelopes and stacked in decks such that none of the 
humans present knew the order of the cards, gave 
results which would, by chance, occur less than once 
in a thousand million experiments. Once again, "animal 
clairvoyance" was the only conclusion that could be 
arrived at.
Attempts', to work with animals smaller than cats and dogs 
such as the work by Richmond (143) on protozoa and that of 
Pratt (132) on pigeons obtained more or less the same 
results.
10. summary
As can be seen, the results obtained from the 
"Reclusive Testing" period are highly varied and devoid 
of any general theoretical background. They are a series 
of more and more well controlled and scientifically 
testable hypotheses which interesting and exciting as 
they may be lack any unifying substance or theory.
Contemporary Research
The major change in the direction of psi research 
since the mid-1960fs has come not from parapsychology, 
but from psychology itself. Due to a varied and large 
number of factors, contemporary psychology has recently 
come to realise that behaviourism, per se, is not capable 
of explaining a large number of data, and that as a 
result the questions of "consciousness" and "mind" are 
once again being re-accepted into mainstream, psychological 
research. The main effect that this re-acceptance has 
had can be seen in the large number of studies involving
"altered states of consciousness". It is not surprising 
that many of the researchers involved in ASC work are 
also parapsychologists. As a result, a great deal of 
data has been collected showing their possible inter- 
relations and inter-dependence. Adrian Parker (116) 
has recently published a valuable summary on this research, 
and it is from it that we shall point to some of the 
major findings in this field.
I* hypnosis and psi
ESP and hypnosis have, in popular belief and 
tradition, always been associated together. It is only 
recently, however, that scientific research in these two 
areas has attempted to study the two effects concomitantly. 
Hypnosis, like ESP, has no generally accepted theory, nor 
is there a known way to measure it physiologically, nor 
is there a definite relationship between personality and 
hypnotic susceptibility (Barber (6)). Just as in ESP 
research, findings in hypnosis after often conflicting 
and contradictory, although hypnotic phenomena are more 
easily accessible and therefore not so open to dispute. 
Reporting on the twelve experimental studies that have 
been made comparing ESP card guessing phenomena in hypnotic 
and waking states, Honorton and Krippner (69) have shown 
that hypnosis does seem to affect ESP. Nine of the 
twelve studies produced significant differences between
waking and hypnotic card guessing success. The studies 
indicate that hypnosis affects the size of deviation 
(ESP magnitude) rather than the sign of deviation (ESP 
direction). It is further suggested from these studies 
that hypnotic increments in ESP deviations cannot be 
"attributable to direct suggestions for high scoring and 
suggestibility is not, in itself, highly correlated with 
extrasensory success". (69, p. 49)
Four further studies by Honorton (69), Krippner (90) 
and Casler (75) have all produced evidence that ESP 
scores under hypnosis are superior to those obtained 
by groups given imagination - motivation instructions, 
thereby showing that it is not the subject's expectation 
of scoring highly that causes the high scores but rather 
some factor in the hypnotic state itself. However, 
subjects who were motivated and told to imagine performed 
better than in their waking states. The remarkable degree 
of consistency in all four of these separate studies is 
almost unique in ESP research and it would seem that 
hypnosis provides one of the few available techniques 
for affecting the level of ESP performance.
As to the nature of the relationship between ESP and 
hypnosis, Ryzl's (147) description of the psi-condusive 
state - that of 'relaxed concentration' is in agreement
with the descriptions reported by high scoring ESP 
subjects. It is important to note, as well, that 
Rhine wrote that many of his high-scoring subjects 
seemed to enter into "trance like states" (133, p.79).
2. mediumship reports
it is also important to recall, that in studies 
with three separate mediums (116, p.55), anecdotal 
responses given by them as to their subjective experience 
describe it as being a "mystical union", a "transcendence 
of the self". One of these mediums, Eileen Garrett, 
believed that her trance was due to auto-hypnosis which 
allowed for ESP ability to emerge. She offered herself 
to a number of psychological studies (which unfortunately 
revealed few obvious physiological changes) and was highly 
articulate in her descriptions though always attesting to 
the fact that the experience was difficult, if not 
impossible, to express in words. As anecdotal evidence, 
these reports bear little scientific, validity, but it is 
interesting to note their correlation to scientific 
findings.
3. dreaming and psi
Dream states have also been traditionally associated
with ESP. Freud and Jung both attested to the ESP content 
of some of their patients' dreams, and Louisa Rhine (140) 
found that dreams accounted for 65% of all spontaneous 
ESP cases reported to her. In many ways the most exciting 
research produced in contemporary parapsychology have 
been the dream studies at the Maimonides Dream Laboratory 
in New York. Departing from traditional' zener cards, 
researchers used famous art pictures as targets since 
their emotional content was more suited as stimulus to 
be incorporated into dreams. The agent, who was located 
in a separate room or building from the sleeping subject, 
concentrated on one of such pictures chosen at random 
from a large pool of cards. The subject's dreams were. 
then monitored by use of .the EO'G-EEG technique so that 
he could be awakened after each dream period and give 
a tape recording of his dream. At the end of the experiment, 
the set of dream records and. target pictures was presented 
in random order to the subjects and to judges who were 
asked to match the two sets. The correspondence was 
then compared statistically. This same methodology (with 
a few incorporations designed to simulate real-life 
experiences such as "acting-out" randomly chosen themes 
by the agents) was used in twelve separate studies (116) 
between 1966 and 1972. As Parker writes:
"The breakdown of their results reveals a
consistency almost unparalleled anywhere 
in parapsychology. Of the twelve projects, 
nine yielded statistical deviations in favour 
of the ESP performance often at a high level 
of significance. Six of the studies were 
replications of some sort and three of these 
were successful".
(116, p. 89)
In evaluation, all that can be truly criticised 
is the early work which employed analyses which may have 
allowed for results to come up by chance but this would 
certainly not account for the continued consistency of 
the findings.
As yet, there have been no repeatable findings by 
other laboratories. Four attempts have been made, two 
of which Parker (116, p. 90) correctly analyses as 
being methodologically weak. All four attempts showed 
insignificant findings although close investigation 
points out some important experimental differences which 
might be the factor.
Honorton and Stump (65) using the same type of art 
picture targets as in the Maimonides studies attempted 
to hypnotically induce clairvoyant dreams in subjects. 
While in hypnosis, subjects were given suggestions to
dream about targets which had been randomly selected 
and concealed in envelopes. They were later asked to 
match their dream descriptions to the batch of targets. 
Subjects were able to do so beyond chance expectation.
Parker (116, p. 95) reports that this experiment 
has been replicated by 4 sets of different researchers - 
once again, a parapsychological rarity.
4. drugs and psi
Research on ESP and psychedelic drugs while not 
necessarily showing that drugs are objectively conducive 
to ESP, shows beyond little doubt that following drug use, 
subjects are more open minded to such phenomena. Because 
of the prohibition of psychedelics, very little research 
has been reported involving LSD or marijuana to induce 
ESP. One of the last such experiments was a pilot 
investigation by Masters and Housten (99). In the first 
part, subjects under LSD attempted.to guess card series 
which their ’guide1 was looking at. Results were far 
below those which would be expected by chance. Subjects 
were described as being bored and poorly motivated. Four 
of these subjects, however, produced very high scores.
They were described as being close friends of the guide, 
and had a high level of empathy with him. In the second
part of the experiment, subjects were given an 'image 
test' in which the 'guide' tried to imagine a scene 
described on a piece of paper and the subject tried 
to experience it* These tests produced an extraordinary 
high level of correspondence by 48 of the 62 subjects.
The remaining 14 subjects were persons not well known 
to the guide and experienced boredom and anxiety through­
out the test although on several occasions they, too, 
appeared to identify correctly "what the guide was 
experiencing even when he was unable to imagine the 
target". (99, p* 138).
Unfortunately, these tests are open to criticism 
in that non-verbal or subliminal forms of communication 
‘ might have been responsible for the scores obtained since 
the guide was often in the same room as the subjects.
5. physiological correlates
a) brain wave's
EEG alpha-rhythmn activity has been associated 
with a state of 'detached awareness' and, as a consequence, 
research exploring the possible relationship between ESP 
and alpha activity has proliferated in the past few years.
Over a dozen studies have thus far been reported but 
their purpose, subject treatment, and methodology have 
varied greatly, as have the types of ESP experiences 
involved, and no coherent data pattern has yet emerged. 
Some studies, Morris (.105), Rao and Feola (131) have 
indicated a positive relationship between alpha 
abundance and ESP. Others (Stanford and Lovin (162), 
Honorton and Carbone (66)) have indicated a negative 
relationship. The most consistent finding thus far 
(Stanford and Stevenson (163)) is that there is an ESP 
related increase in alpha frequency. So far, then, 
some shape and meaning is beginning to emerge but nothing 
conclusive can be stated.
It is important to note that McCreery (100, 101) 
devoted some chapters of his book to the discussion of 
possible EEG patterns that might accompany ESP 
manifestations. He put forward the hypothesis that 
when ESP occurred one should find:
(a) that it was accompanied by a continuous
sequence of alpha waves, and that
(b) there would be a slight increase in the
frequency of the alpha rhythmn.
Both these hypotheses have, at least partially, 
been confirmed by research.
In a review of the current literature on ESP and 
altered States of Consciousness, Honorton (69) offers up 
two "empirical generalisations" that can be made 
concerning the present data:
1. Success in extrasensory tasks will be 
augmented by attenuation of externally 
directed attentive activity.
2. Relatively 'large and rapid shifts in 
state will be associated with enhanced ESP 
performance.
b) subliminal perception
In terms of more 'acceptable' physiological 
correlates of ESP, Bel-off (9) has argued that many of 
the properties which are attributed to subliminal 
perception could equally be attributed to ESP. He takes 
his arguments from Dixon's (32) theory which argues that 
when a stimulus falls below a certain critical level of 
intensity it tends to elicit a response which is not just 
weaker, but qualitatively different from the response 
which it elicits at normal intensities. In other words, 
subliminal perception involves not only a certain amount 
of discrimination in the absence of awareness but a 
different kind of processing mediated by a different set
of brain mechanisms capable of operating in parallel 
with those which mediate ordinary conscious perception.
A'n analogy (though certainly a ‘literal1 one) can be 
made with ESP. Beloff argues that what must first be 
done is to distinguish between ESP that manifests 
itself under two distinct conditions - that of a "forced- 
choice" test (where a guess can only be right or wrong, 
with no question of it being qualitatively similar or 
dissimilar to the target symbol - as in zener card 
experiments), and that of a "free response" test (where 
the task is to reproduce a message or a picture inside 
a sealed opaque envelope, or to say something relevant 
about the owner of some objects). In the forced-choice 
test, the subject has no conscious perceptual experience 
of the target and, often no clue as to whether he is 
right or wrong on any particular trial, successful hits 
coming about only through guessing. This can be compared 
to the effect obtained in a forced-choice situation where 
subliminal stimuli are involved. In a free-response 
task, however, there exists something more akin to 
Dixon's theory of subliminal perception in that results 
of this type of experiment are likely to incorporate 
large numbers of distortions and the subject is likely 
to make plentiful use of images which spring to con­
sciousness spontaneously. This is, of course, reminiscent 
of the 'dream studies' experiments we have discussed
earlier. Beloff suggests then, that there are grounds 
for thinking that as far as the psychodynamic process 
of ESP is concerned, it is similar to subliminal 
perception in that it could be described as perception 
at zero intensity. In connection with this hypothesis, 
Johnson1s (74) demonstration that a connection between 
patterns of ESP scores and his 'defence mechanism1 test 
which utilises pre-conscious perception can be seen to 
fit within this framework. Similarly, Dixon's hypothesis 
that the function of subliminal perception is to enlarge 
the scope of perception, though at a cost in accuracy 
and dependability is very reminiscent of the effects - 
of lack of them - obtained in ESP tasks.
The limitations of such a model are, however, that 
although it helps us< to understand what occurs once 
critical information comes within the range of an 
individual's perceptions, it tells us nothing about how 
contact with that information came to be in the first 
place. In subliminal perception, it is generally accepted 
that "the threshold for nervous excitation will be very 
much lower for a given stimulus than the threshold for 
conscious recognition" (9, p.395), but once appeal to an 
even more minute level of stimulation cannot be made, 
the question becomes difficult to solve.
Taking a similar standpoint, Kreitler and Kreitler (87)
argue that there already exists considerable evidence 
that the human being has limited capacity for dealing 
with incoming stimuli and has, therefore, to undertake 
selection among stimuli on various levels. This problem 
is an especially difficult one, in particular, when 
information is forthcoming from at least two different 
sources or through two different channels at the same 
time. Selection usually implies the ignoring of one 
source of information while concentrating on the other. 
However, evidence now exists indicating that the division 
of attention between two channels is not an "all-or- 
nothing" principle but rather, that the 'ignored' channel 
still receives enough attention so that the subject 
perceives that it contains information that supplements 
that coming in through the attended channel (Trey and 
Weddenburn ;(87)) or that the subject's name is being 
called (Moray (87)).
These observations become relevant once it is 
hypothesised that ESP information is communicated through 
a channel, or channels, different from that through which 
normal (supraliminal and subliminal) exteroceptive and 
interoceptive stimuli are perceived. Such an assumption 
becomes plausible through the observations that ESP 
messages do not fuse with the habitual supraliminal 
information. An acceptance of two separate, non-mingling
channels of information transmission would lead to the 
conclusion that under most conditions, attention.focuses 
mainly on information flowing in through the habitual 
channel, or channels, of perception while the ESP 
channel remains largely unattended. As long as ESP 
messages are in line with information communicated 
through the usual channel of perception, they will have 
no demonstrable effect on behaviour and remain unexploited. 
Similarly, even if no perceptual information is available, 
it may be expected that ESP messages would go mostly 
unattended due to the high noise level produced under 
these situations by chance reactions and unselected 
stimulation for guessing. It may, on the other hand, be 
assumed that enough attention is paid to the ignored ESP 
channel to enable the individual to note a contradiction 
between ESP information and other perceptual information:
"The evocation of attention by a contradiction 
is well attested by the recurrent finding that 
contradictions, disconfirmations of expectations, 
and in general deviations from the habitual and 
familiar trigger the orienting response (Berlyne 
1970; Lynn 1966). However, if the contradiction 
occurs between ESP messages and normal supra­
liminal information, the chances that the ESP 
communication would come through are low, not
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only because of the supraliminal information 
is habitual and of a familiar nature but 
mainly because it is usually stronger and 
more compelling. It follows that when ESP 
messages compete for attention with antagonistic 
messages communicated subliminally, i.e., with 
messages which are of an approximately equal 
strength to the ESP communication, the ESP 
messages enjoy higher chances of being 
discovered, attended to, and even acted upon."
(87, p. 187)
Even if it were claimed that what makes subliminal 
stimulation a viable rival for ESP communication is an 
affinity in nature, quality and atmosphere between the 
two, rather than similar strength (as Beloff argues) 
and that the triggering of attention to ESP is not a 
contrast between communications but, rather, the clash 
between competing response tendencies evoked by these 
communications, Kreitler and Kreitler1s conclusions would 
still hold. The basic, element in their argument, however, 
is that ESP information is attended to when it contrasts 
with other relevant perceptual information which is similar 
to it in strength or in another respect.
6. interpersonal factors
The effects of interpersonal factors in the emergence 
of ESP have also lately received attention. The 
relationship between subject and experimenter, and the 
subject's motivation and interest in the tasks involved 
are now thought of, by a number of researchers, to be 
crucial to ESP success, as well as to an 'ordinary' 
psychology experiment (Rosenthal (146)). The precise 
operation of these effects is largely unknown. Honorton 
(68) has found that even apparently superficial behaviour 
as whether or not experimenters smiled and greeted their 
subjects caBually had a significant effect on scores.
An experiment carried out by West and Fisk (187) suggests 
that the experimenter need not be actually present to 
affect the results he obtains. Rhine himself has pointed 
to the possibility that his success during the 1930's can at 
least partially be attributed to his ability to motivate 
subjects. Expectancy of success is also a contributing 
factor with ESP "believers" usually scoring at significantly 
different levels than "non-believers". Research on dream 
states also gives some support to this viewpoint. Dreams 
do not arise in vacuum but are influenced by previous 
experiences. Tart (.168) has noted how the laboratory 
situation influences not only the dream content but the 
dream process, as well.
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7. intelligence and creativity
Researchers have also recently investigated the 
nature of ESP in relation to intelligence and creativity. 
Brier (16) administered a highly controlled clairvoyance 
experiment with a large number of high I.Q. subjects 
taken from MENSA. He found a highly significant 
(p C. *0.06) negative relationship between the ESP task and 
intelligence, as measured by I.Q. Moss (106) measured 
the ability to employ ESP by groups of 'artists' and 'non- 
artists'# SRe put subjects through a series of well- 
controlled experiments which were of an emotion-provoking 
nature. Results showed that if each pair of subjects 
tested at a time contained at least one artist, significant 
levels of ESP would be measured. If, on the other hand, 
used 'non-artist' pairs of subjects, scores would be 
at chance level.
8# animal experiments
In the area of 'anpsi' experiments, a large number 
of experimenters have turned to animal ESP experiments 
because of their more highly controllable nature. Duval 
and Montredon (35) in 1968 published results of the 
first entirely automated animal precognition experiments. 
A mouse was confined in a cage, the floor of which was 
divided into two halves by a low barrier. Electric
shocks were delivered through the floor of one half of 
the cage or the other by a random number generator while 
a photocell device monitored the movement of the mouse 
each time it jumped the barrier. Recording was automatic 
so that the experiment could be left running even when 
the experimenter was not present. It was found that the 
mice employed all were able to avoid going into the half 
of the cage that was being shocked at a highly significant 
above chance level (p <.001).
Since these experiments, there have been a large 
number of attempts to replicate them. Unfortunately, 
most of these replication experiments can now no longer 
be accepted since the researcher in charge of them was 
discovered to be tampering with the data of one such 
experiment. Although he insisted that he had not changed 
the data in any of the other experiments, these results
r
have been declared invalid.* There are, however, a number 
of other researchers conducting anpsi experiments.
Schmidt (151) has conducted PK experiments with cats (152) 
and cockroaches (152) which produced significant results. 
The Parapsychological Division at the University of 
Utrecht (152) has utilised anpsi research giving positive
* It should be pointed out, especially to ardent critics 
of parapsychology, that it was other research workers in para­
psychology who discovered the guilty researcher and detailed 
information of the event was hastily circulated by the major 
parapsychology journals.
reinforcement to mice in telepathy and clairvoyance 
experiments. Results were marginally significant#
Very recently, Eysenck (45) has conducted a precognitive 
experiment with rats which yielded positively significant 
results# He also observed that differences in the 
strength of electric shock produced differential results - 
the very weak, nonaversive shock causing rats to seek 
out the electric source at significant levels above chance, 
whereas the slightly stronger, nonaversive shack produced 
non-significant results. Eysenck related these findings 
to his arousal hypothesis of psi which we have discussed 
earlier#
Although highly interesting and more liable to 
produce a highly replicable procedure due to 
convenience and control, anpsi experiments have, however, 
as yet not provided any new startling evidence for ESP 
manifestations.
9 * random number generators and psi
Highly controlled and totally automated experiments 
with human beings are also, at present, seen as a likely 
avenue to 'replicable' experiments. Schmidt (151) has 
designed a number of portable binary random number
generator machines which can generate almost ideal 
random sequences by use of electrons emitted by atoms 
of Strontium 90 in radioactive decay. The subject's 
task in such experiments is to try to influence the 
direction taken by a moving light which represents the 
electron's motion on a display panel. A number of 
successful experiments have been reported by Schmidt and 
other researchers; although, as usual, there have been a 
number of failures as well#
10. anthropological studies
Anthropology has also recently provided various 
clues concerning the nature of ESP in man. While the 
vast majority of anthropologists are unwilling to entertain 
the notion that genuine parapsyc.hologic.al events may be . 
occurring in some magical or religious ceremonies, 
several first-hand reports taken in field observations 
have now emerged. Beattie (7) has noted that during his 
participation in a primitive seance, cures of quite 
serious conditions were notuncommon. With reference to 
psychic healers, Jensen (73) concluded that there could, 
be no doubt that some of the healers actually possessed 
paranormal abilities. Firth (46) describes a Tikopia 
case of possession in which the 'spirit' stated he arrived 
to announce the coming of fish; the next morning, a school 
of fish appeared. Similarly, Prince (124) describes how
a West African diviner correctly predicted that one of 
his companions would have a male child one year later.
Such accounts, and others of a similar nature, 
certainly stir one's curiosity, but they cannot be accepted 
as providing any scientific evidence for the reality of 
psi.
There have, however, been various attempts to employ 
rigorous testing by the use of ESP cards with native 
.groups.
The most extensive of such research carried out was 
by Ronald and Lyndon Rose (144). They employed standard 
zener cards and Rose served as agent while his wife 
recorded the subject's verbal calls. Subjects were all 
tested individually. Their first series of tests was 
with several groups of native Australians. Their first 
group consisted of tribalised and de-tribalised Aborigines. 
The de-tribalised group scored at chance levels, while 
the tribal AboriginAs^ obtained statistically significant 
scores. The Roses also tested Maori subjects where, once 
again, highly significant scores were obtained. In Samoa, 
however, no significant results were obtained. It was 
argued, in this case, that the cause was due to the 
repressive efforts of missionaries since 1830 to stamp
out any native beliefs in psychic powers. Interestingly, 
PK tests which the Roses administered were also non­
significant. Rose pointed out that the average native 
did not believe he could influence such phenomena 
as these were the prerogative of the sorcerers.
The reports of such card-guessing experiments offer 
substantiation that evidence for psi abilities can be 
obtained by non-Western societies. Some researchers have 
also raised the question that perhaps parapsychologists 
have chosen the worst of all possible cultures (our own) 
to study such phenomena. If, as Palmer's (103) studies 
indicate, a subject's attitude of belief in ESP is an 
important determinant of his scoring level in an ESP 
task, then they may well be correct.
It is argued by Van de Castle (.179) among others, 
that non-Western societies will display more frequent 
examples of psi because their strong belief in such 
phenomena and because in their societies a greater 
cultural sanction exists for the experience of altered 
states of consciousness.
11. plant studies
Finally, the work done by Cleve Backster (4) on
'primary perception in plants' deserves mention.
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computer-determined 1 termination’ of brine shrimp lives 
located in another section of his laboratory,' claimed to have 
demonstrated that plants were able to perceive - and react 
to life termination. He went on to complete large numbers of 
experiments (none thus far published) using varying types of 
living matter - all of which, he claims, caused plant 
reactions when they were injured or killed. He has demonstrated 
his techniques to universities and interested bodies always 
seemingly, achieving the same phenomena. Attempts at 
replication have met with some success although largely with 
failure. Vogel (183) in a major review of this and related 
research and one of the few people able to replicate 
successfully Backster1s findings argues that human beings are 
the causative agency in the experiments somehow sensitising 
or 'charging' the plant to be receptive of thoughts and 
emotions. Vogel also gives very clear, precise data-on how 
to run such experiments so that hopefully either his point of 
view or Backster's will meet some scientific criterion. 
Regardless of the interpretation, however, it does remain•that 
in a few cases monitoring of GSR activity in plants has 
seemingly produced ESP-type data. The majority of researchers, 
however, who have attempted to replicate Backster's published 
experiment have failed to obtain similar findings. It has 
also been noted that a number of external factors (such as, 
for example, temperature variations, air currents, etc.) were 
possibly not controlled adequately by Backster in his published 
paper.
The results are, however, so intriguing to both the 
interested public and various parapsychological researchers that 
proper experiments on this issue (with Backster's assistance 
and co-operation) would be extremely helpful.
12. summary
It can be seen then, that although contemporary 
research in parapsychology is still varied and dispersed, 
strong attempts are now being made to accommodate the 
large body of data into loose but inter-related frame­
works. The largest portion of such evidence has been 
collected on ESP with relation to altered states of 
consciousness. This research has proven to be the most 
exciting and rewarding to researchers. Similarly, the 
growing body of data being collected on 'anpsi' experiments 
seems to be leading towards a day when even the most 
behaviouristically inclined psychologists will be able 
to replicate ESP experiments. Work on personality, 
empathy, creativity, and intelligence has also produced 
important clues as to the nature of ESP.
Summary of the Overview of the Experimental Data on ESP
In an attempt to summarise the varying findings 
associated with the nature of ESP, the following list of 
'probabilities' has been produced. We believe that the 
following points are the best attested to with regard to 
ESP and, as a result, should be accountable for in any 
theory of ESP.
1. ESP in the varying - but closely related - forms
of telepathy, precognition, and clairvoyance
exists, as does the mental influence over 
matter (PK) although in all cases, such 
phenomena are highly sporadic in nature.
2. The content of ESP information in spontaneous 
cases is usually of a highly emotional nature. 
This is not necessarily so in experimental 
situations, although there seems to be an 
improvement in scores if the experiments are 
conducted under emotion-probing situations.
3. Most subjects tested seem to possess ESP 
ability for a very short and limited duration. 
There are a few highly-gifted subjects whose 
•powers1 tend to wane and eventually disappear 
over a long period of time.
4. These latter subjects have usually been of a 
lower than average I.Q. and/or in a state of 
emotional disorder.
5. Adamant non-believers of ESP ('goats*) tend to 
score at negatively significant levels below 
chance, wher:eas .iie'iiievers'-.-pf-.ESP (‘sheep') tend . 
to score at positively significant above chance 
levels .
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6. 'Displacement1 effects wherein subjects 
anticipated or 'hit' correct targets at earlier 
or later points have been noted, although 
modern research seems to take little account of 
this peculiarity,
7. Similarly, growing boredom or anger with the 
experimental procedure seems to produce a great 
deal of 'psi missing* during the middle of most 
long-run card guessing experiments,
8. Distance and time seem to be no factor in the 
successful appearance of ESP information.
9. Verbal descriptions of the phenomena of ESP 
are very limited although the idea of 'relaxed 
awareness' is usually involved.
10. Dreaming, hypnosis, trance states, alpha-states 
and, to some extent, psychedelic states are all 
conducive to ESP manifestations.
11. Associated with point 10 is.the hypothesis that 
relatively large and rapid shifts in state will 
be associated with enhanced ESP performance.
12. Creative, non-intellectual subjects are usually
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more able to bring about ESP manifestations 
than highly intelligent (by I.Q.) subjects.
13* Empathy between subject and experimenter, as 
well as the subject's level of relaxation and 
his certainty of being able to employ ESP 
powers' tend to add to the number of successful 
scores accumulated.
14. Subjects from primitive tribes are capable
of employing psi abilities sometimes to greater 
effects than Western subjects.
15. The four types of psi phenomena discussed are 
also available to animals, and possibly (although 
experimental evidence is still far from conclusive) 
to plants and simple organisms.
3. MAIN CRITIQUES OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY
Before completing this overview of the major theories 
and observations made in parapsychology, it remains for 
us to look closely at the various critiques and attacks 
made on this field to see if in any of these criticisms 
there exists any salient point which would bring some 
doubt to the conclusions we have thus far reached.
Scientific parapsychology has received a great deal 
of attack from nearly all the sciences, but most especially 
from psychology. In most cases, the underlying reasons 
for these attacks are due to the extremities of 
behaviourism, in its varied appearances, which at first 
could not accept any non-mechanistic or 'nonphysical1 
events in nature and which even now cannot accept any 
except those which it has had to incorporate into its 
system in order for it to continue as a viable theory.
The first and foremost area of early attack centred 
upon Rhine's statistical methods. These objections come 
from psychologists rather than professional mathematicians 
who, when called upon, endorsed Rhine's techniques as a 
body. The issue was ended by a statement from the 
American institute of Mathematical Statistics supporting 
the ESP mathematics.
Following the failure of the initial attack, a 
second major assault was launched on the grounds of 
poor experimental controls of extraneous variables such 
as sensory cues, recording errors and the like* In many 
cases, these criticisms were justified and Rhine set 
about to answer each of them. In relatively few years, 
he produced studies (or could point to other's studies) 
which were virtually foolproof. Whether or not these 
criticisms .were, justified or not, they are relatively 
obsolete with regard to present day techniques and 
totally automated apparatus wherein, in some cases, 
the experimenter is not even present*
A third cause of critical attack on positive ESP 
results was the fact that ESP violates a priori the 
framework of .mechanistic, science in that it cannot be 
explained as consistent with so-called 'natural* laws. 
These 'natural' laws are, however, on close inspection 
merely 'present day’ laws, and the rejection of.such is 
a common scientific endeavour - witness Galileo, 
Copernicus, and Einstein. Furthermore, it would, seem 
to be a treacherous and costly fallacy to draw a priori 
or deductive conclusions from a posteriori or inductive 
data. Such a temptation has, however, been taken by 
even such rational and creative psychologists as 
D.O. Hebb who has stated that he cannot accept the
evidence for ESP - as plentiful as he admits it to be - 
simply because ESP does not make sense to him. The 
lack of any of the objective rationality which is 
supposed to be a cornerstone of science is obviously 
lacking in such viewpoints and, as such, the criticism 
is more on the critics than on parapsychology.
The fourth line of criticism that has been labelled 
is the argument that if there is nothing wrong with the 
evidence, then there must be dishonesty on the part of 
the experimenters. Hansel (59) has even argued that 
even if no cheating were in fact shown, the mere ■ 
possibility of cheating would be enough to disqualify 
any evidence presented. The first part of this criticism 
can be met by pointing to the number and the quality- of 
the experimenters who have produced the results in 
question. Positive findings for ESP come from such a 
large number of researchers representing such a wide 
variety of scientific disciplines that even critics of 
ESP don't take this criticism seriously. In fact, the 
man who most clearly 'launched' this attack,
Professor G.R. Price, has in recent years publicly 
apologised for it and has now accepted the existence 
of ESP. Hansel's criticism cannot be entirely met as 
it can be directed to practically any science and most 
social sciences. It would, however, be a difficult task 
for Hansel to disprove the results of automatic experiments
involving random number generation via radioactive 
material by providing an 'alternative theory' as to 
how such results could be obtained by fraud. To be 
fair to Hansel, most of the criticisms he levelled were 
at early research which to some extent was lacking in 
various not-so-obvious controls. But, as we have 
pointed out, such criticisms would today not even be 
considered. The point to make, however, is that when 
Hansel did launch his criticism, there were in existence 
a very large number of modern experiments reported in the 
major parapsychology and psychology journals that met 
high levels of control and precaution, yet which went 
totally unmentioned.
The fifth criticism levelled at parapsychology is 
that it is merely a series of observations without any 
underlying theory to support them and, therefore, cannot 
be regarded as a science. While it is true to say that 
the general state of parapsychology at present is one 
in which no specific theory is in command or dominates 
the majority viewpoint, it is dishonest to state that 
no theory or theories exist within it. We have discussed 
some of the major theories and although we have argued 
that not one of them can answer all the problems
successfully, a large number of them lead to predictions 
which can be tested experimentally. Certainly, it would 
be foolish to compare the level of theory involved in 
chemistry or physics, for example, with that in para- 
pscyhology. But it would not, on the other hand, be too 
unfair to compare the state of parapsychological theory 
with the various psychological theories in memory, 
perception, cognition, personality and virtually all 
other categories in psychology. In each of these, there 
fails' to exist one general acceptable theory that 
incorporates all the data that has been observed. Rather, 
as in parapsychology, we find a large number of theories 
which give answers to some of the problems encountered 
but fail to offer a solution for all of them. Now no 
one would be so foolhardy as to suggest that, therefore, 
further research in these various areas of psychology 
should no longer seriously be considered until a valid 
underlying theory is available. Both psychology and. 
parapsychology are emerging sciences and, as such, although 
they are not replete of theories, neither can one expect 
a 'total' one at present. Furthermore, in the case of 
parapsychology, it is unfair to say that no underlying 
theory exists. From the very start of experimental para­
psychology, the aim has been to provide scientific 
evidence, in purely behavioural terms, for the existence 
of mind, consciousness, and the many subjective altered 
states of consciousness which man has always experienced
and yet which behaviourism denied.
The final argument against the acceptance of 
parapsychological evidence is the question of 
'replicability1. The argument being 'even if there 
were cases of highly-controlled experiments yielding 
data which would lead to conclusions in favour of ESP 
phenomena, there are as yet no replications of such 
experiments in existence and therefore no such experiments 
can be scientifically acceptable.' This is a very serious 
and valid point and, to some extent, parapsychology does 
fail to meet this requirement. But the question to ask 
here is what is meant by 'replicability'? If we mean 
that there is as yet no experiment in parapsychology which, 
when repeated, will have as its outcome a predictable and 
virtually exact replica of the first experiment, then we 
must agree that parapsychology fails to meet this 
requirement. But, if this is the definition of 
'replicability' that we are in fact employing then, once 
again, it must be pointed out that, similarly, it would 
be fair to say.that no psychology experiment has ever 
truly been replicated. This is because 'replicability' 
as defined above can be applied only to the physical 
sciences. But once one begins to deal in the areas of 
medicine and the.human sciences - especially psychology - 
then the concept of replicability is loosened somewhat 
to mean that an experiment when repeated will have as
its outcome a generally predictable (within a much wider 
range of statistical limits than a physical science 
experiment) result. It is often the case, in psychology 
that authors from differing schools of thought, or even 
within the normal undergraduate experimental demonstrations 
of a 'classic.1 experiment, theoretically replicable 
experiments will yield results highly divergent from 
those predicted. Recently, Rosenthal (146) and his 
associates have made a compelling case for the 
' experimenter-effect' as being a probable reason for 
such totally different sets of data. It becomes clear 
that allowed these two 'aids' - the 'looser' definition 
of replicability, and the experimenter-effect - then 
parapsychology can meet this argument as well, to some 
extent. The large number of successful zener card 
experiments by various researchers from all over the 
world would go some way to fulfilling this requirement.
But more conservatively, we can point to at least three 
different sets of studies which have all been replicated 
by different authors. These are:
1. The 'sheep-goat' effect
2. ESP-hypnosis experiments
3. Precognition in the rodent.
As we have mentioned all of these studies in detail 
earlier, it is unnecessary to discuss them further.
It is also important to consider that the current 
experimenter effect studies have given various clues as 
to the possible reason for the more wide-scale number 
of positive results. It Is interesting to note that 
Hansel mentions an attempt at replicating an experiment 
himself at the University of Manchester. If it can be 
assumed that he wasn't exceptionally optimistic that he 
would obtain positive results, and that neither was his 
one subject (a traditional behaviourist lecturer in 
the department of psychology) then the 'experimenter- 
effect' would predict with relative confidence that 
the data obtained from the experiment would not 
replicate the previous one - which, as Hansel reports, 
is exactly what happened.
ESP as far as can be at present ascertained, is governed 
by the unconscious processes which are not normally under 
voluntary control. Until psychology and parapsychology 
produce techniques which will allow the inducement of 
such processes at will, then the strict criteria of 
repeatability and predictability cannot be met totally 
by parapsychology. There exists, at present, a large set 
of collected data which is inexplicable.by the existing
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framework of knowledge that we have. This/data has 
been given the general name 'ESP1. As scientists, 
it is our duty to work with ths.$£data - not against it - 
to discover the how and what of it - only in doing so 
will we discover the 'if1.
This section.has presented the major arguments 
against the acceptance of data collected as evidence 
for ESP. We have shown that NOKMlof these arguments are 
valid except for the lack of replicability of 
experiments which, we have argued, is at least partially 
met by modern ESP research.
4. SUMMARY
The aim of this section of the thesis has been to 
discuss the validity of the major theories of ESP, to 
describe the major observations that have been made in 
parapsychology, and to put into perspective each of the 
criticisms that have been libelled at parapsychology.
We have found that although most of the theories 
discussed have within them valuable concepts and ideas, 
none of them is capable of explaining all the observations 
collected. Even the most popular general theory - that 
of ESP as a primitive communcation system - fails to stand 
up to all the evidence.
A description of the major observations made in 
parapsychology since the 1930's has given us a table of 
15 specific aspects of ESP that can be generally accepted 
as having been clearly observed and which any theory 
would need to account for.
Finally, all the criticisms levelled at parapsychology - 
except the arguments concerning replication - have been 
considered and declared invalid. Replication, although being 
a partial set-back to the complete acceptance of para­
psychology by the other sciences, has been considered and
various arguments have been raised whiph, if not 
entirely successful in dismissing this criticism 
have at least placed it in the perspective of the human 
sciences.
PARANORMAL COGNITION :
OUTLINE AND HYPOTHESES
PARANORMAL COGNITION: OUTLINE
AND HYPOTHESES 
1. THE CONCEPT OF 'EXTRA-SENSORY1 COGNITION
The main departure being made in this thesis is 
that it suggests that 'ESP phenomena' can be better 
understood if they are seen not as remnants of a 
•primitive universal language or communication system 
but as observable features of our cognitive abilities.
This new emphasis on 'cognition' rather than 
'perception' leads to the generation of a large number 
of new and testable hypotheses and provides the basis for 
a clearer understanding of the function of paranormal 
phenomena observed both spontaneously and in the 
laboratory.
Burt (22) has argued that both parapsychologists 
who have glibly adopted the phrase "extra-sensory 
perception" and the critics who decry it, have yet to 
explain what other simple "sensory" perception they are 
contrasting it with. In most Cases, it would be fair to 
argue that the proper synonym for "sensory perception" 
would be "observation". But it is very important to 
note that "observing" - that is, seeing, touching and.
hearing, and other types of sense-experience are all ’ 
forms of cognition. .
The first point to be made is that there is no 
one form of sense perception but that, in fact, the 
several types of sense-perceptions are fundamentally 
different in nature from one another.
The first division of sensory perception can be 
into two quite broad categories: extra-somatic, perception, 
wherein the percipient seems to himself to be perceiving 
foreign bodies and events; and somaesthetic perception, 
wherein he seems to himself to be perceiving the inside 
of his own body and the processes going on it.
Some psychologists will strongly deny that somaesthetic 
perception does, in fact, exist. We shall, therefore, 
concentrate our attention on extra-somatic perception.
Bread (18) . contributed a highly important analysis 
of extra-somatic, perception, the major points of which will 
now be summarized.
The three most important forms of extra-somatic 
perception are: sight, hearing and touch. It is our argument 
that each of these is fundamentally different from the other.
Sight and,hearing agree with each other but differ
from touch, in .that they.seem to reveal to us objects and 
events • which..are;,located at various distances from our 
bodies.
Hearing differs from:touch, in a way best characterised 
by. example. If I , say ,fI hear the door-bell", I realise 
immediately that this is an elliptical expression in 
that what I am actually hearing is a rhythmic noise 
emanating: from a, certain direction. But when I say "I 
see a door-bell' it ; is not usual to view this phrase as 
an elliptical expressionas I seem to myself to be 
directly and; intuitively .apprehending a remote coloured 
area.which I . take., to. be.,part of the surface of an 
independent.,foreign body..., Even if I were to learn that 
certain rhythmic processes are going on from where the bell 
is which are .causing a disturbance to be .emitted in all 
directions.: from., this,.: centre and that this disturbance 
travels to my body., and produces a visual sensation, the 
situation.will still not present itself to me in that 
way when I am having any experience. In this way, sight 
is similar to touch except for the fact that in one case, 
the objects are perceived, as being remote (sight) yet 
in the..other;(touch)-in contact.
Therefore, hearing and sight are emanative, but 
hearing is projective while sight is ostensibly prehensive.
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Whereas, touch, like sight, is ostensibly prehensive 
but unlike the others, non-emanative.
We must now see whether sight and touch are genuinely, 
as well as ostensibly, prehensive.
An obvious difficulty in arguing that sight is 
genuinely prehensive is the following: light travels 
at a finite velocity. When the light which started 
from a distant star reaches my eyes, the star itself 
has either moved position, changed colour, or blown up.
If sight were genuinely prehensive then the light 
striking my eyes and affecting my brain should allow me 
to directly apprehend the surface of that star as it 
was when the light left it. My act would therefore have 
to bridge a temporal gap of some thousand odd years 
between "the date of its own occurrence and the date 
of existence of its own immediate object" (22, p.31-32).
But the object I am seeing is in all certainty being 
perceived by me as simultaneous with my act of seeing 
it. Visual perception can therefore be seen to be 
ostensibly prehensive but not genuinely so because the 
percipient always seems to himself to be directly 
apprehending the surface of a remote object as it now is 
while at best he is only cognising very indirectly 
certain facts about the emitting source as it formerly 
was.
An important consequence of this conclusion is 
that when two people are looking at the same object, 
though there is no ostensible reason to doubt that 
they are viewing the same things, their visual experiences 
are not prehensions of a common object.
There are three distinguishing factors in tactual 
perception: the awareness of various sensible qualities 
(e.g. hotness, smoothness); the awareness of shape 
and extent; and the experience of active pulling or 
pushing foreign bodies in contact with one*s own, or 
their resistance to pulling or pushing, or being pulled 
or pushed by them. We can call this third factor the 
dynamic experience. It is because of this dynamic factor 
in tactual perception and the systematic way in which 
variations in it are correlated with variations in the 
other two non-dynamical factors that it would seem to 
be highly difficult to deny that tactual perception is 
genuinely prehensive.
We must, however, mention another characteristic which 
touch shares with sight and hearing. This is their common 
transmissive characteristic in that they depend on the 
existence and function of "nerves which connect the 
periphery of the body to the brain and convey disturbances 
at a finite rate inwards and. outwards" (22, p.34). Now,
we must all agree that the occurrence of this characteristic 
in one’s brain is a necessary condition for tactual 
perception to occur. But is this occurrence of such a 
process in one’s brain also the sufficient physical 
condition of my having such an experience? If it is 
sufficient, then one should have the exact same tactual 
experience provided that this process in the brain were 
to occur even if there were no foreign body in contact 
with the skin. If this were so , then tactual perceptions 
would not be genuinely prehensive. It is difficult to 
settle such a question conclusively but it is a'..fact that 
one can dream of struggles with a foreign body though, in 
fact, nothing of the kind is going on. Similarly, one 
can be hypnotised into believing he is struggling with,a 
foreign body when none exists. These facts would 
certainly suggest that even tactual manipulation is not 
genuinely prehensive.
We have argued that when we have the experience of 
hearing, seeing, and touching something, we are not, in 
fact, directly apprehending the foreign body which we say 
we are hearing, touching, or seeing.. This is not to say 
these perceptions are inferred, but rather that though 
one's sense experiences are indirect and mediate they have 
been closely correlated with certain past experiences and 
this correlation has established a persistent system of 
traces and dispositions in one's mind.
We have therefore shown quite conclusively that 
"ordinary"', perception and sense experience are in fact 
forms of cognition.
. The proper question to ask, therefore, is not 
whether extra-sensory "perception" ever occurs but rather 
whether extra-sensory cognition does. The answer to this 
is, without any question, yes.
As Burt (22) points out:
"Pleasure-is not itself a sense-datum nor is it 
a qualification solely of sensory experience.
Logical relations can be directly cognised; but 
they, too, are not forms of sensory experience.
Many psychologists would extend the list, and ' 
include such things as pseudo-perceptions based, on 
processes equivalent to 'unconscious inference'
(e.g. the visual perception of distances and depth), 
and a variety of intuitive apprehensions, such as 
meanings, hunches, insights, the sense of value and 
beauty, and even mystical experiences. Hence, to 
reject any form of extra-sensory cognition merely 
because it is extra-sensory would be just a clumsy 
way of begging the question."
(22, p. 78)
Furthermore, according to Burt, any 
psychologist who accepts the principle of human 
evolution could not possibly view reality as
concepts or theories which are,derived solely from 
sensory experience* Our sense-organs evolved to help 
our species to survive in a particular type of environ­
ment, not to attain reliable knowledge of the universe, 
our nature is to look upon the world as a collection of 
material objects located or moving* in empty spaces; we 
picture or think of them in terms of visual-muscular 
representations, but to argue that this is our only 
basis of obtaining reliable knowledge of the universe 
is not only wrong, it is stupid. For example, most of 
the objects we encounter on our planet carry no electrical 
charge and exhibit no magnetic properties. We have not 
evolved any sense organs for the reception of either 
electricity or magnetism. Yet we know them to exist and 
employ them in highly important and beneficial ways. Yet 
they are both "extra-sensory" properties.
2. EVOLUTION AND COGNITION
From an evolutionary viewpoint, cognition seems to 
have developed in two distinct ways.
Firstly, as a primitive 'species consciousness' as
exemplified in insect communities and much more primitive 
life forms whose survival rests in total and immediate 
group communication and interaction*; and secondly as a 
'specific consciousness' as exemplified in man who as 
far as we know at present is the only animal possessing 
an awareness of 'self* which extends beyond a survival 
instinct. This latter development can be associated with 
the evolution of the brain and the number of functions it 
is able to perform. But in order to allow for 'specific 
consciousness' to evolve the main function that the brain 
has had to carry, out is a limiting or screening-process of 
filtering incoming information which is geared largely to 
'self' interest, awareness and survival.
* A large number of examples can be cited. There are
some colonies of unicellular animals that get together in
large social groups (see Watson (186)), but sponges, for
example, are composed of loosely organised cells. Yet if
one cuts them up and squeezes the pieces through cheese
cloth to separate every cell, the gruel will reorganise
itself so that various functions can be fulfilled. Similarly,
studies of the single celled organism 'Dictyostelium
discoideum* (186) and of social insect communities such as
the harvester ants Atta (186) provide some of the more 
obvious examples.
Why, exactly, we seem to have eschewed 'species 
consciousness' and taken on 'specific consciousness' is 
beyond our present knowledge. All we can really say on . 
the matter is that scientific observation has to some 
extent determined that this choice has taken place. Most 
physiologists, anthropologists, philosophers and 
psychologists would agree, however, that the major and 
most effective weapon of humans and the higher animals 
in their struggle for survival is their greater ability 
to remember, to think about problems and their solutions, 
to anticipate alternative outcomes, to plan actions, and 
therefore, in general, to be free from instincts and habits 
to the extent that they will be able to behave in accordance 
with these new alternatives. Such capabilities would of 
course be unable to function effectively in a 1 species 
consciousness' type community.
Regardless of the choice made, however, both cognitive 
systems can be seen to originate from the same process since 
at the core their purpose is the same - namely, survival.
We would argue that cognition can therefore be seen 
as being 'binary' in that it may be viewed either as a 
case of normal cognition (i.e. internalised, self-related, 
sensory-linked connections) or of paranormal cognition 
(i.e. externalised, species-related, non-sensory 
connections).
3. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND PARANORMAL COGNITION
Introduction
It also seems to be the case that the more capable 
an organism is at making complex internal connections, 
the less likely is the manifestation of external con- 
nections since/organism's consciously directed internal 
behaviour which is of specific survival value necessitates 
'blocking' by the brain's filtering process.
Each human being has a certain potential for complex 
internal connections. The limits to that potential - 
which Hebb (63) has named Intelligence A - are unknown. 
Certainly, we can say that our neurophysiological system 
has evolved in such a way that the general potential we 
have available to us as a species is higher than any other 
species potential.
There are, however, individual differences in the 
actual use of our potential which can also be said to be 
due to a combination of hereditary and environmental 
factors. Therefore, what Hebb calls Intelligence B is the 
representation of the actual amount of use of the potential 
for internal connections that any individual employs.
Unlike Intelligence A, Intelligence B can be measured and 
is in fact usually correlated to I.Q. scores.
According to our hypothesis, one would expect a 
greater occurrence of external connections (i.e. paranormal 
cognition) in:
1. Cultures whose survival depends on 
close-knit, tribal organisation.
2. Subjects in mentally abnormal or sub­
normal states which impede the formation 
of complex internal connections.
3. Subjects in emotionally unbalanced states 
which impede the formation of complex 
internal connections.
We would expect a greater frequency of ESP phenomena 
in tribal cultures because the actual use of their potential 
for individual internalised connections is greatly limited 
due to the specific demands and conditions of tribal life. 
Although very little work has been done on this topic (see 
pages 112-114) what little research has emerged would, be 
in agreement with our hypothesis.
We would also expect a greater frequency of ESP 
phenomena from subjects with low I.Q. scores or subjects 
in 1 altered states' because once again their potential 
for making internalised connections is restricted either 
by hereditary factors or environmental factors, or a 
combination of both> Once again, very little research has
been done on this topic of low I.Q. scores although some 
of what has been done would be in agreement with our 
hypothesis. Research on altered states and ESP would 
also be in agreement.
Thirdly, we would also expect a greater frequency 
of ESP phenomena from subjects in emotionally unbalanced 
states because such states also would not allow for 
complex internal connections to take place very often.
Once again, ’spontaneous' evidence for ESP would certainly 
agree with our hypothesis. Furthermore, most of the 
'famous' subjects of ESP experiments were likely to have 
been in emotionally unbalanced states.
We have made an implicit assumption in our argument 
thus far which must now be made clear. We have assumed 
that the unknown potential for making internalised 
connections is the same for all members of our species. 
There exists no evidence which either supports or denies 
this assumption and, as such, our basis for making it is 
due solely to a biased notion of the equality of man. It 
is an important assumption to make, however, because it 
leads to all the predictions we are making at present.
It also leads to what we consider to be the most 
important predictions for our thesis.
If we assume that all members of our species have the 
same potential for making internalised connections, then 
it would be fair to argue on a general level that the 
majority of our species employs this potential in the 
same general way and to the same general extent. It is 
this assumption that allows us to make distinctions and 
categories of intelligence. It would, also be fair to say 
that before complex internalised connections can be made, 
a whole series of simple (to men at least) internalised 
connections must be learned. Such 'connections* - such 
as the ability to employ language, the development of the 
senses, etc. are common to our species even though they are 
internalised. We would argue that these 'species common' 
internalised connections would not necessarily be blocked 
by the brain from becoming externalised and are, in fact, 
the basis of 'trivial1 ESP occurrences. More importantly, 
we would argue that it is at this maturational state where 
internal connections are being made but are more species 
related than individually related due to their relative 
simplicity and to the necessity for their having been 
learned before more complex internal connections are made 
that we would be able to observe greater manifestations 
of ESP phenomena. To put it simply, we would hypothesise 
that young children would display a higher and more 
controlled ability to employ paranormal cognition than 
would adult subjects.
Piaget and Development
It is advantageous for most child psychologists to 
argue that children mature in progressive stages of 
development. For instance, Freud (50) and Erikson (43) 
have each postulated specific stages of emotional 
development. The most important and far-reaching stage 
theory of development is Piaget's (118). It is unnecessary, 
if not impossible, to go into a detailed study of Piaget's 
theory at this time. But very briefly, it is concerned 
with the intellectual development of man. In it, there 
are four specific stages that each child goes through in 
his intellectual development. These four stages have been 
named in the following ways:
Stage I : The sensory-motor stage
Stage II : The pre-operational stage
Stage III : The concrete operational stage
Stage IV : The formal operational stage
a) The sensory-motor stage
This stage usually covers the first 18 to 24 months 
of life and is itself, composed of 6 sub-stages.
These are, briefly:
1. learning reflexive efficiency
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2. repetition of simple acts for their own sake
3* repetition of responses which produce
interesting results.
4. solving of simple problems
5. trial-and-error experimentation
6. development of a primitive form of 
representation
b) The pre-operational stage
This stage usually covers the ages 2-8 and is composed 
of 2 main sub-stages.
These are, briefly:
1. The pre-conceptual stage which lasts until 
approximately the age of 4 and wherein 
the child begins to construct symbols, use 
language, and indulges in make-believe play 
although he has yet to understand the nature 
of classes and, as such, has not yet produced 
concepts.
2. The intuitive thought stage lasts up to 7-8 
years of age and the child begins to 
conceptualise, elaborate and construct 
representations, thoughts and images. But
he is largely restricted by his own perceptions
and his ability to draw logical conclusions 
is extremely limited.
c) The concrete operational stage
This stage usually covers the ages 9-12 and is
characterised by the implementation of several intellectual 
abilities. These are:
1. Mental representations
2. Conservation
3. Relational terms
4. Class inclusion
5. Serialisation
d) The stage of formal operations
This stage covers intellectual development from the
age of twelve onwards. It is characterised by three main 
new intellectual abilities:
1. the tendency to generate and explore 
systematically all possible solution 
hypotheses and then check each for its 
probable validity.
2. self-conscious deductive thought.
3. higher order operations involving abstract 
rules to solve classes of problems.
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Piaget*s hypothesis is that intelligence is the 
ability to adapt to the environment. The development 
of this ability to adapt passes through a series Of four 
maturational stages which we have just outlined. Within 
each of these stages are various sub-stages such that 
no sharp changes are made, but rather the child develops 
via a steady process. Each major stage is also associated 
with an age range although for Piaget the ages at which 
the stages occur are not of primary importance. All 
children go through the same succession of stages, 
progressing from earlier to later in the same order, but 
the rate of progress varies from child to child. However, 
one can say that, in general, the ages we have outlined 
can be associated with each.stage of development within 
groups of children from a Western society and culture.
Using these stages as a general developmental outline 
we would argue that on the basis of our hypothesis, 
subjects in the sensory-motor and pre-operational stages 
would produce a larger and more controlled number of 
paranormal cognition scores than subjects in successive 
stages. We would also argue, that subjects in the sensory- 
motor stage would show greater ability to employ ‘paranormal 
cognition* than subjects in the pre-operational stage. And 
that, similarly, subjects in the early sub-stages of each 
stage would show more ability than subjects in the later
sub-stages of each developmental stage. In other words, 
paranormal cognition follows a negatively developmental 
pattern.
Maturation
Besides there being a reduction of the employment of 
paranormal cognition due to intellectual development, we 
would also argue that there are physiologically developmental 
(i.e. maturational) changes that also to some extent further 
reduce the availability of paranormal cognition due to the 
overtaking of one phylogenetic skill or structure by another. 
It becomes necessary at this point to demonstrate that the 
replacement or superseding of one phylogenetic skill or 
structure by another is not a viewpoint restricted solely 
to the requirements of this present theory but that rather 
such a process is not uncommon in man's maturation, as is 
in fact apparent in all four of its aspects.
1. skeletonation
At birth, even though the skeleton is in an early 
formative stage, some 21 separate 'bones' are already present 
and identifiable in the hand and wrist. By the time the 
child is 10 years of age, 29 new bones have formed in the 
child's hand and wrist, making a total of 50 separate, 
identifiable bony structures. Ten years later certain of 
bones that were apparent at age 10 are no longer present
as separate entities; they have fused with each other and 
thus have lost their original and individual identity.
The total number of bones in the region is now 29.
Similarly, throughout life, changes are also taking 
place in the shape, the contours and the inner structure 
of the skeleton as bones accommodate to each other and 
fuse'together. Fusion of separate bones in the skull, for 
example, along with other skeletal changes continue into 
old age.
Such changes are qualitative in nature designed to 
fit the ongoing and changing needs of the organism as it 
matures•
Thus, in the process of skeletonation, it can be seen 
that as the human being matures a primitive - yet adequate 
bone structure (in this example, the hand) is replaced by 
more adequate structure which, though it originated from 
the old. structure, is totally new in shape, contours and 
inner structure.
2. endocrination
Of the various glands connected with the endocrine 
system the adrenal gland is of interest to our study.
The largest sub-structure of the gland, the adrenal cortex
nearly completely covers the adrenal medualla which is 
more neurobiological and intimately connected with the 
sympathetic nervous system. The adrenal medulla is 
able to secrete, due to this connection, both adrenalin 
and noradrenalin which are responsible for the sudden 
fantastic bursts of free energy which occur in situations 
of panic.
Adrenalin, though having an enormous survival value 
in physical emergencies is not particularly useful in 
most of the alarming situations which confront modern man. 
These situations require more a cold, rational approach 
rather than a powerful physical response. However, with 
the young, child, adrenalin is extremely important in 
allowing quick manoeuvres out of difficult situations.
A common such situation is when it enables a child to 
extricate himself from tangled bed-clothing and to 
sustain a considerable amount of activity to draw 
attention to an emergency.
Thus we can see that within the endocrinational 
process, a gland such as the adrenal though of vast 
importance to the young child's survival becomes less 
and less important - and in some respects embarrassing - 
to an adult placed under stressful situations.
It is interesting- to note, however, that, though
infrequently emerging'in adults it never entirely disappears • 
as incredible feats of speed or strength will attest.
The function of the adrenal gland then can be seen 
as an example of yet another process which though of 
highly effective survival value to the infant in cases 
of physical emergencies is largely ineffectual to an 
adult plagued with mental emergencies, though it is able 
to appear in situations of great physical stress.
This is not the case with the thymus gland. The 
thymus gland's function is not entirely understood but 
what we do know of it indicates that its abilities lie 
in holding in check the functioning of other glands while 
the glands themselves are maturing. Its usefulness, 
therefore, is completed at about the age of eleven and it 
is virtually non-existent in the adult.
Therefore, in the case of the thymus gland we find 
within.the endocrine system a situation whereby through 
the process of maturation on entire glandular system 
which is of great importance in the early stages of the 
endocrine system being'virtually made non-existent once 
its function is completed - in this particular case the 
functioning of the glands themselves.
3. myelination
. At birth, the overwhelming majority of the motor 
nerve cells are rather small, and comprise of long, thin, 
conducting parts called axons. These nerve fibres are 
very slow in producing action since the transmission of 
the nervous impulse involves a rather cumbersome electro­
chemical change in the composition of the cell wall that 
causes a wave of energy to pass down the cell. These 
cells carry impulses at a slow rate. Similarly, it takes 
an equally long time for the cell to chemically regenerate 
so that it can carry a second pulse. This slow process 
accounts for the infant's responses being so primitive, 
so slow and so generalised.
According to McGraw's (102) theory, the human brain 
has two major divisions: the cerebral dortex and the sub- 
cortical nuclei. The first center - which is the more 
primitive and is dominant at birth is composed of the sub- 
cortical nuclei. These nuclei are primitive nerve centers 
located in the brain stem and spinal trunk as well as in 
the diencephalon area of the brain itself. They are part 
of a vast, complex, autonomic and reflexive network that 
functions in the absence of any voluntary control. All 
of the important functions of the body and most of the 
body reflexes are controlled at birth by these sub-cortical 
centers.
Some of the responses of the newborn (as we shall see 
when we deal with the process of cerebration) appear to be 
valueless to the organism and are perhaps residue of 
prehistoric adaptive mechanisms. These reflexes are 
replaced by equivalent but adaptive responses under the 
control of the cerebral cortex.
Essentially, then, there is a period of time in . 
childhood in which the subcortical centers are dominant, 
a period in which the cortical centers inhibit the sub- 
cortical centers (and thus behaviour patterns are rather 
disorganised) and a final stage in which the cortical 
centers are dominant.
Once again, then, we have seen that in the process of 
myelination as well there occurs a slow but steady replace­
ment of one partially adequate system (in this case control 
of the organism through the subcortical nuclei) by another 
new and more adaptive system (control of the organism 
through the cerebral cortex).
4. cerebration
Several primitive reflex responses - such as the grasp 
reflex, the Babinski reflex and the Moro reflex - seem to 
be primitive automatic reflexes which are replaced by more 
adaptive reflexes once the subcortical centers begin to lose
control of the organism to the higher centers.
a) grasp reflex
The infant’s grasp reflex allows him to grip firmly 
any object laid in his hand. Later, when the use of the 
thumb becomes available, the reflex is modified so that 
the thumb comes into play, adding considerable strength 
to the child’s grip. The grasp reflex is an extremely 
potent automatic response. It follows upon any stimulation 
to the palm of the child’s hand. The grasp reflex 
gradually subsides with maturity, becomes voluntary in 
nature and by 12 months has disappeared. Here again, 
then, we are confronted with replacement of a specific 
reflexive skill by a similar, but more adaptive one.
b) The Babinski reflex
The Babinski reflex is a fanning of the toes in 
response to any stimulation to the sole of the foot. As 
a reflexive response it begins to disappear at four to 
six months of age as neural control shifts from the sub­
cortical nuclei to the cortex. As a reflexive action, 
its immediate value is largely unknown and as such the 
Babinski reflex is considered to be very primitive in 
comparison to some of the young infants other reflexes.
It is interesting to note that in the case of the Babinski 
reflex, its persistence indicates a neurological problem 
which is usually the result of a malfunction in myelination. 
Therefore, its elimination from the maturing child*s repetoire 
is a necessity to his well-being.
c) Moro reflex
An infant responds to loud noises or a sudden loss of 
support with the Moro reflex - a fanning of the arms in a 
more or less clutching fashion while arching the back.
Its survival value can be easily seen as it enables an 
infant carried on either hip of the mother to be caught 
easily. Yet it is a dated response going as far back as 
prehistoric times when infants were perhaps carried from 
tree to tree.
As the child matures, the Moro reflex disappears and 
is replaced by the more adaptive startle reflex of the 
adult. -Within the process of cerebration, then, we have 
seen that at least primitive reflexive skills of some 
adaptive value disappear early in the infant's life and 
are replaced by more adaptive and voluntarily elicited 
skills.
Thus far, then, it has been shown that within the 
four separate yet commonly-linked processes of maturation
in man there is a steady replacement of one phylogenetic 
structure or reflex which is primitive and involuntary a 
more adaptive structure or reflex whose origins lie 
within the first structure or reflex but which is to all 
intents and purposes a new structure or a new skill 
dominated by the voluntary system.
Eidetic Imagery
It is interesting - and of some importance to the 
topic, at hand - to briefly discuss a similar situation in 
which one process is replaced by another: in this, case, 
the disappearance of eidetric imagery and its replacement 
by memory proper.
Eidetic imagery ("photographic memory") is the ability 
to maintain a complete visual image of a picture so that 
when it is taken away the person can describe it in detail. 
Haber and Haber (58) have shown that about 5 to 10 per cent 
of the American population has eidetic imagery in that they 
can "see" in its original colours an image of a picture for 
45 seconds after it is taken away from them and can report 
details on it.
However, research conducted on young schoolchildren 
in American infant and nursery schools (111) has shown 
that eidetic imagery is much more greatly prominent and
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available to children of this age group and may well, in 
fact, be the principal method of memorising employed by 
children three years of age and younger whose language 
resources are not as yet fully adequate. Lending support 
to this theory is the research done by sUpola and Hayden 
(154) on eidetic imagery and mentally retarded Americans. 
Their results showed that the occurrence of eidetic imagery 
in their groups ran at the 20% level - a highly significant 
difference from the normal population level. Similarly, 
Doob’s (34) research on the non-literate Ibo indians of 
eastern Nigeria showed that adults of this tribe have a 
frequency of edietic imagery that is close to 20 per cent. 
Again, Mussen, Conger and Kagan (ill), reporting these 
studies, theorise that higher use of eidetic imagery is 
possibly due to the consequences of inadequate language 
resources and. the tendency to use images as the primary 
unit in converting experience to meaning.
For our own purposes, it can be seen that it seems 
highly likely that eidetic imagery is yet another example 
of a primitive adaptive process (in this case, memorising) 
which is replaced by a more advanced process - memory 
proper.
The Critical Period
It becomes now necessary to introduce in the present
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argument the concept of the critical period.
The critical period refers to the period in maturation 
when the acting out of a new skill or an alteration in the 
skeletal structure is possible and, under normal conditions, 
inevitable. Attempts to elicit a reflex or structure 
before this critical period have only a small, transient 
impact. More importantly, deprivation of such skills or 
structures until the period has passed, results in 
permanent loss of the original skill.
Once again, there are ample numbers of developmental 
examples to prove this point. We shall briefly note three 
such examples: congenital cataracts, the swimming reflex 
and the failure of Project Headstart.
1. congenital cataracts
Von Senden (184) in 1932 studied medical reports 
written about people who were born nearly blind as a 
result of congenital cataracts. These individuals were 
often able to distinguish light from darkness but could 
not differentiate forms. Since some patients who have 
cataracts removed do achieve approximately normal vision 
Von Senden (184), London (95)), these people presumably 
should have been capable of making adequate visual
discriminations after undergoing appropriate surgery.
Yet, interestingly, when their cataracts were removed, 
they remained unable to make certain types of visual 
distinction. The patients could tell that the visual 
field was varied, but could not identify objects, or 
describe their shapes from visual cues. When allowed 
to feel the objects, they were able to identify them 
immediately. Colours were perceived and named accurately 
as soon as colour names were learned. Nevertheless, it 
took many trials for an individual to learn even, so simple 
a difference as that between a square and a triangle.
After learning, if required to make this discrimination 
in a new setting or under new conditions of illumination, 
the individual was again unable to differentiate. There­
fore, despite an apparently adequate visual mechanism, 
many who were studied remained unable to distinguish 
between different persons on a purely visual basis even 
after years of visual experience. Furthermore, some of 
them could not learn to discriminate between objects on 
the basis of their shapes, despite seemingly normal vision. 
Von Senden's findings suggested strongly that many aspects 
of vision were permanently impaired by lack of visual 
experience during a critical period ending somewhere 
about the age of four. Further studies on humans carried 
out by Dennis (31) and London (95) (who reported on 
cataract patients in the U.S.S.R.) both fully support
Von Sender. It would seem likely, then, that even innate 
behaviours cannot be at all adequate in later development 
unless they undergo at least some exercise during a 
critical period.
2. swimming reflex
The swimming reflex, like the Moro reflex and the 
grasp reflex, is a subcortical reflex. It occurs in 
children under 6 months of age and provides the infant 
with the ability to swim without training. The child 
swims head down, and does not breathe except to exhale 
slowly through the mouth. He is highly mobile and is 
capable of keeping water out of his lungs for a rather 
extensive period of time. By the time the child is one 
year old., if the swimming reflex has not been put into 
practice, then the critical period is passed and the 
child, as is sadly so often the case, will drown if he 
accidentally falls into water.
McGraw1s (102) studies illustrated swimming movements 
as a function of age. She trained raters to identify 
reflex swimming movements, disorganised or struggling 
activity, and deliberate or voluntary swimming movements. 
They observed 42 infants from 11 days to two*and-one-half 
years of age, making a total of 445 observations. McGraw
found that reflexive swimming was at its peak at birth 
and then fell off rather steeply until, at 250 days, 
it was almost unobserved; that disorganised, struggling 
activity began to appear reliably at 100 days, reached 
a peak at 175 days and slowly declined through the .two-./' 
and-one-half age limit of her subjects; and that 
deliberate or voluntary movements began to appear at 
about 200 days, reached a peak at 300 days, and remained 
constant for the remaining portion of the study.
Kennedy (83) reports that to make use of the 
swimming reflex it must be done before the child is one 
year old and the sooner the better. He also provides 
evidence that if a child has had experience swimming 
reflexively, he can make a smooth transition to voluntary 
swimming.
3* 1 Project Headstart1
Project Headstart was an American government 
sponsored educational research project designed to allow 
culturally deprived children a chance at better success 
in schools by preparing them in advance for the classroom 
experience and teaching them various concepts and skills 
which a non-culturally deprived child would be expected
to have at his disposal upon entering the educational 
system. The project was prompted by the sadly obvious 
fact that culturally deprived children found great 
difficulty in assimilating themselves into a classroom 
atmosphere .and, because of their lack of basic skills 
and intellectual development, were destined to failure 
right from the first grade. Culturally deprived children 
of the age of five were therefore trained and looked after 
by Project Headstart teachers one full year before actual 
schooling began. When these children were placed in 
schools the following year they made no significant 
advances over their non-Project Headstart peers and 
failed just as dismally. Goldschmidt (53) states that 
at this point it was decided to attempt the project once 
again only this time using children at a younger age 
level - three years of age. These culturally deprived 
children were taken through the various levels of skill 
and language acquisition stages that the average non­
deprived child would be receiving. At the age of five 
they were given the same training as the first Project 
Headstart group. Results after their initial school year 
were dramatically different from the first Project 
Headstart group and there was a very low rate of failure.
Summary
The results from this survey indicate then that 
critical periods are not only limited to biological and 
reflexive skills but play an important part in educational 
and culturally-determined behaviour. In all cases, once 
past the critical period such skills or intellectual 
behaviours are to a large extent, if not totally, lost 
to the individual.
We would argue that the reverse is also true in that 
once old skills or reflexes are replaced by new ones which 
are in some way different to the previous skills or 
reflexes - as in the case of eidetic imagery and the 
various reflexes we discussed earlier - then, once past 
the 1 critical point' where new behaviour takes over from 
old behaviour, the old behaviours are largely lost in 
the original form. Paranormal cognition is to some 
extent dependent on the maturational state of the brain 
and. we would argue that cerebral maturation would also 
to some extent determine the ability to employ paranormal 
cognition. In the case of normal subjects this would imply 
the ability to employ paranormal cognition is to some 
extent lost due solely to cerebral maturation.
4. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF ESP IN CHILDREN
Although there has been seemingly little interest 
or inclination by parapsychology to study ESP phenomena 
in children or young subjects in general, what research 
does exist is of importance and of great relevance to 
our theory in that they provide early confirmatory evidence 
for the present discussion.
Early Studies
Children, have been largely overlooked as subjects 
for large scale experiments. The reasons for this seeming 
lack of interest are unknown, but one would suspect that 
possibilities might be the general association made by 
the public of ESP with the 'occult* - which would not be 
conducive to the involvement of children, the fear that 
if an especially 'gifted' child were found he would be 
harassed and open to all types.of emotional problems by 
the subsequent publicity, and the lack of any researchers 
skilled enough to know the requirements of, and the 
specific problems encountered in, child testing.
As a result, a large number of reported studies on 
child, subjects - such as the Creery sisters, the peasant 
girl, Maria, the Jones boys - have been made because they
were subjects who appeared to be particularly gifted, and 
who happened to be children.
In an early paper, Louisa Rhine (140) mentioned the 
possibility of the relationship between age and ESP but 
did not follow this up with any experiments. Similarly, 
Bond (14.) in 1937 administered a general ESP experiment 
with a group of 4th and 5th grade retarded children. He 
studied 22 retarded children who were given taslcs of 
guessing numbers. He found only four individuals who 
scored significantly above chance levels, but general 
group results were significantly above chance. He was not 
able to find any reliable relation between intelligence 
and scoring ability. He also noted that extra chance 
scores did. not occur when subjects used rational schemes 
to guess or, more oddly, when a subject was absent for 
the day.
The Van Bussed bach Experiments
Van Bus^ hbpwI (174, 175, 176, 177, 178) is the one 
researcher who has worked extensively with children. 
Between 1953 and 1961 he reported the results of five 
separate studies made with primary and secondary school­
children in Holland and in America. His first study dealt 
with 10-12 year old primary school children. He used
guessing cards marked with arithmetical symbols, colours 
and words. Only scores from guesses made from the 
arithmetical symbol cards showed any significant above 
chance levels.
His second experiment involved secondary school 
children and employed their teacher as the * sender*. Results 
obtained were at the expected chance level. In the second 
part of this experiment, he used both primary and secondary 
school children and altered the identity of the sender such 
that it was sometimes their teacher, sometimes a stranger 
and sometimes another pupil. Scores here proved to be 
significantly above chance but this was due largely to the 
scores obtained by the primary school children. The best 
scores obtained by the primary school children as a group 
came when their teacher acted, as sender. Scores in the 
second series were significant enough so that an overall 
positive significance was obtained for both series. It 
was also found that primary school children1s scores were 
significantly higher than secondary school children’s.
Van Busst&ach1 s third experiment was an attempt to 
replicate the data obtained from Dutch children with 5th 
and 6th grade American children. The only difference in 
experimental design was that he had the classroom teacher
concealed in the back of the classroom looking at randomly 
selected cards. Once again, there was an overall 
significance of above-chance scores, even though the older 
children did not score significantly.
His fourth experiment was once again in Holland and 
involved even younger subjects - 1st and 2nd grade school 
children from two separate cities. His overall scores 
were highly significantly above-chance with the first grade 
children scoring significantly higher than the second grade 
children. Van BussO\bach also noted that female subjects 
scored significantly higher than the male subjects. One 
interesting effect was that whereas scores from one city 
were very highly significant, scores from the second city 
were at chance levels. At the time of writing (1959) 
there seemed to be no explanation for this variation. 
However, Van Bussckbach mentions that the test leaders in 
both cities were different people and., therefore,
*experimenter-effect* might be a probable cause of the 
variation of results.
His final experiment involved. American 1st and. 2nd 
grade students. This experiment was divided into two 
halves which took place on two separate occasions. In 
the first half of the experiment, scores obtained were 
highly significantly above chance. In the second half
of the experiment, scores were insignificant. Once again, 
there at first appears to be no probable cause for this 
variation until it becomes clear that the second experiment 
took place during a heavy snow fall and, more importantly, 
on a Saturday - which is generally a holiday for American 
school children..
Therefore, separate studies besides being important 
for their overall significance point to the general trend 
of younger subjects scoring higher than the older subjects. 
It could also be argued that the success obtained in his 
first experiment with the arithmetical symbols alone could 
point to the fact that they were the only symbols which 
might possibly not have been as well cognitively understood.
Other Studies with Children
1. the Anderson and White studies
Contemporary to this research were the Anderson and 
White (191) studies on teacher-pupil attitudes and each 
other and the effect they had on ESP scores. These 
experiments as important as they are were interested more 
in personality variables than in age. In a series of ten 
experiments, four experiments showed a highly significant 
level that if the teacher and pupil liked each other, then.
positive extra-chanc.e scores were obtained, whereas if 
the teacher and pupil relationship was a negative one, 
then insignificant or even negative extra-chance scores 
were obtained. The pupils tested were never younger than 
•in the 5th grade so any age variation studies would already 
be severely limited. A possible reason for the partial 
failure of replication of this research after the first 
two successful experiments might be that while Anderson, 
in the first two studies, was able to create a feeling of 
enthusiastic but relaxed interest in the teachers over the 
experiments, it is uncertain as to whether the later 
experiments were able to do this as well leaving the 
teachers1 attitudes toward the experiment as an uncontrolled 
variable.
2. the Vasse and Vasse experiment
Vasse and Vasse (182) reported on an ESP test they 
gave to French 1st grade school children. They obtained 
some highly significant results for tests given near the 
end of the school year - after the children had got to 
know them and feel relaxed, with them.
3.. the • experiment
Similarly, Louwet^£»45,3 (96) reported on an ESP
experiment given to nursery school children in the 
Netherlands. She studied ten classes of children aged 
between 4 and 6j years of age. The experiment was similar 
to a zener card test except that instead of the 5 zener 
symbols she substituted 5 coloured pictures of toys. The 
children were given fairy tale instructions and the teacher 
acted as sender. The results were at an astoundingly high 
level of significance above chance (p = .000,000,006).
She also found that the females in the groups scored at 
levels of significance greater than those of the males,
4* twin studies
Studies of twins have also employed children and 
adolescents. Kubis and Rouke (93) reported on an investigation 
they made with a number of sets of twins aged between 10 
and 21 years of age. They obtained no significant results 
overall. Unfortunately, no mention was made of any 
differences in the scores obtained by the different age 
groups. Similarly, Nash and Buzby (112) ran an experiment 
involving 11 sets of identical twins and 14 sets of 
fraternal twins, some of whom were adolescents. Once again, 
no significant findings were reported, nor were any possible 
age differences in the scores.
5. individual subject studies
Recent studies by three separate researchers on 
individual child subjects reported the common event of 
extremely high scoring ability dwindling down to no or 
little ability. Schwartz (152) reported on 91 separate 
telepathic phenomena which occurred in a child-parent 
relationship between the child’s ages of 1 and 3r*
These phenomena abruptly ended after this point in time. 
Freeman (49) reported oh a nine year old who showed 
extremely high ESP ability but which after three years 
of experimentation was down to nothing. Banham (5) 
reported on an 8 year old subject who was able to score 
very briefly on ESP tasks for 17 consecutive months but 
then went down to. chance levels and remained there.
6. Randall's experiments
Randall (129) has also recently reported on a series 
of successful ESP and PK tests with three highly gifted 
schoolboys although no ages were given, More interestingly, 
he ran an experiment in GESP and clairvoyance with a large 
group of grammar school subjects, with their teacher as 
the sender. Although the overall deviation was insignificant, 
he found that there were 8 subjects in the class who suffered 
from hay fever throughout the test and that they all obtained
significant GESP scores• A replication of that test 
confirmed the fact that the hay fever sufferers were 
scoring at significant levels above chance* Unfortunately, 
once again, Randall fails to mention their ages.
Summary
Although the number of studies in ESP with children 
and adolescents are far from numerous, the findings that 
have been obtained from them are not in conflict with our 
proposed theory, and, in fact, to some extent support the 
predictions made*
The major set of studies is, of course, van BusstKbach1s 
and his findings that younger subjects score significantly 
higher than older ones are of importance to our own hypothesis
Similarly, the findings by Vasse and Vasse and by 
Lo\m€*£*is strongly indicate that very young subjects tend 
to obtain scores far higher than even the most •gifted1 
adult subjects*
Finally, studies on individual children show that 
high ESP abilities fade away after relatively brief periods 
of time*
These findings are, however, far from sufficient 
adding credence to our hypothesis or in confirming our 
predictions. It is therefore necessary to design a 
series of experiments to study the necessary variables 
in a more controlled and complete fashion.
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5. EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES
We have shown that the overtaking of an adequate 
yet primitive and highly reflexive phylogenetic skill 
or structure with another more evolved skill or structure 
which, even though it may be linked in some way or even 
have had its origins in the old. skill or structure, is 
a totally new system, is not unique to theories of 
1 paranormal phenomena* but is, in fact, a common and 
necessary occurrence in man*s maturational process.
We have also discussed the concept of a * critical 
period* showing that there is a specific time associated 
with the incorporation of a new skill and that if that 
time is passed without the new skill having been introduced, 
then the new skill is largely - if not totally - lost.
We have argued, further, that if the * critical period.* passes 
and the new skill has been introduced in time, then the old 
skill is largely - if not totally - lost. We have, in the 
light of this latter statement, analysed the parapsychological 
data on child ESP experiments and. found, that the evidence, 
although too inconclusive to stand on its own, is in 
agreement with this statement.
Bearing these points in mind, we would hypothesise
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.that:■:
1. Child subjects who have not yet matured to 
the stage of forming complex internalised 
connections (approximately the age of 8 in 
our society) will show a greater tendency
to employ paranormal cognition than subjects 
who have already formed complex internalised 
connections (i.e. subjects older than eight 
years).
2. In keeping with Piaget* s theory of intellectual 
development, the tendency to employ paranormal 
cognition will be inversely proportional to 
intellectual development.
3. It would follow, therefore, that in general 
chronologically younger subjects (up to the 
age of 8) will display a greater tendency to 
employ paranormal cognition.
4. Similarly, it would also follow that subjects 
at lower intelligence levels (as measured by 
I•Q.) will display a greater tendency to 
employ paranormal cognition.
5. In the case of subjects of the same chronological 
age but of differing intelligence levels (as 
measured by I.Q.), those subjects at the lower 
intelligence level will display a greater 
tendency to employ paranormal cognition.
6. In the case of subjects at the same intelligence 
levels but of different chronological age, 
those subjects of the lower chronological age 
will display a greater tendency to employ 
paranormal cognition.
7. The introduction of a normal cognition task 
during a paranormal cognition task will impede 
the employment of paranormal cognition.
8. Following from 7)» the more complex is the 
normal cognition task being introduced, the 
greater the impedence of the employment of 
paranormal cognition.
9. The introduction of a task designed to 'cut 
off' normal cognition during a paranormal 
cognition task will enhance the employment 
of paranormal cognition.
10. Following from 9), the more powerful the 
'cut off’ task, the greater will be the 
employment of paranormal cognition.
The observational studies and experiments designed 
to test these hypotheses appear in the following sections.
THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
1. OUTLINE OF THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
A series of highly controlled studies was conducted 
to test the hypothesis that paranormal cognition is 
negatively developmental, from a chronological viewpoint. 
Large samples of Subjects between the ages of 3 and 70 
were tested for paranormal cognitive ability. Subjects' 
scores were not analysed on the basis of individual 
scoring, but as age group scores. Since Chronological 
Age (C.A.) was the only TRUE independent variable on 
the basis of which groups of Subjects were formed, the 
following investigations cannot be properly classified 
as experiments but, more accurately, as observational 
studies• Terminology aside, however, severely stringent 
procedural controls were employed throughout each set 
of studies to ensure that any emerging significant group 
scores could be indicative only of successful employment 
of paranormal cognition and not as examples of sensory 
'leakage'«
All the Subjects studied came from the small city of 
Guildford, Surrey, and its surroundings. All the members 
of each of the age groups studied were taken from the same 
school or university or club or were working adults.
The schools from which the younger subjects were
taken were unstreamed. Experimental dyads of Subjects 
from each chronological age group were taken from two 
different classrooms on a random basis although strong 
attempts were made to pair subjects on the basis of 
intelligence and vocabulary test scores where possible 
or, alternatively, by means of assessments of class 
teachers and head teachers.
The University Subjects came from various faculties 
in the University of Surrey. Dyads were selected on a 
random basis but only those of the same chronological 
age and in the same university year were selected for 
experimental pairing.
The adult Subjects studied were composed of the 
following groups:
a) interested parents of children who had 
attended schools from which the younger 
Subjects had been selected.
b) University visitors to the annual * Surrey 
University Free Arts Festival* recruited 
via notices advising that experiments 
testing their 'ESP* ability were being 
carried out in a designated experimental 
area.
Adult dyads were composed of Subjects of the same 
chronological age and, wherever possible, of the most 
closely paired social class and academic background.
The senior Subjects studied were members of selected 
old age pensioners1 centres in the Guildford area who had 
agreed to the Experimenter's request that they participate 
in an experiment on 'guessing*. All Subjects were aged 
between 65 - 70 years and were paired, whenever possible, 
in dyads of similar social class and academic background.
All of the Subjects in all of the C.A. groups studied 
were voluntary and in no case were there any monetary 
rewards offered or received.
Although C.A. was the independent variable, strong 
attempts were made in all cases to pair the dyads in 
each C.A. group studied for intelligence (where independent 
Subject I.Q. test scores were made available or, 
alternatively, on teacher and headmistress assessment of 
Subject intelligence), university and pre-^university 
background and social class.
2. THE FIRST OBSERVATIONAL STUDY 
Procedure
Subjects were tested in dyads (see TABLE 2)• Upon 
being led into the experimental room, each Subject was 
greeted by the Experimenter and two assistants and then 
shown by one of the latter into one of three possible 
alternative experimental settings where he was given a 
set of either 'sender' or 'receiver* instructions.
Alternative experimental settings were necessary as 
it was impossible for all Subjects to come to the University 
of Surrey Psychology Department and be tested in Amplivox 
sound-proof booths. In the cases of the younger school 
Subjects and the old-age pensioners, members of each 
dyad were tested either in separate rooms or while 
separated by a heavy screen. Very stringent deprivation 
of normal sensory communication was employed throughout.
( see EXPERIMENTAL PRECAUTIONS, page 180).
All the groups, except for the four youngest C.A. 
groups, were given straightforward directions on how to 
carry through the Experiment. The four youngest C.A. 
groups were given the same instructions but in the form 
of a puppet sketch, and puppets were employed throughout
by the assistants* to teach the Subjects how to "play 
the guessing game" (see APPENDIX A for script).
The purpose of the puppets was two-fold. Firstly, 
they removed much of the tension generated in young children 
when being called upon to perform tasks by a group of 
strangers. Secondly, they allowed for the learning of 
instructions to be much easier and more interesting.
Subjects from the four youngest C.A. groups were also 
given "thinking caps" (cone-shaped cardboard hats covered 
with tin foil and wire and padded inside around the ear 
area) which were worn throughout the Experiment. Similar, 
though smaller, 'thinking caps' were worn by the puppets 
as well.
The ostensible purpose of the 'thinking caps' was to 
enhance the number of correct guesses by the Subject dyads 
(see APPENDIX A for script). The actual purpose of the 
thinking caps was, once again, two-fold. Firstly, they 
helped to authenticate the Experimenter's claim that the 
subjects would be playing a game and, hence, remove further 
tension on the Subjects' part. Secondly, they partially 
attenuated any incoming sounds. Further precautions to 
attenuate incoming sounds were also incorporated into the 
procedure employed.by the four youngest C.A. groups (see 
APPENDIX A for script).
* There were five assistants employed throughout the 
Observational Studies and in the Experiments.' Four (A.C. ,
S.G. C.0. and L.M.) were Undergraduates'and one (P.R.) was 
a Research Assistant in the Psychology Department.
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precautionary instruction. Because of the excitement 
generated by the style of the Experiment and the 
appearance of three relatively unknown adults, it was 
imagined that either by intention (in order to score 
more correct guesses) or by accident (by thinking aloud, 
for example) Subjects would 'blurt out* their guesses to 
each other. To control for this eventuality, a rule was 
incorporated into the script (see APPENDIX A) in which 
Subjects (and puppets) were to cover their mouths with 
their hands during each trial.
Once each subject entered his experimental area, he 
was shown his stimulus choice machine (called "guessing 
box" by way of explaining its function to the Subjects) 
and told how to work it (see APPENDIX B for photographs 
of the two stimulus choice machines). Each of the two 
stimulus choice machines was made of sheet metal, measured 
22" x 7H x 11" and was painted either blue (RECEIVER'S 
machine) or orange (SENDER'S machine). They each consisted 
of one red indicator light, five black stimulus choice 
buttons and five yellow stimulus choice lights. Each 
machine also had a slot into which stimulus choice cards 
could be placed one at a time.
There were two sets of stimulus choice cards - one 
for each Subject. Each set consisted of twenty cards.
On each card there were five stimulus pictures which were
either pictures taken from an infant vocabulary test or 
were abstract shapes designed by the author (see 
APPENDIX C for photographs of some of the 20 stimulus 
choice cards). The five stimulus pictures appearing on 
each card were never repeated in any of the other cards. 
In all, then, there were 100 different stimulus pictures, 
half of which were vocabulary test pictures and half of 
which were abstract shapes• Of the twenty stimulus 
choice cards, half were comprised of 5 vocabulary test 
stimulus choices and half were comprised of 5 abstract 
shape stimulus choices. Each card measured 22" x 5j"* 
Each of the 5 stimulus choices on each card was equal 
in size to the others and was in black and white.
The 'sender' was told that once the red indicator 
light on his * guessing box' went oh, he* should pick up 
the top card in a pile of twenty cards and slot it into 
his machine. He would then see that the card bore five 
different pictures, each of which was positioned so that 
a button from the guessing box would appear beneath it. 
The 'sender' was to look at each of the five pictures 
and then choose the one he wanted to 'transmit' to the 
'receiver'. This choice would be made by pressing the 
button underneath the chosen picture. This done, the
* With the 5 youngest age groups, this was in fact 
done for the subjects by the assistants (see APPENDIX A).
red indicator light would go off and an orange light 
would go on beneath his choice so that he could be 
certain of the picture he had picked. He could then 
concentrate or relax* with that picture in mind. If 
a CHIME rang, then that meant the 'receiver* had guessed 
the 'sender's* choice correctly. If nothing happened, 
then the 'sender' was to wait for the red indicator 
light to go on again and then move on to the next card 
in his pile.
The 'receiver' was told that once the red indicator 
light on his 'box' went on, he was to pick up the top 
card in a pile of twenty cards and slot it into his 
machine. He would see that the card contained five 
different pictures each of which was positioned so that 
a button from the guessing box would appear beneath it.
The receiver was to look at each of the five pictures 
the 'sender' had chosen and was * transmitting' to him.
Once having decided on his guess, the 'receiver' was 
to press the button beneath the chosen picture. This 
done, the red indicator light would go off and an orange 
light would go on beneath his choice so that he could be 
certain of the picture he had picked. If a chime sounded 
immediately after he had made his choice, then this 
would mean he had guessed the 'sender's' choice correctly. 
If nothing happened, then it would mean that he had
* At no time were any specific 'techniques' on how to 
•transmit1 or 'receive' more effectively given to any of 
the subjects. They y/ere left to do what they themselves 
thou, ht best.
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guessed incorrectly and was to wait until the red
indicator light went on again and then move on to 
the next top card in his pile.
Subjects went through a run of twenty cards through­
out the Experiment. At the end of the tenth trial,
Subject roles were reversed so that each Subject acted
as sender and receiver.
Subjects were told prior to their last (i.e. 20th) 
trial that it was, in fact, their last trial, so could 
they “try extra hard to guess correctly”.*
Although a run of twenty cards might be considered 
quite small in comparison to previous 1 ESP* experiments, 
it was necessary to keep it to this number due to the 
low concentration times of the younger subjects. As 
any experienced researcher in child psychology will 
attest, young children's enthusiasm for experiments very 
quickly diminishes. In fact, it was considered a great 
success that the younger Subjects were 'entertained* 
enough to remain for the twenty minute session. It is
* Although it might have seemed obvious to the older 
Subjects that they were on their last trial since they were 
using the last card, younger Subjects often thought that 
the cards would be repeated or that new cards would be 
presented. Therefore, it became necessary to verbally 
confirm the fact that this was indeed their last trial.
also important to recall that group scores were the 
main concern and interest and that as long as a large 
enough number of subjects from each C.A. group were 
tested, then statistically valid data could be 
accumulated.
Throughout the Experiment, a ten track recorder 
recorded:
a) the 'sender's* choice (ink lines 1-5)
b) the 'receiver's' choice (ink lines 6-10)
c) correct hits (ink lines 5 and 6 appearing 
simultaneously along with the choices).
Experimental Precautions
Because of the controversial nature of the 
Experiments, very strict precautions were taken to ensure 
that results collected were not due to normal sensory 
cues or to cheating on the part of the Experimenter, 
the Subjects, or the two Experimental assistants. It 
is believed that all serious objections to the 
Experimental procedure have been accounted for. These 
are listed below, together with relevant precautions:
1o sender choice
If the sender is allowed to choose the card he wants 
transmitted, results cannot legitimately be compared to 
levels of chance as the sender is possibly working along 
extra-chance lines, and if his biased preferences should 
coincide with those of the receiver (a not unlikely 
contingency) spurious positive responding would be recorded.
The principal reason why sender choices were allowed 
was the expectation that this might be a crucial moti­
vational factor in enhancing the attainment of 'hits'.
With the very young subjects, it was also one of several 
tactics that were required to achieve the extremely 
difficult task of capturing and retaining their interest 
throughout a long and otherwise boring procedure. It 
should be emphasised that, though related, these two 
points are not the same. In one case, the subject is 
encouraged to 'act' and in the other the action itself 
may be suffused with a quality that aids 'transmission'.
The precautions against concordant bias in 'sending' 
and. 'receiving' were of two kinds. Firstly, the stimulus 
material was carefully pre-screened.
Before the final set of one hundred stimuli was 
chosen, a long series of picture elimination tasks was 
conducted with nursery school children in which pictures
that engendered an abnormally high or low frequency were 
discarded. In addition, vocabulary test pictures which 
could not be properly named were also discarded.. After 
these initial trials, the remaining pictures were put on 
to cards in sets of five and children were simply asked 
to point to their most and least favoured choice. Any 
pictures which appeared significantly above a 20% choice 
level were eliminated. A final set of cards was prepared 
and children were called upon to play the ’sender’s1 role 
while their choices were recorded. The data from these 
trials was analysed and compared to a random selection of 
the same pictures. No significant differences were found 
and, on this basis, the cards were accepted as. unbiased.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, as the 
apparatus recorded both receiver and sender choices, any 
deviation from random sender selection could be deduced 
from the analysis.
2. centering effect
If the ’sender1 and 'receiver' select on the basis 
of position rather than picture representation, then, 
once again, above chance scores will appear. It is well 
known that young children tend to select central cards 
more often than those on the periphery.
This objection is countered by the fact that although 
both 'sender' and 'receiver' were shown the same five 
picture representations, the spatial arrangement in which 
they saw them was different, e.g. if the 'sender' is given 
a card with the picture representations in the order 
A B C  D E, the receiver is shown the card with the same 
picture representations but in the order, for example,
D B E A C. Hence, if a concordant centering bias or any 
other positional preference is employed, it would tend to 
a reduction in positive scoring. The positional arrange­
ment of the receiver's targets was re-arranged following 
each morning or afternoon session (1 session ^ 1 0  runs).
It becomes necessary at this point to explain briefly 
the mechanics of the recording apparatus in relation to 
the 'centering effect'.
At the back of the 'Sender' machine, there were five 
connecting leads (nos. 1-5) each of which corresponded 
to selection buttons 1 to 5. The pressing down of any 
one button would set off an electrical charge from its 
lead from which a pen recording of the selection would 
appear on the pen recorder. For example, pressing down 
button two sets off an electric charge from connecting 
lead two and a pen line in the number two box on the chart 
will appear.
The positional arrangement of the leads for the 
'Sender' machine remained the same throughout.
This was not the case, however, for the leads in the 
’Receiver’s’ machine. These leads (numbered 1 to 5, in 
correspondence with those in the Sender machine) could be 
manually removed from the sockets at the back of the 
Receiver machine and a positional re-arrangement could be 
made.
This would mean that the connecting lead for position 
1, for example, on the Receiver's machine could be placed 
in the position socket for button 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 on the 
Receiver machine.
Therefore, the targets could be positionally re-arranged 
for any.button; but in terms of the electrical charge 
being translated to the pen recorder, this would still 
correspond to the 1 to 5 sequence (in this case appearing 
in the 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 boxes on the pen recorder).
As far as the targets themselves were Concerned those 
presented to the Receiver were rearranged manually 
following a morning or afternoon session (l session 10 runs ^
3. possible fixation on one button by the 'sender'
Should the 'sender' consistently maintain the same 
positional preference, any such repetition would appear 
on the analysis of the sender's choices and such data 
would be eliminated from the results.
It was decided that a 'sender' would be allowed 
to choose the same position button three times successively 
before such intervention became necessary. Intervention 
initially was carried out by the assistant who would (via 
his/her puppet) take longer time in pointing out all 5 
of the possible target choices to the 'sender'. Should 
this intervention fail to succeed, the assistant informed 
the experimenter and all data for that dyad would be 
considered invalid. This second procedure, in fact, 
occurred very rarely (i.e. 5 ^  10 times in all). No 
restraint was placed on the 'receiver's' choice strategies.
It should also be noted that as each subject has 
only ten trials in all, it is highly unlikely that he 
would adopt such a stratagem.
4. . the possibility must always be considered 
that Subjects will cheat to please the 
Experimenter
Most adult Subjects were in sound-proof booths which 
eliminated any sensory cues. The younger Subjects, 
tested in different rooms,.were also subject to such 
restrictions together with the wearing of 'thinking caps' 
and being required to cover their mouth with their hands. 
Subjects being tested in the same room were at opposite 
ends of a very large space separated by a screen which
made any visual cues impossible. (See APPENDIX B for 
experimental room layouts).' In addition, they adhered 
to the procedural instructions (see APPENDIX A) very 
strictly.
In all cases, each Subject had an Experimental 
assistant beside him at all times whose main function 
was to prevent any cheating from occurring. Also, the 
Experimenter and usually the school headmistress or a 
teacher were present and alert for any signs of cheating.
5. the person with the most to gain from positive 
results is the Experimenter and the possibility 
- of cheating on his part must be strongly 
safeguarded against.
The role of the Experimenter was simply as overseer.
He had. no direct contact with the Subjects after they 
were introduced to the assistants, and he could not see 
which card was being presented.
All data w&Vft. collected automatically during the 
Experiment and not by the Experimenter so no alteration 
of data was possible at that time. Following the Experiment, 
the Experimenter and the two assistants analysed the data 
independently and compared each others estimates of dyad 
'hits' so that any differences in the reporting of scores 
for proper analysis could, be eliminated. Several assistants
presented, independent project papers of this work to the 
Psychology Department.
6. a third possible source of cheating that has
to be considered is on the part of the
assistants
Each assistant' dealt only with one child and could 
see only that child’s choices or guesses. The assistants 
had no idea what the ordering on the other child's 
machine was (as this was Independently changed by the 
Experimenter between sessions) and. any attempts they 
might make to guess were subject to the same precautions 
as the subjects. Similarly, any attempts to "communicate" 
with each other were to all practical extents either 
impossible (i.e. different rooms) or subject to the
same highly stringent precautions as the Subjects.
Because of lack of space, no assistants were 
employed when Subjects were in sound-proof booths. 
Precautions were such that their presence became 
unnecessary.
7o it could be argued that the Subjects' 
knowledge of each other's personality 
would give clues as to which picture to 
pick.
School subject dyads were chosen from different
196a
classes in the same school - though they were 
approximately of the same age and intelligence level - 
and with the restriction that they did not normally 
associate with each other in school breaks, games, etc. 
This was done on the basis of teacher and headmistress 
consultation and as this was done for all school groups, 
any errors made would appear in all the groups studied..
University Subject teams were selected, from 
different faculties and asked beforehand if they knew 
each other.
Adult Subject dyads were composed mainly of 
parents of school Subjects who had only a limited 
knowledge of each other. In a small number of cases 
adult teams were composed of young married couples 
who had. come to the University of Surrey Free Arts 
Festival.
8. biased preferences might be established 
for particular symbols.
Each card, was composed of five symbols which 
never appeared on any of the other cards. Hence, 
no re-use of symbols was possible throughout each
196b
run.
9. the order of the cards might be learned 
by one or more Subjects and, this 
information passed on to prospective 
Subjects,
The order of presentation for the twenty cards 
was randomised (i.e. standard random number tables were 
employed) with each new dyad. This was especially 
necessary in order to control for any first and last 
trial variations in scoring (see Results). The Experimenter 
randomised the order of presentation independently and 
prior to the days' sessions, ■ Assistants were informed 
of the presentation order just prior to the arrival of 
each dyad, although randomised, the order of target card 
representation was arranged to allow a recurrent concrete 
target choice/abstract target choice sequence (i.e. each 
concrete target choice card was followed by an abstract 
target choice card which, in turn, was followed by a 
concrete target choice card, and so on)
C.A. Group Breakdowns
The origin by educational or professional status of 
each of the ten chronological age groups and the 
experimental setting they were tested in is shown in
TABLES 1 and la. The sex composition of the 500 
sender/receiver pairs is shown in TABLE 2.
The total number of runs and trials given to each 
C.A. group is shown in TABLE 3*
As can be seen from TABLES 1 and la, the 10 age 
groups are clearly differentiated on the basis of 
chronological age. However, the range within each 
chronological age group becomes wider as the chronological 
age increases. The reasons for this variation are 
threefold:
Firstly, a purely practical consideration of the 
immense numbers of Subjects needed for testing should 
the age range be as small for the adult groups as 
with the child groups makes the feasibility of such a 
study near-impossible.
Secondly, the area of main concern in this study is 
with the developmental hypothesis that has been described 
in the theoretical section. The adult groups were tested 
mainly to be certain beyond any doubt that any 
significant results obtained were due to (to some extent, 
at least) a chronological age variable and not by any 
normal (or even paranormal) abilities available to all 
Subjects.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the rate of 
development in the subjects slows down dramatically 
as C.A. becomes larger and, as such, the reasonable 
increase! of C.A. range in the older groups would have 
little, if any, effect on scores obtained.
It should also be noted from TABLE la that the 
experimental setting for the various age groups tested 
varies considerably. As explained previously, this is 
due mainly to the unavailability of Subjects in many 
of the C.A. groups unless they were studied in their 
own chosen environment rather than in the university 
laboratory. Whenever possible, Subjects were brought 
to the university, but in a large number of cases 
Subjects were unavoidably tested in their schools or 
social clubs.
TABLE 2 gives the breakdown of the sex composition 
of the total number of Subject pairs in the first 
Experiment. There were an equal number of male and 
female Subjects - 500 members of each sex tested in 
all. Subjects were tested in dyads throughout the 
Experiment. These dyads were composed of either two 
males (M-M), two females (F-F), or one male and one 
female Subject (M-F). TABLE 2 gives a breakdown of 
these dyads for each of the chronological age groups.
TABLE 3 shows the total number of trials obtained 
from each age group. As can be readily seen, each 
group made a total of 1,000 trials with each dyad 
making one run which consisted of twenty trials.
Once again, it must be explained that the relatively 
low number of trials for each dyad was necessary due 
to the impossibility of keeping the youngest C.A. 
group Subjects interested and/or amused for longer 
than approximately twenty trials. It was found in the 
pilot study made before the Experiments that 3-5 year 
old children would comply with the experimental procedure 
for between 18 - .25 trials but certainly for no longer. 
They would either stop following the specified rules, 
begin to fidget, demand to go back to their classroom, 
get worried, or just start shouting out their choices.
It was therefore necessary to avoid this recurring 
in the actual Experiments and that was why twenty trials 
were eventually set down as the total for each completed 
run. It is also important to recall that the area of 
concern was not so much with individual scores but with 
general chronological age scores and, as such, 1,000 
trials for each age group were considered adequate to 
reliably indicate any real effects.
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Results
!• group scores
TABLE 4 gives a breakdown of the expected and 
observed frequencies of ’hits1 (correct guesses) for 
each C.A. group* TABLE 5 gives a breakdown of the 
percentage (%) of expected and observed hits for each 
chronological age group*
From both TABLES 4 and 5 it can be seen directly 
from the frequency and percent (%) of above-chance 
hits that there is a substantial degree of above-chance 
scoring among the first three chronological age groups 
(i.e.: Subjects aged between 3 and 8 years of age) 
whereas there is no such above-chance scoring in the 
remaining age groups*
Further, it can also be that there is a pronounced 
decline of frequency of * hits* as the chronological age 
of the groups increases, up to the age of eight (8).
Statistical analysis provides supporting evidence 
for this observation*
For Subjects in chronological age group A (3*3 - 
4*2) a chi-square test comparing their observed score to
the expected test score produced a result at a very 
highly significant level (xj* * 393.701;'p 4- .001 
(p.001 » 10.83)).
The probability of Subjects obtaining a score such 
as the one obtained in Group A has been calculated* as 
8.05 x 10“72.
A chi-square test for the score obtained by Subjects 
in Group B also produced highly significant results 
( x 2b = 162.0; p .001 (p.001 = 10.83) ).
The probability of obtaining this score has been 
calculated as being 1.55 x 10“^2.
A chi-square test for the score obtained by Subjects 
in Group C was also shown to produce a highly significant 
result (x2c = 23.63; p Z_ .001 (p .001 * 10.83) ).
The probability of obtaining this score has been
. ' _7
calculated as being 5.48 x 10 .
All of the chi-square tests performed on the
* All probability calculations are equated from the.
formula (n N .. nI
s kl (n-kj*.
as found in Lectures on Physics by R. FEYNMAN, CHAPTER 6, 
•Probability*•
remaining age groups produced insignificant results 
(x 2d >  .91 s P *n.s); (x2B * .32; p *n.s); (x2p » .005;
P =n.s); (x 2q = 0; p =n.sj ; (x2H = .02; p **n#s)»
(x2j s= • 32; p*n*s.); (x2^  = 1.3; p «=n.s).
If a chi-square test of the overall number of 
'hits* by all the groups is made then, once again, a 
highly significant result is obtained (x2QVer = 131.002;
p .001 (p .001 = 10.83) ).
Therefore, from this first set of results, it is 
clear, that Subjects in the three youngest chronological 
age groups scored at levels far above those predicted by 
chance. It is also seen from these results that the 
scores obtained by the first three age groups were so 
far above chance that the overall score for all the groups 
was at highly significant levels above chance even though 
the seven remaining chronological age groups all scored 
at expected chance levels.
It can also be seen from TABLES 4 and 5 that there 
is a pronounced decline of hits as the chronological age 
of the groups increases up until the age of 8 (i.e. in 
the first three age groups) whereupon the scoring level 
remains at chance expectation.
Once again, a statistical analysis can be made to
■ . ■ 1 ' ■ • 207.
see if this observation is, in fact, significant.
To test the differences in scoring levels between 
the 10 age groups, a Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks 
Test was devised. This test was most useful because not 
only would it be able to point out any significant score 
differences between each C.A. group, but it would also 
be able to point out any intra-group scores that might 
be of interest at the same time (i.e.: MALE-FEMALE 
differences; first half vs. last half scores, etc.).
A computer program was written by the Department*s 
Computer Research Associate, Mr. K.F. Lee, to tabulate 
this data.
The results obtained showed that Subjects in C.A.
Group A obtained scores significantly greater than Subjects 
in C.A. Group B (z = -2.2; p * .01) and in C.A. Group C 
(z = -2.5; p = .0059). Subjects in C.A. Group B obtained 
a score significantly greater than subjects in C.A. Group 
C (z «= -2.2014; P * .0139).
Within the remaining C.A. groups, the widest scoring 
variation was between Group E and Group JC. A Wilcoxon- 
matched-pair analysis revealed that there was no 
statistically significant scoring difference between these 
two groups (z = -1.0954; p = .1367 *= n.s.)
Therefore, only the three youngest C.A. groups obtained 
significantly different scores between their groups.
3EIPECTED AND OBSERVED' FHEONEHCIES OF 'HITS'- ■■ -   - -   ■- - ■ ■   ■—     - J —' - - -   - -   
Group A g e Total No. of 
. Trials:
Expected 
Number of 
Hits •
Observed 
Number of 
Hits
Number of 
above Chance 
Hits
A 3.3-3.7 . 1000 200 451 ro v_n _
k
. B 4.5-4.9 1000 200 361 161
c 5.3-7.B 1000 . 200 . 261 61
D 8.0-10.0 1000 200 212 12
E 11.0-13.0 1000 200 192 -8
F. 14.0-17.0 1000 200 . 201 ■ 1 ■'
G ' 19.0-22.0 1000. 200 200 0
H 24.0-35.0 1000 200 198 -2 ;
J 40.0-54.0 1000 200 208 8
K 65.0-70.0 1000 200 214 14
TABLE 5
PMtCENTAGE OF EXPECTED MID OBSERVED IIITS
Group " A^e /j Hits Expected /j Hits Observed $6 Above Chance 
' (= .20%)
A 30-3.7 20 45.1 25-1
B . 4.5-4.9 20 36.1 16.1
C 5.2-7.8 20 26.1 6.1
P.' . 8.0-10.0 20 • 21.2 1.2
E . 11.0-13.0 20 19.2 -0.8
F 14.0-17.0 20 20.1 0.1
G 19.0-22.0 20 2.0.0 0.0
H 24.0-35.0 20 19.8 -0.2
J 40.0-54.0 20 20.8 0.8
K 65.0-70.0 20 21.4 1.4 .
2. sub-group scores
The Subjects in Group C (5.3 - 7*8 year olds) take 
in a wider age range than the other two above-chance 
scoring groups.* Because of this difference, it becomes 
important to study Group C more closely.
'Group C was composed of 100 children between the 
ages of five and eight. As the level of intellectual 
and physical development is generally greatly differentiated 
in these years it becomes useful to divide Group C into 
three sub-groups based on the range of chronological 
age which it incorporates.
As can be seen from TABLE 6 the three sub-groups in 
Group C were composed of a total of 100 Subjects, 50 of 
whom were males and 50 of whom were females.
TABLE 6 THE THREE SUB-GROUPS IN GROUP C
Age of 
Subjects 
in Sub-group
Number of 
Subjects 
in sub-group
Sub-Group Dyad? (of 2 Subjects) 
M-M M-F F-F
'B
5.2 - 5.9 
6.0 -  6.9 
7.0 - 7.8
34
32
34
* Both Group A and Group B were composed of Subjects 
whose C.A. range was only approximately four months.
211.
TABLE 7 shows the breakdown of scoring in e a c h  of 
the three sub-groups*
TABLE 7 SCORES OBTAINED BY GROUP C SUBJECTS
BROKEN DOWN INTO SUB-GROUPS
Sub-Group Expected Score Observed Score 0 - E Mean Score
CA 68 97 29 5.7
CB 64 84 20 5.25
CC . 68 80 12 4.71
A t-test was performed between sub-group CA and 
sub-group CB to see if any difference existed between 
the means, i.e. whether there was any difference between 
the 5-6 year old and 6-7 year old Subjects1 scores.
From these results it was clear that a significant 
difference exists between sub-group C A and CB performance, 
(t » 2.45; 31 df; p » .02).
A second t-test was conducted between sub-group CA 
and sub-group C c to test whether there was any difference 
between the 5-6 year old and 7-8 year old Subjects' 
performance. It was found that there exists a highly 
significant difference between sub-group CA and Cg 
performance in paranormal cognition (t * 3.65; 32 df;
p * .001)•
A third t-test was performed between sub-groups 
CB and C.q to test whether- there was any difference 
between the 6-7 and 6-8 year old Subjects' performance. 
No significant difference in the scores obtained by 
sub-group C B and (£. Subjects was obtained (t * 2.75;
31 df; p * n.s.).
From these results, it is clear that the youngest 
sub-group, C A ,was mainly responsible for the significant 
above-chance overall score of Group C Subjects. This 
is in keeping with our experimental hypothesis. It is 
also clear from these results that by the age of 6-8 
the overall above-chance scoring level drops to levels 
close to those expected by chance.
A chi-square test was conducted to see which of 
the three sub-groups in Group C had obtained scores 
significantly above those predicted by chance. The 
results showed that whereas sub-groups CA and Cfi 
obtained statistically significant above-chance scores, 
sub-group Cc scores were within the levels expected by 
chance, (x^ = 15.02; p z  .001) ; (x^ * 7.55; p zL .01);
P A- ■ B
Xp * 2.18; p « n.s.).
■ cc ■
It has been shown then that in the three sub-groups 
within Group C, paranormal cognition scores also followed
a negatively developmental pattern. It has also been 
shown that this negatively developmental trend reaches 
a chance expectation level in sub-group Cc which was 
composed of Subjects aged between 7 and 8 years of age.
3. graphs
FIGURE 1 in APPENDIX D compares the mean paranormal
cognition score obtained by each of the 10 C.A. groups
to the chronological age range of the groups studied.
As can be clearly noted, an above-chance level curve 
is present only for Q.A. groups aged between three and 
eight years of age.
FIGURE2 in APPENDIX D compares the mean paranormal
cognition score obtained by Subjects in C.A. groups A,
B and C (the three significant scoring groups) and the 
chronological age range of these three groups (3 to 8 
years). Once again, it can be seen that lower the C.A., 
the further from chance expectation is the scoring curve.
From both FIGURE i and 2, the magnitude and direction 
of the emergent curves add strong support to the hypo­
theses that chronological age is inversely related to 
paranormal cognition.
4. summary of C.A. group and sub-group scores
From the analysis of the data of Study 1 
presented thus far, it is clear that paranormal cognition 
is being employed by the three youngest C.A. groups but 
not by the remaining groups. It is implied also that the 
C.A. groups aged between 3.3 and 8 years are capable 
of producing results indicative of the use of paranormal 
cognition, whereas C.A. groups older than 8 years are 
not.
Analysis has also shown that there are significantly 
different scoring levels obtained by subjects in the 
three youngest chronological age groups indicating very 
strongly that there is an inverse relationship between 
chronological age and paranormal cognition ability (i.e. 
the younger chronological age of the group, the higher is 
the paranormal cognition score obtained). This 
observation held even when Subjects in C.A. Group C were 
sub-divided in three C.A. sub-groups. Once again, it 
was found the lower ttesub-group age the higher the para­
normal cognition score. Once passed the chronological 
age of eight, however, the results obtained in the 
Study ‘ indicate a levelling off in all chronological 
age groups to scores clearly within the limits of chance.
5. intra-group scores
We must now take a closer look at the intra-group 
scores obtained by Subjects in Study 1 to see if there 
are any other obvious variables which might be 
influencing the scoring levels obtained.
TABLE 8a compares the intra-group scores obtained 
by the three sex division dyads (i.e. M-M, M-F, F-F) 
in each chronological age group.
TABLE 8b compares the male and female scores 
obtained by each chronological age group.
TABLE 8c compares the concrete and abstract symbol 
hits obtained by each chronological age group.
a) dyad scores
From TABLE 8a, the scores obtained by the actual 
dyads who participated in the Study can be 
observed. It will be recalled that dyads were divided 
into three categories: dyads composed of two male 
Subjects (M-M), dyads composed of one male and one 
female Subject (M-F), and dyads composed of two female 
Subjects (F-F). In each chronological age group there
were 17 dyads composed of two male subjects, 17 dyads 
composed of two female subjects and 16 dyads composed 
of one male and one female subject.
The simplest way of seeing whether there are, in 
fact, any intra-group scoring differences is to compare 
the mean score obtained by each of the three subject- 
dyads within each chronological age group. TABLE 8a1 
shows this comparison.
From TABLE it can be seen at a glance that the 
mean scores obtained by the dyads in each C.A. group 
are highly similar, to a degree where any statistical 
evaluation would be both unnecessary and time-consuming.
The greatest variation in means can be observed between 
the M-F and F-F dyads in group D. In this case there is 
a mean scoring difference of .7. A t-test was performed 
between these two dyads to see if any statistical 
difference existed. A t-value was obtained which was 
less than the tabulated value for the relevant degrees 
of freedom. There appears to be no significant statistical 
difference in paranormal cognition ability between the 
two dyads where there existed a difference in mean 
scores (t « 2.1; 16 df; p * n.s.). It is obvious, then, 
that no dyad scoring differences exist between any of 
the dyads in the 10 C.A. groups.
217.
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TABLE 8a^ also gives the total mean score obtained 
by each of the three sex-dyads in all 10 C.A. groups•
Once again, the mean scores are so similar that no 
statistical analysis is necessary to confirm the lack 
of any mean scoring difference.
Therefore, from the results obtained by the three 
sex-dyads in each C.A. group it can be seen that there 
was no variation in scoring and that, therefore, the sex 
make-up of the dyads does not significantly 
effect the scores obtained.
b) sex differences
TABLE 8b compares the total scores obtained by the 
male and female Subjects in each C.A. group.
Once again, it can be clearly seen that within
each C.A. group, the scores obtained by the male and
female members are highly similar. From the Wilcoxon 
matched-pair test a statistical analysis of these scores 
revealed no significant scoring differences between the 
male and female Subjects within each C.A. group.
(ZA s ~*°8» P * .4 « n.s.); (Zg * -.25; p * .4 = n.s.
(Z^ « -.23; P * .4 » n.s.); (Z^ * -l.i; p * .12 = n.s.
(Zg a —1.1; p * .12 s n.s.); (Zp a —»4-5; p *® .3 * n.s.
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(Zq = .-,85;'p. « .2 a n.s.) ; (zH = -.2; p = .4 = n.s.) 
(Zj = -.1; p a .4 = n.s.); (Z^ a -.02; p a .5 a n.s.)
It can also be seen from TABLE 8b that the total 
scores obtained by all the male and female Subjects 
employed in the Experiment show no significant difference 
in scores.
It is clear, therefore, by the comparison of male 
and female scores obtained within each C.A. group and 
overall that there are no significant differences in 
scoring due to superior ability by one of the two sexes 
employing paranormal cognition within an experimental 
situation.
TABLE 8b1 shows the male and female sub-group scores 
of Subjects in C.A. Group C.
A t-test was performed between male and female 
Subjects in sub-group CA to see if any difference existed 
between 5-6 year old male and 5-6 year old female 
performance in paranormal cognition. From these results, 
it was observed there does not exist a significant 
statistical difference between male and female Subject 
performance in paranormal cognition in sub-group. C^.
(t = 2.15; df =  14; p = n.s.).
A second t-test was performed between males and 
females in sub-group C2 to see if any difference existed 
between 6-7 year old male and female performance in 
paranormal cognition. Once again, there was no 
significant statistical difference obtained between male 
and female Subjects1 performance in paranormal cognition 
in sub-group C2. (t = 2.1; df = 16, p = n.s.)
A third t-test was made between males and females 
in sub-group to see if any difference existed between 
7-8 year old male and female subjects' ability to employ 
paranormal cognition. In this sub-group as well no 
significant differences between male and female para­
normal cognition scores obtained in sub-group were 
found, (t = • 2.15; df =14; p = n.s.).
Therefore, from the breakdown of Group C into three 
chronological age sub-groups it is clear that in none of 
the sub-groups does there occur a scoring difference.
c) concrete/abstract symbol scores
TABLE 8c compares the total number of correct hits 
obtained by each C.A. group when the target was either a 
concrete or abstract symbol. It will be recalled that in
each set of 20 cards, 10 of the^  cards were composed of 
concrete symbols and the remaining 10 were composed 
of abstract symbols. It is important to see whether the 
successful use of paranormal cognition would be more 
noticeable with concrete or abstract targets. Secondly, 
it is also important to see whether there is a sex 
preference for either concrete or abstract symbols to 
the extent that successful employment of paranormal 
cognition would be dependent on such preference.
TABLE 8c gives the total concrete and abstract 
symbol hits obtained by the males and females in each 
C.A. group.
It can be clearly seen that when comparing the 
total number of concrete and abstract symbol hits 
obtained by each C.A. group, the vast majority of C.A. 
groups obtained identical or highly similar (difference . 
of 3 or less hits) target hits between concrete and 
abstract symbols. The only two C.A. groups in which 
the difference was greater were C.A. groups B and C 
where in each case the difference between abstract and 
concrete symbol scores was 5 (in the case of group B, 
there were 5 more concrete symbol hits; in the case 
of group C, there were 5 more abstract symbol hits.
From the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test for these 
two groups, a statistical analysis was made to determine 
whether such a difference was, in fact, statistically 
significant. In neither case was a statistical 
difference found.
(Zfi = -2.2; p = .2 = n.s.); (ZQ = -.5; p = .3 = n.s.)
Similarly, when looking at the overall number of 
target hits made by all the C.A. groups, there emerges no 
statistically significant difference between the total 
number of concrete or abstract symbol hits obtained by 
the C.A. groups.
Also from TABLE 8c, it can be seen that in all the 
C.A. groups except two, there was no scoring difference 
of more than three hits by either males or females with 
regard to concrete or abstract targets. In Group C, 
females obtained four more hits with abstract targets than 
with concrete targets and in Group F females once again 
obtained 4 more hits with abstract targets than with 
concrete targets. This scoring difference, however, is 
not significant.
(Zc = -.149;p= .44 = n.s.); (zp = .00; p = .5 = n.s.)
Therefore, it is clear that there was neither any 
age nor sex scoring preference for concrete or abstract 
symbol scores obtained in Experiment one.
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TABLE 8b1 INTRA-GROUP SCORES
MALE AND FEMALE SUB-GROUP SCORES
SUB-GROUP
B
C
C
TOTAL
MALE SCORES
1+6
1+2
111 '
129
FEMALE SCORES TOTAL
51
1+2
39
132
97
81+
80
261
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6. first and last target 'hits'
TABLE 9 shows the frequency of expected and 
observed first trial 'hits* for each of the chrono­
logical age groups.
Similarly, TABLE 10 shows the frequency of expected 
and observed last trial hits for each of the 
chronological age groups.
It will be recalled, that one of the more general 
hypotheses that had been made was concerned with the 
'emotional* effects that should be generated in a 
paranormal cognition testing situation. Previous 
research in subject scoring has pointed to a tendency 
for subjects to score better at the beginning and end 
of their trials. In order to study this possible effect 
in our own .Studies, it was argued that by looking 
at the number of first trial and last trial 'hits* 
obtained by each dyad of Subjects, it should be possible 
to see whether Subjects were in fact obtaining highly 
significant scores on the first and last trial. Although 
it could always be obvious to Subjects that they were 
performing their first trial, this might not always 
have been the case with the last trial since it was 
found in the pilot study that some of the younger 
Subjects expected new packs of stimulus cards to appear
once the original twenty were completed. It therefore 
became necessary to inform subjects just previous to 
their final trial that it was, in fact, their last 
attempt at 'guessing1• This statement was further 
supplemented with the phrase "so let's try and get 
this last one right, O.K.? Because it would be nice 
to end our games with a right guessI"
While it might be argued that since Subjects 
reversed roles after the tenth trial it would be better 
to call the tenth trial the last trial for Subject 1
and the eleventh trial the first trial for Subject 2.
This view was not adopted for two main reasons.
Firstly, the switch of roles at the end of the 
tenth trial was expected by both Subjects. Therefore, 
each of them knew that the Experiment was not near the
end and, as such, we could argue that they did not
consider this switch as an end and a new beginning, but 
merely a pause.
Secondly, if trials 10 and 11 had, in fact, been 
studied, then either we would have had to inform 
Subjects twice that this was their final trial, or 
alternatively, we would have had to cut out any last 
trial indications for trial 20.
It was decided that the inclusion of new special 
instructions or the part elimination of the older ones 
would only serve to complicate matters. Trials 10 and 
11 were considered to be artificial beginnings and 
endings by both the Subjects and the Experimenter and 
to view and name them as other than such might easily 
introduce (especially in the younger Subjects) an 
element of competition to the proceedings. This was 
clearly against the idea of a 'co-operative effort' 
that the procedural instructions stressed. Only first 
and last trial 1 hits' for each dyad were therefore 
considered.
Chi-square tests for first trial hits in each 
chronological age groups showed significant above­
chance scoring by all groups.
(x| = 15.15 P Z  .001 (p.001 = 10.83) )i 
(x| = 17.2; p /. .001) ; (Xp * 17.2; p Z  .001);
(x£ » 8.1; p z .01 (p.01 = 6.64)) ; (x| - 20.9; p Z .001)
(x® » 12.5; p Z  .001); <jc| = 15.1; p z .001);
(x£ = 15.1; p z .001); (x| = 15.1; p Z .001);
(x^ * 12.5; p Z .001).
It might be argued that first trial hits in the 
three youngest age groups (A - C), while being
230.
significantly above chance expectations, were not 
significantly different from the number of 'hits' 
obtained in trials 2 - 19 (due to the inordinately 
high number of correct hits obtained by these groups) •
This same argument however cannot be applied to the 
remaining 7 age groups since their overall group . 
results were insignificant.
It seems to be quite clearly the case that Subjects, 
overall, obtained a significantly greater number of 
first trial hits than would be expected by chance,
TABLE 10 shows the frequency of expected and observed 
last trial hits for each of the chronological age groups*
Once again, an initial survey of the results shows 
an obvious above-chance level of scoring 'hits' on the 
last trial by all 10 chronological age groups.
Chi-square tests made for each of the chronological
age groups show an overall tendency for highly
significant above-chance scoring.
( x ^ =  17.2; p Z  *001 ( p . 0 0 1 »  10.83));
(Xg = 20.9; P C .001); (x| * 35.9; P Z  .001);
(x*5 = 8.1; p Z .01 (p.01 = 6.64)); (x*j - 17.2; p z  .001);
■ 231.
. ' . ; : . . . ■
(xj; .» 4.7; P L  .05 (p.05 * 3.84)); (x| = 20.9; p Z  .001); 
(x|> 24.2; p Z .001); (Xj * 31.6; p Z  .001);
(x| x= 15.1; p Z  .001).
Once more, while it might be argued that the last 
trial f hits1 obtained in age groups A - C , while being 
significantly above chance, are not significantly 
different from the overall 'hit' scores obtained by 
these 3 age groups, it is certainly not the case for 
the remaining chronological age groups since their 
overall group results were insignificant.
Therefore, it is quite clear that, overall, Subjects 
obtained a significantly greater number of LAST trial 
hits than would be expected by chance.
FIGURE THREE in APPENDIX D gives a comparison of 
first and last paranormal cognition trial hits to the 
C.A. range of the groups studied. It is evident from 
this graph that all groups scored at levels far above 
those predicted by chance and that no C.A. variation 
appears as it does so strongly in the overall group scores.
These highly significant scoring levels for all 
groups add support to the proposed hypothesis that 
paranormal cognition should be more noticeable in all 
C.A. groups when internalised cognition is somehow either 
impaired or affected by variables (such as anxiety or
boredom) which have a tendency to reduce self-*conscious1 
cognition.
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TABLE 11 shows the frequency of first trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
As there are no obvious large scoring differences 
and because of the comparatively small number of hits 
obtained by each individual C.A. group it is best to 
look at the overall total results to see if there result 
any biases either for the type of target symbol or for 
sex preference.
From TABLE 11, it is instantly clear that there 
emerges no preferential first trial hit bias for either 
concrete or abstract symbols, overall (C « 107; A .* 102)• 
It is also clear that this lack of bias is common to 
both males (C = 54; A *= 50) and females (C » 53; A * 52).
Finally, it is also clear that there is no overall 
difference in the total number of first trial hits 
obtained by males and females in the C.A. groups 
(M - 104; F * 105).
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TABLE 12 shows the frequency of last trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
Once again, as there are ho obvious large scoring 
differences and because of the comparatively small number 
of hits obtained by each individual C.A. group, it is 
best to look at the overall total results to see if any 
biases either for the type of target symbol or for sex 
preference appear*
From TABLE 12, there emerges no preferential last 
trial hit bias for either concrete or abstract symbols 
overall (C « 109; A « 113). It is also clear that 
this lack of bias is common to both males (C » 55;
A =56) and females (C * 54; A * 57).
Finally, it is also clear that there is no overall 
difference in the total number of last trial hits 
obtained by males and females in the C.A. groups (M * 111 
F = 111).
TABLE 9
FREQUENCY OF EXPECTED AND OBSERVED FIRST TRIAL HITS
Group Expected First Trial 
Hits
Observed First Trial 
Hits
Number of Above 
Chance First 
Trial Hits
A 10 21 11
B 10 ; 22 12
C 10 22 12
3 10 18 8
E 10 2-3 15
F 10 20 1°
G 10 21 . 11
H 10 21 11
J 10 21 11
, K 10 20 10
TOTAL 100 . 209 . o V
O
TABLE 10
FREQUENCY PI*1 EXPECTED AND OBSERVIID LAST TRIAL HITS
Group Expected Last Trial 
. Hits
Observed Last Trial 
Hits
Number of Above 
Chance Last 
Trial Hits
.A 10 22 12
B 10 " 23 1 3
c 10 27 17
D 10 18 0
E 10 22 12
F 10 16 : ; 6
G 10 •
N~\
CM 13
; H. 10 24 14
J 10 26 16
K 10 21 11
TOTAL 100 222 122
GROUP SEX
1ST TK'JLJUj HITS.
1ST TRIAL CONCRETE HIT 1ST TRIAL ABSTRACT HIT TOTAL
4 i i
5 10
B
M
F
10
12
M
F
11
11
D
M
F
M
F
13
10
9
10
9
12
M
F
10
11
10
11
K
12
8
TOTAL
TOTAL
MALE
107
54
102
50
209
FEMALE 53 52
GROUP SEX LAST TRIAL CONCRETE HITS LAST TRIAL ABSTRACT HITS TOTAL
D
II
K
M
P
M •
F
M
F
M ■ 
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M ' 
F
TOTAL
MALE
5 
7
6
5
7
6
4
5
5
5
3
4
7
7
5
5
109
55
6
4
6
6
8
6
3 
6
6
6
5
4
5
6
6
7
6
5
113
56
11
11
12
11
15
12
7 
11
11
11
8 
8
12
11
12
12
12
14
11
10
TOTAL 122
FEMALE 54 57
7. range and rank order of 1 hitsy
TABLE 13 indicates the range of hits and the rank 
order of scores obtained by each of the chronological 
age groups. It is important to note that all dyads 
scores obtained from Group A (3.3 - 3.7 year olds) are 
at levels above chance. This indicates clearly that all 
dyads at this age level were able to obtain scores which 
could only have been obtained with the employment of 
paranormal cognition. TABLE 13 also clearly indicates 
that the highly significant above-chance scores obtained 
in the three youngest age groups were not due to a small 
number of highly successful subjects but rather to the 
fact that the dyad scores tended to remain within a 
well-defined and limited range. This observation is true 
not only for the highly significant chronological age 
groups which are of prime interest but for all the age 
groups studied.
8. mean scores
TABLE 14 indicates the mean score obtained by each 
of the groups. Once again, it can be seen that in 
contrast to their expected mean score, Subjects in the 
first three chronological age groups obtained mean group 
scores significantly different from those expected. On
the other hand, mean group scores obtained by the 7 
remaining chronological age groups were insignificantly 
different from those expected.
9• target choice positional arrangement
TABLE 15 shows the total number of positional 
choices made by both the 'senders* and 1 receivers * of 
each group studied. It will be recalled that both the 
•sender* and * receiver* in each dyad tested were' given 
the freedom to choose the stimulus target. Although 
great care was taken to ensure that the target choices 
presented in each 5-stimulus card stood an equal chance 
of being the chosen target, it was necessary to determine 
that this was indeed the case statistically. It was for 
this reason that a pen recorder had been employed to record 
all the positional choices of both the sender and the 
receiver in each team tested. This made it possible to 
compare the actual positional choices made by each 
chronological age group with the number of positional 
choices expected by chance. TABLE 13 gives the expected 
number of positional choices and the actual number of 
positional choices made by each chronological age group 
and by the groups combined. It can easily be observed 
that the total number of times each of the five (5) 
possible position points was recorded is indeed very 
close to the number expected by chance.
A chi-square test for each, chronological age group*s 
positional choice was made# None of the positional 
differences obtained were significant.
Instead of detailing each of the 100 x2 tables, 
it would seem enough to examine simply the result which 
deviated most from the expected level. That is, the 
receiver position 5 in Group D* In this case, the 
expected number of positional hits was 200, whereas 
their actual number was 194, leaving a difference of 6.
The chi-square obtained for this difference was:
p . . , .
x « .18; which is insignificant. We can conclude that
there was no biased positional scoring talcing place in 
any of the chronological age groups.
Chi-square tests were also made for positional
choices overall. These were also found to be insignificant.
(Xg a 0; p a n.s.);' (xj « .018; p » n.s.); (Xg « .002;
1 2 3
P = n.s.); (x? * .0005; p * n.s.); (x^ «■ .018; p *= n.s.);
4 ■ - - 5
.0045; p = n.s.) ; (x^ * .0125; p « n.s.);
(xi? « .0045; p « n.s.); (xj? » .008; p « n.s.);
3 4
(xj£ « .05; p = n.s.).
From the results obtained from TABLE 15, it is clear 
that above-chance scoring was not due to any positional 
preferences or bias on the part of the Subjects.
TABLE 13 llAl'IGE AMD H/iiTIC. 0.111)121 HITS
Possible
Hits
Group
A
Team
Hits
Gr oup 
33 
Team 
Hits
Group
G
Team
Hits
Group 
D . 
Team 
Hits
Group
E
Team
Hits
Group
F
Team
Hits
Group
Cr
Team
Hits
Group 
II . 
Team 
Hits
Group
J
Team
Hits
Group .
K
Team
Hits
0
1
2 .
' 5
.4 4
1
1
2
1
14
3 
2 .
5-
ay
10
1
3
C.
14
5
1
6
C
6
Qs
1
1
3 • 
15 
11
4
5 
10 
15
1
3 
’ 6 
8 
10
5.
1
20
' CH/ilTCE LEVEL
5 • 2 4 10 6 5 " 8 13 11 9 22 '
6 2 10 12 . 6 Yv.P 10 ' 4 3 9 -
7 . 8 12 6 7 • 4 3 1 1 2 2
8 6 16. 3 1 1 1 1 —  • ' . 2
9 12 5 1 - , - - -
10 12 1 . - - •- — -
11 2 1 - 1 - ■ - ■. : ”  :
12 : 5 - ■ . - - . - - ■
13 - - - - - - - -
14. . - _ - -
15 1 ■ - - ~ - . - - ~  .
16 - - ■ : - . . -■ - -
17 - —  - - - - - -
18 . - • — - - . - - - — ■
19 - - - - • - - - - -
■ 20 — ■ — — ~ — ■ — ■— — . — . —
TABLE 14
MlilAM NUHU l'!U OF EXPECT J'lD AMD OBSERVE!) HITS BY GROUPS
Group Expected Mean Observed Mean 0 - E
A 4.0 9.02 5.02
33 4.0 7.22 3.22
C 4.0 ■ 5.22 1.22
4.0 . 4.24 .24
E 4.0 3.84 - . 1 6
E ’4.0 4.02
C
M
o
 . •
G 4.0. , . 4.00; 0
H 4.0 3.96
o
•I
J 4.0 : 4.16 . 1 6
K 4.0 4.28 .20
TABLE 13
' ClIQIOi; DISTRIBUTION; SLLLMl(s) AND RECEIVER (R)
Group Expected 
No. of 
Position 
Choices
si
Pos.
S2
Pos.
: s3
.Pos,
S.
4
Pos.
S5
Pos,
> i
Pos.
n2
Pos,
2
Pos,
R4
Pos,
> 5
Pos.
TOTAL
• A 200 202 200 199 199 200 198 201 198 199 204 2000
B 200 198 201 203 196 202 201 2Q3 197 201 198 2000
c 200 200 203 196 204 196 198 196 202 201 204 2000
D 200 201 197 203 199 202 202 199 201 202 194 2000
E 200 197 202 202 200 199 203 196 202 199 200 2000
E 200 201 203 196 201 . 200 200 198 201 201 199 • 2000
, G 200 199 200 200 . 201 200 200 199 200 200 201 2000
H 200 198 196 202 204 200 204 196 196 200 204 2000
J 200 . 203 199 201 200 199 203 197 201 201 200 2000
IC 200 . 201 197 200 197 196 188 210 205 200 206 2000
TOTAL 2000 2000 1994 2002 2001 1994 1997- 1995 2003 2004 2010 20,000
Summary of the First Observational Study
The first C.A. study was mainly concerned with 
testing the hypothesis that chronological age is inversely 
related to paranormal cognition (i.e. the older the 
Subjects, the lower is their ability to successfully 
employ paranormal cognition).
There were ten experimental C.A. groups tested 
taking in a total age range of between 3 and 70 years of 
age. There were 100 Subjects in each C.A. group; 50 
being male and 50 female. Subjects were tested in dyads, 
these being either male-male, male-female, or female- 
female. Wherever possible, the dyads chosen were made up 
of Subjects who had similar mental ages. The Experiment 
itself was as fully automated as possible under the 
limitations of working sometimes outside of the laboratory. 
Each dyad completed a run of twenty cards. Each card 
contained five pictures which never reappeared. Ten of 
the cards were made up of concrete symbols taken from an 
infant vocabulary test, while the remaining ten were made 
up of abstract shapes designed by the Experimenter.
The 1 sender* in each dyad was asked to choose the 
picture he wished to ‘transmit* to the ‘receiver*. His 
choice, as well as the 'receiver*s* guess were recorded
at all times by an automatic pen recorder. Subjects 
were given positive feedback on correct target hits 
by way of a chime which they could both hear.
There was always an assistant present to aid any 
problems either Subject might conceivably find himself 
with, as well as to make certain that the Subjects did 
not attempt any trickery or accidentally blurt out 
their choices.
The Experimenter's role, once the introductions and 
explanatory rules were given, was to act simply as an 
overseer. In most situations he did not have access 
to the Subjects' choices but only to the re-arranged 
orders which appeared on the pen-recorder.
There were various very strict controls taken to 
ensure that Subjects would not be able to successfully 
carry out the Experiment by employing sensory or, in 
some cases, cognitive clues. These have been duly noted 
earlier.
Just following the tenth trial, Subjects reversed 
roles so that each Subject was tested as a 'sender' and 
a 'receiver'. With the youngest Subjects, this switch 
also served as a small break in which they were once again
reminded of their roles in the Study. . Prior to 
their final trial, Subjects were informed verbally that 
their Experimental run was nearly complete.
The results obtained very strongly confirmed a 
number of the experimental predictions made previously.
Firstly, it was found that only the three youngest 
age groups obtained group scores which deviated 
significantly from chance. Their level of significance, 
however, was so high to the extent that the data went, 
in many cases, beyond the necessity of statistical 
evaluation.
These three youngest chronological age groups were 
composed of Subjects between 3 and 8 years of age which 
once again confirms our prediction that in general the 
ability to employ paranormal cognition will diminish as 
the Subject develops his ability to employ complex 
internal connections. In keeping with Piaget's general 
theory of intellectual development, such an ability would 
generally appear at around the age of eight in our society.
Following from this prediction, it was hypothesised 
that past the stage of internalised connections the ten­
dency to employ paranormal cognition will become stabilised
such that its appearance would be observationally rare 
in a paranormal cognition task. This was also borne 
out by the data since the seven remaining C.A. groups 
all obtained scores well within the limits imposed by 
chance.
From the three C.A. groups who did obtain above- 
chance scores it was found that the youngest C.A. group 
obtained significantly higher scores than either of the 
two other groups and that the second youngest C.A. group 
obtained significantly higher scores than the third group. 
Similarly, it was found that when the Subjects within the 
third C.A. group (which was composed of Subjects between 
5 and 8 years of age) were sub-divided into three C.A. 
sub-groups, the youngest C.A. sub-group obtained 
significantly higher scores than the remaining two.
Two figures comparing mean paranormal cognition 
scores obtained to chronological age also clearly indicated 
the inverse relation between C.A. and paranormal cognition 
scoring ability.
Therefore, it can be seen from the observations that 
a very clear inverse relation exists between paranormal 
cognition and chronological age and that since this 
relation ceases to exist after the age of 8, there is a 
strong implication that this relation is in turn connected
to the intellectual development of the Subjects.
Various other results were obtained from this 
Study.
Firstly, it was found that in none of the C.A. groups 
individually or as a whole were there any significant 
scoring differences between males and females.
Secondly, there were also no significant scoring 
differences found between the three types of sex dyads 
employed within each C.A. group or overall.
Thirdly, there were no significant scoring differences 
found betwe_en the total number of concrete target and 
abstract target symbols correctly employed within each 
C.A. group and. overall.
It was also found that in all C.A. groups there was 
a highly significant level of first and last trial 'hits' 
obtained. As the target cards were randomised prior to 
each new subject run this effect could not be due biased 
sampling. Instead, we would argue that such an effect 
is likely to occur in all C.A. groups due to shifts in 
the alertness and attentiveness of each Subject during the 
run. Such an effect has been recorded before and has been 
generally termed 'deline effect' due to the U-shaped scoring
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curve that Subjects tend to produce. It is clear from 
our results that such an effect is very strong for all 
C.A. groups.
Therefore, the results of the first C.A. Study 
are very strongly indicative of both the experimental 
existence of paranormal cognition and of its inverse 
relation with, specifically, chronological and, 
generally, with internalised connections (i.e.: 
intellectual development).
3. A REPLICATION OF THE FIRST OBSERVATIONAL STUDY
Introduction
Due to the very high above chance scores obtained 
by the three youngest chronological age groups in the 
first Study an attempt was made to replicate these
findings by testing a new group of Subjects within the 
age range of 3 to 8 years.
Outline of the Investigation
The Subjects studied were taken from the same
schools as the Subjects in the first chronological age#
study. In some cases, these new Subjects were tested 
one year after the original group of Subjects, but in 
most cases they were, in fact, suitable Subjects who had 
not been tested in the first observational study.
Just as in the previous study, Subjects from each 
C.A. group were taken from two different classrooms on a 
random basis although, once again, strong attempts wer^ e 
made to match each pair of Subjects on the basis of I.Q. 
scores where available, or, alternatively, by means of 
class teacher assessments.
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Procedure
Subjects were tested in exactly the same way as in 
the first study. The same experimental procedure was 
employed and the same experimental precautions were 
taken. All Subjects were given directions via the same 
puppet sketch as was previously used.
Group Breakdowns
There were three different age groups tested, each 
composed of 25 male and 25 female Subjects giving a 
total number of 50 Subjects per age group.
TABLE 16 gives the educational status of each of the 
three chronological age groups and the experimental 
setting they were tested in.
The sex composition of the 75 sender/receiver dyads 
is given in TABLE 17.
The total number of trials made by each of the 
chronological age groups are shown in TABLE 18.
TABLE 16 GROUP: BREAKDOWN
GROUP ORIGIN AGE RANGE (in years) OBSERVATIONALSETTING
Al Nursery School 3.3 - 3.7 Separate rooms .
B1 . Nursery School 'i.5 - ':.9 Separate rooms
Cl Infant School 5.2 - 7.8 Same room
TABLE IT BREAKDOWN OF SUBJECTS
GROUP SUBJECTS 
MALES FEMALES
DYADS DYAD TOTAL SUBJECT
TOTALM-M M-F F-F
Al 25 25 8 9 8 25" 50
B1 25 25 8 9 8 25 50
Cl 25 25 8 9 8 25 50
TOTAL 75 75 2k 27 2k 75 150
TABLE 18 BREAKDOWN OF DYAD RUNS AND TRIALS
GROUP NO. OF TEAMS NO. OF RUNS NO. OF TRIALS 
(1 RUN = 20 TRIALS)
Al : 25 25 500
B1 .25 25 500
Cl 25 25 500 .
TOTAL 75 75 1,500
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Results
1# C.A. group scores
TABLE 19 gives a breakdown of the expected and 
observed frequencies of ‘hits* for each C.A. group*
TABLE 20 gives a breakdown of the percentage (%) 
of expected and observed hits for each C.A. group.
As in the first .Study , it is obvious on sight 
that the scores obtained by each of the three C.A. groups 
are at levels above chance.
A chi-square test for each of the three C.A. groups 
in Experiment 2 confirms this observation: all three age 
groups did, in fact, obtain scores which are at levels 
highly significantly different than those predicted by 
chance.. '
(xf M 183.11; p i .001); (x^ = 56.2; p /_ .001);
1 1
(x.? = 7.75; p A .01).
1  '
The probability of each of the three obtained scores
was calculated as: p =1.25 x 10“34; p_ » 7.89 x lO"1 :^
„ A1 B1 
pP = 1.03 x 10~*.
C1 . , . . ' -
Therefore, it seems clear that the results obtained 
in the first Study were not due to any specific 
biased chance occurrence, but rather, that they were 
indicative of a general C.A. group trend.
Secondly, a Wilcoxon-matched-pair analysis of the 
inter-group scores revealed that Subjects in C.A. Group 
A^ scored at significantly greater levels than Subjects 
in C.A. Group B1 (Z = - 2.2014; p = .0139) and in Group ^  
(Z = -2.51; p = .006). Subjects in C.A. Group 
obtained scores at significantly greater levels than 
Subjects in C.A. Group C1 (Z = -2.3; p = .015).
Therefore, once again, the results show that there 
is an inverse relationship between C.A. and paranormal 
cognition scoring in Subjects aged between three and 
eight years of age.
TABLE 19 EXPECTED ANp OBSERVED FREQUENCIES OF ♦HITS1
GROUP AGE TOTAL NO. 
OF TRIALS
EXPECTED 
NO . OF 
HITS
OBSERVED 
NO. OF 
HITS
NO. OF ABOVE 
CHANCE HITS.
Al 3.3 - 3.T 500 100 221 121
B1 U.-5 ->.9 500 100 167 67 .
Cl 5.3 - 7.8 500 100 125 25
TABLE 20 PERCENTAGE OF EXPECTED AND OBSERVED HITS
GROUP AGE % HITS 
EXPECTED .
% HITS 
OBSERVED
% HITS 
ABOVE CHANCE
Al 3.3 - 3.7 20% kk.02% 22.02%
B1 U.5 - k.9 20% 33.1* % 13.k %
Cl 5.3 - 7.8 20% 25.0 % 5.° %
2. sub-group scores
Once again, because subjects in Group (5.3 - 
7.8 year olds) take in a relatively wider age range 
than the other two chronological groups, it is of value 
to study Group C1 more closely.
As in the previous Study, the 50 Subjects which
composed Group can be sub-divided into three chronologica
age sub-groups.
As can be seen from TABLE 21, the three chronological 
age sub-groups in Group were composed of 25 male and 
25 female Subjects.
TABLE 21 THE THREE SUB-GROUPS IN GROUP C1
SUB GROUP AGE OF SUBJECTS 
IN SUB-GROUP
NO. OF SUBJECTS 
IN SUB-GROUP
DYADS (OF 2 
SUBJECTS)
M-M M-F F-F
C1A 5.2 - 5.8 18 3 3 3
C1B 6.1 - 6.8 16 3 2 3
o O 7.0 - 7.9 16 3 2 3
TABLE 22 gives a breakdown on scores obtained by each 
of the three Group C.^  sub-groups.
First of all, a chi-square analysis of the three 
total scores obtained in each sub-group shows that only 
Subjects in sub-group C^A (i.e. the youngest Subjects 
in Group C1) obtained a score significantly greater 
than one expected by chance.
(x2c A * 8.1; P /_ .01); (x2c _ = 1.8; p = n.s.) ;
o
(x c Q - *3; P ** n.s.).
The lack of any significance in the two older sub-groups 
may be due, to some extent at least, to the relatively 
low number of Subjects involved in each sub-group.
However, it is clear that once more a negatively 
developmental pattern emerges in the scoring.
A series of t-tests were made to see if there were 
any significant differences in the scoring of each sub­
group.
A t-test was made between scores obtained by Subjects 
in sub-groups C^A and C^B. A t-statistic was obtained 
which showed a highly significant difference in scoring 
between these two sub-groups (t « 4.015; df » 16; p .001)
Similarly, a t-test of scores obtained by Subjects 
in sub-groups C^A and C^C was made. A t-statistic was 
obtained which showed a highly significant difference in
scoring between these two sub-groups (t « 4*015; df * 16;
V Z. .001) *
Finally, a t-test was made of scores obtained by 
Subjects in sub-groups C^B and C^. A t-statistic was 
obtained which showed a significant difference in scoring 
between these two sub-groups (t » 2*145; df » 14; p z. .05)•
Therefore, once again the inverse relation between 
chronological age and ability at paranormal cognition is 
evident.
TABLE 22 GROUP C. SUB-GROUP SCORES
SUB-GROUP EXPECTED SCORE OBSERVED SCORE 0-E MEAN SCORE
CXA 36 51 15 5.67
C1B 32 39 7 4.87
ClC 32 35 3 4.37
3. graph
FIGURE 4 in APPENDIX D compares the mean paranormal 
cognition score obtained by each of the three C.A. groups 
to the chronological age range of the groups studied.
As can be seen, once again the emergent curve 
indicates that the lower the C.A., the further from 
chance expectation is the scoring curve.
4. intra-group scores
Further analyses from the data obtained in Study 
Two were concerned with various intra-group variables.
TABLE 23a compares the intra-group scores obtained 
by the three sex-division teams (i.e. M-M, M-F, F-F) in 
each C.A. group.
TABLE 23b compares the male and female scores 
obtained by each C.A. group.
TABLE 23c compares the concrete and abstract symbol 
hits obtained by each C.A. group.
a) dyad scores
From TABLE 23af the scores obtained by the actual 
dyads who participated in the . Study can be observed.
It will be recalled that dyads were divided into three 
categoriesi dyads composed of two male Subjects (M-M), 
dyads composed of one male and one female Subject (M-F),
and dyads composed of two female subjects (F-F). In 
each C.A. group there were 8 dyads composed of two male 
Subjects, 8 dyads composed of two female Subjects and 9 
dyads composed of one male and one female Subject.
The simplest way of seeing whether there are, in 
fact, any intra-group scoring differences is to compare 
the mean score obtained by each of the three Subject 
dyads within each C.A. group.
TABLE .23a^  gives the data necessary for such a 
comparison.
From TABLE 23a^, it can be easily seen that the 
mean scores obtained by the dyad in each C.A. group are 
very similar. The greatest variation in means can be 
observed between the M-F and F-F teams in Group B^. In 
this case, there is a mean scoring difference of .9.
A t-test was performed between these two teams to 
determine if any statistically.significant difference 
existed.
There was no significant statistical difference 
found in the paranormal cognition ability between the 
two dyads where there existed the largest mean scoring 
difference. It follows,then, that no team scoring 
differences exist between any of the teams in the three
C.A. groups (t « 2.306; d£ » 8 ; p * n.s.).
b) sex differences
TABLE 23b compares the total scores obtained by 
the male and female Subjects in each C.A. group.
It can be seen once again that these scores are 
highly similar to each other. From the wilcoxon-matched-j- 
pair test, a statistical analysis of these scores revealed 
no significant scoring differences between the male and 
female Subjects within each group.
( zai * -l.*2; p = .12 *= n.s.) ; (zfil « -1.8; p * .3 = 
n.s.); (zcl = -.3; p = .4 = n.s.).
It can also be seen from TABLE 23b that the total 
scores obtained by all the male and female Subjects 
employed in the Study show no significant difference 
in scoring.
It is clear, therefore, by the comparison of male and 
female scores obtained within each C.A. group and overall, 
that there are no significant differences in scoring due 
to superior ability by one of the two sexes in employing 
paranormal cognition within an experimental situation.
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A second series of t-tests were made to see if there 
were any differences observed in the male and female 
scores obtained by sub-groups in Group C^.
TABLE 23b shows the male and female sub-group scores 
obtained by Subjects in C.A. Group C^.
A t-test was performed between scores obtained by 
males and females in sub-groups C^A, C^ B- and C^C. In 
none of the cases was a significant t-statistic found 
at the 0.05% level.
(t = 2.365; df ® 7; p = n.s.); (t = 2.365; df * 7; p = n.s.)
(t = 2.365; df is 7; p = n.s.).
Therefore, there were no male and female scoring 
differences within any of the sub-groups in Group C^.
c) concrete and abstract symbol scores
TABLE 23c. compares the total number of correct hits
obtained by each c.A. group when the target was either a
concrete or abstract symbol.
It can be clearly seen that when comparing the total 
number of concrete and abstract symbol hits obtained by 
each C.A. group, there is a great similarity in the scoring
for target symbols. It is, in fact, only in Group C, 
where the greatest target scoring difference occurs 
and there are 5 more abstract symbol hits than concrete 
symbol hits.
From the Wilcoxon-matched-pairs test for this group 
a statistical analysis was made to determine whether such 
a difference was, in fact, statistically significant.
It was not.
(zCi = -.18; p = .42 « n.s.).
Similarly, when looking at the overall number of 
target hits made by all three C.A. groups, no 
statistically significant difference between the total 
number of concrete or abstract symbol hits obtained 
emerges.
Also from TABLE 23c, it can be seen that in all 
the C.A. groups, there was no scoring difference of 
more than three hits by either males or females with 
regard to target symbols.
Therefore, it is clear that there was neither any 
age nor sex scoring preference for concrete or abstract 
symbol scores obtained .in... Study two. .
TABLE 23a INTRA-GROUP RESULTS
_ _  |j. , , . _
1, DYAD SCORES
GROUP M-M HITS M-F HITS F-F HITS
■ Ai  ; '
71 77 73
B!
52 65 50
c
1
39 U8 38
TOTAL 162 190 l6l
TABLE 2 3aj INTRA-GROUP RESULTS.
MEAN DYAD SCORES
GROUP MEAN M-M • 
SCORE
MEAN M-F. 
SCORE
' MEAN F-F ' 
SCORE
V 8.9 8.7 9.0
B
1
6.5 7.2 6.3
: ci U.8 5.3 M
TABLE 23b . , INTRA-GROUP RESULTS
2. MALE/FEMALE SCORES
GROUP MALE SUBJECT 
HITS
. FEMALE SUBJECT 
HITS
TOTAL
V
" 1 1 3  . 108 221
B1 80 87 . 167
C1
60 65 125
TOTAL 253 260 513
TABLE 23b1 INTRA-GROUP SCORES
1. MALE AND FEMALE
SUB-GROUP SCORES
SUB-GROUP MALE SCORES FEMALE SCORES TOTAL
C^A 28 23 51
C1B 21 18 39
C1C 18 17 35
TOTAL 67 58 125
TABLE 23c INTRA-GROUP RESULTS
3. CONCRETE/ABSTRACT 
SYMBOL SCORES
GROUP CONCRETE SYMBOL SCORES ABSTRACT SYMBOL SCORES
MALES FEMALES MALES FEMALES
A1 57 55 56 53
B1 40 44 40 43
C1 29 31 31 34
TOTAL 126' 130 127 130
TOTAL 256 257
5. first and last target «hits'
TABLE 24 shows the frequency of first trial ‘hits* 
for each of the chronological age groups.
TABLE 25 shows the frequency of last trial ‘hits* 
for each of the chronological age groups.
TABLE 26 shows the frequency of male and female 
1st trial concrete symbol and abstract symbol •hits ' .
TABLE 27 shows the frequency of male and female 
last trial concrete and abstract symbol 'hits*•
A chi-square analysis of the scores obtained by 
each of the three C.A. groups in their first and last 
trial hits revealed a highly significant above-chance 
scoring level obtained by all C.A. groups in both first 
and last trial hits.
(x2A p » 9.1; p L .01); (x2fi p= 12.2; p ^ .001);
. 1 1
(x2Cip = 6.2; P L .02); (x2 = 15.9; P L .001);
(^BjL “ 15,9 : p ^  *001): X. 25.0; p £.001) .
Therefore, all three C.A. groups in Study two 
obtained highly significant above chance first and last
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trial scores.
FIGURE 5 in APPENDIX D gives a comparison of first 
and last paranormal cognition trial hits to the C.A. 
range of the three groups studied. It is evident from 
this graph that all groups obtained scores at levels far 
above those predicted by chance and that no C.A. variation 
appears as it does in the overall group scores.
Once again, these highly significant scoring levels 
for the three C.A. groups can be considered as being 
supportive of the hypothesis that paranormal cognition 
becomes more observable in all C.A. groups if internal 
cognition is either impaired or affected by variables which 
have a tendency to reduce self-1conscious’ cognition.
TABLE 26 shows the frequency of first trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
As there are no obvious large scoring differences 
and because of the comparatively small number of hits 
obtained by each individual C.A. group it is best to look 
at the overall total results to see if there result any 
biases either for the type of target symbol or for sex 
preference.
From TABLE 26, it is instantly clear that there 
emerges no preferential first trial hit bias for either 
concrete or abstract symbols overall (C * 15; A * 18).
It is also clear that this lack of bias is common to 
both males (C =7; A =9) and females (C n 8; A » 9).
Finally, it is also clear that there is no overall 
difference in the total number of first trial hits 
obtained by males and females in the C.A. groups (M «= 16; 
F = 17). '
TABLE 27 shows the frequency of last trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
Once again, as there are no obviously large scoring 
differences and because of the small number of hits 
recorded, it is best to look at the overall total results 
to see if any sex or target symbol biases emerge.
From TABLE 27, there emerges no preferential last 
trial hit bias for either concrete or abstract symbols 
overall (C = 19, A = 22). It is clear that this, lack of 
bias is common to both males (C « 11; A » 10) and females 
(C * 8; A a 12).
Finally, it is also clear that there is no overall 
difference in the total number of last trial hits obtained 
by males and females in the three C.A. groups (Ms21; F=20).
FIRST TRIAL HITS
GROUP
EXPECTED 
FIRST TRIAL HITS
OBSERVED 
FIRST TRIAL HITS
NO. OF ABOVE CHANCE 
FIRST TRIAL HITS
■ *
A1 5 n 6
B1 5 12 7
Ci 5 10 5
TOTAL 15 33 18
TABLE 25 FREQUENCY OF EXPECTED AND OBSERVED 
LAST TRIAL HITS
EXPECTED OBSERVED NO. OF ABOVE CHANCE
GROUP LAST TRIAL HITS LAST TRIAL HITS LAST TRIAL HITS
Al 5 13 8 ■
B1 5 ' 13 8
C1
1
5 . 15 10
TOTAL 15 41 26 » -
GROUP SEX
If .
FIRST TRIAL 
CONCRETE HITS
FIRST TRIAL 
ABSTRACT HITS TOTAL
Ai
M 3 : 2 5
F 2 '■ 4 G
Bi
M • 2 3 5
F 4 - 3 7
Ci
M 2 4 6
F 2 2 4
TOTAL
• M - 7 : 9 16
F 8 9 17
TABLE 27 FREQUENCY OF MALE/FEMALE/CONCRETE/ABSTRACT
LAST TRIAL HITS
GROUP SEX
LAST TRIAL 
CONCRETE HITS
LAST TRIAL 
ABSTRACT HITS TOTAL
M 3 2 5
,A!
F ' 3 5 8
M ■ 4 3 7
B1
F 3 ■ 3 6
M ‘ 4 5 9
C1 F 2 4 6
M 11 10 21
TOTAL
F S 12 20
6. range and rank order of hits
TABLE 28 indicates the range, of hits and rank order 
of scores obtained by each of the chronological age 
groups. Once again it can be observed that in Group A 
(the 3.3 - 3*7 year olds) there are no dyads from the 
total of 25 that scored at or below chance level.
7. mean scores
TABLE 29 indicates the mean score obtained by each 
of the groups. As can be seen, the mean scoring obtained 
by the three C.A. groups are of obvious difference.
Once again, the lower the C.A. of the group, the higher 
is the mean paranormal cognition score obtained.
8. target choice positional arrangement
TABLE 30 shows the total number of positional choices 
made by both the 1 senders' and 'receivers' of each 
chronological age group studied. It can be seen that 
there was, again, no significant positional bias in the 
subjects' choices. A statistical analysis of the observed 
positional arrangements shows that the total number of 
each positional arrangement does not deviate significantly 
from a positional arrangement expected by chance.
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(x2e * ,08; p = n.s*); (x2 * .003; p * n.s.);
S1 2
(x2 * 
3
.12; p * n.s.); (X2 ■ .
4
.003; p * n.s.)
(x2 = 
5
.003 ; p * n.s.) .03; p » n.s.)
(x2r = 
2
.03; p * n.s.); .27; p * n.s.);
(x2 * 
R4
.08; P * n.s.); (x2 - 
5
.05; p *= n.s.).
Therefore, once again, it has been shown that the 
highly significant results obtained cannot be said to 
have been due to any positional preference on the part 
of the Subjects.
TABLE 28 1 RANGE AND RANK ORDER OF HITS.
POSSIBLE HITS GROUP A1 HITS GROUP B1 HITS GROUP Cl H]
■; o V - . -
l : ; . 
o
- ■ - •
CL
' -3' ■ ■ _ 1 h
- 6
CHANGE : LEVEL
' 5 : . ■ i . 3 -• 6
. .: 6 i ' 6 6
7 ■' k V 7 ' 2  ' ■
. 8 5 8 -  -
■ 9  .v-
: 5  ' ■' .1 '
10 k - , -
11 3
12 2. -
13 . . .
Ik ■ “  - ■ ■ -  ■
' . 15 V - ""
16 - : ~
17 - -
18 - ~ '
19 ' - .
2 0
_ —
TABLE 29 ' ; MEAN NUMBER OF EXPECTED AND OBSERVED 'HITS* BY GROUPS
GROUP EXPECTED MEAN OBSERVED MEAN 0-E
A1 k.o . ■ 8.8U . k.Qk
B1 k.O 6 .6 8 2 .6 8
Cl k.o 5.0 1.0
TOTAL
C1 B1 
.
A1
GROUP
300
100
100
100
EXPECTED 
NO. 
OF 
POSITION 
. 
CHOICES
ro
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rovo
vo 6
6 vo
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TABLE 
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' 
CHOICE 
DISTRIBUTION:1 
SENDER 
(S). 
AND 
RECEIVER(R)
Summary of the Second Observational Study
The second C.A. study was an attempt to replicate 
the data obtained in the first C.A. study.
The experimental procedure followed was as exactly 
similar to the first C.A. experiment as possible, the 
only difference being that only the three C.A. groups 
who had obtained significant results in the first C.A.
study were employed. There was a total of 50 
Subjects in each C.A. group - 25 being male and 25 being 
female. Once again, wherever possible Subjects dyads 
were made up of Subjects of similar mental ages. Subjects 
were tested in teams of two, these being either male-male, 
male-female or female-female.
All other conditions, precautions and rules were 
followed exactly as possible to the first C.A. study.
The results obtained once again strongly confirmed 
all of the observational results obtained in the previous 
Experiment•
Firstly, it was found that all three groups obtained 
highly significantly above chance scores. This once 
again confirms the prediction that, in general, the ability 
to employ paranormal cognition is related to the lack of
ability to form internalised connections.
From the three C.A. groups tested, it was also 
found that the youngest C.A. group obtained significantly 
higher scores than either of the two other groups, and 
that the second youngest C.A. group obtained significantly 
higher scores than the third C.A. group.
Similarly, it was found that when the Subjects 
within the third C.A. group (which was composed of 
Subjects aged between 5 and 8 years of age) were sub­
divided into three C.A. sub-groups, the youngest C.A. 
sub-group obtained significantly higher scores than the 
remaining two.
Therefore, it can be seen once again from the 
second studythat a very clear inverse relation exists 
between paranormal cognition and chronological age and 
that since this relation virtually ceases to exist at 
the age of 8, there is a strong implication that this 
relation, in turn, is connected to the intellectual 
development of the Subjects.
Various other confirmatory results were obtained 
from this study.
Firstly, it was found that in none of the C.A. groups
individually or as a whole were there any significant 
scoring differences between males and females.
Secondly, there were also no significant scoring 
differences found between the three types of sex-dyads 
employed within each C.A. group, or overall.
Thirdly, there were no significant scoring 
differences found between the total number of concrete 
target and abstract target symbols employed correctly 
within each C.A. group and overall.
It was also found that within all three of the C.A. 
groups, there was a highly significant level of first 
and last trial 'hits1 obtained.
Therefore, the results obtained from the second C.A. 
study are highly confirmatory of the results obtained in 
the first C.A. study and lead, once again, to the 
conclusion that paranormal cognition both exists and is 
in some way dependent on intellectual development as 
measured by chronological age.
4. AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY WITH PRE-SELECTED RANDOM TARGETS
Outline of the Investigation
Following the highly significant above-chance scores 
obtained by the three youngest chronological age groups 
(i<>e. children between 3-8 years of age) in the two 
previous studies, it was considered necessary to demonstrate 
beyond any reasonable doubt that the results obtained were 
not due to unforeseen lack of control of the .studies 
or in the experimental setting itself.
It was decided that there were two possible, though 
unlikely, experimental controls which could be improved 
upon and which in their present state might account for 
these high results.
The first control was concerned with the experimental 
assistants. It was suggested that the assistants were 
themselves, either facilitating paranormal cognition by 
their concentration on the Subjects' choices, or, 
alternatively, were soleV responsible for the above-chance 
scores by either employing paranormal cognition between 
each other or in some way cheating.
The first part of this suggestion is rather improbable
since if it was the assistants who were employing para­
normal cognition then above-chance scores would be likely 
to have been obtained by all the groups in which they were 
present. This was clearly not the case. Secondly, if it 
were to be argued that the assistants showed signs of a 
special empathy with child Subjects, then all child 
Subjects (i.e. Groups A - E) should have obtained above 
chance scores. This was not so. Thirdly, when Group G 
(university students) was studied, the assistants acted 
as Subjects and showed no ability to obtain above-chance 
scores. However, it is true to say that due to the 
problems of working with young children their level of 
concentration was in fact higher and since they could 
see the Subjects1 choices (though, of course, only either 
the 'sender's' choice or the 'receiver's' choice - not 
both) then possibly this might have facilitated above­
chance scoring. As a precaution against this unlikely 
possibility, the procedure of the third study was changed 
so that rather than sitting beside the Subjects throughout 
the study , the assistant sat in front of them. In 
this way, they were unable to see the actual choice that 
the Subjects made but were still able to observe any 
attempts at cheating or come to the Subject's aid should 
he require it. As a further precaution, the stimulus 
choice cards were held face down so that only the Subjects 
actually saw the stimulus choices.
The second modified control is a far more important 
one and is concerned with the question of the 'sender1 
being able to choose the stimulus to be 'transmitted'. 
Although it is clear from TABLES 13 and 28 that choice 
distribution took place with no significant deviations 
from chance, it still remained that both sympathetic 
and antagonistic critics of the research pointed to this 
experimental innovation as somehow being a factor for the 
above-chance scores obtained by the younger subjects. It 
will be recalled that the reason for incorporating this 
feature into the study was an attempt to keep the younger 
'sender's' interest in the 'guessing game' for as long 
as possible. It was thought that giving them an active 
role in the study would maintain their interest and 
possibly influence the level of scoring by all the 
Subjects being tested.
In order to counter these criticisms, a set of 
studies was conducted in which the 'sender's', choice 
of stimulus targets was eliminated and the 'sender' was, 
in fact, presented with a one stimulus card which was 
randomised (via random number tables) both for picture 
representation and positional arrangement.
This task was easily accomplished by the construction 
of 5 blank cards whose function it was to cover the 
'sender's' stimulus choices. Each of these blank cards
had only one viewing space which corresponded exactly 
with one of the five stimulus targets on the stimulus 
cards. Each blank card was constructed, to allow only 
one of the five possible stimulus choices to be seen 
by the 'sender1. The five blank cards were randomised 
■(via random number tables) prior to each run and were 
presented on top of the stimulus choice card to each 
sender for all trials. In this way, the target stimuli 
which were presented to the ’sender’ were properly 
randomised independently both for target choice and for 
positional arrangement.
Procedure
As in the previous set of two studies, Subjects 
were tested in dyads (see TABLE 32). The procedure of 
the third study was exactly similar to the two previous 
studies with the exception of the two new precautions 
just discussed; namely:
a) experimental assistants did not.see.the 
stimulus choice being made by their 
Subject.
b) the ’sender’ was given a pre-arranged 
stimulus target card which was randomised 
for picture representation and position.
All other controls, apparatus and experimental
instructions were exactly the same as in the previous 
two studies.
All the Subjects tested were either in separate 
rooms, sound-proof booths, or in one large room 
separated by a heavy screen*
Because only the three youngest age groups had 
obtained above-chance scores previously, they were the 
only groups of concern in this study. One adult
group composed of university students was also tested 
for control precautions.
Group Breakdowns
TABLE 31 gives the educational origin and age of 
each of the chronological age groups studied, as well as 
their experimental setting.
TABLE 32 shows the sex composition of the 100 pairs 
of Subjects tested.
The total number of runs and trials given to each 
of the four chronological age groups is shown in TABLE 33.
As can be seen, as in the previous two studies,
Subjects were matched as closely as possible with 
regard to the numbers of each sex tested within 
each chronological age group and overall although 
it had, by then, been clearly demonstrated that 
sex was not a relevant factor.
TABLE 31 Group Breakdown
Group Origin Age Range 
(in years)
Experimental
Setting
: * 2
Nursery School 3*2 - 3*6 Separate Rooms
2 ;
Nursery School 4.5;- 4.9 Separate Rooms
C 2
Infant School 5.0 - 8.0 Room Separated 
By Screen
G 2
University 19 - 21 Sound-Proof
Booth
TABLE 32 Breakdown of Subjects
Group Subjects Dyads Dyad Total Total Number 
of Subjects
Males Females M-M ' M-F F-F
A2 25 25 8 ■; 9 8 25 50
B2 25 25 8 9 8 25 50
C2 26 24 9 .8 8 25 50
V 25 25 8 9 8 25 50
TABLE 33 Breakdown of Dyad Runs and Trials
Group Number of Dyads
-.
Number of .Rune Number of Trials 
(1 Run = 20 Trials)
. A2 25 25 500
. B2 25 : 25 500
°2 25 25 500
>2 25 25 500
Results
1. C.A« Group scores
TABLE 34 gives a breakdown of the expected and 
observed frequencies of ’hits1 (correct guesses) 
for each C,A. group.
TABLE 35 gives a breakdown of the percentage {%) 
of expected and observed hits for each chronological 
age group.
Once again , it can be observed directly from 
the raw data that some of the C.A. groups have 
obtained scores far above those that would be expected 
by chance alone.
A chi-square test of each of the four C.A. groups 
studied confirms the observation that the three youngest 
C.A. groups (i.e. Groups A2 to C2 - the 3 to 8 year olds) 
obtained scores at above chance levels, whereas Subjects 
in the university age group (Group G2) obtained scores
I*
288.
within the range expected by chance.
(X2a » 198.46; P .001); (X2B
2 2
.04; p * n.s.)•
68.16, p,/ .001);
2 2
The probability of obtaining these scores has been 
calculated as:
From these results it now appears highly likely that 
the scores obtained in the third study are explicable 
only by resorting to the phenomenon of paranormal 
cognition. Also that it is beyond reasonable doubt 
that the scores obtained in the two previous studies 
were attributable to the same phenomenon and did not 
arise from an undetected biased sampling on the part of 
the Subjects.
A Wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis was made between 
all the C.A. groups in Study Three. It was found 
that Subjects in C.A. Group A2 obtained significantly 
greater scores than Subjects in C,.A. Groups B2 
(Z * -.2.1704; p = .015), C2 (Z * - 2.48; p « .006) and
pA * 3.52 x lO-37 . p * 2.86 x 10"20 
2 2
»
2
2.34 x 10“3 ; p., = 4.38 x 10-2.
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G2 (Z = — 2*7; p = .001). Subjects in C.A. Group B2 
obtained significantly greater scores than Subjects in 
C.A. Groups C2 (Z » -2.34; p « .014) and G2 (Z * -2.6; 
p *= .006). Subjects in C.A. Group C2 obtained a 
significantly greater score than Subjects in C.A.
Group g2 (z « -2.4; p » .01).
Therefore, once again, there is a very clear 
statistically confirmed inverse relationship between 
C.A. and paranormal cognition.
2. sub-group scores
Because of the differences observed in the 5 - 8  
year old Subject groups in the first and second studies, 
it is of importance to analyse the data obtained by 
similarly aged Subjects in study 3 to see whether 
differences observed previously will reappear.
It will be recalled that in the previous studies, 
the youngest aged Subjects in this group ( 5 - 6  year olds) 
scored significantly higher than both the 6 - 7  and 7 - 8  
year olds in the group.
It is convenient then, to divide Group C2 into three 
similar sub-groups.
As can be seen from TABLE .36 the three sub-groups 
in Group C2 were each evenly distributed. There was a 
total of 25 male Subjects and 25 female Subjects in 
Group C2.
TABLE 36 THE THREE SUB-GROUPS IN GROUP CP.
SUB-GROUP AGE OF Ss IN 
SUB-GROUP
NUMBER OF Ss 
IN SUB-GROUP
TEAMS (OF 2 Ss)
M-M M-F F-F
C2A . 5.1 - 5.9 18 3 3 3
mCM
O
6.1 - 6.8 16 3 2 3
C2C 7.0 - 7.9 16 3 2 3
TABLE 37 shows the breakdown of scoring in each of 
the three sub-groups•
TABLE 37 SCORES OBTAINED BY GROUP Cx SUBJECTS BROKEN
DOWN INTO SUB-GROUPS
SUB-GROUP EXPECTED SCORE OBSERVED SCORE 0-E MEAN SCORE
_ 'v C2A 36 58 22 6.44
CM
O
32 34 2 4.25
C2C 32 30 -2 3.75
A t-test was performed between sub-group C ^  and 
sub-group C2B to see if any difference existed between
the 5 — 6 year old and 6 - 7 year old Subjects1 
performance in the paranormal cognition study. ,
From these results it was observed that a significant 
difference exists between sub-group and C2B 
performance (t *■ 2.921; df * 16; p * .01).
A second t-test was conducted between sub-group 
C2A arjc* C2C tes* whether, there was any difference 
between the 5 - 6 year old and 7 — 8 year old Subjects V 
performance. Once again it was found that there exists 
a significant difference between sub-groups'and C2c 
performance in paranormal cognition (t * 2.977; df * 14;
p * .01)•
A third t-test was performed between sub-groups C2B 
and C2C to test whether there was any difference between 
the 6 - 7 and 7 - 8 year old Subjects1 performance. In 
this case, no significant difference in the scores obtained 
by sub-groups C2B and C2C Subjects was found (t * 2.145; 
df « 14; p * n.s.).
From these results,.it is once again clear that the 
youngest sub-group was mainly responsible for the 
significant above-chance overall score of Group C2 
Subjects. This is in keeping with our Experimental 
hypothesis. It is also clear from these results that by 
the age of 6 -  8 the scoring level drops to levels close 
to those expected by chance.
3* Graphs
FIGURE 6 in APPENDIX D compares the mean paranormal ; 
cognition score obtained by each of the 4 C.A. Groups 
to the chronological age range of the groups studied.
As can be clearly noted, an above-chance level curve 
indicates once again that the lower the C.A. of the 
Group, the further from chance expectation is the scoring 
curve.
4. Intra-group results
It is now necessary to take a closer look at the 
intra-group scores obtained by subjects in Study 3, 
to see if there are any other obvious variables which 
might be influencing the scoring levels obtained.
TABLE 38a compares the intra-group scores obtained 
by the three sex^division dyads (i.e. M-M, M-F, F-F) •
TABLE 38b compares the intra-group scores obtained 
by the male and female Subjects in each C.A. group.
TABLE 38c compares the concrete and abstract symbol 
hits obtained by each of the C.A. groups.
a) dyad scores
From TABLE 38a, the scores obtained by the actual 
dyads who participated in the study can be observed.
In each chronological age group there were three categories 
of dyads: two male subjects (M-M), two female subjects (F-F) 
and one male, one female subject (M-F).
A t-statistic ofthe mean intra-group scores for 
each C.A. dyad was calculated. In several cases, 
significant scoring differences were found. These were:-
In Group A,,:
between M-M and M-F teams, (p /  .01)
M-F and F-F teams (p L. .05)
In Group B2:
between M-M and F-F teams (p A  .01)
M-F arid F-F teams (p /  .01)
In Group D^:
between M-M and M-F teams (p • 01)
M-M and F-F teams (p ^ .05)
M-F and F-F teams (p .01)
The remaining intra-team scores were insignificant. 
Therefore, unlike the previous two experiments several 
significant intra-team differences emerge.
A possible explanation for this observation, however
is that significant differences may simply be due to
the relatively small sample in each . 5 ^  \-group. It is 
important now to see whether any significant differences 
between male and female scores emerge* Should they do so 
then a further indication as to the reason for this 
discrepancy might be made clearer*
b) sex differences
From TABLE 38b, a comparison of the total scores
obtained by male and female subjects in each C.A. group
can be studied.
It can be clearly seen in this study as well
that male and female scores are highly similar to each
other. From the Wileoxon matched pairs test, a 
statistical analysis of these scores revealed no 
significant differences between the male and female 
subjects within each C.A. group.
(Z. * *■*«31; p * . 402 * n * s.) ; (Zn ** *“1.9; P * • 29 * n
2 2
(Zp, » -1.1; p * .14 » n.s.); (Zn = -1.0; p * .11 « n 
2 2
It can also be readily seen from TABLE 38b that the 
total scores obtained by all the male and female subjects 
employed in the study • show no significant scoring
differences (M « 311; F * 309).
TABLE 38^ shows the scores obtained by the male 
and female subjects in each sub-group in Group C2*
A t-test was performed between male and female 
subjects in sub-group to see if any difference 
existed between 5-6 year old male and female performance 
in paranormal cognition. There was no significant 
statistical difference found between male and female 
subject performance in paranormal cognition in sub-group 
C2A. (t « 2.365; df * 7; p « n.s.).
A second t-test was performed between male and 
female subject performance in sub-group C2fi. No 
significant statistical difference was found in this 
sub-group either, (t * 2.365; df * 7; p * n.s.).
Similarly, a third t-test was made between male 
and female subject performance in sub-group C2C. No 
significant statistical difference was found in this 
case, (t » 2.571; df * 5; p « n.s.).
From the breakdown of Group C2 into three 
chronological age sub-groups it is clear that no
significant sex differences in scoring exist. This 
is in keeping with our previous findings that no sex
differences in scoring appeared in any of the sub­
groups.
Because there are no significant differences in the 
male and female group and overall scores in Study Three, 
it becomes clearer that the significant differences that 
emerged in several of the dyads seem more likely to be . 
due to scoring variation due to the small size of the 
sample rather than to any intra-group variables previously 
unnoticed in the first two studies.
c) concrete and abstract symbol scores
TABLE 38c compares the total number of correct hits 
obtained by each C.A. group when the target was either a 
concrete or abstract symbol.
It can be clearly seen that upon comparison of the 
total number of concrete and abstract symbol hits obtained 
by each C.A. group there is a great similarity in the 
scoring for target symbols (ABSTRACT: M * 156, F * 155V 
CONCRETE: M *  155; F * 154).
It is evident that there is no overall difference 
in Male/Female scoring preference for concrete or abstract
symbols
299.
The one group which recorded the greatest Male-Female 
scoring difference was Group B2* Here, male subjects 
scored five more concrete symbol hits than female subjects*
From the Wilcoxon matched pairs analysis for this 
group, it was determined that this difference was not 
significant*
(Zr, * -*18; p * *42 * n.s*)
2 ...
It appears that there were no significant sex differences 
in correct symbol choice*
TABLE 38a INTRA-GROUP SCORES 1. Dyad Scores
GROUP M-M HITS M-F HITS F-F HITS
A2 78 75 73
b 2 50 60 64
C2 43 39 40
G2 32 26 40
TABLE 38b INTRA-GROUP SCORES 2. Male/Female Scores
GROUP MALE SUBJECT HITS FEMALE SUBJECT HITS TOTAL
A2 114 112 226
B2 83 91 174
C2 64 58 122
G2 50 48 98
TOTAL 311 309 620
TABLE 38b1 INTRA-GROUP SCORES
2. MALE AND FEMALE SCORES
SUB-GROUP MALE SCORE FEMALE SCORE TOTAL
■ V
- '
• 31 ■.,■■■: 27 58
C_B 15 19 3b2 .i '
C C 16 lh 30
2
,
: ' ..
TOTAL
62
I
. ■ 6o '
I
122
TABLE 38c INTRA-GROUP RESULTS 3. CONCRETE /ABSTRACT
SymbOl SCORES.
GROUP CONCRETE SYMBOL SCORES ABSTRACT SYMBOL SCORES
MALES FEMALES MALES FEMALES
A2 56 56 58 56
B 2 42 47 41 44
C2 32 29 32 29
G2 25 22 25 26
TOTAL 155 154 156 155
TOTAL 309 311
301.
5* first and last target hits
TABLE 39 shows the frequency of expected and observed
first trial hits for each of the.C.A. groups.
Similarly, TABLE 40 shows the frequency of expected 
and observed last trial hits for each of the C.A. groups*
TABLE 41 shows the frequency of concrete and abstract
symbol first trial hits by male and female subjects in the 
four C.A. groups*
TABLE 42 shows the frequency of concrete and abstract 
symbol last trial hits by male and female subjects in the 
four C.A. groups•
A chi-square analysis of the scores obtained by each 
of the four C.A. groups in their first and last trial hits 
reveals a highly significant above-chance scoring level 
obtained by all C.A. groups in both first and last trial 
hits.
(x2 * 14.4; P/. .001); <*V - 14.4; P ^ .001);
(x2c2F “ 14.4; P I .001); “V - io.5; P L .01).
(x2 « 
A2L
22.3; .001); (x2^
2 •
22*3; P L .001);
 ^X^C gL ” 14.4; .001); (x 2g 2l * 17*3; P f *001).
Therefore, all four C.A, groups in Study three 
obtained highly significantly above-chance first and last 
trial scores*
FIGURE7 in APPENDIX D gives a comparison of first 
and last paranormal cognition trial hits to the C.A. 
range of the groups studied. It is evident from this 
graph that all groups scored at levels far above those 
predicted by chance and that no C.A. variation appears as 
it does so strongly in the overall group scores*
Once again, the highly significant scoring levels 
obtained for all four groups add support to the hypothesis 
that paranormal cognition would be more noticeable in all 
C.A. groups when internal cognition is either impaired or 
affected by variables which have a tendency to minimise 
self-related cognition.
TABLE 41 shows the frequency of first trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
As there are no obvious large scoring differences and 
because of the comparatively small number of hits obtained 
by each individual C.A. group, it is best to look at the 
overall total results to see if there exist any biases 
either for the type of target symbol or for sex preference.
From TABLE 41, it is clear that there emerges no 
preferential first trial hit bias for either concrete or 
abstract symbols overall (C * 24; A * 23)# It is also 
clear that this lack of bias is common both to males (C » 
A * 13) and females (C =13; A * 10)•
Finally, it is also clear that there is no overall 
difference in the total number of first trial hits 
obtained by males and females in the C.A, groups (M =28; 
F » 25)«
TABLE 42 shows the frequency of last trial concrete 
and abstract symbol hits made by males and females in 
each C.A. group.
Once again, as there are no obviously large scoring 
differences and because of the small number of hits 
recorded, it is best to look at the overall total results 
to see if any sex or target symbol biases emerge.
As in the previous studies, there emerges no 
preferential last trial hit bias for either concrete or 
abstract symbols overall (C>  27; A « 26). It is clear 
that this lack of bias is common to both males (C =13;
A « 15) and females (C =14; A = 11)•
304*
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TABLE hi. FREQUENCY OF MALE/FEMALE - CONCRETE/ABSTRACT
1st TRIAL HITS.
GROUP SEX 1st TRIAL CONCRETE HITS 1st TRIAL ABSTRACT HITS TOTAL
A2 MF
h\
' ' 3 ‘ /
2
3.
6 ■ 
* 6
V M 3 i ' k ■ .7cL F. ' 3 2 5
C2 ; M - 3 ■ 5 'CL F .5 2 7
G : m ■ 2 ■ k ■ 62 F• . ' 2 ....■■■• ’ 3; • 5
TOTAL ■ M ■■'! n 13 2k
F , i 13 10 23
TABLE h2. FREQUENCY OF MALE/FEMALE - CONCRETE/ABSTRACT
: LAST TRIAL HITS.
GROUP
■ f ■ ■ ■
SEX } LAST TRIAL CONCRETE HITS LAST TRIAL ABSTRACT HITS TOTAL
V
•
M ' h k 82 F. . 3• 3 '
6
M 2 7 •
d: F ■ h 3 7
Cp M ’ - ' 3 3 6c. F k 2 6
GP : M j )| 3 7d F ■ 3 3 6
TOTAL M IS 13 . 15 28
F ■- -1^ 11 i' 25
Finally/ it is also ciesir that there is no overall 
difference in the total" number of last trial hits 
obtained by males and females in the four C.A. groups 
(M » 28; F
---•— - 6. —  range-and rank-order of hits  ---
•v ' . •
TABLE 43 indicates the range of hits and rank-order 
of scores obtained by-each-of the C.A. groups0 It can be 
easily observed that in GROUP A2 (the 3.2 - 3.6 year olds)
there are no teams from the total of 25 which scored at
l'1 . . .  .1:, . .[ : : •
or below chance level*—  —  -
7. mean scores
TABLE 44 indicates, the!mean score obtained by each 
of the chronological age groups.
Once againf-“from-these—two-tables it is clear that 
the mean scores obtained for each group are not due to 
any individual highly successful teams but rather to an 
overall group .ability in employing paranormal cognition 
successfully.
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Summary of the Observational Study with Pre-Selected 
Random Targets
The third C.A* study was an attempt to determine 
whether the results obtained in the first and second 
C.A. Studies were wholly or partly dependent on 
either ‘sender1 choice of targets or on the experimental 
assistants* conscious or sub-conscious aid via clues, or 
both.
As such, the experimental procedure followedvas as 
exactly similar as possible to the two previous C.A. 
Experiments with the exception of the two following 
changes:
1) ‘senders* were given pre-selected 
randomised targets to ‘transmit* to 
the receiver
2) the experimental assistants sat in front 
of the Subjects rather than beside them 
and could not therefore look at the 
target choice.
There were four experimental C.A. groups tested 
in all the three C.A. groups tested in the previous two 
Studies and an adult group composed of university
Subjects. Each C.A. group was composed of 50 subjects -
25 being male,. 25 female. Subjects were, as always, 
tested in teams of two, these being either male-male, male 
female, or *female-femalei.. Wherever possible, the teams 
chosen were made up of Subjects who had similar mental 
ages.
All other conditions, precautions and rules with 
the exception of the two changes made above were followed as 
closely as possible to the first and second C.A,
Experiment.
The experimental results obtained once again strongly 
confirmed air of the experimental results obtained in the 
two previous Studies.
Firstly, it was found that the three youngest C.A. 
groups obtained highly-significantly above-chance scores, 
whereas the university C.A. group obtained a score clearly 
within the limits of chance. These results once again 
confirm the findings of the two previous Experiments in 
which it was found that, in general, the ability to employ 
paranormal cognition diminishes as the Subject develops 
his ability to employ complex internal connections. In 
keeping with Piagetian theory, such an ability would be 
expected to appear at around the age of eight in our 
society.
In the three C.A. groups in which paranormal cognition
ability was found, it was once.again seen that the 
youngest C.A. group obtained significantly higher scores 
than either of the two other groups and that the second 
youngest C.A. group obtained significantly higher scores 
than the third C.A. group.
Similarly, it was found that when the Subjects 
within the third C.A. group (which was composed of 
Subjects between 5 and 8 years of age) were sub-divided 
into three C.A. sub-groups, the youngest C.A. sub-group 
obtained significantly higher scores than the remaining 
two.
Therefore, it can be seen from Study Three 
as well that a very clear inverse relation exists 
between paranormal cognition and chronological age and 
that since such a relation virtually ceases to exist 
at the age of 8 (where it 'levels out' at chance limits), 
there is a very strong implication that this relation is, 
in turn, connected to the intellectual development of the 
Subjects.
Various other confirmatory results were obtained 
from this Study.• .
Firstly, it was found that in none of the C.A. groups 
either individually or as a whole, were there any
significant scoring differences between males and females.
Secondly, while there were in some cases significant 
scoring differences found between the three types of sex-team 
employed within each C.A. group, it seems likely that 
such differences are mainly due to the score variations 
brought about by the small sample size.
Thirdly, there were no significant scoring differences 
found between the total number of concrete and abstract 
target symbols employed correctly within each C.A. group 
and overall.
It was also found, once again, that in ail of the 
C.A. groups tested in Study Three there was a highly
significant level of first and last trial 'hits' obtained.
This final result indicates that the above chance 
scores being obtained by the three youngest C.A. groups 
are genuine cases of paranormal cognition ability on the 
parts of the Subjects alone and not due to experimental 
faults or errors.
The results obtained from the third C.A. study are 
therefore most highly confirmatory both of the results 
obtained and conclusions made in the previous two 
studies, and of the validity of the experimental technique 
employed.
5. A COMPARISON OF SCORES OBTAINED BY C.A. GROUPS IN
THE THREE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
It is now necessary to compare chronological age 
group scores obtained in the first and second studies 
where 'senders' were allowed to choose the target to 
chronological age group scores obtained in the third 
study where 'senders' were given pre-selected targets
which were randomised for picture representation and 
position.
TABLE 45 gives a comparison of the mean scores obtained 
by the same chronological age groups in all three 
studies.
It can be clearly seen from a comparison of the mean 
scores obtained by each C.A. group in the three C.A.
studies that there is no significant difference in
the scores.
A product moment correlation was made for results 
obtained in the three separate studies by the three youngest 
C.A. groups and by the university group.
In all cases, correlation coefficients were very close 
to unity indicating that scores obtained in the three studies
were slightly similar to each other
^A+A-f *915 rA+A2= ‘92: rA1+A2= *89! rB+Bl= *84! 
rB 4B2= *91’ rB^+B2= *90’ rC+C1’n *90' rC+C2”’ 9!
T°\+CZ *92’ r<3+G2= *9^
FIGURE EIGHT in APPENDIX D shows a comparison of 
the mean paranormal cognition scores obtained by the 
three youngest C.A* groups in the three observational 
studies. As can be seen, all three curves fall within 
a very similar range, indicating a very high correlation 
of scoring in the three studies.
This is a strong indication that the ability to 
employ paranormal cognition by Subjects aged between 3 
and 8 years of age is a real phenomenon and not simply 
due to the availability of target choice on the part of 
the senders as was the case in Studies One and Two 
but not in Study Three.
A comparison of the scores obtained by the same C.A. 
groups in the three different studies showed a very high 
similarity in group scoring throughout. These results 
indicate that chronological age is a strong indicator of 
high paranormal ability scoring.
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6. GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE THREE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
In three separate studies concerned with the effects 
of chronological age on paranormal cognition, it was 
shown that there is strong evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that paranormal cognition is observable in 
Subjects aged up to eight years.
With the increase of chronological age there is a 
steady and repeated decline in paranormal cognition 
scoring such that by the age of eight scores are well 
within chance expectation, where they remain for all 
succeeding ages.
The decline effect observed also indicated repeatedly 
significant scoring differences between the three C.A, 
groups studied which were under the age of eight, such 
that the younger the C.A. of the group, the higher was the 
group paranormal cognition score.
Overall, in all three studies, there were no 
significant scoring differences observed between males 
and females or dyads made up of the same or opposite 
sexes.
Similarly, there were no observed scoring preferences 
for either concrete or abstract target symbols.
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Also of interest was the continual evidence of very 
highly above-chance scoring for first and last trial 
* hitsV for all C.A. groups, with no significant scoring 
differences between C.A. groups. These results have 
been seen as further indications in agreement with 
the hypothesis that paranormal cognition would be most 
clearly observable in all C.A. groups during situations 
in which self-related cognition is either prevented or 
strongly impeded.
Finally, the correlations made for the different 
C.A. group scores obtained in the three separate studies, 
indicated a highly positive similarity in scoring 
throughout the studies.
These results indicate that chronological age should 
be a strong and stable indicator for paranormal 
cognition scoring ability.
7. THE I.Q. VARIABLES IN THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
Before considering the specific I.Q. Experiments 
which were designed, it is of interest to note several 
mental age effects that have appeared in the first 
three observational studies.
1. first half/last half scores
Firstly, it must be recalled that the Subjects in 
the three observational studies were divided as closely 
as possible on the basis of cognitive ability. If our 
hypothesis that Subjects of the same mental and 
chronological age employ paranormal cognition to the same 
measurable amount is correct, then it should follow that, 
in general, the number of hits obtained in the first half 
of each run (i.e. the first 10 trials) should be equal 
to the number of hits obtained in the second half of 
each run (i.e. the last 10 trials).
It will be recalled that the two Subjects in each 
dyad reversed roles at the half-way point of each run.
TABLE 46 shows the number of hits obtained in each 
half-run by each C.A. group in the three studies.
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TABLE 46
A COMPARISON OF THE CHRONOLOGICAL AGE GROUP HITS IN THE 
FIRST HALF AND SECOND HALF OF THE TOTAL RUNS MADE
GROUP AGE TOTAL NUMBER 
OF RUNS MADE
FIRST HALF HITS 
(TRIALS 1-10)
LAST HALF HITS 
(TRIALS 11-20)
DIFFERENCE 
(FIRST - 
LAST)
A 3.3 - 3.7 50 226 225 + 1
A1 3.3 - 3.7 25 111, 110 + 1
A2 3.2 - 3.6 25 .112 114 - 2
B 4.5 - 4.9 50 180 181 - 1
B1 4.5 - 4.9 25 88 86 + 2
B2 4.5 - 4.9 25 88 85 + 3
C ; . . 5.2 - 7.8 50 131 130 + 1
ci 5.2 - 7.8 25 65 60 + 5
C2 5.0 - 8.0 25 62 60 + 2
D 8.0-10.0 50 105 107 - 2
E 11.0 -13.0 50 99 93 + 6
F 14.0-17.0 50 • 102 99 + 3
G 19.0 -22.0 50 101 99 + 2
G2 19.0 -21.0 25 48 50 - 2
H 24.0 -35.0 50 95 103 - 8
J 40.0 -54.0 50 105 103 • + 2
K 65.0 -70.0 50 107 107 o
TOTAL 675 1825 1812 + 13
The difference between the total number of hits 
obtained in the first half and last half of each run 
made by all the C.A. groups studied in the three 
observational studies is only 13 (on the first half).
It is obvious then, that there is no measurable difference 
in the number of hits obtained in the first and last 
half of each run and that therefore our hypothesis 
that Subjects of the same chronological ages and highly 
similar I.Q.*s tend to employ paranormal cognition 
equally successfully has been shown to be correct.
An analysis employing the Wilcoxon matched-pair 
signed-ranks test gave statistical credence to this 
observation#
(Z ** '*“1 • 06 i p s «15 = K«s*)»
There are also several other features that can be 
observed directly from the dyad data of the three • 
Observational Studies.
2. scoring similarity
First of all, we can study the similarity in dyad 
scores; that is, the number of dyads in which both 
Subjects obtained the same score. We can then compare 
the similarity in scores to the similarity in I.Q.
It is convenient to divide I.Q* scores into three 
categories:
1) High I.Q. (H)
2) Average I.Q. (A)
3) Low I.Q. (L)
It is important, however, to recall that this division 
and subsequent division of Subjects into these three 
categories was based either on independent I.Q. studies 
to which theExperimenter had access or, alternatively, 
entirely on teacher or head-mistress evaluation.
Therefore, the interpretive value of this data while of 
interest is not of sufficient substance to allow for 
any valid conclusions.
TABLE 47 shows the number of dyads whose Subjects 
obtained the same scores in the first and second half of 
each run. It also points out, where possible (only school 
Subjects were divided into I.Q. categories), the I.Q. 
categories of the two Subjects.
If we consider only the school age groups (i.e.
Groups A - F inclusive), it becomes clear that of the 
total number of dyads whose Subjects scored the same number 
of hits in the first and second half of the run, 80% were 
composed of dyads in the same I.Q. category. TABLE 48 gives 
this figure in a tabular form.
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TABLE 48 % NUMBER OF DYADS WITH SAME SCORES AND I.Q.
GROUP TOTAL NO. OF DYADS WITH 
SAME SCORE
TOTAL NO. OF 
SAME SCORE 
DYADS WITH 
SAME I.Q.
% OF SAME 
SCORE/SAME 
I.Q. DYADS
A 1.4 13 92.8
A1
0 0 0
A2 ■ 5 . 3 60.0
B 18 15 83.1
B1 10 8 80.0
B2 9 7 77.8
C 16 13 81.0
C1 7 5 71.4
C2 8 8 100.0
D 15 12 80.0
E ■ ■ 4 . 2 . 50.0
F 11 8 72.6
TOTAL 117 94 Ave.% = 80.3
A Product Moment Correlation was made for identical 
dyad scores and dyad similarity of I.Q.
TABLE 48a gives the calculations made for this 
correlation.
The correlation coefficient that was calculated
was highly indicative of a correlation between 
identical dyad scores and dyad I.Q. similarity* 
(r » .96).
TABLE 48a CALCULATIONS FOR PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION
GROUP X Y X2 Y2 XY
A 14 13 196 169 182
A1 0
0 0 0 0
A2 5 3 25 9 15
B 18 15 324. 225 270
B1 10 8 100 64 80
B2 9 7 81 4? 63
C 16 13 256 169 208
C1 7 5 49 25 35
°2 8 8 64 64 64
D 15 12 225 144 180
E 4 2 16 4 8
F 11 8 121 64 88
117 94 1457 986 1193
3* scoring differences
Secondly, we can also study the difference in 
dyad scores, that is, the number of dyads in each group 
in which there was a difference of 3 or more hits in
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the scores obtained in the first and last half of each 
run-* We can then compare this difference to the I.Q. 
categories in the groups.
TABLE 49 shows the number of dyads whose members 
obtained different scores (i.e. scores different by 
3 or more hits) in the first and last half of each run. 
It also shows, where possible, the I.Q. categories of 
the two subjects in these dyads.
If we consider only the school-age groups (i.e. 
Groups A - F inclusive) it is clear that of the total 
number of dyads whose Subjects scored different numbers 
of hits in the first and last half of each trial, only 
16% were composed of teams in the same I.Q. category. 
TABLE 50 shows this in a tabular form.
It is once again clear from this result that there 
is a very strong negative correlation between disparity 
in dyad scores and similarity of I.Q. By implication, 
the results show that dyads composed of Subjects coming 
from different mental age categories tend to score at 
different levels of success with regard to paranormal 
cognition ability.
Once again, by employing the Product Moment 
Correlation on the data our observations are shown to 
be in accordance with statistical conclusions.
A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENCES IN j)YAD SCORES TO TEAM I.Q.
GROUP NO. OF 
TEAMS
NO. OF DYADS 
WITH DIFFERENT 
SCORES
I . Q. CATEGORIES
L-L A-A H-H L-A L-H A-L A-H H-L H-A
A 50 12 - - ■ - 1 2 3 - 4 2
A1 25 0 - - ■ - — - ' - .
A2 25 1 ' - - - - - 1 ■ - .
B 50 4 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 -
B1 25 2 ■- - - - 1 - 1
B2 25 2 - - 1 - 1
C 50 10 2 1 2 2 I .1 . . .1. . .T .
Cl 25 5 - - - 1 - - . 1 2 1
C2 25 ■ 1 - 1 - ■ - . - -
D 50 9 - . - - 2 3 1 - 2 1
E 50 4 - - 1 - 1 1 1 -
F 50 6 1 — 1 1 2 - 1 -
G * 50
G2 * 25
' ■ 1
H * 50 2
J * 50 / ■ 4
K * 50 1
.
TOTAL 675 69
* I.Q. SCORES UNOBTAINABLE
TABLE 30
GROUP TOTAL NUMBER OF DYADS WITH 
DIFFERENT 
SCORES
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF DIFFERENT 
SCORE DYADS 
WITH SAME I.Q.
% OF DIF­
FERENT SCORE/ 
SAME I.Q. 
DYADS
A 12 0 0
V 0 0 0
A2 1 0 0
B 4 i : ■ 25.0
B1
2 0 0
B2 ' 2 0 0
C 10 5 50.0
C1 5 0 0
C\J
o
1 1 100.0
D 9 0 0
E 4 ■ i' 25.0
F • 6 l 16.7
TOTAL 56 9 Ave.% = 16.1
There is no significant correlation between the 
total number of different scores obtained and the 
similarity of team I.Q. (r « .304).
TABLE 50a shows the calculations for the Product 
Moment Correlation.
TABLE 50a CALCULATIONS FOR PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION
GROUP X Y X2 Y2 XY
A 12 0 144 0 0
V 0 0 0 0 0
A2 1 0 1 0 1
B 4 1 16 1 4
B1 2 0 4 0 0
B2 2 0 4 0 0
C 10 5 100 25 50
C1 5 0 25 0 0
C2 1 1 1 1 1
D 9 0 81 o 0
E 4 1 16 1 4
F 6 1 36 1 6
TOTAL 56 9 428 29 66
4. highest scores
Thirdly, we can look at the highest scores obtained
by the group dyads and compare these to the similarity of 
1st and last half scores and I.Q. of the Subjects in these 
dyads*
TABLE 51 gives the highest dyad scores obtained in
each of the C.A. groups and compares them to dyad 
similarity in scoring and, where possible, to the I.Q. 
grouping of each dyad,.
It can be clearly seen that of the 24 highest dyad 
scores obtained none of the dyads except one obtained 
significantly different scores in the first and last 
half of each run, and that in fact 9 of these teams 
obtained identical scores.
It can also be seen that where I.Q. equivalents 
were available, 11 of the 15 top scoring dyads were 
composed of two subjects of LOW I.Q.
Therefore, it can be concluded that, in general, the 
highest dyad scores obtained for each C.A. group tested 
were obtained by dyads of Subjects who scored similarly 
in the first and last half of their run. (The one dyad 
that does not fit this description is a team in Group X 
in which a difference of three hits is recorded between 
the two Subjects. The relatively low score (in comparison 
to other highest dyad scores) obtained, however, and its 
singularity should not greatly affect our general 
conclusion)•
It can also be concluded that whenever it has been
SCORING AND DtAD I.Q.
GROUP HIGHEST SCORE 
OBTAINED 
(OUT OF 20)
NO. OF DYADS 
OBTAINING 
HIGHEST SCORE
FIRST HALF 
TEAM SCORE
LAST HALF 
TEAM SCORE
TEAM
I.Q.
A 15 ■ ■ 1 8 7 L-L
Al : 12 2 6
6
6
6
L-L
L-L
A2 13 2 7 6 L-L
6 7 L-L
B 11 1 6 5 L-L
B1 8 8 NOT CALCULATED
B2 10 . 2 ■ 5
4
. ' 5 
6
L-L
M-L
C 9 1 4 5 M-L
Cl 9 ’ 1 4 5 L-L
C2 8 2 4 4 L-L
4 4 L-M
D 10 . 1 5 "v. 5 L-L
E 8 1 5 3 L-H
F 8 ■■■ ■ 1 4 4 L-L
G 8 ' 1 3 5 Not Avail­
able
G2 6 3 3 3 Not Avail­
4 2 able
2 4
H 7 1 4 3 Not Avail­
able
J 8 2 4
• 3
4
5
Not Avail­
able
K 7 • .. 2 3
2
4
5
Not Avail-
possible to study the I.Q* category of each of the 
highest scoring teams, an overwhelming majority of them 
have been composed of two subjects in the low I.Q. 
category. It should also be noted that in all four groups 
in which this is not the case, one of the Subjects is in 
the low I.Q. category.
It can be concluded that in the highest scoring 
dyads in each C.A, group, there is a marked tendency for 
there to be both a similarity in first half and last 
half run 1 hits', and for the Subjects to be members of 
the low I.Q. category.
5. lowest scores
Fourth, we can also look at the lowest scores 
obtained by the group dyads and compare these to the 
similarity of first and last half scores and I.Q. of 
Subjects in these dyads.
TABLE 52 gives the lowest dyad scores obtained in 
each of the C.A. groups and compares them to dyad 
similarity in scoring and, where possible, to the I.Q. 
grouping of each dyad.
It is clear that of the 31 lowest dyad scores obtained, 
all of the teams.except 5 obtained approximately similar 
scores in the first and last half of each run. It should 
be noted, however, that this is largely due to the very 
high number of lowest I.Q. scores that equalled 0. If 
the 0 score dyads were to be left unconsidered for the 
purposes of similarity in dyad scores then only one dyad 
out of a possible 22 obtained similar scores and five 
dyads obtained scoring differences of 3 or more hits in 
their run.
It is also clear that of the 19 lowest dyad scores 
that had I.Q. levels available, only 5 lowest scores were 
obtained by Subjects of the same I.Q. - and that these 
were all high I.Q. Subjects except for one dyad composed 
of 2 average M.A. Subjects.
It is also important to note that of the 5 dyads which 
did not obtain similar scores, none was composed of 
Subjects in the same I.Q. category.
Although conclusions drawn from this observation 
cannot be as clear-cut as those from our previous analysis, 
it can be generally stated that a relative similarity in 
scoring in the first and last half of each dyad run does 
appear although it is due primarily to the inordinately
a. *■ i i ^ u u ^  vi a a. xuva. iv Vii \-/i X xaxj < JJ^f/llOJ. y  X t \ L S  . iJ\j U l \ . E t k? X ^  O l H l  U  t \ J \ J L X X
OF INDIVIDUAL SCORING AND DYAD I.Q.
GROUP LOWEST SCORE 
OBTAINED
NO. OF DYADS 
OBTAINING 
LOWEST SCORE
FIRST HALF 
SCORE
LAST HALF 
SCORE
DYAD I.Q.
A 5 2 3 2 H-L
1 4 L-H
A1 5 1 . 3 2 H-H
A2 6 1 " 5 1 L-H
B - 3 1 ' 0 3 A-H
B1 3 1 1 2 H-A
B2 4 ' 1 4 0 L-A
C 1 1 0 1 H-H
Cl 3 4 2 2 H-H
3 1 L-H
1
4
3
0
H-A
A-L
C2 1 2 ' 1
0
0
1
H-H
H-A
D 0 ■■ ■ 3 ;■ 0
0
0
0
0
0
< 
 ^
<
 
I 
1 
l
W 
<
E 0 i 0 0 A-H
F • 0 i 0 0 H-L
G 0 i 0 0 NOT
AVAILABLE
G2 0 i 0 0 NOT
AVAILABLE
H 1 ■ ; 4 1 : . 
0 
1
0
1
0
NOT
AVAILABLE
1 0
J 0 1 0 o NOT
AVAILABLE
r ■ 1 5 1 0 NOT
0
1
1
0
AVAILABLE
1 0
r : ' 3-35.. ■
: . • i: ■
high number of 0 scores. If we eliminate the 0 total 
scores for the moment, it becomes clear that none of 
the remaining dyads obtained identical scores - except 
one (dyad a in Group C^) which was composed of two high 
I.Q. Subjects. It can also be concluded that where dyad 
I.Q. was available, all of the dyads obtaining the 
lowest score were composed of either two Subjects coming 
from different I.Q. categories, or were composed of dyads 
of two high I.Q. categories.
6. I.Q. categories
Finally, we can add up the scores obtained by Subjects 
in the three I.Q. categories in Groups A - F inclusive and 
note the mean group score for each of these categories.
TABLE 53 gives the data for this observation. TABLE 
53 shows:
1) the total number of dyads composed of Subjects 
in the same I.Q. category in each C.A. group 
studied;
2) the total scores obtained by all the I.Q. 
category dyads in each C.A. group;
3) the mean dyad score for each I.Q. category in 
each C.A. group.
A COMPARISON OF SCORES OBTAINED BY THE THREE I »Q♦ CATEGORIES
i
GROUP NO. OF DYADS IN EACH 
I * (Q • CATEGORY
DYAD SCORE IN 
I . Q. CATEGORY
MEAN DYAD SCORE IN 
I. Q. CATEGORY
L-L A-A H-H L-L A-A H-H L-L A-A H-H
A 12 14 12 123 118 100 10.2 8.5 8.3
A1 6 7 5 ■ 62 59 48 10.3 8.4 9.6
A2 7 6 6 66 55 52 9.4 9.0 8.7
B 14 14 14 107 100 91 7.6 7 .1 6.5
B1 6 7 6 - 52 50 45 8.6 7.1 7.5
B2 7 . 6 7 52 43 48 7.4 7-1 6.9
C 12 14 12 71 71 52 5.9 4.9 4.3
Cl 7 6 7 36 35 26 5.1 5.8 5.0
C2 9 . 8 9 46 39 37 5.1 4.9 4.1
D 15 15 14 66 58 54 4.4 3,9 3.9
E 13 16 14 58 56 48 4.4 3.5 3.4
■: F 14 14 !4 56 52 50 3.9 3.7 3.5
TABLE 54 gives a comparison of the mean scores 
obtained by dyads in the three I.Q. categories.
TABLE £4
A COMPARISON OF THE MEAN SCORES OBTAINED 
BY DYADS IN THE 3 T.Q. CATEGORIES
GROUP MEAN L-L SCORE MEAN M-M SCORE MEAN H-H SCORE
A 10.2 8.5 8.3
A1 10.3 8.4 9.6
A2 9.4 9.0 8.7
B 7.6 7.1 6.5
B1 8.6 7.1 7.5
B2 7.4 7.1 6.9
C 5.9 4.9 4.3
Cl 5.1 5.8 5.0
C2 5.1 4.9 4.1
D 4.4 3.9 3.9
E 4.4 3.5 3.4
F 3.9 3.7 3.5
TOTAL 82.3 73.9 71.7
MEAN 6.8 6.1 5.9
A series of t-tests were made between the three 
I.Q. categories to see if there were any statistical 
differences in the scoring levels obtained by each I.Q. 
category.
In each case, a highly significantly different 
statistical reading was obtained,
+ A = 87v5; df = 237; P L .001):
(trL + H ” 69*2; djF = 240; P L  .001); (tA + H = 28.57; 
df » 235! P A. .001).
Therefore, the results clearly show that along with 
a chronological age effect on paranormal cognition 
success, there is also a pronounced I.Q. effect which is 
affecting successful scoring. The general tendency of 
this latter effect is, once again, an inverse relationship 
between 1.0. and successful paranormal cognition scoring.
7. summary
Several effects related to I.Q. were observed in the 
three chronological age (C.A.) studies. Although there 
were major difficulties in designating Subjects into either 
low I.Q., average I.Q., or high I.Q. categories (since 
Subject designation into each of these three categories
was conducted entirely either on the basis of data 
obtained from previous school I.Q. tests, administered 
by educational authorities, or on headmistress/teacher 
subjective evaluations of Subjects, thereby restricting 
I.Q. categorisation to school age Subjects (no 
independent records of I.Q. levels in the adult Subjects 
were available)) several general observations could still 
be made, within the limits of the data obtained, which 
strongly suggested various I.Q. effects in the C.A. 
Experiments.
Firstly, since it had been hypothesised that Subjects 
of the same C.A. and I.Q. category employ paranormal 
cognition to the same measurable amount, and since 
Subject dyads had been allocated as closely as possible 
on the basis of cognitive ability, then it should follow 
that the number of correct hits obtained by one of the 
dyad members in the first half of the Study should 
equal the total number of hits obtained by the second 
dyad member in the last half of the Study. A 
comparison of all the first and last half scores obtained 
by all the dyads in the three C.A. studies gave strong 
confirmation to this hypothesis.
An alternative explanation for these results might 
be that scores were similar in the first and last half of 
these runs because one of the Subjects - either the
•sender1 or the •receiver• - was the only dyad member 
employing paranormal cognition and that therefore the 
results would be expected to be similar.
There are several points to be made concerning this 
explanation.
Firstly, although parapsychologic.al literature will 
employ terms such as 'telepathy* or 'clairvoyance' or 
'psychokinesis' all of which have specific, definitions 
and purport to point out different mechanisms of para­
normal cognition, it is a highly difficult, if not 
impossible task, to design paranormal cognition experiments 
which in all certainty are concerned with one such term or 
label but not any other. Among this experimental 
confusion, the one label which has proven to be of 
greatest difficulty to assess is 'telepathy', since in 
all experimental cases of 'telepathy' results obtained 
could just as correctly be considered to have been obtained 
by the employment of 'clairvoyance'. This being the case, 
until matters can be further clarified, researchers have 
taken to conducting, experiments using terminology which 
depends on the procedure of their experiment thereby 
indicating that although their research is concerned 
with 'telepathy', for example, this is due only to 
its construction and procedure but that results obtained 
might just as clearly be due to any one of a series of
possible paranormal cognition 'mechanisms1. It is clear 
from the type of observational studies that have been 
employed thus far that the Experimenter has chosen to 
work in a mode defined by telepathy and that although 
results are being explained as such it is possible that 
they might be due to another paranormal cognition mechanism.
However, if the latter possibility is indeed the case, 
then it becomes difficult to explain the large number of 
scoring differences obtained by Subjects. Were 
'clairvoyance' the mechanism being employed then these 
should not be the case.
Given this alternative series of results, it becomes 
more realistic, to view results as being due to a co­
operative effort on the part of the dyads rather than 
the success of a single individual in each dyad.
The question still remains somewhat open to inter­
pretation, however, and, as such, will be looked at again . 
in the I.Q. Experiments wherein the same set of 90 
Subjects were tested in three separate experiments by 
being paired into new dyads for each investigation. In 
this case, should scores be d.ue to only one participant 
in each dyad then scores should remain similar throughout 
each Experiment, whereas, on the other hand, should scores 
be due to co-operative dyad effort then scores should vary 
considerably.
Secondly, the similarity in dyad scoring (i.e. the 
number of dyads in which both Subjects obtained the same 
score in the first and last half of their own) was 
compared to the similarity of the two Subjects1 I.Q.’s.
It was found that in 80% of the dyads in which Subjects 
obtained the same scores, Subjects had been matched for 
I.Q. as well.
Thirdly the difference in dyad scoring (i.e. the 
number of dyads in which there was a difference of 3 or 
more hits in the first and last half of each run) was 
compared to the similarity of the two Subjects1 I.Q.’s.
It was found that only 16% of all the dyads who had 
obtained different first and last half run scores were 
composed of Subjects in the same I.Q. category.
Fourth, a comparison was made between the highest 
score obtained by each C.A. group and the similarity of 
first and last half scores as well as to the I.Q.1s of 
the dyad Subjects. It was found that of all the highest 
score dyads, only one obtained a different score in the 
first and last half of each run whereas all the rest 
obtained highly similar scores. It was also found, that 
where I.Q. equivalents were available, a highly significant 
majority of highest score teams were composed of two Low 
I.Q. Subjects.
Fifth, a comparison was made between the lowest 
score obtained by each C.A. group and the similarity of 
first and last half scores as well as the I.Q.1s of the 
Subjects in these lowest score dyads. It was found that 
a majority of the lowest score dyads obtained similar 
scores in the first and last half of each run - this was, 
however, largely due to a high incidence of 0 scores 
obtained by these dyads. It was also found that less than 
of the lowest dyad scores were obtained by Subjects in 
the same I.Q. category - and that of those same I.Q. 
category - and that of those same I.Q. category low 
score dyads all (except one) were composed of two Subjects 
belonging to the HIGH I.Q. category.
Finally, the mean score of all the available dyads 
composed of Subjects in the same I.Q. category was 
calculated. Each I.Q. category score was then compared 
to the two remaining I.Q. category scores. It was found 
that dyads in the LOW I.Q. category obtained a significantly 
greater total of hits than dyads in the AVERAGE I.Q. and 
HIGH I.Q. categories and that dyads in the AVERAGE I.Q. 
category obtained a significantly greater total of hits 
than Subjects in the HIGH I.Q. category.
Therefore, from the I.Q. analyses made on the results 
obtained in the three C.A. studies, data was suggestive 
that I.Q. was a very strong influence on paranormal
cognition scoring and that generally there seemed to 
be once again an inverse relationship between I.Q. and 
successful paranormal cognition scoring.
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THE EXPERIMENTS
1. THE I.Q. EXPERIMENTS 
Introduction
Although the data obtained from the C.A. studies 
was highly significantly in accordance with the 
experimental hypotheses developed in the theoretical 
section of the thesis, a series of Experiments was 
designed to test the following major hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : C.A. is inversely related to
paranormal cognition ability.
Hypothesis 2 : I.Q. is inversely related to
paranormal cognition ability.
Hypothesis 3 ‘. Subjects paired for both C.A.
and I.Q. will obtain higher 
paranormal cognition scores than 
Subjects paired for only one of 
these two variables.
Hypothesis 4 : In groups of Subjects paired for 
C.A., those Subjects at lower I.Q. 
levels will obtain higher paranormal 
cognition scores than Subjects at 
higher I.Q. levels.
Hypothesis 5 : In groups of Subjects paired for I.Q;,
those Subjects of lower C.A.'s will 
obtain higher paranormal cognition 
scores than Subjects of greater C.A.
I.Q. was seen to be the most useful measurement (along 
with C.A.) on which to pair Subjects into different dyads. 
This was so because the tests employed to divide the 
Subjects into different I.Q. groupings often did not 
generate an M.A. score but simply an I.Q. score since they 
referred to a norm conversion table with the standardised 
score derived from the test itself. However, since
1 - O'/ "cfronological^Age^ (C. A.) x 100 the” tlle Pairin9 of 
dyads in which both C.A. and I.Q. were held constant,
would yield results indicative of the effects of M.A.
differences in Subjects.
Similarly, should dyads be paired on the basis of 
identical I.Q.’s but of different C.A.1s, then results 
would once again be indicative of the effects of M.A. 
differences in Subjects.
And, as well, in cases of the pairing of dyads in 
which C.A. alone was held constant, results obtained 
would, be indicative of the effects of M.A. differences.
The use of I.Q. then allowed for the study of both 
Co A. and M.A. variables in the different dyad groupings.
Procedure
In all three I.Q. Experiments, the same procedure 
was employed as in the chronological age studies.
Namely, dyads paired for I.Q., C.A., or both were 
tested for paranormal cognition ability in an automated 
Experiment. Each dyad completed a run of twenty cards. 
Each card contained five different pictures (either from 
a vocabulary test or Experimenter-designed abstract 
shapes) which never reappeared in any of the other cards.
The 'sender' in each dyad was asked to choose the 
picture he wished to 'transmit1 to the 'receiver'. His 
choice, as well as the 'receiver's' guess were recorded 
at all times by an automatic pen recorder. Subjects were 
given positive feedback on correct target hits by way of 
a chime which they could both hear.
Instructions were carried out by use of two puppets 
which greatly reduced the young Subject's anxieties and 
fear of strange adults. Padded tin-foil hats (called 
'thinking caps') partially attenuated any incoming sounds.
Subject:, breakdown
The same ninety subjects (90) were used throughout 
the three Experiments, all of them participating in each 
experiment; the numbers of male and female Subjects being
equal at forty-five (45).
All the dyads were composed of one male and one 
female Subject*
TABLE 55 gives the breakdown of Subjects on the basis 
of chronological age (C.A.)* As can be readily seen, there 
were three different chronological age groupings. GROUP P 
was composed of Subjects aged between 3.4 - 3*9 years of
age. GROUP Q was composed of Subjects aged 4.5 - 5*5
years of age. GROUP R was composed of Subjects aged
between 6.5 - 7.4 years of age.
Each chronological age group was composed of thirty 
(30) Subjects fifteen (15) males and fifteen (15) 
females.
TABLE 55 C.A. GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP C  A
NO. OF SUBJECTS TOTAL NUMBER 
OF SUBJECTSU  • n * Males Females
P 3.4 - 3.9 15 15 30
Q 4.5 - 5.5 15 15 30
R 6.5 - 7.4 15 15 30
Subjects were also broken down on the basis of I.Q. 
Previous to experimentation, all ninety Subjects were
■ .35.0- •
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given individual tests to measure their I.Q. levels.
Subjects between the ages, of 3 and 5 inclusive were
given the Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale test which
is considered by most child psychologists to be the most
satisfactory instrument for infant testing.* Subjects
aged between 5 and 7*5 years of age were given the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). Both tests
allowed for an individual I.Q. rating to be given to the
Subjects. Three different I.Q. groups were then constructed.
The HIGH I.Q. group was composed of subjects with I.Q.rs
between 115 and 106. The AVERAGE I.Q. group was composed
of Subjects with I.Q.•s between 100-99• The LOW I.Q.
group was composed of Subjects with I.Q.1s between 92-87*
There were thirty (30) Subjects in each M.A. group - 15
males, 15 females.
TABLE 56 shows this breakdown in a tabular form.
TABLE 56 M.A.GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP I.Q. LEVELS NO. OF SUBJECTS TOTAL NUMBEI OF SUBJECTSMales Females
HIGH I.Q. 115-106 15 15 30
AVERAGE I.Q. 100 - 99 15 15 30
LOW I.Q. 92 - 87 15 15 30
* See Mussen, P.H. , Conger, J.J. and Kagan, J. Child 
Development and Personality, third ed. New York: Harper 
and Row.
In C.A. GROUP P f there were ten (10) Subjects 
(5 males, 5 females) who belonged to the HIGH I.Q.
Group, ten (10) Subjects (5 males, 5 females) who 
belonged to the AVERAGE I.Q. Group, and ten (10)
Subjects (5 males, 5 females) who belonged to the LOW 
I.Q. Group.
In C.A. GROUP Q, there were ten (10) Subjects 
(5 males, 5 females) who belonged to the HIGH I.Q. Group, 
ten (10) Subjects (5 males, 5 females) who belonged to 
the AVERAGE I.Q. Group, and ten (10) Subjects (5 males,
5 females) who belonged to the LOW I.Q. Group.
In C.A. GROUP R, there were ten (10) Subjects (5 
males, 5 females) who belonged to the HIGH I.Q. Group, 
ten (10) Subjects (5 males, 5 females) who belonged to 
the AVERAGE I.Q. Group, and ten (10) Subjects (5 males,
5 females) who belonged to the LOW I.Q. Group.
TABLE 57 shows the total number of C.A./I.Q. divisions. 
TABLE 57 C.A./l.Q. GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP
CHRONOLOGICAL AGE
FOTAL'P
Males Females
Q
Males Females Males
r :
Females
HIGH I.Q. 5 5 5 . 5 5 5 30
AVERAGE I.Q. 5 5 5 5 5 5 30
LOW I.Q. 5 5 5 5 5 5 3°.
TOTAL 15 15 15 15 15 . 15 90
Experiment One
IV introduction
In the first Experiment, Subjects were matched for 
both chronological age (C.A.) and I.Q. levels and were 
then tested for paranormal cognition ability as in the 
previous set of observational studies.
2. group breakdown
There were 45 dyads of 1 male - 1 female Subject 
tested in all. There were five dyads composed of 
GROUP P/HIGH I.Q. Subjects, five dyads composed of GROUP P/ 
AVERAGE I.Q. Subjects, five dyads of GROUP P/LOW I.Q. 
Subjects, five dyads of GROUP Q/HIGH I.Q. Subjects, 5 
dyads of GROUP Q/AVERAGE I.Q. Subjects, 5 dyads of 
GROUP Q/LOW I.Q. Subjects, 5 dyads of GROUP R/HIGH I.Q. 
Subjects, 5 dyads of GROUP R/AVERAGE I.Q. Subjects and 5 
dyads of GROUP R/LOW I.Q. Subjects.
TABLE 58 shows the breakdown of groups for Experiment
One.
TABLE 58 EXPERIMENT ONE: GROUP BREAKDOWNS
GROUP P DYADS Q DYADS R DYADS TOTAL
HIGH I.Q. 5 5 . 5 15
AVERAGE I.Q. 5 5 5 15
LOW I.Q. 5 5 5 15
TOTAL 15
■
15
■ •
15 45
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3. results
a) group scores
TABLE 59 shows the dyad scores obtained by the 
various C.A./E.q . groups.
It is important to note three main observations 
from this data. Firstly, as in the previous three studies 
all of the groups obtained scores which are above those 
predicted by chance. Secondly, the level of positive 
scoring declines as the chronological age of each group 
increases. Thirdly, the Subjects designated as Low I.Q. 
Subjects in each group obtained the highest scores.
We shall now look at each observation and determine 
its statistical validity.
Chi-square tests made for each C.A./E.Q. group 
revealed that all groups scored at significantly above- 
chance levels, although in two cases (High I.Q. and 
Average I.Q. Subjects in Group R) the level of significance 
was only at .05.
(x2ph = 27.55; p l_ .001); (x2pa = 39.05; p Z. .001); 
(x2Pl = 49.0; p i_ .001); (x2qh = 10.5; p a  .01);
(x2QA = 12.2; p /_.001); (x2ql = 18.1; .001);
(x2^  = 5.1; p /. .05); ( x ^  = 5.1; p/. .05);
The probability of obtaining these scores was 
calculated as:
” rL 'yH
H
pn = 4.01 x 10 ' 
A
3.69 x 10-5;
p = 8.77 x 10“3 ; p 
H kA
8.77 x 10“ 3
pR = 1.58 x 10-3.
L
Therefore, all groups in the 9 C.Av/E.q . categories 
obtained scores which are significantly above scores 
expected by chance.
C.A. groups (P, Q, and R) revealed that Subjects in C.A..* 
Group P obtained significantly greater scores than 
Subjects in C.A. Group Q (z = -2.1325 ; p = .0165) and
Subjects in C.A. Group R (Z = 2.1325; p =  .009). Subjects
in C.A. Group Q obtained significantly greater scores than
Subjects in C.A. Group R (Z = -1.5990; p = .05)*
Therefore, from an analysis of the C.A. Group scores,
A Wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis between the three
it has been shown that there is an inverse relationship 
between C.A. and paranormal cognition ability.
A second wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis between 
the three I.Q. groups revealed that Subjects in the low 
I.Q. group obtained significantly greater scores than 
Subjects in the high I.Q. group (Z = -1.61; p = .05) •
No other significant statistical differences between the 
I.Q. groups were found. This implies that the inverse 
relationship between I.Q. and paranormal cognition may 
not be as clear cut as the C.A. relationship or that the 
pairing of both C.A. and I.Q. affects to some extent the
I.Q. effect. It is clear, however, that there is a strong 
tendency for Subjects classified as having low I.Q. to 
score higher than either average I.Q. or high I.Q. Subjects.
TABLE 59 TOTAL NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED IN EACH
- C.A./E.Q. GROUP
GROUP HIGHEST POSS. SCORE P Q R
HIGH I.Q. 100 41 33 29
AVERAGE I.Q. 100 45 34 29
LOW I.Q. 100 48 37 32
A Product Moment Correlation was calculated for C.A.
and. I.Q. Group paranormal cognition scores obtained in 
Experiment one.
The results showed a high correlation coefficient 
between C.A. and I.Q. Group paranormal cognition scores 
(V= >74).
b) graph
FIGURE 9a in APPENDIX D compares the total scores 
obtained by the three I.Q. groups to the I.Q. range of 
the groups tested.
FIGURE 9b in APPENDIX D compares the total scores 
.obtained by the three C.A. groups to the C.A. range of 
the groups tested.
It is clear from these two graphs that, paranormal 
cognition scoring ability is inversely related to 
both I.Q. and C.A., although this inverse relation 
is much more in evidence in FIGURE 8b which looks at 
C.A. scores.
c) intra-group results
TABLE 60 gives the mean score obtained by each of 
the C.A./I.Q. Groups.
It can be seen that in each of the three C.A. groups 
tested, the highest mean score obtained was by Subjects 
in the low I.Q. categories.
In group P (the youngest C.A. group), a Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs test revealed a statistically significant 
difference between scores obtained by the low I.Q.
Subjects and the high I.Q. Subjects (Z = -1.8; p = .03).
In Group R (the oldest C.A. group.), a Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs test revealed a statistically significant 
difference between scores obtained by the low I.Q.
Subjects and the high I.Q. Subjects (z = -1.6; p = .05).
These axe the only statistically significant 
differences obtained.
However, it should be noted that the number of Subjects 
within each I.Q. category was noticeably small and that such 
a small sample would not easily disclose statistical 
differences.
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It is important, however, that clearly within each 
of the groups tested, those dyads made up of Subjects of 
the lowest I.Q.fs obtained the highest mean scores. It 
is also noticeable to some extent that dyads made up of 
Average I.Q. Subjects obtained higher, scores than 
Subjects in High I.Q. categories, the one exception 
being the average I.Q. and high I.Q. Subjects in Group R 
(the oldest C.A. group) who obtained the same mean scores.
TABLE 60 MEAN SCORES OF C.A./ 
I.Q. GROUPS
GROUP P Q R MEAN I.Q. 
SCORE
High I.Q. 8.2 6.6 5.8 6.87
Average I.Q. 9.0 6.8 5.8 7.2
Low I.Q. 9.6 7.4 6.4
co.
C.A. Mean Score 8.9 6.9 6.0
d) other scores
We can also observe several other results obtained 
from this Experiment..
1. C.A. Group comparisons
Firstly, we can compare C.A. scores obtained 
in these Experiments to those obtained in the three
observational studies. "
TABLE 61 gives the three sets of mean scores 
obtained by the four C.A. groups.
TABLE 61 A COMPARISON OF MEAN C.A.
SCORES OBTAINED
STUDY 1 
mean score
STUDY 2 
mean score
STUDY 3 
mean score
EXPERIMENT 1 
mean score
3.3-3.7 9.02 8.84 9.04 8.9
4.5-4.9 7.22 6.68 6.96 6.9
5.0-7.8 5.22 5.0 4.88 6.0
Once again, the similarity in the mean scores 
obtained by each of the C.A. groups in the 4 separate 
analyses is overwhelming, showing that Subjects 
within those dyads seem to be continually able to 
employ paranormal cognition successfully.
2. first and last half scores
Secondly, we can compare the number of hits 
obtained in the first half of each dyad run to the 
number of hits obtained in the last half of each 
dyad run.
TABLE 62 gives this comparison
From TABLE 62 it is once again obvious that 
there is no significant differences obtained in 
the scoring levels in the first and last half of 
each run.
The results obtained herein are, in fact, 
so similar that they show once more our previous 
observation that dyads composed of Subjects in 
the same I.Q. category tend to obtain an equal 
number of hits in the first and last half of their 
run.
It must be noted here that since each dyad was 
made up of one male and one female Subject and that 
all male Subjects were designated as the 1 sender1 
in the first half of each run, whereas all female 
Subjects were designated as the 'sender* in the 
last half of each run, the lack of any scoring 
differences in the first and second half of each 
run also indicates that there were no male/female 
scoring differences.
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■ ■■■4* summary and conclusions
Subjects in Experiment One were divided into 45 
dyads paired for both C.A. and I.Q., and then tested 
for paranormal cognition ability.
There were three separate C.A. groups tested made 
up of Subjects aged between 3.4 and 74 years of age. 
Similarly, there were three separate I.Q. groups tested 
made up of Subjects whose I.Q. levels were between 87 
and 115 points.
All group results obtained were significantly above 
those expected by chance.
Results indicated that, as in the three experimental 
studies, there was a very strong inverse relationship 
between C.A. and paranormal cognition scoring ability 
in the three C.A. groups.
Results also indicated that there was an inverse 
relationship between I.Q. and paranormal cognition scoring 
ability in the three I.Q. groups.
. Graphs showing the comparison of C.A. and I.Q. to 
paranormal cognition scoring ability showed that although 
the C.A. curve was more pronounced than the I.Q. curve,
both clearly showed an inverse relationship to 
paranormal cognition scoring ability.
Results also indicated that within each of the 
three C.A. groups, Subjects demonstrated abilities in 
paranormal cognition inversely related to their I.Q. 
level. These results were not as clear-cut as the 
previous ones, however, mainly because the sample size (10 
Subjects) of each I.Q. category within each C.A. Group 
was so small. Nevertheless, even within C.A. Groups 
the tendency for lower I.Q. subjects to obtain higher 
paranormal cognition scores than higher I.Q. Subjects 
was strongly indicated.
Results also showed that there were no significant 
scoring differences during the first and last half of 
each dyad run. Since all the male Subjects acted as 
'senders* in the first half of each run and all the 
female Subjects acted as * senders' in the last half of 
each run, and all dyads were made up of one male and one 
female Subject then the lack of any significant scoring 
differences in the first and last half of each run also 
indicates the lack of any male/female scoring differences 
in Experiment One.
A comparison of mean C.A. Group scores obtained in
Experiment One to C.A. Group mean scores, obtained in 
the three Observational Studies showed a very strong 
scoring similarity for all C.A. Groups .throughout the 
four studies.
Since all Subject Groups in Experiment One were •
MApaired for both I.Q. and C.A. and since I.Q. = ^  x 100 
then the results obtained in Experiment One logically 
indicate that mental age (MA) must also be an important 
factor in paranormal cognition ability in that paranormal 
cognition scoring ability is inversely related to M.A.
Experiment Two
1. introduction
In the second Experiment, Subjects were paired on 
the basis of I.Q. but were composed of dyads ;of one male 
and. one female Subject of different Chronological Ages 
and then tested in the usual procedure for. paranormal 
cognition ability,
2. group breakdown
There were 45 dyads tested in all. In the high I.Q. 
group, there were five dyads composed of one Group P
and one Group Q Subject, five dyads composed of one 
Group P and one Group R Subject, and five dyads composed 
of one Group Q and one Group R Subject. In the average 
I.Q. group, there were five dyads composed of one 
Group P and one Group Q Subject, five dyads composed 
of one Group P. and one Group R Subject and five dyads 
composed of one Group Q and one Group R Subject. In 
the low M. A. group, there were five dyads composed of 
one Group P and one Group Q Subject, five dyads composed 
of one Group P and one Group R Subject, and five dyads 
composed of one Group Q and one Group R Subject.
TABLE 63 shows the breakdown for the groups in 
Experiment Two.
TABLE 63 • EXPERIMENT TWO:GROUP BREAKDOWNS
GROUP NO. OF GROUP P/ GROUP Q DYADS
NO. OF 
GROUP P/ 
GROUP R 
DYADS
NO. OF 
GROUP Q/ 
GROUP R 
DYADS
TOTAL
DYADS
High I.Q. : 5 5 . 5 15
Average I.Q. 5 5 5 15
Low I.Q. 5 5 5 15
TOTAL 15 15 15 45
3. results
a) group scores
TABLE 64 gives the dyad scores obtained by the 
mixed chronological age, but similar I.Q. category.
Once again, three separate but highly important 
observations can be made from this table.
Firstly, as in the previous Experiment, all C.A./
I.Q. teams obtained scores above those predicted by chance.
Secondly, unlike the previous Experiments, there is 
very little difference in the scores obtained by the 
various chronological age groups, to the point where 
there is only minimal decrease in the level of correct 
scoring as the chronological age of the groups increases.
Thirdly, while there is no obvious chronological 
age effect in the groupfs scores, there is a very strong 
effect on positive scoring due to the I.Q. of the groups; 
namely, positive scoring increases as the group*s I.Q. 
decreases.
Once again, we must look at each of these observations 
from a statistical viewpoint to determine whether they can 
be validated.
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Our first observation made was that all the C.A./I. Q.
groups obtained a total number of 'hits* which were
significantly above chance.
Chi-square tests made for each C.A./E.Q. group 
revealed that all groups did, in fact, score at 
significant above chance levels.
(x2(p-q)„ = 7-55: p l  *01); (x2(p-q)a- 12*2: p ^ - 001)Jri A
(x (p_g\ * 29 . 8 't p • 001) i (x sz. 6 • 2 J p ^  . 02) |
L H
(x p^«.p) = 12.2j p^.001); (x p^_]£^  **25.0; p/. .001) ;
A L
(x 2(q-e ) = 5,05: PZ*°5); U 2(q_E ) = xo.55; p /..oi)
H A
(x  ^Q—R ) * 25*0 ; p .001).
Therefore, our first observation has been shown to be 
statistically valid.
The probability of obtaining each of these scores was 
calculated as:
P( p / 0 ) H =
2 .9 3  x »-* o
i CO
p ( p /Q ) a =
4 . 0 1  x 10- 4 ‘
p ( p / q) l * 2 .9 8  x 10- 7 ; p ( p A ) h = 5.19  X
10"3 ;
p ( p A ) a =
4 .0 1  x 10- 4 ; p ( p / r ) l “ 2 . 3 2  x 1 0 - 6 ;
p ( oA ) h " 8 .7 7  x
10- 3 ;
p ( qA ) a = 8 . 1 4  x
10~4 ;
p ( qA ) l = 2. 32 x 1C'6 .
A Wilcoxon matched-pair analysis of the three C.A. 
Groups revealed that there were no significant scoring 
differences between Subjects in Groups p/q and p/r 
(Z "«= -•5345; p * .2965 « n.s.), P/Q and q/R (Z = -.3381; 
p =s .3677 * n.s.) or p/q and q/R (z ~ -.3381; p = .3677 = 
n.s.). ..
Therefore, the mixing of C.A. in the dyads affects 
the data obtained so clearly that the highly noticeable 
inverse relation between C.A. and paranormal cognition 
scoring seen in all the previous experiments disappears 
entirely.
A second Wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis between the 
three I.Q. groups revealed that Subjects in the low I.Q. 
Group obtained scores significantly greater than Subjects 
in the Average I.Q. group (z = -1.78; p » .04) and 
Subjects in the .High I.Q. group (z « -2.5208; p = .0059). 
It was also found that Subjects in the Average I.Q. group 
obtained scores significantly greater than Subjects in the 
High I.Q. group (z « -1.8593; p = .0315).
Therefore, there is revealed a very clearly 
statistical inverse effect between I.Q. and paranormal 
cognition when M.A. is matched but C.A. is mixed.
TABLE 64 TOTAL NUMBER OF HITS OBTAINED BY
GROUPS IN EXPERIMENT TWO
GROUP
HIGHEST 
NO. OF 
HITS
POSSIBLE
p/q DYAD 
HITS
P/R DYAD 
HITS
Q/R DYAD 
HITS
TOTAL
HITS
HIGH I.Q. 100 31 3° .29 90
AVERAGE I.Q. 100 34 34 33 101
LOW I.Q. 100 42 40 4 0  • 122
TOTAL 300 107 104 102 313
A Product Moment Correlation was calculated for 
C.A. and I.Q. scores in Experiment Two. Results 
indicated a very high correlation between the C.A. 
and I.Q. scores (a . = .94).
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c) intra-group scores
TABLE 65 gives the mean score obtained by each of 
the Experiment Two dyads*
It can be seen that in each of the three C.A. groups 
tested, the highest mean score obtained was by Subjects 
in the Low I.Q. categories*
In Group P/Q, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test revealed 
that a statistically significant difference existed 
between scores obtained by the low I.Q. Subjects and the 
High I.Q. Subjects (z = -2.2; p = .01).
In Group.P/R, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test revealed 
that a statistically significant difference existed between 
scores obtained by the Low I.Q. Subjects and the High 
I.Q. Subjects. (Z = -1.7» p = .04).
Similarly, in Group Q/R, a V/ilcoxon matched-pairs 
test revealed a statistically significant difference 
between scores obtained by the low I.Q. subjects and the 
high I.Q. Subjects. (Z = -1.8, p = .04).
These were the only statistically significant 
differences observed.
However, as in the previous Experiment, it is
important to note that the sample of Subjects within each 
I.Q. category was small (10) and that such a sample would 
not easily yield statistical differences.
It clearly remains, however, that within each group 
tested, those dyads made up of Subjects of the lowest 
I.Q.'s obtained the highest mean scores. It should also 
be noted that within each group those dyads composed of 
Subjects of average I.Q.'.s obtained higher mean scores 
than teams made up of high I.Q. Subjects. Therefore, a 
clear progression of scoring appears wherein I.Q. is 
inversely related to paranormal cognition ability.
The next most obvious result to be observed is the 
drop in scoring levels in some of the C.A. groups in this 
Experiment as compared to the previous one. This drop can 
only be accounted for by the difference of the Subjects'
C.A. in each of the dyads. In comparing the mean score 
obtained by the low I.Q. Subjects in Group P in the first 
Experiment to that of the low I.Q.' Subjects in Group p/q 
in the second Experiment, there is found to be a significant 
scoring difference (z= -2.1; p ■» .02). In comparing the 
mean score obtained by the AVERAGE I.Q. Subjects In Group 
P in the first Experiment to that of the AVERAGE I.Q. 
Subjects in Group p/q in the second Experiment, there is a 
similarly significant scoring difference (Z = -2.2; p =
.02), as there is also between High I.Q. Subjects in
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Groups P and P/Q (Z * -2.2; p = .02).
In fact,it is evident that whereas there was in 
the previous Experiment an obvious relation between the 
mean C.A. Group score and the C.A. of the group involved 
(the relation being an inverse one), there is no longer 
the case as there is absolutely no difference in this 
present Experiment in the mean C.A. score obtained by the 
three C.A. groups (whereas there still is with the mean I .Q. 
score of each I.Q. group).
Therefore, it seems clear from this Experiment that 
by controlling the I.Q. variable within each group, but 
altering the C.A. variable, the clear C.A. inverse relation­
ship that has been found throughout all the previous 
Experiments is cancelled and is instead to some extent 
replaced by an inverse M.A. relationship.
TABLE 65 MEAN SCORES OF MATCHED I.Q./taXED
C.A. DYADS
GROUP
P/Q DYAD 
MEAN SCORE
P/R DYAD 
MEAN SCORE
q/r DYAD 
MEAN SCORE MEAN SCORE
High I.Q. 6.2 6.0 5.9 6.0
Ave. I.Q. 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.7
Low I.Q. 8.4 8.0 8.0 8.1
Mean score 7.1 6.9 6.8
other scores
Several other observations can be made from this 
Experiment.
1. a comparison of I.Q. Group P.C. 
scores in Experiments 1 and 2.
Firstly, we can compare the mean I.Q. 
scores obtained in the previous Experiment with 
those obtained, in this Experiment. TABLE 66 
gives that comparison.
It is evident that there is no significant 
difference in the mean I.Q. Group P.C. scores 
obtained in the first and second Experiment.
This implies to some extent that.the effects 
of I.Q. on paranormal cognition ability are affected, 
by C.A. only to a minimal level, and that once 
again there seems to be an inverse relationship 
between I.Q. and. paranormal cognition ability, 
although this is by no means as pronounced, as 
with the relationship between C.A. and paranormal 
ability.
TABLE 66 A COMPARISON OF I.Q. GROUP P.C. SCORES 
IN THE TWO EXPERIMENTS •___
GROUP
I.Q. GROUP 
EXP. 1
MEAN SCORE
I.Q. GROUP 
EXP. 2 
MEAN SCORE
DIFFERENCE
High I .Q. 6.87 6.0 .87
Ave. I.Q. 7* 2 6.7 o 50
Low I.Q. 7.8 8.1 .30
2. first and last half scores
Secondly, we can compare the number of hits 
obtained in the first half of each dyad run to the 
number of hits obtained in the last half of each 
dyad run.
TABLE 67 gives this comparison.
Once more, a cursory glance at the total scores 
obtained in the first and last half, of each GROUP 
score reveals that there is no significant scoring 
difference by dyads. This lends further credence 
to our observation that dyads composed of Subjects 
of the same I.Q. tend to obtain an equal number of 
hits in the first and last half of each trial.
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Once again, it must be noted that since all dyads 
were made up of one male and one female Subject, and 
that all males acted as 1 senders1 in the first half 
of each dyad run while all females acted as 1 sender* 
in the last half of each dyad run, then the lack of any 
significant scoring differences in the first and last 
half of each run also indicates the lack of any male/ 
female scoring differences in Experiment Two.
4. summary and conclusions
Subjects in Experiment Two were divided into 45 
dyads paired for I.Q. but not for C.A. and then tested 
for paranormal cognition ability.
There were three separate mixed C.A. groups tested 
made up of dyads ranging in age between 3.4 and 7*4 years 
of age. Similarly/ there were three separate paired I.Q. 
groups tested made up of Subjects whose I.Q. levels were 
between 87 and 115 points.
All group scores obtained were significantly above 
those expected by chance.
Results indicated, however, that unlike the three 
previous observational studies and the first Experiment,
there were no significant scoring differences in the 
three mixed C.A. groups. This lack of any significant 
difference can only be explained by the introduction of 
mixed C.A. dyads into the Experiment.
Results also indicated a strong inverse relation 
between I.Q. and paranormal cognition scoring ability in 
the three matched I.Q. groups* This significant 
difference shows that the inverse relationship between 
I.Q. and paranormal cognition scoring ability that was 
noted in the previous experiments and observational 
studies has been shown to be experimentally valid so 
long as C.A. is less than or equal to 8 years.
Graphs comparing C.A. and I.Q. to paranormal 
cognition scores showed no curve whatsoever for the 
mixed C.A. groups and a clear curve for the paired 
I. Q. groups.
Results also indicated that within each of the mixed 
C.A. groups, Subjects demonstrated abilities in paranormal 
cognition inversely related to their I.Q. level. These 
results were not entirely significant because of the 
small sample size of each I.Q. category with each mixed 
C.A. group. Nevertheless, within each mixed C.A. group 
the tendency was indicated that the lower the I.Q. of 
the Subjects, the higher was the paranormal, cognition 
score obtained.
Results also showed that there were no significant 
scoring differences during the first and last half of 
each dyad run. Since all dyads were composed of one 
male and one female Subject and since all males were 
assigned to ’sender1 roles in the first half of each run, 
whereas all females were assigned to 'sender' roles in 
the last half of each run, lack of any first half/last 
half scoring differences also indicated the lack of any 
male/female scoring differences in Experiment Two.
A comparison of mean I.Q., group scores obtained in 
Experiment One to mean I.Q. Group scores obtained in 
Experiment Two showed a very strong scoring similarity 
for all I.Q. groups throughout the two Experiments.
The results of this experiment indicate that there 
exists a clear inverse relationship between I.Q. and 
paranormal cognition ability in subjects up to the age 
of 8 years. Since I.Q. alone was held constant within 
groups and. variation in scoring by the C.A. groups < showed, 
no significant differences, then it once again logically 
follows that the I.Q. differences which emerged, must have 
been mainly due to differences in Mental Age (M.A.) and 
that therefore M.A. is an indicator of ability in 
paranormal cognition.
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TABLE 68 shows the group breakdown in Experiment 
Three.
TABLE 68 EXPERIMENT THREE: GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP LOW I.Q./ 
AVE.I.Q. . DYADS
LOW I.Q./
HIGH I.Q.DYADS
AVE.I.Q./
HIGH I.Q.DYADS
P 5 ’ 5 V 5 ' ..
Q 3 5 : 5
R . 5 • ■/ 5 / ■.. 5
TOTAL 15 15 15
' 3. ■' results
a) group scores
TABLE 69 gives the dyad scores obtained by the 
groups of mixed I.Q. but same C.A.
As in the previous two Experiments, three main 
observations can once again be made from the results 
obtained in this chart.
Firstly, all of the 9 separate C.A./I.Q. groups 
seemingly obtained scores which are above those expected 
by chance levels.
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Secondly, there is a tendency (though not nearly 
as strong as in Experiment one ) for there to be a 
decrease in positive scoring as the C.A, and I.Q. of 
each group increases; there also seems to be a marked 
tendency (though again, not as strong as in Experiment 
Two) for there to be a iecrease in positive scores as 
the mean I.Q. of each group increases.
Thirdly, Subjects designated as Low I.Q. Subjects 
in each C.A. group obtained the highest scores.
We shall now, as previously, look at each of these 
observations individually to determine their statistical 
validity.
The first observation made was that all the C.A./
I.Q. groups obtained a total number of ‘hits1 which 
were significantly above the number expected by chance.
Chi-square tests were made for each C.A./t.Q. 
group in fact revealed that all of the nine groups except one 
(the High I.Q./Average I.Q. group)in C.A. Group R ,
(the oldest chronological age group) obtained a 
significant above-chance score; one of the C.A./t.Q. 
groups (the High I.Q./Average I.Q. group in C.A. group 
Q only obtained scores at the .05 level of significance.
392.
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All the remaining groups obtained scores highly 
significantly above chance.
(x 2P(H-A) = 15.0; P ^  .001); (x2p(L<-H|)« 20.2; p^.OOl)
(x p(L-A) ~ 27.55; p^.OOl); 6.2; p ^  *02);
(x q (L—H) 30 i2.2; p .001); (Xq (L_a) ■**. 17• 0; p £_ • 001)
(X\(H-A) * 4o0; p = •03; P.05 * 3.84);
(x r (l-h ) == 6.2; p *°5); (x p(L—a )'■** * .P ^  .oi).
Therefore, a statistical analysis of the 9 G.A./l.Q. 
group reveals that all groups, except one, obtained 
scores which were significantly above those predicted 
by chance. It should be noted as well that the one 
group whose score was not significantly different from
. p
one predicted by chance obtained a x recording exceedingly 
close to that needed for a .05 significance level.
The probability of obtaining each of these scores 
was calculated as:
pp (h-a ) = 8.53 X io-5. Pp(L-H) = 4.01 X 10
PP(L-A) = 8.47 X 10~7; PQ(H-A) = 5.19 X 1°'
PQ(L-H) = 4.01 X 10"4; Pq(l-a ) = 8.53 X 10'
Pr (h-a ) = 1.41 X 10“2; Pr (L-H) = 5.19 X 10'
Pr (L-A) = 1.58 X 10"3.
A Wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis of the three 
C.A. groups in Experiment Three revealed that Subjects 
in C.A. group P obtained significantly greater scores 
than Subjects in C.A. Group Q (Z = -1.6036; p = .0544) 
and C.A. Group R (Z *= -2.0226; p = .0216). No 
significant statistical difference was found between 
Subjects in C.A. Group Q and C.A. Group R (Z = -1.4270;
p * .0768)•
Therefore, although the inverse relationship 
between C.A. and paranormal cognition still exists to 
some extent, it is not as clear-cut as in previous 
Experiments.
A second Wilcoxon matched-pairs analysis of the 
three I.Q. groups in Experiment Three revealed a 
significant scoring difference between Subjects in the 
Low I.Q./Average I.Q. group and the Average I.Q./High 
I.Q. group (Z = -1.8593; p = .0315)* There were no 
statistical scoring differences between Subjects in the 
Low I.Q./Average I.Q. group and the Low I.Q./High I.Q. 
group (Z xs -1.0954; p = .1367) or between the Low I.Q./ 
High I.Q. and Average I .Q./High I.Q. groups (Z = -.9129;
P = .1807).
Therefore, once again the inverse relationship 
between I.Q. and paranormal cognition is much more limited 
than in previous Experiments.
TABLE 69 HITS OBTAINED BY SAME C.A./hlXED 
. I.Q. TEAMS________ .
GROUP
HIGHEST 
POSS.NO. 
OF HITS
P Q R
TOTAL
HITS
HIGH IQ/ 
AVE. IQ 100 36 30 28 94
LOW IQ/ 
HIGH IQ 100 38 34 30 102
LOW IQ/ 
AVE. IQ 100 41 36 32 109
TOTAL 300 115 100 90 305
A Product Moment Correlation was calculated for 
C.A. and I.Q. scores in Experiment Three0 The results 
indicated a very high correlation between the two 
variables (A. = .96).
It is important here to note as well the 
deterioration of C.A. scores obtained by Groups P, Q 
and R in Experiment 3 as compared to Experiment 1.
TABLE 70 shows the scores obtained by these three 
paired * C.A. groups in the two Experiments.
As can be seen, it is only with the youngest C.A. 
group that any strong scoring deterioration occurs.
Such results suggest that the younger the C.A. of the 
Group being studied, the more dependent is the C.A. 
variable on the pairing of other variables such as I.Q.
TABLE 70 C. A ^ GROUP SCORE SIN EXPERIMENTS 1 8c 3
C.A. GROUP
C.A. GROUP 
SCORE IN 
EXP. 1
“C.A. GROUP 
SCORE IN 
EXP. 3
DIFFERENCE
.. P 134 115 19
Q 104 100 4
R 9° 90 0
b) graph
FIGURE lla in APPENDIX D compares the total scores 
obtained by the three mixed I.Q. groups to the I.Q. range 
of the groups tested.
FIGURE I lb in APPENDIX D compares the total scores 
obtained by the three paired C.A; groups to the C.A. 
range of the groups tested.
As can be seen from GRAPH 11a, there is virtually 
no scoring differentiation between the three mixed M.A. 
groups. A clear curve emerges, however, in GRAPH lib, 
showing the inverse relation between C.A. and paranormal 
cognition scoring Ability.
It is important to note, however, that the curve 
that emerges for the C.A. Groups in GRAPH lib, is not 
nearly as pronounced as the one for the paired C.A. 
group in GRAPH 9b, from Experiment One. It seems the 
case, therefore, that while C.A. is a partial indicator 
of paranormal scoring ability its overall strength can 
be diminished by the negative effect of non-paired I.Q. 
dyad grouping.
Results from Experiment Three therefore suggest 
that while both C.A. and I.Q. are both indicators of 
paranormal scoring ability, they are each affected, to 
some extent, by pairing or lack of pairing of the 
other variable.
c) intra-group scores
TABLE 71 gives the mean score obtained by each of 
the Experiment 3 groups.
It can be seen that in each of the three C.A. 
groups tested, the highest mean score obtained was by 
Subjects in the Low I.Q./Average I.Q. category. There 
is, however, no statistically significant difference 
in the scores obtained by the three I.Q. groups in 
each C.A. group.
The lack of any such significance might be explained 
either by the relatively low number of Subjects tested in 
each category or by the very nature of the Experiment 
which was concerned.with studying the effects of mixing 
dyads with Subjects of different I.Q. categories. More 
probably, a combination of these two factors was the main 
reason for any appearance of significantly different 
results.
There does, however, exist a significant difference 
in group scores when comparing the mean score obtained 
by each of the three C.A. groups. A Wilcoxon matched- 
pair analysis shows a statistically significant difference 
in the scores obtained by Subjects in C.A. group P and 
C.A. Group Q (Z =s -1.9; p = •05) and by Subjects in C.A. 
Group P and C.A. Group R (Z = -2.3; p = .02).
Therefore, a statistical difference still emerges 
based on the inverse relation between C.A. and para­
normal cognition, but this is not as pronounced as in 
Experiment 1.
It seems clear from this Experiment that the 
altering of the I.Q. variables to the extent that we 
have, greatly affects the ability to successfully employ 
paranormal cognition to the point that differences 
possibly due to I.Q. become negligible and also affect, 
to some extent, the C.A. effects on paranormal cognition 
by lowering the mean score* With regard to this second 
observation, a comparison of the scores obtained by 
Subjects in Group P of Experiment 1 to scores obtained 
by Subjects in Group P in this Experiment shows the extent 
to which such effects might take.
TABLE 71 MEAN SCORES OF MATCHED CA/falXED IQ TEAMS
GROUP P Q R MEAN SCORE
HIGH IQ/AVE. IQ 7.1 6.0 5.8 6. 3
HIGH IQ/LOW IQ 7.6 6.8 6.0 ov . 00
AVE. IQ/LOW IQ 00 • rv> 7.2 6.4 6.4
MEAN SCORE 7.6 6.7 6.7
d) other scores
1. first and last half scores
It is useful to compare scores obtained in 
the first half of each run to those obtained in 
the last half of each run.
TABLE 72 gives a breakdown of dyad hits in 
the first and last half of each run.
As can be seen from TABLE 72, it becomes clear 
that there are obvious differences in the number of 
hits obtained in the first and last half of each 
run, with the clear indication that Subjects in 
the Lower I.Q. categories obtained a greater number 
of hits than Subjects in the Higher I.Q. categories.
A Wilcoxon matc.hed-pair analysis showed these 
differences to be valid overall (Z = -2.3; p = .02) 
and for the Low I.Q./Average I.Q. categories (Z = 
-2.2; p = .02) and the Low I.Q./High I.Q. categories 
(z = -1.9; p = .02) individually.
Therefore, by mixing the I.Q. in dyads composed 
of Subjects of the same C.A., there appears a strong 
difference in first and last half run scoring levels.
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2. male and female scores
It is important here to note that unlike the 
previous two Experiments first half/last half 
scoring differences are not direct indicators of 
male/female scoring differences. This was due 
to the nature of the Experiment which by mixing 
I.Q. levels necessitated a change in the arrangement 
of male/female Subject order.
TABLE 73.compares male and female scoring 
differences in the three C.A. groups.
As can be clearly seen from TABLE 73, the 
total male and female scoring difference is only 5., 
therefore, there are no significant male and female 
scoring differences in Experiment Three#
However, because there is a difference in the 
first, and last half run scores obtained in Experiment 
Three, this difference strongly suggests that scores 
obtained in each dyad run are not due solely to one 
dyad member acting alone, but rather by a co-operative 
effort on the part of the two dyad members which in 
this case is strongly impaired, most likely due to 
the mixing of I.Q. levels in each dyad.
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TABLE 73 MALE AND FEMALE SCORING DIFFERENCES
GROUP MALE SCORE FEMALE SCORE
P 58 57
' Q , 51 49
R 46 44
TOTAL 155 150
4. summary and conclusions
Subjects in Experiment Three were divided into 45 
dyads paired for C.A. but not for I.Q. and then tested 
for paranormal cognition ability.
There were three separate paired C.A. groups tested 
made up of dyads ranging in age between 3.4 and 7.4 years 
of age. Similarly, there were three separate, mixed I.Q. 
groups tested made up of Subjects whose I.Q. levels were 
between 87 and 115 points.
All Group scores obtained (except one - the Average 
I.Q./kigh I .Q. dyads in oldest C.A. group) were significantly 
above those predicted by chance.
Results indicated a significant inverse relation 
between C.A. and paranormal cognition scoring ability for
all three C.A. groups. This inverse relation was also 
evident for several of the mixed I.Q. groups, but was 
not nearly as pronounced as in the two previous Experiments, 
indicating that the introduction of mixed I.Q. dyads greatly 
affects the scoring relation between I.Q. and paranormal 
cognition scoring ability.
To some extent, paranormal cognition scoring ability 
was not as strong as in the three observational studies or 
in Experiment One for the paired C.A. groups. This decline 
in scoring - especially evident in the youngest C.A. group —  
indicates that whereas C.A. can be on its own a sufficiently 
suitable indicator for paranormal cognition scoring ability 
it is to some extent affected by other variables such as 
I.Q.:"
Graphs comparing C.A. and I.Q. to paranormal cognition 
scores showed no emergent differences in the mixed-I.Q. 
group scores. On the other hand, a clear curve showing 
the inverse relation between C.A, and paranormal cognition 
ability emerged.
Results also indicated that within each of the mixed 
I.Q. groups, while there was a slight tendency for dyads 
composed of Subjects in the lower I.Q, levels to obtain 
higher scores than dyads composed of Subjects in the higher
I.Q. levels, there were absolutely no significant 
differences to add more credence to this observation.
The lack of any such scoring differences once again 
indicates the strong effect that I.Q. may have on 
paranormal scoring ability.
Results also showed significant scoring differences 
during the first and last half of each dyad run. In all 
cases, the first half of each run had more * hits' than 
the second half. It is of interest to note that in all 
cases, Subjects in each dyad with the lower I.Q. level 
acted as the initial 'sender1. This observation might 
prove of value to further research into the 'mechanics' 
of paranormal cognition. Of immediate importance, however, 
is the clear indication from this sudden scoring difference 
in first half/last half scores that 'hits' are not due to 
the actions of one member of each dyad (as was suggested 
as an alternative explanation at the end of the Observational 
Studies) but rather to a co-operative effort on the part 
of both dyad members. This observation is also of interest 
and importance to research in parapsychology as it is 
suggestive of a demonstration of telepathy1 alone and not 
of an alternative mechanism.
There were no male and female scoring differences in 
Experiment Three.
Since all Subject Groups in Experiment Three were 
paired only for C.A. and since I.Q. = 100, then
the results obtained in Experiment Three once again 
indicate that M.A. is an independent indicator of 
paranormal cognition ability in that paranormal cognition 
scoring ability is inversely related to M.A.
Summary of the I.Q. Experiments
A series of three I.Q. Experiments was conducted to 
see what effects I.Q. had on paranormal cognition ability. 
Three C.A. groups each composed of thirty Subjects (15 
male, 15 female) were sub-divided into three T.Q. sub­
groups (i.e. Low I.Q., Average I.Q., High I.Q.) each 
composed, of ten Subjects (5M, 5F). The three C.A. 
groups were composed of Subjects aged between 3.2 - 3.7 
years of age, 4.5 - 4.9 years of age and 5.0 - 7.9 years 
of age. All three C.A. groups were therefore within the 
age range in which successful paranormal cognition 
ability should be observed:.
The Experiments were in all other ways totally similar 
to the experimental procedure employed in the previous C.A. 
studies. As no scoring difference had. been observed between 
the sender target-choice and randomised target Experiments, 
it was decided in this instance that sender target-choice 
would be retained in order to allow optimal active
participation in all the Subjects.
In the first I.Q. Experiment, Subject dyads were 
matched for both C.A. and I.Q. It was found, as in the 
previous Experiments, that:
1) all three C.A. groups and all three I.Q. 
groups obtained above-chance scores indicating 
successful employment of paranormal cognition, 
and that
2) the level of scoring declines as both the 
C.A. and I.Q. of each group increases.
It was also found that in each of the three C.A. 
groups tested, the Subjects in the Low I.Q. category 
obtained the highest mean scores. Several other intra­
group statistical differences were found but on the whole, 
possibly due to the small number of Subjects within each 
I.Q. category in each C.A. group, there was little 
statistical indication of very powerful intra-group I .Q. 
effects. However, it remains clear that, overall,
Subjects of the lowest I.Q.'s and lowest C.A.'s obtained 
the highest scores. From the first I.Q. Experiment, 
therefore, there is evidence available that I.Q, is a 
factor in paranormal cognition ability.
In the second I.Q. Experiment, Subjects were once 
again paired, for I.Q. but not for C.A. It was found, 
as in all the previous Experiments, that all three mixed 
C.A. groups obtained scores significantly above chance 
thereby indicating the successful employment of paranormal 
cognition* Unlike all the previous Experiments, however, 
no significant differences were found between the three 
mixed C.A. group scores; while it is true that the lowest 
aged mixed C.A. group obtained the highest total score and 
the highest aged mixed C.A.groupsobtained the lowest total 
score, the differences are too.small to attach any 
statistical significances to. This lack of difference can 
only be attributed to the mixing of C.A. groups.
More importantly, however, there were very strong 
I.Q. differences recorded—  with the Low I.Q. Subjects 
obtaining a statistically greater mean score than the 
Average I.Q. and High I.Q. Subjects, and the Average I.Q. 
Subjects obtaining a statistically greater mean score than 
the High I.Q. Subjects. These differences also appeared 
within the mixed C.A. groups but were not as prominent due, 
possibly, to the small number of I.Q. Subjects within each 
mixed C.A. group, A very noticeable drop in scoring was 
observed in some of the mixed C.A. groups. Once again, 
this drop can only be accounted for by the difference of 
the C.A. in each dyad; it is this difference which produces
the total lack of any mixed C.A. inter-group scoring 
differences. Finally, the lack of any significant 
differences in each of the three I.Q. categories between 
the mixed C.A. groups, indicates that the effects of
I.Q. on paranormal cognition are to some extent 
independent of C.A. in that I.Q. on its own can influence 
and be related to paranormal cognition ability. By 
controlling I.Q, but altering C.A. the clear inverse 
C.A. relationship to paranormal cognition no longer exists, 
whereas a clear inverse I.Q. relationship to paranormal 
cognition emerges.
In the third I.Q. Experiment, Subjects were paired 
for C.A. but not for I.Q. It was found, as in the previous 
Experiments, that all three of the C.A. groups obtained 
scores which were significantly above those expected by 
chance, thereby indicating the successful employment of 
paranormal cognition. It was found also that 8 out of the 
9 mixed I.Q. sub-groups also obtained scores significantly 
greater than those predicted by chance. There was an inverse 
relation found between both C.A. and paranormal cognition 
and I.Q. and paranormal cognition overall, although in 
both cases the differences are not nearly as pronounced 
as in previous Experiments. Within each C.A. group there 
are no significant I.Q* scoring differences although these 
may once again be explained in terms of the low number of
Subjects in each mixed I.Q. sub-groups. It is clear 
from Experiment Three that the lack of control of the
I.Q. variable greatly affects the ability to employ 
paranormal cognition and also affects any controlled C.A. 
effect by diminishing the level of successful scoring.
From the three I.Q. Experiments, it becomes clear 
that both C.A. and I.Q. are linked in determining the 
success of paranormal cognition experiments for Subjects 
up to the age of eight. It is obvious that dyads composed 
of Subjects of similar C.A. and I.Q. obtained the best 
scores, and that by the manipulation of one of these two 
all important variables data either presented an inverse 
relation between C.A. or I.Q. and paranormal cognition, 
or both but to a much lesser extent.
It is evident then, that both these factors can be 
seen both as independent and combined variables in 
determining and predicting the success of a paranormal 
cognition Experiment.
It was also found in all three I.Q. Experiments that 
there were no male/female scoring differences in the 
Groups studied.
Except for the third Experiment, there were also no
first half/last half run scoring differences found.
The scoring difference occurring in the third run strongly 
indicates both the adverse effect of mixed-I.Q. dyads on 
paranormal cognition scores and the co-operative nature 
of the Experiments in question.
Finally, because of the strong inter-relationship 
between I.Q., C.A. and M.A. (mental age), the results 
Obtained in the three I.Q. Experiments also point to 
the independent effect of M.A. on paranormal cognition 
scoring.
The three separate I.Q. Experiments just reported 
have verified the following hypotheses:
1) C.A. is inversely related to paranormal 
cognition ability.
2) I.Q. is inversely related to paranormal 
cognition ability.
3) Subjects paired for both C.A. and I.Q. 
will obtain higher paranormal cognition 
scores than Subjects paired for only one 
of these two variables.
4) In groups of Subjects paired for C.A., 
those Subjects at lower I.Q levels will 
obtain higher paranormal cognition scores
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than Subjects at higher I.Q. levels.
5) In groups of Subjects paired for I.Q., 
those Subjects at lower C.A.’s will 
obtain higher paranormal cognition 
scores than Subjects of greater C.A.
• i. " .
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2. THE EFFECTS OF COMPLEX TASKS ON PARANORMAL COGNITION 
Introduction
The second set of Experiments to be considered is 
concerned with the effects of internal cognition tasks 
being performed at the same time as a paranormal cognition 
task. Two different possible effects are of prime . 
importance.
First, will an internal cognition task which has 
no direct bearing on the paranormal cognition task being 
performed have any positive or negative effect on the 
performance of a paranormal cognition task?
Second, will varying the complexity of the internal 
cognition task be a factor in any further effect on 
performance of a paranormal cognition task?
We have argued that paranormal cognition is employed 
under conditions in which the individual is not employing 
complex internalised self-related cognition. We have 
argued that young children would therefore employ para­
normal cognition far more frequently than adults since 
their ability to produce and employ such internalised 
cognitive processes is still minimal. Our results are in 
agreement with this hypothesis. We would therefore
further hypothesise that the introduction of a normal 
cognition task on a paranormal cognition task would 
impede the Subject's ability to employ paranormal 
cognition successfully.
We would further argue that the more complex the 
normal cognition task, the more would it impede the 
employment of paranormal cognition.
A set of Experiments was therefore designed to 
test these tw.o hypotheses.
Procedure
Sixty (60) Subjects were employed in all - thirty 
(30) being male and thirty (30) being female. All 
Subjects were aged between 5.0 and 6.1 years of age and 
all had an I.Q. between 98 and 102. Subjects were tested 
in teams of two. There were, therefore, thirty (30) dyads 
in all. Each dyad consisted of one male and one female 
Subject.
The 30 dyads were divided into 3 main experimental 
groups.
Group M was the control group and consisted of ten 
dyads. The Subjects in these dyads were given a paranormal
cognition task exactly the same in procedure as the 
previous paranormal cognition tasks we have employed 
in the Experiments.
Group N was the low complex task group and consisted 
of ten dyads. Before the start of the paranormal 
cognition task one of the Subjects in each dyad (the 
'sender') was shown a list* of ten paired associates 
which he was told to try to remember. He was given two 
minutes to do this. Similarly, after the tenth para­
normal cognition trial, Subjects in each dyad reversed 
roles and at this point the new 'sender' was given the 
same list to memorise in two minutes and was then allowed 
to recommence the paranormal cognition task. Therefore, 
a secondary task relating to internal cognition was 
introduced into the Experiment.
At the same time as the 'sender' was shown his 
control target during each trial, he was also asked to
* The 'list' was in the form of pictures since children 
of such young C.A. were usually unable to read. Pictures 
were pointed to one at a time and named by the Subject. 
Wrong answers were corrected by the Experimenter. Positive 
feedback (i.e. 'yes! or 'good') was given for correct 
naming.
give the second half of a paired associate. Therefore, 
the paranormal cognition task and the secondary internal 
cognition tasks ran as concomitantly as possible.
There were ten paired associates in all, one for 
each trial that any particular 'sender1 would have.
The paired associates listed below are those which were 
employed in the secondary task for all Group N Subjects. 
The order of the paired associates is that in which they 
were presented to each Subject prior to the paranormal 
cognition task. Their testing order was, however, 
randomised.
The ten paired associates employed were:-
1. Salt — Pepper
2. Cup Saucer
3. Cat - Mouse
4. Needle Thread
5. Pencil Paper
6. Ship ■ - Sea
7. Chimney - Smoke
8. Cowboys - Indian*
9. Happy - . Sad
.0. Milkman ' —  ‘ Milk
As can be readily seen, all the secondary task 
associations were of low complexity in that the pair 
bond was a common one to make.
Group P was the high complex task group and consisted 
of ten (10) teams of Subjects. Before the start of the 
paranormal cognition task one of the Subjects in each 
dyad (the 'sender1) was shown a list of ten paired 
associates which he was told to attempt to memorise. He 
was allowed two minutes to do this. After the tenth 
paranormal cognition trial when dyad Subjects reversed 
roles, the new 'sender* was given the same list to 
memorise in two minutes and was then allowed to begin 
the paranormal cognition task once again. There, once 
again, an alternative secondary task relating to internal 
cognition was introduced into the Experiment*
At the same time as the * sender* was shown his control 
target during each trial, he was also asked to give the 
second half of a paired associate. Therefore, as with 
Group N, the paranormal cognition task and the secondary 
internal cognition task ran as concomitantly as possible.
There were ten secondary task paired associates in all, 
one for each trial that any particular * sender* would have. 
The paired associates listed below are those which were
employed for all Group P Subjects. The order of presentation 
of the paired associates listed here is, the same order 
as that shown to Subjects previous to the paranormal cognition 
task. Their testing order was, however, randomised.
The ten paired associates employed in Group P were:
1. Sun
2. Radio
3. Grass
4. Peaches
5. Book
6. Snow
7. Castle
8. Church
9. Hair 
10. Cheese
As can be seen, the pair bonds being required were 
relatively simple but not common ones and therefore requiring 
a higher level of complex internalised associations to be 
made by the Subjects than the previous paired associates.
It is important to note here that although for the 
purpose of this Experiment we have referred to the secondary 
task associations given to Group N and Group P Subjects as
Beach
Record
Cricket
Cream
Pen
Ski
Crown
Choir
Brush
Goat
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having 1 low complexity* or fhigh complexity*, these 
terms are interchangeable with the more widely used 
terms of 1 high frequency* and * low frequency*• In both 
cases, the terms imply a simplicity and difficulty of 
the paired associates employed. However, since this 
Experiment is primarily concerned with the effects of a 
secondary internal cognition task on a paranormal cognition 
task and whether any such effects become more intensified 
with the increasing complexity (or diminishing frequency) 
of the associational bonds that the Subject is being 
called upon to make, then it was considered that the 
terms * low complexity* and *high complexity* gave a 
clearer understanding of the purpose of the Experiment 
than *high frequency* or * low frequency*• I t must be 
stressed however that other than this alternate use of 
terminology, the secondary task paired associates are 
clearly *hgih frequency* and * low frequency* associates.
The secondary task words employed for Group N and 
Group P were taken from the Teacher*s Word Book of 30,000 
Words by E.L. Thorndike and I. Lorge (5th Printing, 1968 
Columbia Press). This precaution was taken to ensure that 
the frequency of occurrence of the words employed in each 
associational bond was suitable.
It should also be noted that although the word- 
associations employed in this experiment would appear 
to fall clearly into either a 1 low frequency* or 
* high frequency* category, this distinction cannot 
be totally validated by consulting independent frequency 
tables. After long and fruitless research into various 
word-association tests none were found which bore 
direct relevance to the present experimental procedure. 
The test which bears closest resemblance to the present 
one is the KentrRossanoff word association frequency 
count. However, this test is both severely outdated 
and based on a limited range of stimulus words, and as 
such was only of partial benefit.
Very careful selection of the low frequency and 
high frequency word associations for the present 
experiment was therefore quite necessary. It is believed 
that the final category choices is perfectly adequate 
for the purposes of this experiment.
Because there was the slight possibility that the
secondary task associations might in some obscure way 
be employed as cues to any concrete object targets in 
the paranormal cognition task, only cards with abstract 
symbols were employed by all three groups being tested.
As there were therefore only 10 cards in a 20 trial 
Experiment, fsender-choic.ef was replaced by a pre-r an demised 
target, in each trial for all ‘senders*. This was also 
necessary in order to allow as close a proximity as 
possible between the sender's 'thinking* of the target 
symbol and of the paired associate at the same time.
Subject Breakdown
TABLE 74 gives the breakdown of the groups and their 
secondary paired associate task in tabular form. As can 
be seen, all Subjects in this Experiment were aged between 
5 and 6 years of age, and all were paired for I.Q. (I.Q. 
range: 98 - 102). There were 60 Subjects in all (30 M,
30F). The 60 Subjects were divided into 3 groups each 
composed of 10 male and 10 female Subjects. The 20 
Subjects in each group were again divided into experimental 
dyads made up of one male and one female Subject.
The ten dyads in group P were tested solely for 
paranormal cognition ability using the same procedure as 
in the previous Experiment•
Subjects in Group N were tested on paranormal 
cognition ability and on a concomitant secondary task 
of low complexity paired associates.
Subjects in Group' ? were tested on paranormal 
cognition ability and on a concomitant secondary task 
of high complexity paired associates.
TABLE 74 GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP CA IQ
SECONDARY NUMBER 
PAIRED OF SUBJECTS 
ASSOCIATE TASK MALES FEMALES
NUMBER OF 
DYADS
M 5*0
6.1
98
100
None ' 10 10 10
N 5.1
6.0
99
102
Low complexity 
associations
10 10 10
, P 5.1
6.1
99
101
High complexity 
associations
10 10 10
Results
l) group scores
TABLE 75 gives the.number of correct hits made on 
the paranormal cognition Experiment by each of the three 
Groups and compares their score with that expected by 
chance.
TABLE 76 presents the data in %, giving the percent 
of hits scores by each group and comparing this % to 
the chance expected % of hits for that chronological 
and mental age group.
Two main observations can be drawn from these two 
tables.
Firstly, all three task groups obtained total scores 
above those predicted by chance.
Secondly, subjects who had no task to perform scored 
more paranormal cognition ‘hits1 than the Subjects who 
had been given either a Low complexity task or a High 
complexity task, and that Subjects who had been given a 
Low complexity task obtained more paranormal cognition 
hits than Subjects who had been given a High complexity 
task.
, We shall now look at each of these observations 
independently and determine whether there is any 
statistical difference between conditions within them.
Our first observation made was that all three task 
groups obtained total scores above those predicted by 
chance.
A chi-square analysis of each of the group scores 
revealed that only task groups M (no task) and N (Low 
complexity task) did in fact obtain scores significantly 
above those predicted by chance and, that, in fact, 
Subjects in task group N obtained a total score 
significant from chance only at the .05 level.
Only Subjects in task group M obtained a group score 
which was significantly above chance*
( x 2m  =16.52; p £  .001); (x2N = 4.5; p £  .05);
(x p = .5; p = n.s.).
The probability of obtaining each of these scores 
was calculated as:
PM = 3.87 x 10-5; PN = 7.83 x 10-3; Pp =5.32 x 10-2.
Therefore, a statistical analysis of our first 
observation reveals that' only task group M and N 
obtained significant above chance scores, and that only 
group M obtained a reliable highly significant above 
chance score.
A Wilcoxon raatched-pairs test was then made between
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the scores obtained by the control group and the low 
complexity task group. Results revealed a statistically 
significant scoring difference (Z » -1.6; p = .05)*
Similarly, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test was made 
between the scores obtained by the control group and 
the hi,gh complexity task group. Results revealed a 
statistically significant scoring difference here as 
well (Z = -1*8; p *= ,03).
Finally, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test was made 
between the scores obtained by the low complexity task 
group and the high complexity task group. Results 
revealed a statistically significant scoring difference 
(Z =.-1.6; p = .05).
Therefore, the results obtained by the comparison 
of scores on each of the three task groups in the 
Experiment indicate that there is a significant 
decrease in successful use of paranormal cognition as 
the complexity of an internal cognition task increases*
2. sub-group scores
All the Subjects in Group N obtained perfect or 
near-perfect (minimum 8 correct paired associations)
scores in their secondary paired-associate task. It 
is important, however, to note and compare the scores 
obtained in the secondary paired associate and paranormal 
cognition task by Subjects in Group P.
TABLE 77 shows a comparison of the individual 
Subject scores in both tasks,
TABLE 77 * A COMPARISON OF SCORES OBTAINED BY 
SUBJECTS IN GROUP P IN PARANORMAL 
COGNITION TASKS AND PAIRED ASSOCIATE TASKS
SUBJECT SEX PARANORMAL COGNITION 
SCORE (OUT OF 10)
PAIRED ASSOCIATE 
SCORE (OUT OF 10.)
1 F 0 8
2 M 1 8
3 M 1 7
4 F 1 6
5 M 2 ■ 6
6 F ' 2 6
7 M 2 6
8 F 2 6
9 M 2 ; ,' . 5
10 F 2 5
11 M- 2 5
12 M 2 5
13 F 2 5
14 M 3 ' 6
15 F ' 3. • 6
16 M ' 3 6
17 F 3' ' 6
18 F 3 5..
19 M 4 4
20 F 4 3
* Subjects are in rank order, not in actual dyad order.
A Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient for 
Tied Observations was carried out comparing the Subject 
scores obtained for the paranormal cognition task and 
the secondary paired associate score task in Group P.
TABLE 78 shows the ranks on paranormal cognition 
and paired associate scores.
The correlation between high paranormal cognition 
scoring and low secondary paired associate scoring was 
sufficiently high (/l.s = *68) to indicate that success 
in one task strongly reduced the possibility of success 
in the second task.
a) graph
FIGURE12 in APPENDIX D compares the paranormal 
cognition task scores obtained by Subjects in Group P 
to the secondary paired associate task scores obtained 
by Subjects in Group P. It is evident from the graph 
as well that success in one task tends to affect the 
level of success in the other task.
It can be clearly noted from these scores that 
Subjects tended to generally score well either on the 
paranormal cognition task or on the paired associate
TABLE 78 RANKS ON PARANORMAL COGNITION SCORING 
AND SECONDARY PAIRED ASSOCIATE SCORING
SUBJECT RANK . di di2PARANORMAL
COGNITION
SECONDARY TASK
1 ■ ■ 1 19.5 18.5 342.25
2 2.7 19.5 16.2 262.44
3 2.7 18 15.3 234.09
4 2.7 13 10.3 106.09
5 9 13 4 16
6 9 13 4 16
7 9 13 4 16
8 9 13 4 16
9 9 5.5 3.5 12.25
10 9 5.5 3.5 12.25
11 9 5.5 3.5 12.25
12 9 5.5 3.5 12.25
13 9 5.5 3.5 12.25
14 16 13 3 9
15 16 13 3 9
16 16 13 3 9
17 16 13 3 9
18 .16 5.5 10.5 110.25
19 19.5 ■ 2 17.5 306.25
20 19.5 1 18.5 342.25
l i V  
1864.87 ,
task but never equally well on both. In fact, the four 
Subjects who obtained the lowest paranormal cognition 
task scores were the same four Subjects who obtained the 
highest paired associate scores and similarly, the two 
Subjects who obtained the highest paranormal cognition 
scores obtained the lowest paired associate scores.
Therefore, although it is not the case that paranormal 
cognition and cognition related to paired associations (i.e. 
normal cognition) cannot be employed together, it is 
certainly likely that attempts to incorporate the two 
severely impair either one cognitive system or the other.
It is also of interest to note that there is no 
difference in scoring between males and females in either 
the paranormal cognition (Males: 22; Females: 22) or 
paired associates (Males: 58; females: 56). Therefore, 
there is no obvious sexual 'preference' for the employment 
of one system of cognition rather than another.
Summary and Conclusions
An Experiment was designed to study the relationship 
between paranormal cognition and normal cognition. Since 
it had been hypothesised that paranormal cognition 
manifestations will diminish under conditions in which 
the Subject is undergoing active, consciously directed
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internalised activity, an Experiment was devised to 
test the validity of such an hypothesis.
Sixty Subjects of similar C.A. and I.Q. were separated 
into three task groups, each composed of 20 Subjects 
(lGM, 10F) • The first task group was categorised as a 
control group and subject dyads performed the paranormal 
cognition Experiment in the same way as all the previous 
Experimental groups. Each 'sender* in the second task 
group was given, prior to the paranormal cognition 
Experiment, a simple word association (which he had to 
memorise as a secondary task. Just as each paranormal 
cognition target card was presented to him, he was also 
given a word from the word association task to which he 
had to give the correct associated reply. Each 'sender* 
in the third task group was also given a secondary word 
association task which he had to memorise. The word 
associations in this case, however, were more complex 
than in the second task group.
Senders in all three task groups were given pre­
selected randomised targets, all of which were of 
abstract shapes.
The results showed that whereas the no-task group 
obtained highly significantly above-chance scores,
Subjects in the low-complexity task group obtained 
scores significant at the .05 level, and Subjects in 
the high-comp1exity task group failed to obtain any 
significantly above-chance scores. There were significant 
scoring differences between the no-task group and both 
the low and high complexity task groups. Similarly, 
there was a significantly greater scoring obtained by 
the low-complexity task group than by the high complexity 
task group.
Therefore, there is a strong diminishing effect on 
paranormal cognition by concurrent cognitive activity.
This is further seen when comparing the scores obtained 
by Subjects in the high complexity task group on both 
their paranormal cognition and internal cognition task. 
Here, it is found that Subjects tended to score well 
either on one or on the other but never equally well on 
both. Those Subjects who obtained the highest paranormal 
cognition task scores also obtained the lowest internal 
cognition scores, and vice versa.
Therefore, although both cognitive systems can be 
employed together, it is highly likely that attempts to 
incorporate the two severely impair either one system or 
the other.
The question remains, however, as to why Subjects
within the complex secondary task group should score 
so differently, either doing well on the paranormal 
cognition task or on the secondary paired associate 
task. It will be recalled that all subjects had been 
paired for both C.A. and i .q . Therefore, some other 
variable must have brought about these intra-group 
differences.
It has been argued that the internal state of the 
Subject is an important variable in predicting success 
in paranormal cognition. It is possible, therefore, that 
varying internal states are the reason for these intra­
group differences in scoring.
The final Experiment is concerned with this variable 
and its results will perhaps go some way to explaining 
the scoring variations found in this present Experiment.
3. THE EFFECTS OF A RELAXATION STIMULUS ON PARANORMAL
COGNITION.
Introduction
The final set of Experiments to be considered is 
concerned with the effects of an internal 'relaxation1 
stimulus on scores obtained in a paranormal cognition 
task. Once again, two different, though related, 
questions are being asked.
First, will an internal 'relaxation' stimulus designed 
to reduce internalised thought but which has no direct 
bearing on the paranormal cognition task have any positive 
or negative effect on the performance of a paranormal 
cognition task?
Second, will the varying of the 'relaxation' stimulus 
be a factor in any further effect of performance of a 
paranormal cognition task?
'Relaxation' is being used in this case as a 
descriptive term for variables associated with Subjects' 
(hypothesised) internal states which are conducive to 
improved paranormal cognition scoring.
Parapsychological research has, as was earlier
summarised, found some variables which in several 
Experiments, seem to enhance paranormal cognition scoring. 
Among these variables, internal states related to the 
generation of the alpha waves were seen to have, in various 
Experiments, improved Subjects' scores. More recently, 
research in the Ganzfeld Effect (a mild form of sensory 
deprivation in which the eyes are covered by a ping-pong 
ball cut in half and headphones are placed over the ears) 
has also supplied data strongly suggestive of enhanced 
paranormal cognition performance while 'in the Ganzfeld'. 
Undergraduate research at the University of Surrey has 
demonstrated that Subjects who have been tested for the 
Ganzfeld Effect are able to consciously generate alpha 
waves more easily and for more prolonged periods than 
Subjects who have not been tested for the Ganzfeld Effect*. 
This result supports the view that both alpha wave generation 
and the Ganzfeld Effect are closely associated. The 
Alpha-wave state has most commonly been described as a 
'day-dreaming' state, or a relaxed pre-meditative state**. 
This description indicates that Subjects in these states are 
generating minimal complex consciously directed thought.
It is this lack of the presence of consciously 
directed thought that we have termed 'relaxation'.
* May, P. 'The Ganzfeld Effect and Alpha-wave generation'. -
unpublished report.
** Tart, C. Altered States of Consciousness;
1972; Anchor Books, New York.
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We have previously argued that paranormal cognition 
is best employed under conditions in which the individual 
is not employing complex, internalised self-related 
cognition. We have shown, indeed, in the previous set of 
Experiments how the introduction of a secondary internal 
cognition task impedes paranormal cognition. We would, 
however, hypothesise that if a Subject undertaking a 
paranormal cognition Experiment could in some way be led 
away from consciously directing internal cognition, then 
his paranormal cognition scores should be employed more 
successfully.
Further, we would also hypothesise that the more 
•relaxed1 the Subject is (i.e. the more led away he is 
from consciously directed thought), the higher will be 
the rate of successful paranormal cognition performance#
We have designed a set of Experiments to test these 
two hypotheses#
Procedure
The same Subjects that were employed in the previous . 
set of Experiments were employed in the •relaxation1 
Experiments. The main reason for doing this was so that 
procedural instructions would be unnecessary as the
t 427.
Subjects already knew how ’’to play the guessing game" 
and that therefore the 'relaxation* aspects of the task 
would not be interrupted by instructions. Sixty Subjects 
were employed in all - thirty being male and thirty being 
female. All Subjects were aged between 5.0 and 6.1 years 
of age and all had an I.Q. between 98 and 102. Subjects 
were tested in dyads, each dyad consisting of one male 
and one female Subject. There were thirty dyads in all. 
Although the Subjects used in this set of Experiments 
were the same Subjects as those in the previous set of 
Experiments, the dyads were totally different with no 
two Subjects having performed the Experiment together 
before. In order to allow 'relaxation1 to be used as 
much as possible, 'senders' were provided with pre­
randomised target stimuli rather than be allowed to choose 
their stimulus target. All the stimuli employed in this 
set of Experiments were the 50 drawings of concrete 
objects taken from a picture vocabulary test. No 
abstract symbols were employed.
The thirty dyads were divided into three main 
Experimental groups.
Group X was the control group and consisted of ten 
dyads. The Subjects in these dyads were simply asked to
perforin a paranormal cognition task following the score 
procedure as all the other previous paranormal cognition 
tasks we have described.
Group Y was the partial relaxation group and con­
sisted of ten dyads. The Subjects in these dyads were 
simply asked to perform a paranormal cognition task 
following the same procedure as Group X. In addition, 
however, the * sender1 Subjects in Group Y were asked to 
wear earphones throughout the Experiment. Two minutes 
before the Experiment began, the 'senders' began to 
receive music, played into their earphones. The music 
consisted of several tracks of electronic/electric music 
played by John Cale and Terry Riley which appear in their 
album 'Church of Anthrax'. The music follows various 
variations in style - random electronics to steady 'rock* 
beat. There is no vocal content. After the first ten 
trials in the paranormal cognition task, the 'sender' 
and receiver changed roles with the new 'sender' being 
given two minutes of music before the start of the record 
half of the Experiment.
Group Z was the total relaxation group. It also 
consisted of ten dyads. The teams of Subjects in Group Z 
were also simply asked to perform a paranormal cognition 
task following the same procedure as Group X. In addition,
however, both subjects in each dyad in Group Z were asked 
to wear earphones throughout the Experiment. Two minutes 
before the Experiment began, both sets of earphones began 
to have the same music, played into them. The music 
consisted of several tracks of classic and electric guitar
played by Mahavishnu John McLaughlin. The music consisted
of several pieces which McLaughlin wrote for his spiritual 
Master, Sri Chimnoy, and which appear in his albums,
* Extrapolations1 and 'Birds of Fire* . They are "eastern-
flavoured" in sound and are considered to be highly 
emotional and spiritual musical expressions. There is 
no vocal content. After the tenth trial, Subjects were 
slowly made to change positions while still listening to 
the music, and no break was taken before the new set of 
targets were shown to the new 'sender'. Therefore, as far 
as was possible within the experimental restrictions, dyads 
in Group Z were given an uninterrupted flow of paranormal 
cognition trials and a 'relaxation* stimulus.
The 'relaxation' stimulus employed during this set 
of Experiments was music. Although alternative 'relaxation* 
stimuli such as alpha-wave biofeedback devices or GansfnAic 
Effect equipment (earphones and ping-pong balls) would have 
been preferable, the conditions presented were such that 
their use was to a large extent impossible. Electrodes take 
up a sizeable amount of time to be affixed in the proper
positions on to Subjects' heads and it was argued that 
the GansfiSLAT Effect might frighten the children being 
tested. As such, music was considered to be, following 
consultation with headmistress and teachers, as the 
simplest and most appreciated 'relaxation' stimulus for 
the children. The children in the school from which 
Subjects for the 'relaxation' experiment were selected • 
were used to listening to classical music with the explicit 
teacher direction that they * let their mind wander to the 
music'. Therefore, although the music used during the 
Experiment had been previously unheard by the children, 
the proper 'relaxation technique* had already been 
'learned' as part of their school activities.
Subject breakdown
TABLE 79 gives the breakdown of the groups and their 
relaxation stimulus in tabular form.
As can be seen, all Subjects in this Experiment were 
aged between 5 and 6 years of age and all were paired for 
I.Q. There were 60 Subjects in all (30M, 30F). The 60 
Subjects were divided into three Experimental groups each 
composed of 10 male and 10 female Subjects. The 20 Subjects 
in each group were again divided into experimental dyads 
made up of one male and one female subject.
The ten dyads in Group X were tested solely for 
paranormal cognition ability using the same procedure 
as in the previous Experiments.
Subjects in Group Y were tested on paranormal 
cognition ability while .the'.•'sender1 listened to 
electronic, music through earphones.
Subjects in Group Z were tested on paranormal 
cognition ability while both members of the dyad listened 
to •devotional1 music through earphones.
TABLE 79 GROUP BREAKDOWN
GROUP CHRONOLOGICALAGE I.Q.
RELAXATION 
STIMULU S
NO. OF 
SUBJECTS
NO. OF 
TEAMS .
MALES FEMALES
X 5.0- 6.0 99-
101
None 10 10 10
Y 5.1 - 6.0 99-
102
Electronic 
music to 
sender
10 10 10
z 5.1 - 6.1 98-
100
Devotional 
music to 
both . 
Subjects
10 10 10
Results
1. group scores
TABLE 80 gives the number of correct hits obtained
432.
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by each group on their paranormal cognition Experiment 
and compares that score to one expected by chance.
TABLE 81 presents the same data in % form showing
*
the percent of hits scored by each group and comparing 
this % to the chance expected % of hits.
Once again, two main observations can be made from 
these tables.
Firstly, all three of the relaxation groups obtained 
scores in excess of those predicted by chance.
Secondly, an increase in ^ relaxation* brought about 
an increase in the group scores obtained.
We shall look at each of these observations 
individually and subject them to statistical analysis in 
order to see if differences are significant.
Our first observation, that all three relaxation 
groups obtained scores significantly above those 
predicted by chance was confirmed. In all three cases, 
groups scored at levels significantly greater than those 
predicted by chance.
(x2x = 10.1; p [_ .01); (x2 M. 33.1; p^.OOl); 
(x2z « 66.6; p /. .001).
The probability of obtaining these scores has 
been calculated as:
P„ ■ 6.22 x 10-4; Py ■ 2.72 x 10-8; Pz = 8.87 x 10"
Therefore, it is clear that all three relaxation 
groups were successfully employing paranormal cognition,
A Wilcoxon matched-pairs test was then made between 
the scores obtained by the control group and the 
electronic music group. Results revealed a statistically 
significant scoring difference (Z * -1.8; p » .03).
Similarly, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test was made 
between the scores obtained by the control group and the 
devotional music group. Results revealed a statistically 
significant scoring difference (Z * -2,01; p * .02).
A final Wilcoxon matched-pair analysis was made 
between the scores obtained by the electronic music 
group and the devotional music group. Results revealed 
a statistically significant scoring difference (z * -1,6; 
p * .05)•
Therefore, the results obtained by the comparison 
of scores on each of the three •relaxation* task groups
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in the Experiment indicate that there is a significant 
increase in successful use of paranormal cognition as 
the Subjects1 Relaxation1 increases.
The results of this Experiment also clarify to 
some extent the reason why Subjects paired for both 
C.A. and I.Q. as in the previous Experiment might 
obtain divergent scores. It is likely that the 
’relaxation’ variable (i.e. the level of consciously 
directed internalised thought) in each Subject will 
increase or impair paranormal cognition scoring.
Summary and Conclusions
It was hypothesised that Subjects whose internalised 
cognitive functions were not being actively consciously 
directed (i.e. were RELAXED) should obtain highly 
significant paranormal cognition scores and that such 
scores should increase along with an increase of 
’relaxation* stimuli.
Sixty Subjects of similar C.A. and I.Q. were divided 
into three ’relaxation* groups, each consisting of 20 
Subjects (10 males, 10 females). The first group was 
classified as a control group and was given the para­
normal cognition Experiment as in the majority of
437.
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Experiments reported thus far. The *partial relaxation* 
group had each set of senders equipped with headphones 
into which was played electronic music. The ‘high 
relaxation* group had both dyad Subjects equipped with 
headphones into which was played ‘devotional* music.
In all cases, Subjects were given pre-selected 
randomised targets all of which were symbols taken from 
an infant vocabulary test.
It was found that all three ‘relaxation* groups 
obtained scores highly significantly greater than those 
predicted by chance. It was also found that the high 
relaxation group obtained scores significantly greater 
than either the partial relaxation group or the control 
group, and that the partial relaxation group obtained 
scores significantly greater than the control group.
Therefore, the data indicates that with the lowering 
of actively directed internalised cognition there appears 
to be an increase in successful paranormal cognition 
scoring.
The results from this Experiment also indicate 
that the level of ‘relaxation* in a Subject is a third
important variable (along with C.A. and I.Q.) in 
either enhancing or reducing paranormal cognition 
scoring.
To some extent, as well, the results obtained 
in this Experiment are in accordance with the various 
•emotional* GESP Experiments summarised in the 
experimental overview in the theoretical section of 
this thesis. In all cases, the overriding rationale 
to the Experiments was the minimisation of the 
Subject*s conscious direction of self-related internalised 
thought.
The successful results obtained add credence to 
our proposal that paranormal cognition is more closely 
related to * species* (or even ‘universal*) cognition than 
to individual (* ego *) internal cognition.
439
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4. GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The Experiments reported herein are concerned with 
both the evidence for the existence of paranormal 
cognition and with several variables which seem to 
affect the successful employment of this cognitive 
system*
The basis for the Experiments were the results of 
three separate experimental studies which were concerned 
with the effects of C.A. on paranormal cognition* In 
three separate studies it was clearly shown that there 
is strong evidence for the existence of paranormal 
cognition in groups of subjects aged up to approximately 
the age of eight. With the rise in chronological age, 
there is a steady and repeated decline in paranormal 
cognition scoring until the age of eight where the 
decline approaches chance scoring levels and remains 
steady from that point on for all older C.A. groups 
tested (the oldest C.A. group tested was composed of 
65 - 70 year old subjects)*
The analysis of various scoring variables in these 
three Studies led to the conclusion that along with 
clear C.A. effects, there was also evidence to show 
that I.Q. was an equally important variable in paranormal 
cognition experiments.
It was that dyads of similar I.Q.*s in the three 
aforementioned studies tended to obtain highly similar 
scores in the first and last half of their run (it will 
be recalled that dyad Subjects reversed their Roles at 
the half-way mark)* It was similarly found that dyads 
of different I.Q.1s tended to obtain quite different 
scores in the first and last half of their runs* It 
was also found that those dyads which obtained the highest 
group scores were both of similar I.Q.rs and were both 
classified as low I.Q. Subjects; those dyads that 
obtained the lowest group scores were either composed 
of two Subjects from different I.Q. categories or were 
classified as high I.Q. Subjects. Most importantly, it 
was found that there was also a very clear inverse 
relationship between I.Q. and paranormal cognition 
ability up to the age of eight.
In the three separate I.Q. Experiments, it was 
found that the control and manipulation of both C.A. and 
I.Q. alone or together greatly influenced the experimental 
results. When Subjects were matched for both C.A. and 
I.Q., the inverse relation between paranormal cognition 
and both C.A. and I.Q. came out most clearly with Subjects 
of low I.Q. and low C.A. obtaining very highly significant 
above chance scores. When Subjects were matched for I.Q. 
but not for C.A. then the inverse relation between C.A.
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and paranormal cognition disappeared and the one between 
paranormal cognition and I.Q. remained, although overall 
successful paranormal cognition scoring diminished.
When Subjects were matched for C.A. but not for I.Q. 
then both inverse relationships, although still present, 
were diminished and overall successful paranormal cognition 
scoring declined; there was also a high ‘incidence of 
first and last half run scoring differences by the 
experimental dyads, which reflected the mixed I.Q. of 
the dyad groupings* It is clear, then, that both C.A. 
and I.Q. independently and in combination are highly 
important variables in a paranormal cognition task for 
Subjects up to the age of eight*
Two final Experiments were each concerned with the 
effect and/or interrelation between paranormal cognition 
and internal cognition. In the first Experiment, where 
Subjects were given secondary word association tasks 
along with their paranormal cognition task, it was found 
that the more complex the secondary word-association task, 
the lower was the Subjects* ability to successfully employ 
paranormal cognition. It was also found that Subjects who 
did well in their paranormal cognition task did poorly in 
their internal cognition task and vice-versa. Therefore, 
it was concluded that although both cognitive systems can 
exist concomitantly, one of the two is severely impaired 
when both are attempted at the same time. A reverse of
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this was found in the last Experiment wherein attempts 
were made to 'relax* (i.e. lower the level of consciously , 
directed thought) the Subjects' internal cognition via 
the introduction of different types of music, to induce 
states of 'relaxation'. It was found that best results 
were obtained when both dyad Subjects were 'relaxed* 
and very highly significant paranormal cognition scores 
were obtained. The results of this latter Experiment 
therefore pointed out a third variable affecting the 
observation and generation of paranormal cognition, 
namely, the level of 'relaxation' in the Subject.
Several other more general observations were made 
throughout the whole series of Experiments and 
observational studies.
Firstly, there were no significant differences found 
in either male and female scores obtained throughout all 
the studies and Experiments, nor were there significant 
differences obtained in the three sex-team types (i.e.
M-M, M-F, F-F) employed throughout (except for some 
minimal intra-group differences in the third observational 
study).
Secondly, there were no significant differences 
between the number of successful concrete picture target
and abstract shape target hits obtained by all the 
groups throughout the Experiments and studies.
Thirdly, in all the C.A* groups observed in the 
three studies, it was found that there was a very highly 
significant successful level of obtaining first trial and 
last trial target hits by all the groups tested - even 
those who did not obtain significant overall above­
chance scores.*
All these results are to a large extent in accordance 
with the various hypotheses and predictions made and tend 
to strongly justify the theoretical model being proposed - 
namely, that "ESP" type phenomena can best be studied 
and understood if seen as aspects of a system of 
cognition*
It is now necessary to discuss this model in 
detail*
* Although first and last trial scores were not reported 
for the 5 Experiments reported (mainly because of the 
highly significant above chance scores obtained overall) 
the data obtained strongly indicated a continual above- 
chance target 1 hitting' by all the groups on first and 
last trials*
A THEORY OF BINARY COGNITION
A THEORY OF BINARY COGNITION
1. INTRODUCTION
The theory that is being proposed here hypothesises 
that ESP-type phenomena originate from the same process 
which allows for the phenomena associated with normal 
cognition.
The main function of both the ESP processes and the 
processes which allow for normal cognition is to connect 
hitherto distinct meanings to form a single new meaning 
unit.
The sole difference in these two processes is that 
in the case of ESP phenomena, the cognitive connections 
that result are externalised via ostensibly non-sensory means 
whereas in the case of cognitive phenomena the resulting 
connections are internalised via ostensibly sensory means.
We have labelled the former as paranormal cognition and 
the latter as normal cognition.
We will attempt to show the inability to accept the 
idea of paranormal cognition is not due to any 'law of 
nature' but rather to a basic, limiting principle concerning 
the process of cognition. We shall present, also, various 
hypotheses and counter-examples which, hopefully, will 
lessen the power that this basic limiting principle has 
over our understanding of cognition.
Were we able to fully explain how either internalised 
or externalised connections are achieved, we could 
inequivocalily state, that the two phenomena under 
consideration are one and the same* However, in neither 
case have we direct proof of the existence of such 
processes* Rather, through subjective experience and from 
experimentation we have obtained inferred proof of their 
existence.
In the case of normal cognition we have inferred a 
process which is a purely hypothetical construct. We have 
done so because we have found no physical correlate that 
will explain how such a process is activated* Our knowledge 
of cognition is simply inadequate at the present time.
What knowledge we have inferred from experience and 
experimentation can be shown to be the same as that of 
the hypothetical construct required to explain paranormal 
cognition phenomena*
It seems reasonable., and hopefully beneficial to 
the understanding of types of cognition, to consider the 
experimental and experiential results obtained from these 
two inferred processes, as being observed data of the same 
inferred process.
The theory we are presenting is not a 'complete' 
one in the sense that it is unable to fully explain how 
either normal or paranormal connections are accomplished. 
Present day knowledge is inadequate. We do therefore 
make the assumption that there exists some as yet 
hypothetical process which allows for connections to be 
made •
Our main concern is to attempt to show how both 
cognitive connections are part of this same hypothetical 
process.
2. THE MBCHANICS OF ESP
It is the tac.it assumption of all the theories that 
we have previously examined (except Jung's) and of most 
of the ideology behind experimental observations of ESP, 
that its purpose for existing is one of survival value 
through quick, direct communication.
However, as Kreitier and Kreitler (88) have pointed 
out, what evidence have we that such an assumption is the 
correct one to make?
While it is true that historical records of ESP 
phenomena clearly recount evidence of its existence and 
use by man certainly from the beginnings of written 
communication and probably before the.n> these same 
historical records imply that there has been very little 
fluctuation in the 'communicative' aspects of ESP between 
then and now. It can be quite clearly seen that ESP 
phenomena were as rare and sporadic then (as inferred 
from the evidence at our disposal) as they are today.
If this is the case, then it is valid to consider 
the possibility that 'ESP communication1 has no direct 
survival value as such, but is rather, simply an off­
shoot or by-product of the true function of some other
process.
Given such a consideration, we must now ask "what do 
we know about this 'other' process?" The answer is that 
we know nothing of it directly except that it must contain 
similarities to what occurs in ESP phenomena.
But what exactly does occur in ESP phenomena?
First, specific information is somehow obtained.
ESP is generally defined as "the experience of, or 
response to, a target object, state, event, or influence 
without any sensory contact".
Secondly, this information does not spread all around 
the world being picked up by everyone, but, rather, is 
only picked up by particular people.
Thirdly, the one and only thing that separates these 
above-mentioned 'particular' people from everyone else, 
is that the content of the ESP communication makes sense 
to them; that is, the content is meaningfully related to 
the cognitive content of the perceiver.
Kreitler and Kreitler (88), in an effort to explain 
and understand the workings of such a phenomenon have
presented the three possible physical models which might 
be employed to better comprehend the mechanics of such a 
connection.
These three physical models are:
1. radio transmission
2. Laser beaming
3. lightning
The 'radio transmission' model implies that an ESP 
message once it is sent, spreads out in all directions 
reaching everyone everywhere but due to some selective 
filter it is deciphered only by those persons set to 
receive it. However, this theory cannot be entirely 
accepted because, as far as we have understood at present, 
selective filtering does not occur peripherally and that 
therefore, in the adoption of this first model, we would 
have to argue that our cognitive apparatus is largely 
engaged in the holding out of in-coming ESP messages which 
would usually be meaningless. While this sort of argument 
could, in fact, be considered and. argued as being correct 
by some, it appears too cumbersome to us for further 
discussion.
If one were to adopt model 2 - the laser beam model - 
to explain ESP phenomena, then one would be required to
argue that the sender of an ESP message must consciously - 
or even sub-consciously if it were possible - direct his 
ESP message to the required target. If this were the 
case, as this model would imply, then it also fails on 
the basis of the experimental evidence available which 
suggests strongly that ESP communication is not necessarily 
a conscious process.
The 'lightning model' of ESP can be viewed as a 
sudden connection taking place between two bodies due to 
the 'electric' conditions within each of them. ESP 
communication is, therefore, conceived of as a connection 
"bridging the gap between two meaning-related contents; 
contents which - if connected - prove to be complementary 
in regard to their meanings" (88, p. 272). This would mean 
that the connection being made is due to a meaning affinity. 
What is also of importance, is that with this last model 
the idea of the 'transmission* of an ESP message changes 
context in that there is no actual travel or movement of 
information involved, but rather, as in the analogy of 
lightning, the information is simply there as long as the 
necessary conditions for its manifestation exist. In the 
case of lightning, these conditions would be the electric 
conditions of two bodies; in ESP we would argue that these 
conditions would be 'meaning affinity*.
The 'lightning' model of ESP assumes, therefore, 
that an ESP "communication" is, in fact the result of 
the connection of two (or more) hitherto distinct 
cognitive events which have now combined, due to some 
common affinity, to form a new - and meaningful - 
cognitive event*
3. THE MECHANICS OF COGNITION
The re-acceptance of cognitive psychology into the 
mainstream of contemporary academic psychology in the . 
.mid-19501s came about largely due to a 'revolt* of 
sorts against both hard-line behaviourism and psycho­
analysis.
Yet, within a relatively brief number of years, 
cognitive psychology has become, by and large, a 
mechanistically orientated movement involving computer 
simulation, feedback, transformational grammar, and 
symbolic logic. Its present day studies are in the main 
concerned with memory, problem-solving strategies, 
concept formation and acquisition, and artificial 
intelligence.
There is, however, a very evident lack of any under­
lying theory or philosophy in such studies.
Eliot (42) has given three reasons for this rather 
gaping fault in such a growing area of research.
First, the task of co-ordinating a multi-disciplinary 
effort such as this is, which is producing masses of dis­
similar data is very difficult if not impossible.
Secondly, there is the total lack of any appropriate 
model to account for the cognitive processes.
Thirdly, there is a lack of any adequate language 
to describe the cumulative inter-dependence of the 
varied fields of study which are Categorised as 1 cognitive 
psychology*.
Cognitive psychologists, notwithstanding the lack 
of any underlying theory or philosophy, have performed a 
great number of highly skilled experiments on memory, 
problem-solving and concept formation. They have also, 
to some extent, renewed neurophysiological research.
And yet, all the results from the numerous experiments 
and highly skilful studies reported and described in books 
and journals have not, up to now, deepened our understanding 
of the cognitive processes. There are simply no adequate 
explanations available as to how two distinct meanings 
combine to form one new one.
As Kreitler and Kreitler (88) pointed out:
"As the thousand finesses of behaviouristic
learning theory did not explain how a satiated
rat learns a maze by viewing it only from above,
so the hundreds of probably correct findings 
of recent cognitive research have not explained 
how two ideas combine to form a new one, or, 
for that matter, how the native speaker of a 
language knows at once that Chomsky1s colorless 
green ideas cannot sleep furiously .....
We do not understand, how people are capable 
of quick memory retrieval of city names ending 
with the letter N, how metaphors are formed, 
and how the productive solution of a problem 
comes about with the suddenness of Btthler's 
AHA-Erelebx\is. Yet, even on a far more modest 
scale, research of thought processes has failed 
to make headway. After more than a hundred 
years of associationistic psychology we still 
do not know what the associational bond consists 
in, why Narzis Ach1s instruction to his subjects 
to react to the stimulus word with its rhyme 
proved stronger that the strongest associational 
bond, and how the rhyming word itself is found. 
The so-called "search set" functioning by force 
of an input address or an input tag could not 
do the job, since it would require the coding 
of every memory item in accordance with many 
organisational principles as for instance, first 
and last letters, number of syllables, second, 
different meaning categories, connotations,
grammatical features, etc. which still would 
not sufficiently reduce the enormous amount 
of memory scanning required for retrieval of 
the adequate item."
(188, p.273-274)
Similarly, in their recent summary of the seven 
most prominent retrieval theories, Tulving and Thompson 
(173) clearly showed that not one of them fits the known 
data pertaining to prompted recall.
PribjHan\ (123) has shown the paradox in the discrepancy 
between the rapidly growing understanding of physiological 
brain mechanisms and the deficient understanding of their 
cognitive function. He points out, for example, that it 
is totally unknown as to how feature detectors and other 
as yet undiscovered analysers produced a unified percept, 
or how we know that a line plus a certain inclination 
plus another line plus a third line connecting the two 
previous ones equals our concept of the capital letter A 
which is formed regardless of the great variety in the 
manner of its visual appearance.
The main difficulty, in an area fraught with 
difficulties, seems to be a marked lack of a unifying 
theory.
To be more specific, we are in a state pf confusion 
with regards to the mechanics of cognition.
As with our previous section oh the mechanics of 
ESP, let us attempt to state clearly and simply what 
occurs in cognition.
Firstly, specific information is somehow obtained. 
Cognition may be defined, loosely, as the direct awareness 
of an object, event, state, or influence.
Secondly, the cognitive content, or information, 
does not spread itself to all possible receptive areas 
but rather is picked up only by particular points.
Thirdly, the only thing that separates these above- 
mentioned 'points' of contact is that the incoming 
cognitive content will be meaningfully related to their 
own content or function.
It is useful to bring up once again the three 
previously discussed physical models in an effort to 
clarify the mechanics of such a connection.
The first model - that of radio transmission - would 
imply that once information is sent out, it spreads in
all directions reaching everywhere but that due to some 
selective filter it is deciphered only by those points 
set to receive it. This theory cannot be accepted 
because the time involved in such a process would be 
in most cases too long in relation to the known speed 
with which cognitive information is available to us.
The 'laser beam' model would also not be able to 
explain matters sufficiently because it would require 
the wilful direction of information. This simply fails 
on the basis of the experimental evidence we have at 
present available from the autonomic nervous system and 
from such diverse studies as those in subliminal 
perception.
The 'lightning model' of cognition can be viewed as 
a sudden connection taking place between two points due 
to the meaning affinity between them. Once again, this 
implies that the idea of 'travel' down various pathways 
is useful but limiting in concept and that, rather, 
information is simply connected - as in lightning - as 
long as the necessary conditions for this connection can 
be seen to exist. In the case of cognition, we would 
argue that these conditions would be 'meaning affinity'.
The "lightning model" of cognition would assume,
therefore, that cognition is the result of the connection 
of two (or more) hitherto distinct cognitive events 
which have now combined, due to some common affinity, 
to form a new - and meaningful - cognitive event.
4. ESP AND COGNITION
By considering the mechanics of both ESP and 
cognition separately, we have arrived independently at 
highly similar descriptions of both mechanisms. The 
similarity of these two supposedly separate and distinct 
mechanisms is so striking that it becomes compelling to 
view the two as aspects of one and the same process.
We have labelled this process 'binary cognition', which 
is the source point of both paranormal and normal 
cognition.
The picture that emerges concerning the present 
state of cognitive psychology is one of a rather chaotic 
state of affairs characterised by an abundance of data 
and a marked lack of unifying theory.
The problem is further intensified by its appearance 
of being a closed circle. On the one hand, a cognitive 
psychologist would be led to believe that already available 
data do not yet warrant embarking on the construction of 
far-reaching theories, while on the other only by the 
building up of theories or by presenting hypotheses can 
the cognitive psychologist find out whether the data is 
sufficient or not.
Kreitler and Kreitler (88) point out that one way out
of this impasse is for cognitive psychologists to act 
as 'true' scientists who, faced with a lot of somehow 
related but unexplained phenomena, would first of all ask 
what sort of force or process would need to be postulated 
in order to explain and relate the observed phenomena, 
what properties this force or process would be required 
to possess, and what features should be expected from 
such an underlying process.
In following this line of reasoning Kreitler and 
Kreitler found that in order to understand more fully the 
processes of memory retrieval, problem solving, and 
productive thought, we would have to postulate a 
mechanism which: .
1, Will account for communication between 
distinct cognitive representations whose 
mutual fit in regard to the relevant 
meaning aspect shows up only after the 
connection between them has been formed,
2. At the same time, this mechanism should 
neither require too simple an organisation 
of memory nor the sequential scanning and 
testing of too many memory items. (It 
would be necessary to postulate a mechanism 
that not only carries information but is 
also sensitive to the meaning of the
carried information as well as to its 
implication of meaning relations, so that 
as a result of this sensitivity it dis­
covers, or is drawn to, complementary memory 
items,
3* We could also assume a mechanism in the
course of which only the items which first 
come into intimate contact and proved to 
be related from the viewpoint of meaning 
would be stimulated and brought into close 
focus•
Most cognitive psychologists would show great 
reluctance to start a search for this unknown process 
having been faced with such assumptions.
However, in this case, a mechanism such as the one 
suggested has already been inferred to exist by the many 
well-confirmed experimental observations it has been 
subjected to.
We refer, of course, to the experimental evidence 
for paranormal phenomena.
We therefore hypothesise that mechanisms of both ESP
and cognition as studied by cognitive psychologists are 
both aspects of the same process which, in man, is 
primarily engaged in producing normal cognition and 
only secondarily, and under specific conditions, produces 
the classic ESP phenomena, which we have labelled 
paranormal cognition.
5e AN ANALYSIS OF COGNITION
Earlier in this thesis (see p. 132) it was argued 
that both proponents and critics of research into psi 
phenomena were perhaps mistaken in their belief that 
parapsychological investigation suggested evidence for 
extra-sensory perception. We have shown that it is not 
perception, but rather cognition which is experienced 
during ESP phenomena. It has also been shown th^t this 
shift in outlook leads to a large number of testable 
hypotheses the most important of which have now been 
carried out and shown to be in agreement with this 
hypothesis.
In continuing this line of reasoning, Burt (21) noted 
that modern science has developed fundamental concepts 
so remote from actual observation and ordinary sense- 
perception that it becomes ludicrous to limit our view 
of the world to our sensory apparatus.
When a pattern of sensory stimulation, resulting from 
the excitation of the peripheral sense organs eventually 
reaches a sensory area in the brain, the physical changes 
in the brain must still be translated into terms of 
mental changes in the individual's consciousness. It is 
only then that we can rightly speak of 'perception' or 
'observation'. It is assumed, also, that the changes in
any one individual's consciousness are directly and 
uniquely correlated with physical changes in the 
individual's brain. But the nature of such a correlation 
is a mystery. Still keeping to an ordinary space-time 
framework of physics, it can be reasonably inferred that 
our sensory experiences synchronise almost perfectly with 
corresponding changes in the grey matter of the brain.
But it would be wrong to conclude from this that the 
1 seat of consciousness1 (in the sense of cognitive activity) 
is spatially localised in the brain of the percipient.
The cognitive contents may under certain conditions appear 
to have an apparent location, but they are never located 
within the brain itself. For instance, the pain I feel 
when I stub my toe is felt in the toe. Indeed, it is 
nearly meaningless to state that the cognitive process 
is localised.
Now, if consciousness is not spatially located within 
one's brain there is no reason why it should not, under 
certain circumstances affect and be affected by processes 
from someone else's brain.
The brain appears at first to be a purely material 
object consisting of a characteristic physical structure, 
a chemical composition, and a capacity for producing 
certain specific chemical and. electrical changes. Its
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chief feature is its complexity with over ninety thousand 
million cells arranged in systematic fashion and all 
working on electric power of between 10 and 20 watts.
The amazing thing is that accompanied by all this physico- 
chemical activity is what we call consciousness. The 
brain is aware of what is going on around it. Not only 
that, but much of this conscious experience shows 
a broad correspondence with the parts of the cerebral 
cortex that appear to be active at the time. Now, if 
one supposes that the brain itself is able to generate 
consciousness then one must be forced to admit that the 
brain, unlike all other material objects, possesses 
special properties.; which are unique to it. Such a 
supposition would no longer allow the brain to be strictly 
defined as being material.
However, many psychologists have maintained that the 
brain is an organ not for generating consciousness, but 
rather for the transmisaon, limitation and. direction of 
consciousness. Further, when we consider the constant 
bombardment of sensory impressions coming in on us, which 
by and large pass unnoticed, it becomes clear that one of 
the most vital functions of the brain is to selectively 
filter out incoming information. One would infer, then,
that the material brain as long as it's alive and 
operative must be in constant interaction with some 
immaterial source of consciousness which we may 
conveniently call "mind". While such a conception is. 
admittedly, a hypothetical conjecture it is important 
to note that this is not a unique event in science. The 
concepts of energy and electrical fields, to name but two, 
are,like 'mind', helpful concepts which allow a wide 
variety of accepted facts to be far more intelligible.
The most striking feature of conscious experience 
is its unity and continuity. Although, as we have shown, 
sensations spring from various sense-organs which are 
distinct from each other in various qualities, they, 
along with the thoughts and images that occur to us at 
the same time, all form part of a single whole. It is 
hard to see, much less argue, how this unity could be 
produced in a material object such as the brain which 
consists of millions of disparate and distinct cells.
Important in relation to this are the findings 
obtained from the 'split-brain' experiments. In some 
cases it is necessary for a surgeon to cut through the 
structural links between the two cerebral hemisphere in 
the brain thus severing all direct connections between 
the right and left halves. Now, if the brain were the
'seat of consciousness* as many believed, then one would 
predict quite confidently that such an operation would 
produce in a patient either two streams of consciousness 
or that one of the hemispheres would dominate leaving one 
side of the body cut off from consciousness or volition. 
Neither of these possible outcomes has been shown to occur. 
Bisection of the brain does not seem to produce bisection 
of personal consciousness but, rather, consciousness still 
continues as a single unified stream. Mountcastle (108) 
and Sperry (I6l) - who, incidentally, is highly skeptical 
of conceptrual processes such as 'mind' or consciousness - 
report, in fact, that actions requiring the co-operation of 
both hemispheres (e.g. binocular fusion) remain apparently 
unimpaired.and that apart from a slight lengthening of 
reaction times, patients commonly show no obvious changes 
in mind, character, or general behaviour, and are not aware 
of any division or limitation in personality or conscious 
experience. Even rigid behaviourists such as Hebb (63) find 
themselves unable to conclude that the split-brain studies 
produce evidence for the 'splitting' of consciousness.
Cognition, which is the distinctive mark of conscious­
ness can be seen, essentially, as a relation. Now, in any 
relation there must be at least two related terms. In any 
cognitive situation we must have both a cognising subject - 
either a person, ego, or self - and a cognised object - 
something sensed, or a concrete perceived thing, or an 
event or conclusion reached by reasoning or in some way 
expected. The exceptional unity and continuity of one's
own individual consciousness would lead to the implication 
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cognises all the different sensations, images, thoughts, 
etc. which make up my consciousness at any one moment, 
and that the factor Which cognised my past experience 
is the same as the factor which now cognises my present 
experience." (21, p. 117).
At certain times, one can even cognise one's own 
cognising. One might say "I feel happy", but one might 
also say "I know that X feel happy" or "I remember how 
happy I felt last night". In all such cases, one seems 
to be intuitively aware that the self who feels happy, 
the self who knows that he is happy, and the self who 
remembers last night's happiness, are not three distinct 
selves, or distinct and separate passing thoughts, but 
rather the one and the same self which is an enduring and 
more or less permanent 1 ego' which will last at least as 
long as the individual's brain.
The nature of our concept of 'mind' which we 
characterise as 'our self' and which functions as the 
subject of the verb 'cognise' is not entirely clear to 
us. We can, however, say that it is not a mere grammatical 
subject since to start with it must possess certain distinct 
properties some of which are intrinsic to its very nature - 
such as its ability to cognise. But the 'mind' is also
capable of learning - or more specifically, of acquiring 
new cognitive dispositions* Further, besides its 
cognitive capacities, it also has affective capacities 
in that it can feel pleasure, approval, sadness, etc. 
and purposive capacities such as the ability to choose, 
will, decide, etc.
Most psychologists would argue that under normal 
circumstances what one cognises and what direction one*s 
attention, takes both seem to be largely determined by 
certain activities of the brain which are sometimes 
initiated from within and sometimes from without. It is 
these activities which have lent themselves quite readily 
to experimental research. A consequence of this is that 
psychologists discussing perceptual cognition have tended 
to concentrate their research almost entirely on these 
more obvious causal relations and have, on the whole, 
ignored the cognitive. These two problems, however, are 
quite distinct and the confusion of the two has caused 
difficulty both in the study of ESP and in the study of 
cognition.
Far from being reduced to causal relations*, cognitive
* It is important to note that as long as investigators 
are dealing with structures such as,nerve cells, it might 
be arguable to state that due to their size the basic laws 
of classical mechanics should still be upheld. However, when 
we reach the minuter processes which appear most closely 
associated with mental activities, the nerve junctions and the 
adjacent knobs, these structures are only visible through the 
electron microscope and, as such, the processes involved are 
not subject to the laws of classical physics but rather those 
of quantum physics where causal relations no longer seem to 
hold.
relations are quite unique. Even in normal perception, 
consciousness is able to span space, just as in memory 
it can span time. As we have argued previously, the 
brain’s main task is to filter out incoming information 
from our consciousness. Under such circumstances, it 
would be far from miraculous that when this inhibiting 
influence of the brain is partly or temporarily reduced 
or removed, one could perform feats which would be 
categorised as ESP phenomena.
We began this section ’.by arguing that the pathways 
of direct awareness are not via sensory perception but 
that, rather, they fall into the realm of cognition. We 
then went on to argue that the concept of 'extra-sensory 
cognition1 far from being another meaningless phrase is 
in fact a far more logical and realistic view to take 
than that which is generally accepted. We then discussed 
the mechanism of cognition and argued that while it is 
necessary for the brain processes and consciousness to 
work in conjunction (though, how such a conjunction works 
is a mystery to us) with each other in order for cognition 
to take place, the 'seat of consciousness' is not localised 
in the brain but rather that there exists a hypothetical 
but highly useful source of consciousness which we have
The next point to be made is that through 
.introspection we can discover two different types 
of cognitive relations. Nearly every major language 
except English accommodates for these two types of 
relations. In French we have 'connaitre' and 'savoir'; 
in German 'kennen' and 'wissen'; in Italian 'sapere1 
and 'conoscere'. Thus, when someone holds up a card 
at two people, they not only cognise a sensory patch, 
they also cognise a material thing. The sensory 
patch is peculiar to each of them, the actual thing 
being perceived or being thought of is the same.
Burt (20) has called the transitory elements which 
one is aware of immediately 'contents' and the more 
permanent and public elements which are cognised 
indirectly he calls 'objects'. Now assuming that there 
is indeed a relation between ESP and cognition, it is 
interesting to note that in most cases of introspective 
accounts of ESP experience, the contents of the extra­
sensory event are not perceptual, but consist rather of 
mental images of a dream-like vividness, sudden ideas or 
impressions, and even of veridical utterances and 
impulsive decisions which the subject himself often finds
difficult to explain. This 'thought process1 is not 
'analytic* in character but rather a kind of 'intuition' 
or 'insight'. Now unlike the perceptual processes, thought 
processes - and particularly those of the intuitive type 
are highly irregular in their nature and occurrence. They 
are spontaneous, creative and much more difficult to predict 
than processes of perception. They are also, as has 
probably already been ascertained, described in a highly 
similar way to 'paranormal' phenomena - which in these 
respects, at least, can no longer be considered paranormal.
Once we begin to recognise that many of the features 
which seem so puzzling in paranormal phenomena characterise . 
nearly every form of conscious process, they begin to lose 
much of their sensational character. Once we admit that 
it is impossible to find any continuous causal chain 
linking the changes taking place in the brain's cortex 
with everyday types of conscious experience, and that 
here, too, as in paranormal phenomena we have a spatio- 
temporal gap, then we are also admitting that normal 
sensory perception is as deep a mystery to us as so-called 
extra-sensory perception.
6. BINARY COGNITION
Both Faraday and Maxwell conceived of the idea that 
an electric charge of a body lies not within it, but 
rather in a spatial continuum around it. This concept 
is the essence of the 'field-theory' of contemporary 
physics. In much the same way, let us suppose that the 
consciousness of a given individual, insofar as it might 
have a location, resides in the environment around him 
rather than inside his head.
To introduce another field would in no way conflict 
with existing theories of science provided it would yield 
verifiable consequences. While it might be argued that 
this new 'psychic field' would appear at first sight 
to be something quite disparate from the fields already 
recognised by physicists, it can be seen that a similar 
disparity appears already in physics in the case of 
gravitational fields and electro-magnetic fields which have 
so far defied all efforts to reduce them to a single 
unified field or to a single set of coefficients describing 
space-time curvature.
Within the bounds of physics, any two fields may 
interact. Whether they do so or not depends on the 
particular conditions, which determine the so-called 
'transition probabilities'. Also, any two fields may 
be wholly or partly isomorphic.
This 'mental field1 - which we label as mind-can be 
seen to be, neither a substance nor a property, but 
essentially an interaction between energy (which transcends 
space and time) and the brain.
Now in the terms of our 'mind', the mental field 
belonging to one person might be in some way a replica 
of that belonging to another person. Similarly, either 
or both might be in partial correspondence with a physical 
field. Rather than causing or producing the active mani­
festations of such a field, we are arguing that structures - 
such as the brain - which we regard as being material and 
therefore specific and localised in space and time are in 
fact limiting such manifestations. Therefore, it would be 
quite possible for an infinite number and variety of sub­
fields to exist, depending on the limitations imposed largely 
by the brain with a resulting hierarchical system which not 
only embraces the physical universe but also coordinates 
the physical and the psychical into a single psychophysical 
whole.
One important corollary which emerges from this 
hypothesis, as Broad (18) pointed out, is that paranormal 
cognition is more than likely a very common occurrence.
Suppose that an event in subject A's mind does, in fact, 
telepathically determine an event in subject B's mind. B 
will have no reason to regard such an event as being 'tele­
pathic* unless the following very important conditions are met
1. The effect on B must take the form of
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an experience which he can and does notice.
The experience must be at such a level of 
discord with his other contemporary or 
immediately past experiences that it 
surprises him and leads him to suspect a 
1 paranormal1 occurrence.
Even if B does, in fact, notice that he 
has been part of a paranormal event, he 
would get no further unless
(a) B knew that he was a 'target1 for A, 
or that A was a friend of B's or 
that they at least had friends in 
common.
(b) the telepathic event would have to 
be some sort of experience which A 
noticed and which he could sub­
sequently describe.
(c) there would have to be an intimate 
relation between A's experience and 
Bfs experience which would make it 
reasonable to single out the former 
as a factor in the cause of the 
latter.
The result of this argument is that paranormal 
cognition may indeed be a very, common occurrence but 
which is noticeable only if the above-mentioned conditions 
are fulfilled.
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7. SUMMARY
Broad (18) makes an excellent example of the 
argument we have just raised by reminding us of our 
discovery of magnetic forces. He writes:
”Such forces occur whenever electric charges 
are moving or electric forces are varying, and 
when they pervade all space at all times and 
are profoundly important factors in the 
physical world. Yet they would hardly have 
been discovered had it not been for the happy 
accident that the earth contains a good deal 
of the one element viz. iron, which is very 
strongly susceptible to magnetic forces; that 
it itself contains natural magnets, vis.
Lodestones; and that it is itself a natural 
magnet. For centuries, magnetism seemed to be 
a freak of nature which occurred exclusively in 
connection with certain very special kinds of 
matter. Yet in fact it was all the time 
operating everywhere. And the very special 
characteristics which it displays in connection 
with iron and with permanent magnets, masked 
its real nature as much as they revealed it.” .
. (18, p. 27)
Such an example is of the highest significance to 
our hypothesis in that it contains within it all the 
points we have thus far hypothesised.
To reiterate:
The theory of 'binary cognition' proposes that 
ESP-type phenomena originate from the same process which 
allows for the phenomena associated with normal cognition.
We have labelled the former phenomena as ^'paranormal 
cognition".
Through a study of the mechanics of both paranormal 
and normal cognition, it was concluded that the function 
of both processes is to connect hitherto distinct meanings 
to form a new meaning. The sole ostensible differences 
between the. two processes is that paranormal cognition 
connections are partially "non-sensory" in origin, whereas 
normal cognition connections are entirely sensory. It has 
been argued that in terms of cognition, this distinction 
is both misleading and meaningless since, as we have 
pointed out, cognition is essentially a "non-sensory" 
process.
Were we able to fully explain how normal cognition or 
paranormal cognition connections are made, we could 
unequivocally state whether the two phenomena are, indeed, 
the same. In neither case, however, have we any direct 
proof of the existence of such a process or processes. What
we have, rather, is inferred proof from subjective 
experience and from experimentation.
We have therefore had to present a hypothetical 
process which would account for each of these observed 
phenomena individually or in a combined form. Such a 
hypothetical construct would have to have, for the 
moment at least, no specific location in the brain or in 
the central processes of an organism since present day 
knowledge points to no specific localisation of such a 
process. Such hypothetical processes are, however, not 
unique to parapsychology but are, in fact, relatively 
common in psychology. Modern behaviourism since Osgood 
has accepted the existence of a central mediating process 
which is purely hypothetical and psycholinguistic theorists 
such as Chomsky refer to an innate but hypothetical process 
which generates language acquisition. The process that 
we have hypothesised carries the familiar name of 'mind1.
We do not use 'mind* as an entity, however, but more 
correctly as an interaction. We have argued that the 
interaction of energy (i.e. mental energy) which has 
no spatio-temporal localisation, and the brain, or central 
process of organism, which is material and therefore 
localised in space and time is that which we refer to 
as mind which is the source of consciousness, and, hence,
of cognitiono
To explain the mechanism of this process we have 
employed the metaphor of 'lightning' in that just as 
lightning is the result of the sudden connection of 
equally charged bodies, so, too, do we see cognition - . 
be it normal or paranormal - as being a sudden connecting 
process between two meaning-related contents which - 
if connected - prove to be complementary with regard 
to their meaning.
The 'lightning* model is also useful to explain a 
further similarity between normal and paranormal 
cognition. We have generally tended to view cognition 
as information somehow carried from one location to 
another. We have inferred this for normal cognition 
because of our knowledge of neurophysiology and the 
observable workings of the brain. We have also tended 
to view paranormal cognition as somehow carrying information 
from place to place and have, as a consequence, come up 
against various problems which seemed to deny this 
possibility. The model that we are employing does not 
consider information as moving from one place to another. 
There is, in fact, no motion involved but rather a sudden 
connection between meaning-related contents which as its 
result produces the observable processes and physiological
changes that we have associated with normal cognition 
and,to some extent, paranormal cognition.
We have argued that, on an evolutionary scale, systems 
have evolved from a species dominated consciousness to 
an individual and internalised consciousness. The 
reasons for such an evolution are not entirely clear but 
within our level of understanding it would seem necessary 
that as systems become more and more complex, meaningful 
connections must become more internalised. This is so 
because the meaning of a meaning is, we believe, dependent 
on an infinite variety of values that an individual imposes 
and the infinite number and variety of meaning values of 
the referent itself which therefore would be severely 
restricted were paranormal cognition alone available to 
us in that the probability that the cognitive process can 
detect distinct meanings which, if connected, prove to be 
in all respects congenial enough to produce a new meaning 
is much higher within the cognitive realm of one organism 
than between two or more organisms.
The evolution of internalised cognition has another 
important effect, however. The more cognition becomes 
internalised and therefore individually related the more 
necessary it becomes in terms of survival value to keep
it internalised and not be overtaken by paranormal 
cognition. Most researchers have argued that one of the 
main functions of the brain is to selectively filter all 
incoming information so that only information of value is 
allowed into our 1 consciousness1. We would agree with 
this viewpoint but further add that this selective filter 
also works for outgoing information.
This would imply that paranormal cognition could be 
observable in man under four main conditions.
First, when the information is so trivial and therefore 
of little, if any, survival value to the organism.
Secondly, when the survival value of paranormal 
cognition becomes greater than that of internalised 
cognition, as in, for example, cases of extreme emotion 
or empathy.
Thirdly, when internal connections are somehow impaired 
due to naturally or chemically induced altered states of 
consciousness.
Fourthly, when the organism's maturational level 
has not yet reached the level of complex internalised 
connections but is, as yet, largely learning to make
internalised connections which have taken on a species - 
rather than individual - survival value or consciousness.
8o THEORETICAL PROBLEMS 
Paranormal vs. Normal Cognition
We have thus far assumed that 'paranormal* cognition 
and 'normal' cognition are both manifestations of the 
process termed binary cognition. We have not, as yet, 
indicated whether these two manifestions are more 
directly related to each other and if so, how?
Major questions (as noted by Kreitler and Kreitler 
(88)) that occur immediately are:
1. do they occur concomitantly?
2. are they mutually exclusive in the sense 
of an either-or phenomenon?
3. do they differ on occasions in their 
respective strengths so that in spite of 
any concomitant activity only one reaches 
its field of application?
4. is one manifestation permanently active 
while the other appears only occasionally?
It has been shown in two sets of experiments (see 
pages 402-438) that:
a) the introduction of a normal cognition
task on an unrelated paranormal cognition 
task impedes the employment of paranormal 
cognition and that, further, the more complex 
the internal cognition task, the greater is 
the impedence to the employment of paranormal 
cognition,
b) the introduction of a secondary task designed 
to reduce the employment of internal cognition 
during a paranormal cognition task, increases 
the employment of paranormal cognition and 
that, further, the: more the secondary task is 
able to reduce the employment of internal 
cognition, the greater is the increase in 
paranormal cognition.
Therefore, it seems to be the case from the results 
obtained that while both cognitive systems can exist con­
comitantly, one of the two systems is severely impaired 
when both are attempted at, the same time.
Why should this be the case?
The first point to raise is that, as we have argued 
before, the evolution of 'internal cognition* has allowed
for greater freedom from instinct and habit and has 
led towards the formation of new plans and patterns 
of behaviour. Such capabilities/ which exist even in 
very low animals although on a very small and hardly 
recognisable scale, would have lost most of their survival 
value had this cognitively processed information spread in 
a 1 telepathic1 or 1 clairvoyant1 fashion so that it could 
have also reached adversaries. Were 'internal1 cognition 
and 'paranormal' cognition identical or parallel processes, 
both thinking and planning would have to be considered 
highly dangerous enterprises. Therefore., the possibility 
must be considered that at the very least the prominence 
of more complex cognitive operations such as recognition, 
decision making, planning, intentional recall, etc., 
would correlate with a reduced efficacy of ESP phenomena 
without necessarily requiring its complete absence* The 
reduction of paranormal cognition can be hypothetically 
brought about in two ways. In the first, most of the 
'mental energy' available for cognition is involved in 
the more complex processes, and therefore the ability to 
cognise paranormaliy is greatly reduced. In the second, 
the brain inhibits the out-going of information, just as it 
inhibits the incoming of sensory 'noise', for the sake of 
safeguarding against detection of plans.
Both possibilities are not necessarily in conflict
with the other, but the former has within it the inherent 
assumption that cognition is a system with limited 
capacity - which, in turn, raises up all manner of 
questions which for the moment we would wish to avoid 
if possible:
On the other hand, if, as most neurophysiologists 
will attest, the brain does in some way select and filter 
incoming information, there is no reason to suppose that 
it cannot do the same for outgoing information. In both 
cases, the information is related to the survival value 
of the organism. Therefore, we would argue that the 
formulation of complex information - that which is 
internally orientated and beneficial to the individual - 
would reduce the appearance of paranormal cognition not 
necessarily due to limitations within a system's capacity, 
but simply because the complex internal connections being 
made are being inhibited by the brain from appearing 
externally. The survival value of thinking and, in this 
case, the shielding of thought against detection by foes 
and competitors well outweighs any merits that paranormal 
'communication' might have. It would have been easier - 
and has proven to be - given the developmental choice 
between thought and ESP to develop alternative means of
long-distance communication than to find an alternative 
for covert cognition.
The acceptance of the hypothesis that paranormal 
cognition is largely inhibited by the brain allows a 
clearer understanding for several unexplained facts which 
have emerged concerning the content of paranormal information. 
Firstly, in spontaneous cases, the content is either highly 
trivial or it is of high emotional urgency. In either 
case, our hypothesis would allow for a greater under­
standing. If the information is trivial, there is no 
reason for the brain to inhibit its outflow. It is quite 
possible, and highly likely (as we have argued previously) 
that, in fact, paranormal cognition of trivial information 
is being made quite often but is just not noticed 
consciously because it does not meet previously stated 
requirements. In the second case, high emotional content 
would not be related to complex internal thought, but 
rather to a far more primitive communication system.
Studies (111) have shown that emotions are innate as 
Darwin (28) argued although the level of their intensity 
can be raised or lowered by learning processes. In most 
cases of.highly emotional paranormal cognition the content 
is concerned with great danger, death, or somefbrm of 
internal breakdown. Paranormal cognition could be seen
in such cases as a final attempt for help by a system 
whose internal connections offer little, if any, survival 
value for the present situation.
Besides the experiments reported, there exist various 
sorts of evidence already available which would further 
enhance our argument.
Introspective statements by skilled ESP subjects on 
how to elicit ESP have centered on the idea of reduction 
of attention and awareness in an attempt to stop thinking 
and to stop intentionally remembering.
Psychotherapeutic observations by psychoanalysts 
and analytical psychologists have pointed to the high 
level of increase of telepathic rapport between analyst 
and patient during periods of ‘free association1 when 
strong attempts are made to reduce intentional, directive 
thinking.
The dream laboratory experiments have in many ways 
been the most successful in eliciting ESP manifestations 
while a subject is in a state of sleep.
The elicitation of ESP phenomena in hypnotised subjects 
have also met with great success when patients are in a
'deeply hypnotic' state
EEG studies of 'telepathists' have recorded a 
significant generation of alpha wave activity throughout 
the subjects' runs. Alpha states are most closely 
related to the 'daydream' experience.
The feature common to all these observations is the 
reduction of intentional thought and remembering or of 
conscious cognitive control.
Furthermore, an analysis of the procedure of nearly 
all ESP experiments reveals that due to the instructions 
given and the nature of the task (supposed or actual), 
both the sender and the receiver in telepathy tasks, or 
the agent in clairvoyance or precognition tasks, are 
largely prevented from engaging in complex cognitive 
activity.
The sporadic nature of ESP results can also be more 
clearly understood in light of the fact that in most 
cases subjects run a thin behavioural line between 
'passive awareness' and 'intentional non-thinking1 
(thinking about not thinking). We would argue that it 
is due to this constant shift of levels of awareness 
that sporadic ESP results are obtained and that more
successful experiments would be available were subjects 
better able to assume states of 'passive awareness*• The 
phenomena of declining scores during the middle of ESP 
runs can also be seen to be related to this shift of 
awareness from emotional curiosity and interest towards 
boredom (which generates, in most cases, intentional 
thought or in this case intentional non-thought) and back 
to emotional excitement as the experiment draws to its 
conclusion.
Lastly, in many cases of exceptional subjects, the, 
emotional state of these persons at the time of testing 
Was highly volatile and their levels of intellect were 
either lowered because of it, or because of alcohol or 
drugs, or because they were naturally of an inferior 
intelligence. The sudden disappearance of these subjects1 
'powers' can be more clearly understood if one realises 
that the excitement and attention bestowed on them by 
eager researchers would diminish much of their emotional 
instability and/or would make the performances in the 
tasks more intentional in conscious efforts to continue 
to score at high levels of significance.
We have argued, then, that 'paranormal' cognition is 
largely reduced to either trivial connections (which are
often not recognised) or to highly emotional connections 
(which are urgent survival value communications which 
manifest themselves in situations when our. internal 
connections have little, if any, survival value) due to 
the inhibition by the brain of information which is 
pertaining to intentional thought and remembering which 
are of survival value to the specific organism which 
generates them. We have also argued that the reduction 
or elimination of intentional thought will allow for an 
increase in paranormal cognition as observed in 
laboratory experiments. We have also raised evidence to 
support this hypothesis which, although on its own is 
insufficient to prove such a hypothesis, is in no way 
in conflict with our argument thus far.
The Meaning of Meaning
We have defined both the 'paranormal' and 'internal* 
aspects of cognition as the formation of connections 
among distinct, but meaning-related or meaning-rcomplementary 
items of information• In doing so we have made rather 
extensive use of the word 'meaning' as though the meaning 
of meaning were self-evident. However, as both cognitive 
psychology and linguistic analysis have shown, this is far 
from the case.
The meaning of meaning is, in fact, a very debatable 
issue which has yet to be argued to everyone's satisfaction 
Recently, however, Kreitier and Kreitier (88) have 
assimilated the more generally accepted principles in 
this topic. They define meaning as a pattern of values 
along 21 dimensions which have been determined, empirically 
and are similar to logical classes or Bruner's (19) 
categories and "which reflect generalised modes of 
classification or characteristics of interpretation; for 
instance, manner of occurrence, contextual allocation, 
antecedents and causes, consequences and results, etc."
(19, p. 280). The dimensions are the abstraction of a 
specific communality and are manifested concretely by 
their respective values; for example, "istangy in flavour", 
'Contains the warmth and gentleness of the mediterranean 
sun"; "is an organic compound"; "results from attractive 
forces of the moon"; "produces pleasure and health"; etc. 
While these dimensions are all interpersonally and, in 
all probability, cross-culturally shared, their values 
can be - and often are - highly individual. The preference 
for any particular dimension is determined by both the 
personality traits and the cognitive structures of the 
individual. Along with this, it must be remembered that 
every referent or 'signified' has potentially an almost 
infinite number of meaning values. Therefore, even though
the meaning of meaning can be measured in 21 empirically 
determined dimensions, the meaning value that the 
individual imposes and the meaning values of the 
referent itself can be of infinite number and variety*
It becomes evident, then, that only a part of the 
connotative meaning that a person attaches to a specific 
referent is actually communicated and can, in principle,
' be communicated*
This statement implies that the different meanings 
that a person has are qualitatively more exact and 
quantitatively more strongly related to each other than 
to the meanings of another person. In other words, 
internally connected meanings are stronger and more exact 
than externally Connected meanings simply because the 
imposed values which one person connects are more likely 
to be similar to the combination of imposed values 
connected by at least two people.
Therefore the probability that the cognitive process 
can detect distinct meanings which, if connected, prove 
to be in all respects congenial enough to produce a new 
meaning is much higher within the cognitive realm of one 
organism than between two or more organisms.
Naturally, most of us hold seemingly identical 
meaning values. If given the statement “imagine a tree" 
we would, most of us, be imagining something which we 
generally would classify as 1 tree1• "But since the 
meaning of each meaning value is determined by other 
meaning values and their hierarchy of personal relevance, 
even a relatively crude fit is not too likely on an 
interpersonal level beyond the most trivial meanings 
shared by a great many people, or the most personal 
meanings shared to a small extent by persons closely and 
intimately connected with each other in at least one 
domain or by some particular subject matter". (19, p. 
280-281).
Most of the meaningful connections that one makes 
consciously are directly related to intentional thought 
and memory of the individual who generates them. It 
is of high survival value that their meaning is in fact 
as specific and as closed off to other individuals1 
meaningful connections. Those connections which are, in 
fact, to a large extent commonly shared are either very 
trivial, or of such a restricted content that they are 
shared by very few individuals who are attached in some 
way or other. It is under these two conditions when, we
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would predict, one would consciously experience 'paranormal 
cognition'. This supposition can be seen to be in 
agreement with both spontaneous and experimental 
observations of ESP. In non-conscious situations, we 
would argue that meaningful connections are to a large 
extent under the domain of the autonomic processes which 
being highly reflexive and primitive and of a highly 
similar nature in each individual of a species would tend 
to generate meaningful connections not specific to the 
individual, but to the species as a whole. A conscious 
recall of such 'species connections' would take on a 
highly symbolic character. It is here that Jung's ideas 
of archetypes and of the collective unconscious take on 
new relevance. We shall argue these at further length 
when we re-discuss previous theories but one would 
hypothesise that ESP experiments with subjects in non- 
cbnscious or altered states conducive to 'species 
connections' should show improvements in ESP manifestations. 
From experiments so far reported in this area, our hypothesis 
would seem to be correct.
The Evolutionary Question
The obvious but highly important question that arises 
from the arguments we have raised thus far is that if 
paranormal cognition is observed on relatively rare
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occasions largely because of brain filter and complex self­
directed meaningful connections, should not animals be 
expected to demonstrate more paranormal cognition than 
human beings do?
First of all, all animals down to the protozoa seem 
capable of learning in that they form simple concepts and 
build up memories. Therefore, to a certain extent, they 
are in need of the internal connections which will allow 
for cognition.
Nevertheless, even very intelligent animals demonstrate 
less reliance on internal cognition than human beings do. 
This is generally explained by way of reference to the 
correlation between relative brain weight and intelligence. 
There is, however, a great deal of doubt of the explanatory 
value of such a correlation. Yet it does seem plausible 
that a learning task is more difficult to perform with a 
brain which is functioning more often on innate, habitual 
behaviours than with one which is commonly involved with 
internalised meaningful connections. Therefore, much 
more cognitive effort is involved in the generation of 
hew learned behaviour in a more primitive brain than in 
an advanced brain like a human being*s.
Therefore, the cognitive activities of animals, as 
simple as they may seem to be to humans are as demanding
to them as ours are to us. A consequence of this is 
that paranormal cognition although possibly more frequent 
in animals in spontaneous situations would almost
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certainly be as sporadic in nature/in an experimental 
task where some form of learning - as primitive as it 
might be - is, essential. Once again, from the experimental 
evidence that we now have at hand, this seems to be the 
case.
There is also, of course, the point that most of 
the anpsi experiments that have been performed have been 
with animals on a relatively high level of evolution 
where learning which is specific to a particular member of 
that species is often accomplished. In other words, the 
animals we use for anpsi tiests have brains which are 
evolving towards internalised connections relevant to the 
individual of a species rather than to the species as a 
whole.
As we have mentioned before, there are relatively 
primitive forms of life whose entire behaviour and basis 
of survival seems to be dependent oh a sort of 1 group 
thinking*. Any actual new behaviour whichis learned seems 
to be species directed and even under unnatural conditions 
(such as, for example, the training of fleas for circus
performances) the whole colony must be taught the new 
behaviour. In cases such as these, what we have termed 
paranormal cognition seems to be dominant to species 
survival.
The question of whether lower animals are better 
capable of employing paranormal cognition remains an 
open one until some form of non-learning or extremely 
simple learning animal, behaviour experiments are created. 
Until then, the evidence so far accumulated agrees with our 
hypothesis in that internal connections being made by the 
animal in the learning task are producing directed thought 
and, as such, any paranormal cognition is being largely 
blocked off by the brain.
It is now necessary to compare the theory of Binary 
Cognition to the major theories of ESP discussed previously 
and to the major experimental evidence for ESP phenomena.
9. THE THEORY OF BINARY COGNITION COMPARED TO THE MAJOR
THEORIES OF.ESP.
Non-Cartesian dualism
Non-Cartesian dualism is a metaphysical speculation 
and therefore should not be judged as a scientific theory. .
In some ways, it has much in common with our own 
speculation that 'mind' is a relation between "mental 
energy" and the material brain. In either case, such 
speculations are neither provable nor nullifiable due to 
our lack of present knowledge. However, such a concept 
has not in any way been diminished by various types of 
research into the brain such as the split-brain experiments 
and, to some extent, the discoveries being made in studies 
concerned with altered states of consciousness.
The only major change from our physical view of the 
world that Non-Cartesian dualism posits is that the universe 
is made up of n-dimensions rather than the four generally 
accepted ones. In so doing, it argues that the total human 
organism extends in ah n-dimensional space. One section 
of-this space contains his physical body and brain while 
another contains his sense-data, images, thoughts and ego. 
Thus, the two are linked simply because they are part of
the same n-dimensional system. Paranormal phenomena 
are easily incorporated into such a system since, to 
accept hypothesised n-dimension intersecting in us it 
becomes possible to perceive in ways that are neither 
spatially nor temporally confined.
The theory of paranormal cognition also hypothesises 
n-dimensions by which knowledge of events is obtained but 
these dimensions are based on meaning and the different - 
and infinite - number of values that each individual places 
in the meaningful connection he constructs. These connections 
are usually internalised in man and result as a sudden 
connection between two distinct meanings to form a new 
meaning. We have used the analogy of lightning to describe 
this connection. We have hypothesised that these connections 
come about through the relation between 'mental energy* and 
the brain and we have argued that through such a relation 
paranormal phenomena could, in fact, be happening on a 
much more frequent level except that they are not recognised 
as such because of the restrictions we place on what 
constitutes an observed paranormal event.
Therefore, although to some extent both taking a 
similar metaphysical starting point, and not necessarily
conflicting with each other, the theory of Non-Cartesian 
dualism and the theory of paranormal cognition are making 
quite different statements. However, the former theory 
offers no predictions whereas the latter does.
The Advaita Vedanta of Shamkara
Thakur argues implicitly that 'ESP1 must in principle 
be a universal ability and also a normal or natural ability 
to all life forms. The reason why ESP doesn't occur more 
often is that the body, once it has divided Brahman (the 
universal soul) into many atmans (individual souls) 
insulates one individual soul from the other. This
insulation is not always complete, however, because through
various processes of enlightenment, atmans may at times 
achieve liberation.
Like the theory of Non-Cartesian dualism Sha&kara's 
philosophy is impossible to either prove or refute.
Further, it is difficult for Western man to accept ideas
of universal and individual souls.
But, in many ways, Shankar a's theory is very similar 
to the theory of Binary Cognition. Our present theory argues 
that 'consciousness' has developed from a species oriented
system of cognition towards an individualistic system 
of cognition which is at least partially associated with 
the evolution of the brain and the number of functions 
it is able to perform. But in order to allow for specific 
consciousness to succeed, the brain has had to evolve a 
filtering process for both incoming and out-going information 
which is of individual benefit. Only in cases of triviality 
or of extreme emotion will 1 specific' information become 
externalised normally. The other most successful ways 
are through: techniques which can be classified as altered 
states of consciousness.
It can be seen, that although the language is different 
the basic, ideas to both theories are similar although, once 
again, Shankara's does not lead to predictions as easily 
as our proposed theory.
Alister Hardy1s Theory
Hardy argues that ESP can be seen as an aspect of 
1 tacit knowledge1 - that is, knowledge which is unformulated 
and that we are actually in the act of doing before it 
becomes expressed in words or symbols. If this is so, 
then examples of this phenomena should be seen in animals.
He further argues that the purpose of ESP is to mould the 
patterns of behaviour in a species in order to modify the 
course of evolution; of great importance would be the 
speed in which such information would be circulated. He
suggests that all members of a species subconsciously
share a psychic pool of experience by some, method akin
to what we call telepathy. This psychic stream of
shared behaviour patterns flows on in the living
population in parallel to the flow of physical DNA
material. There would be, then, two streams of
information - the DNA code which supplies the varying physical
form of the organic stream to be acted on by selection,
and the subconscious 'species blueprint' which is the
psychic stream of shared experience.
Our present theory would agree with Hardy's in that 
it also argues that the main purpose of ESP phenomena is 
to allow meaningful connections to be made which mould 
patterns of behaviour. We would also agree that para­
normal cognition is species related rather than 
individualistic. We do not, however, feel the necessity 
to argue for the existence of a 'psychic stream' or to use 
Jung's phrase a 'collective unconscious' since we do not 
view either as entities which exist independently of the 
living members of a species; rather, we view them as 
potential cognition which as the species evolves becomes a 
more and more likely pattern of species behaviour in order 
that new behaviour - either species or individual selected - 
can in turn evolve from previous connections. Interactions 
between meaningful connections and the physical processes
contribute to both the possibility of new meaningful 
connections being made and the evolution of physical 
processes. It seems impossible to totally distinguish 
the two, and once this dynamic interaction is seen, the 
idea of a psychic stream or a collective unconscious in 
both Hardy1s and Jung's sense of the word becomes 
expendable.
John Randall1s Theory
Randall argues that there exists an entity distinct 
from matter but capable of interacting with it called 
'the psi factor'. This 'psi factor* , at the beginning 
of life interacted with primeval molecules which had 
information fed into them so that ordered patterns could 
emerge. The tendency throughout evolution, however, is 
to produce self-regulating systems so that the necessity 
of psi-factor intervention is reduced to a minimum. 
Nevertheless, psi factor intervention will occur when a 
structure is required which is so highly improbable as 
to be unlikely to occur by chance.
What Randall calls 1 the psi factor1 we would call 
'mind1 or rather, 'the relation between 'mental energy' 
and brain*. We would agree that the tendency has been 
for self-regulating systems to evolve but unlike Randall
we would argue that this has not reduced the working of 
this ’psi factor' but rather tended to internalise it. 
We would also disagree with the general god-like 
tendency that Randall seems to give to his 'psi factor' 
in that it is the active force whereas living systems 
are passive to it. We would again re-iterate that our 
view is an interactionist one of which Randall's 'psi 
factor' or our 'mind' is the relation of such an inter­
action.
Physical Theories
Physical theories of ESP have been mainly concerned 
with proving that the possibility of ESP being explained 
in purely physical terms is not an impossibility. In 
doing so, theorists like Oobbs and Marshall have stretched 
somewhat the meaning of 'physical'. They have to a large 
extent succeeded in proving their points logically but as 
explanatory theories they never get beyond the initial 
question of transmission.
In our present theory, we have argued that no 
'transmission' in the sense of actual movement 
of information units from one location to another 
takes place but that rather reception of information 
takes place by a sudden 'lightning like' 
connection between two meaningfully 'charged'
systems. As a result of this connection physiological 
changes take place (as in our anabgy, lightning is 
produced) but that the connection itself is not dependent 
on time or space. Such an argument would not disagree 
with observations made that ESP is probably not an 
electro-magnetic, phenomenon.
Acausal Theories
Both Kammerer's law of Seriality and Jung1s law of 
Synchronicity are concerned with the affinity between 
events simply due to their meaningful content.
1. the theory of seriality
Kammerer's classification of coincidental series 
which in the main were highly interesting but very trivial 
brings into the forefront once again our contention that 
paranormal cognition occurs much more often than we believe 
it does simply because of the restrictions we have imposed. 
Kammerer's interest in coincidental events shows to us 
that detailed observation of events greatly increases the 
number of 'coincidences1 or, in our terms, the amount of 
paranormal cognition that takes place in one's life.
2. the theory of synchronic.ity
Jung's definition of synchronicity as fei coincidence 
in time of two or more unrelated events which have the 
same or similar meaning' is highly similar to the 
definition we have given to paranormal cognition. His 
further contention that a synchronistic event is often 
expressed in archetypal symbol would also agree with our 
hypothesis that paranormal cognition is species related 
and therefore that the meaningful connections made from 
it tend to pertain to the whole species and which, when 
translated into a verbalised form, emerge as a common 
character or symbol. The circumstances that tend to 
bring on synchronistic events - death, danger, sickness, 
etc. - are also those circumstances which, we have argued, 
tend to bring on observed spontaneous manifestations of 
paranormal phenomena.
We would disagree with Jung only in his contention 
that the Collective Unconscious is many ways the entity 
responsible for synchronistic events. We have argued 
above that although the idea of a Collective Unconscious 
is a useful one, we would view it as a brain-energy 
interaction rather than as an entity.
This, however, is our only major contention with Jung
and in many ways we would look at the basis of our own 
theory as a more scientifically acceptable version of 
Jung's metaphysical speculations.
Psychoanalytic Theories
1. Freud's theory
Both of Freud's major statements on ESP, that it 
is connected with deep primitive impulses and conflicts, 
and that its appearance in a therapeutic situation 
contains material complementary to problems which both 
the patient and the analyst are undergoing fall into our 
present theory. The species specific content of para­
normal connections would explain Freud's insight concerning 
'primitive impulses'. Telepathic phenomena between analyst 
and patient would also be suggested from our theory both 
because of the therapeutic situation which attempts to 
bring the unconscious into more prominence, and because 
the patient's health is not being attended to by simply 
his individual internalised connections and that therefore 
the brain's filtering system is not as powerful as normal 
while at the same time the analyst is opening up his own 
thoughts away from himself and towards, his patient whom 
he is trying to understand and help.
2 • Ehrenwald's theory
Ehrenwald's argument that the extreme dependency 
of the new-born and their lack of a specific ego will 
put them in 1 telepathic1 contact with their caretaker 
is basically in agreement with our own viewpoint. We 
have argued that paranormal cognition emerges most 
prominently when internalised meaningful connections are 
not sufficient for the organism's survival or when they 
are not yet being produced to the required extent. This 
is basically Ehrenwald1s viewpoint. His further contention 
that 'telepathic communication1 does not convey any clear- 
cut or well-defined cognitive content but rather, that it 
conveys messages of distress and other emotional constructs 
is, once again, in agreement with our own viewpoint.
Lastly, he also argues that 'telepathy' runs counter to 
the process of individuation and separation and that 
therefore it must be discarded. This is, again, in total 
agreement with our own viewpoint. .
The main area of disagreement between the two theories 
is that Ehrenwald sees 'ESP' as a communicative system per 
se which dies out once speech is introduced. Our view is 
that 'ESP' is a system of cognition and that, as such, its 
communicative factor is peripheral to its main function.
We would agree with nearly all the statements that 
Ehrenwald makes, but our basis for such statements 
differ widely.
3. Carington's Association Theory
Carington assumed that human minds are not entirely 
separate and individual but that in a deep subconscious 
level they become "fused" into one common subconscious. 
Telepathy is, therefore, not involved with any trans­
mission but rather, a diffusion of information from the 
common subconscious to individual consciousness. The 
way telepathy actually works, according to Carington, is 
through a similarity of mental associations between 
sender and receiver which may also exist in the common 
subconscious and, if so, the associations will emerge 
into the subject’s consciousness.
We would once again agree with the idea of a 'common 
subconscious1 but disagree with Carington's understanding 
of it. Once again, like Jung and Hardy, he views it as 
an independent entity whereas we see it as an interaction 
We would also agree that the more similar the association
We would agree with nearly all the statements that 
Ehrenwald makes, but our basis for suc.h statements 
differ widely.
3. : CaringtonVs Association Theory
Carington assumed that human minds are not entirely 
separate and individual but that in a deep subconscious 
level they become "fused" into one common subconscious. 
Telepathy is, therefore, not involved with any trans­
mission but rather, a diffusion of information from the 
common subconscious to individual consciousness. The 
way telepathy actually works is through a similarity of 
mental associations between sender and receiver which 
may also exist in the common subconscious and, if son 
the associations will emerge into the subject's conscious­
ness.
We would once again agree with the idea of a 'common 
subconscious' but disagree with Carington's understanding 
of it. Once again, like Jung and Hardy, he views it as 
an independent entity whereas we see it as a relation - 
or a series of species patterned potential relations. We 
would also agree that the more similar the associations
being made between sender and receiver, the higher the 
likelihood of ESP phenomena. However, the level that 
Carington1s associations are conceived is quite different 
to our definition of 'meaningful connections'. Carington's 
arguments could not account for successes in rapid card- 
calling experiments whereas by our proposed theory such 
results can be explained by the various factors of 
triviality, altered states of consciousness, as well as 
'meaningful connections'.
Personality Theories
1. the sheep-goat effect
Schmeidler's observations of the 'sheep-goat' effect - 
both the replication of her studies as well as the negation 
of them - can be more clearly understood in terms of our 
proposed theory. Subjects who believed or disbelieved 
very strongly in the existence of ESP should not necessarily 
score any better or worse on the basis of their belief, but 
rather on the physiological effect such a belief has on 
them. If in either case, they very consciously try to 
prove or disprove the existence of ESP, then we would 
argue that low levels of ESP should appear. If, on the 
other hand, regardless of belief they are relatively
complacent during the experiment, then results would tend 
to be higher* Schmeidler's data and other researchers' 
data would appear to be more consistent if such viewpoint 
were accounted for.
2. Eysenck's theory
Eysenck's hypothesis that high cortical arousal is 
unfavourable to ESP manifestations would also be upheld 
in our theory not because, as Eysenck suggests, psi is a 
primitive form of perception but because high cortical 
arousal suggests conciously self-directed thought which, 
as we have argued, is the basis of internal cognition which 
is not open to paranormal cognition due to the loss of any 
survival value it would have were it not so. .This would 
also explain Kanthamani and Rao's explanations in terms 
of their combined personality measure.
The Primitive-Communication System Theory
The main effect that our present theory has on the 
most accepted theory thus far is that it does not falsify 
its basic, observations and eliminates its faults.
The main difference between the two theories is that 
one assumes that ESP is an archaic precursor to language
and is therefore an early communicative system, whereas 
our theory argues that ESP is an externalised form of 
cognition which is evolutionarSj^more primitive than 
internalised cognition and which is still available if 
certain physiological conditions are met.
The problems with the first theory are that it does : 
not explain why in such case language proper ever 
developed since ESP could have much greater communicative 
potential, and why animals1 ability to employ ESP seems 
to be experimentally, at least, as sporadic as ours• The 
theory also argues that ESP and the sense organs are 
mutually exclusive - which does not seem to be the case.
Our proposed theory, however, while accommodating 
all the observations that have been made through the 
Primitive-Communication System theory, also makes the 
problems mentioned irrelevant.
We have now looked at the major theories of ESP and 
compared them to our own proposed theory. In many cases, 
the theories complemented each other and in no case were 
there observations made in one theory which could not be 
accounted for in our present theory.
10. THE THEORY OF BINARY COGNITION COMPARED TO THE MAJOR
OBSERVATIONS OF ESP PHENOMENA
In our section on research observations obtained 
through parapsychological research, fifteen main points 
were summarised which seem to be the most widely attested 
to and acceptable (or at least of major interest) to 
researchers« We argued in our summary to that section 
that all of these 15 points would have to be accounted 
for by any major theory. We shall, therefore, study each 
point in relation to our theory.
The first point made was that ESP exists but the 
phenomenon is highly sporadic in nature. We would 
certainly agree that the phenomenon in question does exist. 
We would also agree that the phenomenon has been observed 
as being sporadic. We have argued that it is quite 
probable that 'ESP' phenomena occur far more often 
than we suspect simply because they are either too 
trivial or are largely impossible to discern. We 
have further argued that observable paranormal cognition 
will occur when self-directed internalised thought is to 
some extent impaired or in some way unavoidable. It is 
this second point that we would argue is the reason why 
results in ESP experiments with adult subjects obtain
such ever-changing results. Adult subjects from our 
society have been invariably 'conditioned1 to think, 
in an experimental situation*, at least, in a very directed 
manner which is contrary to the state or states of 
consciousness which would be beneficial to paranormal 
cognition.
The second point made was that in spontaneous 
records of ESP the content of the 'message' is usually 
highly emotional in nature and while this is not 
necessarily so in ESP experiments, those experiments 
which, .have been conducted under emotion-provoking 
situations have yielded better results. Once again, our 
theory would be in agreement with this statement. We 
have argued that high levels of emotion both because of 
the primitive species-shared expression of emotions and 
because of the negative effect high emotion will have on 
self-directed internalised connections, will have a 
tendency to increase observed paranormal cognition.
The third point'considered was that most subjects 
tested for ESP ability seem to have this ability for short 
periods of time and that gifted subjects have such 
abilities for longer periods but these 'gifts' will also 
wane and eventually disappear entirely. With the
restriction that this observation is valid only for 
experimental observations of ESP, we would agree that 
while this is not necessarily the case, it is unfortunately 
the most common one not because any 'powers’ as such are 
lost to subjects but, rather, that the employment of 
paranormal cognition diminishes largely due to a growing 
dissatisfaction or boredom with the experiments which 
usually leads to self-connected day dreaming, or the 
growing dependency on such 'abilities' for fame or 
fortune which forces the spontaneous events to become 
more directed and hence less likely to appear, or shifts 
into states of consciousness not conducive to paranormal 
cognition, etc.
The fourth point made is that most 'gifted' subjects 
have usually had a. lower than average I.Q. and/or are in 
a state of emotional disorder. Once again, our theory 
would accommodate these arguments. I.Q. in many ways 
is a measurement of the complexity of internalised 
connections that one is able to make. The lower the 
complexity of such connections, the more their species- 
content the more the appearance of paranormal cognition.
We have already argued the case for emotional disorder.
The fifth point is Schmeidler's 'sheep-goat' effect.
We have argued previously that we do not accept belief 
or disbelief in ESP as being necessarily the important
factor, but rather the physiological effect on a subject's 
state of consciousness that such a belief or disbelief 
will have. We have shown that this alternative viewpoint 
will account both for Schmeidler's experiments and their 
replications as well as the negative findings on such an 
effect.
The sixth point is concerned with the displacement 
effect or the 'hitting1 of correct targets at earlier or 
later points than those set out by experimental procedure.
Very little modern research on this effect has been 
reported, and yet the effect itself must be considered 
to be of importance since it forms the basis of some of 
the most important early experimental studies of ESP.
We would argue that this effect is a result of the 
procedure employed to test ESP ability, rather than any 
specific aspect of the ESP process itself. For example, 
in the zener card procedure there are five symbols which 
keep recurring at relatively fast speeds and for lengthy 
instalments of time. Because of this quick, constant 
repetition the possible meaning-related connections 
available can easily bring about a time displacement effect. 
For example, the agent might well be supposedly con­
centrating on one symbol while, in fact, his 'mind' is 
still attuned to the previous one and in so doing
possibly aiding the backward displacement effect in 
the target on the part of the subject. Similarly, 
because of the agent's knowledge of the cards in each 
pack that have already been used (each pack contains 
25 cards - 5 for each symbol) his anticipation and 
predictions concerning which symbol will appear on the 
following card or cards might well produce the forward 
displacement effect of the probable target on the part 
of the subject. To reiterate, although strong evidence 
suggests the existence of a time displacement effect, we 
would argue that such an effect has little to do with 
the process of ESP itself, but is, more likely, the 
result of the experimental procedure employed to test 
ESP.
The seventh point has to do with decline effect or 
the inability to obtain the same level of correct hits 
that a subject begins and ends with throughout the run 
such that there is a low number of correct scores in the 
middle of the experiments. Most researchers have argued 
that such an effect is due to a sub-conscious repressing 
of his 'gift' on the part of the subject. We would argue, 
instead, that the effect is more likely due to either the 
growing levels of boredom and anger with the experimental 
procedure which put the subject into non-conducive states 
of consciousness or, on the other hand,, that a subject's
excited, emotional, state at the beginning which will 
allow for greater levels of paranormal cognition slackens 
down due to the experimental procedure and picks up again 
only towards the end when once again excitement and higher 
emotion due to the fact that the experiment is ending and 
he will know his rate of success once again raises the 
probability of paranormal cognition occurring.
The eighth point is that both distance and time seem 
ftA-to 9a . factors in the successful appearance of ESP 
information. We have argued that paranormal cognition 
occurs due to the sudden lightning-like connection of two 
or more equally 'meaning-charged' bodies. Therefore, no 
travelling of information as such takes place which, of 
course, would answer the distance question. The time 
effects - or lack of them - can also be explained by this 
argument in that meaning is dependent on n number of value 
dimensions and that a change in such value dimensions will 
change the 'meaning charge' of any possible connections in 
which case time effects would be noted. It is of interest 
to note that such an effect is similar to internally 
directed cognition. In many cases such as the statement 
'my work has no meaning for me any more' there is no change 
as such in the informational content of the meanings involved, 
but rather in the values that a person places on such 
information. A change in value, even in this case, will 
set off a whole series of new internalised connections 
which are due solely to this value shift.
The ninth point made is that verbal descriptions of 
the nature of ESP are severely limited but, even so, the 
concept of ’relaxed awareness' is usually involved. This 
point also is in agreement with our theory that verbalised 
descriptions require to a large extent some form of directed 
internalised thought, in a situation such as one where para­
normal cognition arises this is not the case as-directed, 
internalised thought has not taken place. Instead, we use 
words like 'hunch' or 'intuitive feeling' to label these .. 
states but they hold no information as to the nature of such 
a process. Similarly, the expression 'relaxed awareness' 
implies that one is conscious but not in the state of thought 
(e.g. intentional thought) which, of course, is the required 
state for paranormal cognition to take place in.
The tenth point raised is that altered states of 
consciousness such as dreaming, hypnosis, trance states, 
alpha-states and, to some extent, states induced by psychedeli 
drugs are all conducive to ESP manifestations. This common 
variable in each of these states is the idea of an awareness 
which is not conscious or directed and this, again, is in 
keeping with our theory.
The eleventh point raised, which is strongly related 
to the tenth, is that relatively large and rapid shifts 
in state will be associated with enhanced ESP performance.
We would agree with this point provided that the shifts in 
state that are being argued are those like the ones in 
point ten which tend towards a 'non-directed awareness'•
The twelfth point is that creative but non-intellectual
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subjects. Creativity such as that expressed by artists
is invariably described as 1 self-transcending1 or,
in other words, non self-directed. This is once again
in keeping with our theory. And, naturally, one would
expect subjects who are more trained in employing this
altered state to show a greater number of correct hits
on ESP experiments.
The thirteenth point is concerned with the question 
of empathy. Empathy between experimenter and subject or 
between subjects is a factor in determining a higher 
level of paranormal cognition. Empathy is a state of 
relaxation or naturalness and trust between two or more 
people. Such a state is emotion-based and behind it is 
a desire and willingness to ’share1 each other's personality 
or 'being*. It is obvious, then, that such a state is not 
centred on self-directed internalised connections but to 
'group* connections. It is of no surprise, then, that 
such a state would be conducive to paranormal cognition 
whereas a state where mutual distrust or dislike would be 
conducive to intensified 'guarding' of one's thoughts or 
personality such that paranormal cognition would be minimal.
The fourteenth point is that through anthropological 
studies it seems that subjects from primitive tribes are 
capable of employing psi abilities to a greater level than
Western subjects. The point is also met by our theory. 
Because of societal conditions, tribal subjects are more 
geared to externalised (or 'paranormal') cognition than 
are Western subjects. There is also a greater interest 
and focus on altered states of consciousness - either 
chemically or mentally induced - in tribal societies than 
in ours and therefore a greater frequency of ESP 
phenomena would be expected.
The fifteenth point is that the various types of 
psi abilities available to man are also available to 
animals. We have argued this point at length previously 
and the findings reported on 'anpsi* experiments are in 
agreement with our theory.
GENERAL SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A theory of paranormal cognition has been presented 
which proposes that ESP-type phenomena can be most clearly 
understood if they are seen to originate from the same 
process which allows for the presence of those phenomena 
associated with normal cognition.
Following a review of the mechanics of both ’ESP' 
and normal cognition, it was concluded that the primary 
function of both processes is to connect hitherto distinct 
meanings to form a new meaning. It was argued that the sole 
ostensible difference between the two processes is that 
'ESP'-type connections (i.e. paranormal cognition) are 
partially non-sensory in origin whereas normal cognition 
connections are purely sensory. We have argued that all 
cognition is, in fact, non-sensory and that, as such, normal 
and paranormal cognition can be seen as being aspects of the 
same process.
In neither case is there any clear explanation by 
qualified researchers as to how such connections take place. 
Until such a time, one cannot unequivocally state that the 
two phenomena are one and the same. But since, once again 
in neither case, have we any direct proof of the existence 
of such a process or processes, it was thought useful to 
propose a combined theory which, it was hoped, might add 
further clues to the nature of one or both of these processes.
A hypothetical process which could account for these 
observed phenomena was presented. This process carries 
the familiar term 'mind1 but, in this case, 'mind' is 
not seen as an entity but rather as the interaction between 
energy (in this case, mental energy) and the brain or 
central process of an organism. This interaction is the 
source of consciousness, and, hence, .of cognition.
The mechanism of this process can most easily be 
explained by employing the metaphor or 'lightning',
Just as lightning is the result of the sudden connection 
of equally charged bodies, so too can cognition (either 
normal or paranormal) best be seen in terms of a sudden 
connecting process between two meaning-related contents 
which - if and when connected - prove to be complementary 
with regard to their meaning. The 'lightning' model is 
also of importance because it dispels the generally 
accepted view, that in the process of cognition, information 
is carried from one location to another. The lightning 
model instead suggests that the process of cognition is, 
rather, a sudden connection between .meaning-related 
contents. It is only as the result of this connection 
that the observable processes and physiological changes 
that we have associated with both cognitive systems take 
place. This new perspective makes much more understandable 
a large number of phenomena which could not be easily 
explained by previous cognitive theories.
We have argued that as systems become more and more 
complex, meaningful connections become further internalised 
because the 'meaning of a meaning1 is dependent on an 
infinite variety of values that an individual imposes 
and as well, on the infinite number and variety.of 
meaning values of the referent itself, both of which 
would be severely restricted were paranormal cognition 
alone available to us. The probability that the cognitive 
process can detect distinct meanings which, if connected, 
prove to be in all respects congenial enough to produce 
a new meaning is much higher within the cognitive realm 
of one organism than between two or more organisms. The 
more cognition becomes internalised, the more necessary 
it becomes in terras of survival value to keep it inter­
nalised, and not allow it to be overtaken by paranormal 
cognition. Most scientists have argued for the existence 
of a 'selection filter' brain mechanism for incoming 
information. This viewpoint has been extended to allow 
for the selective filtering of outgoing information as 
well.
This argument would allow for paranormal cognition 
to be most easily observable in man under four main 
conditions:-
a) when information is so trivial that it 
contains little, if any, survival value.
b) when the survival value of paranormal 
cognition becomes greater than that of 
normal cognition .. ■•r.r--:?.?.
c) when internal connections are somehow 
impaired due to naturally or chemically 
induced altered states of •consciousness'.
d) when the organism's maturational level has 
not yet reached the level of complex 
internalised connections its species-is 
capable of generating but is, as yet, 
largely engaged in learning to make 
internalised connections.
Cases a) and b) are most clearly observed in 
'spontaneous' cases of paranormal cognition. While 
clearly of major interest and importance as indicators of 
paranormal cognitive phenomena, such cases are highly 
difficult if not impossible to replicate in an 
experimental situation, although it is arguable that the 
early Rhine studies and the thousands following which 
employ zener cards, dice, etc. might fall into a 
combination of category a) and category c).
The greater part of modern day interest in paranormal 
cognition is in association with studies of category c).
We have reported on the large number of personality 
studies, dream research, hypnosis, meditation, hallucinogens, 
specific types of brain-waves and, most recently, the 
Ganz/eld Effect which all seem to more or less produce 
examples of paranormal cognition. We have also indicated 
that the common experimental factor in each of these 
'techniques' is the minimisation of the subject's consciously 
directed thought. We have termed this effect as 'relaxation*. 
A successful Experiment was designed and carried out 
validating the hypotheses that 'relaxation* is an important 
variable in the study of paranormal cognition. The main 
area of interest in this thesis however is in the d) 
category and its application to human development.
A series of experimental predictions was made with 
regard to this all of which were then tested in a rigorous 
scientific fashion as described in the sections entitled 
THE OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES and THE EXPERIMENTS.
First, it. was predicted that child Subjects who have 
not yet matured to the stage of forming complex internalised 
connections will show a greater tendency to employ para­
normal cognition than adult Subjects who have already 
formed complex internalised connections. It was argued 
that by far the most exhaustive and generally accepted 
theory of intellectual development is Piaget's and that 
within the general Piagetian framework it would be safe
to argue that within our society and culture the 
majority of children reach the stage of creating and 
employing internalised connections at .around the 
chronological age of eight. Following this chronological 
age, the observable amount of paranormal cognition 
employed should stabilise itself to levels of chance.
In three separate paranormal studies involving a large 
number of Subjects between the ages of 3 and 70 it was 
repeatedly found that only the three youngest C.A. 
groups (those aged between 3 and 8 years of age) 
consistently scored as a group at levels far above 
those predicted by chance while all the remaining C.A. 
groups scored at levels within those predicted by chance.
Secondly, still in keeping with Piaget's theory, 
it was predicted that the tendency to employ paranormal 
cognition is inversely proportional to intellectual 
development as measured by chronological age. This would 
imply that within the 3 - 8 year old C.A. groups, the 
younger Subjects would obtain better scores than the older 
Subjects. Once again, the results of the three studies 
reported clearly indicated this. In all cases, the 
younger the C.A. of the group, the higher the paranormal 
cognition score - with highly significant inter (and in 
some cases, such as the 5 - 8  C.A. group, intra) group 
differences.
Thirdly, in a series of three Experiments, this 
time concerned with the I.Q. of Subjects as a variable 
for paranormal cognition, it was predicted that Subjects 
of lower intelligence levels within the same C.A. group 
will show a greater tendency to employ paranormal 
cognition more successfully than Subjects of the same 
C.A. but of a higher I.Q. Testing Subjects aged between 
3 - 8 years of age, this prediction was once again 
clearly borne out indicating another measureable 
variable - I.Q. - as a determinant of the successful 
employment of paranormal cognition.
Fourthly, it was predicted that the manipulation of 
both these variables - C.A. and I.Q. - either in com­
bination or independently - would cause observable 
changes in the paranormal cognition scoring of Subjects. 
It was found that those Subjects paired for both C.A. 
and I.Q. obtained the highest paranormal cognition scores 
indicating a clear inverse relation between paranormal 
cognition and both C.A. and I.Q. It was also found that 
those Subjects paired for I.Q. but not for C.A. showed 
a clear inverse relation between paranormal cognition 
ability and I.Q. but not between paranormal cognition 
ability and C.A. Finally, it was found, that those 
Subjects paired for C.A. but not for I.Q. showed a still 
clear (but much reduced in terms of successful scoring), 
inverse relation between paranormal cognition and C.A.
and, to some extent, I.Q.
Fifth, it was hypothesised that although both 
paranormal cognition and normal cognition can be 
employed together, if a secondary normal cognition 
task of some complexity is introduced at the same time 
as a paranormal cognition task then the successful 
employment of paranormal cognition will diminish. 
Further, the more complex the secondary normal 
cognition task, the lower the level of successful para­
normal cognition scoring. An Experiment employing the 
use of secondary word-association tasks of varying 
degrees of complexity which were administered during a 
paranormal cognition task was designed. It was found 
that those Subjects given both tasks at the same time 
obtained significantly lower paranormal cognition scores 
than those expected and that the more complex the word- 
associations were, the lower was the group paranormal 
cognition score.
Sixth, (as described earlier) In contrast to this, 
it was predicted that if Subjects in a paranormal 
cognition task were given an addition task geared to 
•relax' normal cognition, then they would demonstrate 
a higher employment of paranormal cognition. An
Experiment employing the use of headphones and various 
types of music being played at the same time as the 
paranormal cognition task showed that Subjects in the 
’relaxed1 environment scored significantly greater 
scores on their paranormal cognition task than 
expected. It was also hypothesised that the more 
’relaxed’ the Subject groups were, the higher would 
be their score at paranormal cognition. Results from 
the Experiment indicated that the more ’relaxation' 
stimuli available, the significantly greater was the 
group paranormal cognition score.
Seventh, it was predicted that no sex 
differences should be present as indicators to 
paranormal cognition. In all the Experiments and 
studies conducted, no sex differences were found.
It is clear that all our predictions have been 
borne out by the Experiments reported and just 
summarised. The indication is strong, therefore, that 
paranormal cognition is clearly being utilised to 
varying degrees by man and that it is strongly related 
and affected by both chronological age and I.Q. - both 
indicators of the level of intellectual development in 
humans - and by the 'relaxed' state of the Subject,.
It seems to be the case that when directed internalised
connections are being minimised or are not yet being 
fully, employed because of the maturational level and 
intellectual development of the Subject, paranormal 
cognition is much more actively and successfully 
employed. We have argued that paranormal cognition can 
best be seen and studied as an alternative system of 
cognition closely related in its mechanics to normal 
cognition and possibly originating from the same process 
as normal cognition although quite clearly unable to 
combine with normal cognition without impairing either 
one or both cognitive systems. All the Experiments have 
pointed to the general validity of this theory. It is 
hoped that even with its limitations and assumptions it 
might provide the springboard for new types of 
Experiments both in paranormal and normal cognition 
which will clarify both systems, and, hopefully, the 
process or processes that initiate them.
FURTHER PRE DICTION S
AND CONCLUSIONS
FURTHER GENERAL PREDICTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS BASED ON
THE THEORY OF PARANORMAL COGNITION
It would seem that on the basis of the large and 
successful number of Experiments on paranormal cognition 
conducted with child subjects, a whole new and easily 
accessible group of ‘gifted1 Subjects has become 
available for parapsychological study. There are, 
however, several limitations and necessary moral 
obligations to be considered in conducting research 
with children as well as a number of practical problems 
which, it is felt, must be considered before an 
Experiment with child Subjects can begin. Several of 
the major problems and obligations facing such a task 
have been noted in Appendix E and.it is strongly 
suggested that any serious researcher wishing either 
to replicate or even extend the ideas and Experiments 
described herein should make due note of them.
There are, on the main, a large number of extension 
and studies which hopefully will be made. It is pdrhaps 
of interest to note some of what might be the most 
interesting and illuminating areas to follow up.
1* Research into Parapsychology with Children
It is strongly suggested that any further initial
research involving child subjects alone should be 
carried out employing either the clairvoyance, pre­
cognition or PK paradigms, rather than the telepathy 
paradigm unless one is working with very small groups 
of subjects. The obvious reason for this is that 
•telepathy1 experiments are the ones which most 
strongly lend themselves to attempts at cheating on 
the part of the Subjects. Secondly, regardless of 
the experimental precautions taken, critics of para­
psychology will insist that * sensory cues' might 
provide the reason for results in favour of 
paranormal cognition, thereby dismissing them. Even 
the Experiments reported in this thesis have come 
under such attack. Unfortunately, there seems to 
be no reasonable way out of the impasse unless 
the telepathy paradigm is dropped and an alternative 
paradigm, such as PIC for example, in which sensory 
cues become irrelevant is employed.
Having noted the difficulties encountered in 
the employment of a telepathy paradigm, it must be 
noted, however, that the importance of telepathy 
paradigm experiments cannot be overstressed. A
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continuation of the initial findings of the effects 
of both C.A. and I. p. on paranormal cognition and the 
further effects of the variation of one or both of 
these variables can best be studied in employing the 
telepathy paradigm. There exists a large number of 
indications in the Experiments reported that the two- 
subject telepathy paradigm will yield a great deal of 
useful data on both the mechanisms of paranormal and 
normal cognition and possibly their underlying 
process(es).
The solution to this quandary seems to be a two- 
way one:
(a) either forget about the telepathy 
paradigm for the moment at least and 
concentrate on experiments that 
critics cannot attack
or
(b) continue with ’telepathy1 experiments 
regardless of the critics' scepticism 
but making certain that there are no 
reasonable grounds for declaring the 
experiments invalid due to sensory 
cues.
It has already been predicted that following 
solution (a) should yield up further experimental 
evidence for the existence of paranormal cognition 
in much the same way as the evidence already produced.
Talcing solution (b), we would predict, will lead 
to more complete theoretical understanding of the 
process(es) behind both systems of cognition.
Regardless of whichever decision is made several 
possible areas of research, we would predict, will lead 
to major research findings. Among them:
in,
a) Brain-wave research
Although this area is still a relatively new field 
for concerted scientific research, it seems to be the 
case that paranormal cognition is associated with 
specific brain patterns or clusters of patterns. The 
high incidence of alpha waves in subjects who performed 
successfully in paranormal cognition tasks was originally 
seen as a physiological correlate to paranormal phenomena* 
It is now more accepted that alpha waves as such are not 
necessarily indicators of paranormal activity; yet there 
does seem to be a link between them and paranormal
cognition. It is hypothesised' that with the development 
of more advanced machinery a specific pattern of brain 
waves most likely predominantly alpha but incorporating 
the other main types of waves simultaneously, will 
appear for each of the various types of paranormal 
phenomena. Naturally, should children continue to 
prove to be such excellent subjects then it will be 
easier to ascertain whether a particular brain pattern 
can be associated with paranormal phenomena.
b) Mental age studies
It is of importance to developmental psychology 
and to education as well as to parapsychology, to 
study further any relationships between paranormal 
cognition and mental age. The major methods of 
measuring mental age are, of course, standardised 
tests. If M.A. tests measure only one aspect of 
cognition, and a whole other system seems to be in 
existence, then they must be both modified and to 
some extent controlled for the two main variables.
2. Research into Children and
Adults.
The most important area of research under this 
section would be between parents and siblings - 
especially mother-child relationships. The importance 
of mother-infant paranormal cognition has been widely 
reported by a large number of psychoanalytic and 
Jungian theorists, some of which were noted in the 
review of paranormal cognition theories. Unfortunately, 
there has been very little research done in this area - 
probably due to the difficulty of devising proper 
experiments in this rather difficult research area. 
However, the importance of such work is not to be 
under-estimated. If the theory proposed is even 
partially correct, the level of paranormal cognition 
employed between very young infants and their parents 
should be very high. Obviously, card-guessing 
experiments, such as those used in this Experiment, 
would not. be possible with very young children, although 
it would be of interest to study whether any evidence 
for paranormal cognition between parents and their 
children employing such experimental apparatus (as 
long as the children were old enough to comprehend the 
rules of the ‘game1) would be forthcoming, (a purely
subjective prediction on such experiments would be 
that positive scoring would emerge, provided the 
relationship between parent and child was a close one; 
such research combined with psychological tests concerned 
with child-parent roles and interaction might prove to 
be of great merit and interest). Clearly, some types 
of passive experiments would need to be devised - 
possibly involving brain waves and strobe light 
simulation or both. It would be predicted, however, 
should suitable experiments be designed, that paranormal 
cognition activity would be very high - especially with 
children only months, weeks, or even days old. It would 
also be predicted that the inverse relationship between 
C.A. and paranormal cognition ability which has been 
observed in the Experiments carried out in this thesis 
would continue further down the C.A. scale.
Experiments between children and fathers would also 
be of value, although it would be predicted that results 
would not be as conclusive as with mothers.
Research between teachers and children, especially 
nursery school teachers, might also prove to be of value. 
Much work has already been done employing teachers as 
Agents' in GESP Experiments, but this has never, to the 
author's knowledge, been extended to the youngest school
age groups. Certainly, even in research with older 
students, there have been a number of very successful - 
experiments which in themselves should provide enough 
of a stimulus for further testing. Once again - 
depending on the strength of the bond between students 
and teacher, and perhaps on its positive or negative 
nature - it would be predicted that successful results 
would appear.
3. Research into ^  Adults
Although seemingly much more difficult to observe, 
it would be predicted that successful experiments in 
paranormal cognition could be achieved if several 
important variables which have arisen in this thesis 
were more closely controlled. The more obvious of these 
variables would be:
a) closely related adults
It is quite feasible that adults who have been, 
together for a period of time or who feel a close 'bond* 
between each other should display a higher incidence of 
paranormal phenomena than non-related adults. A number 
of studies have pointed to this observation, although 
once again research in this area is very small and loosely
scattered. The proposed theory would predict the 
appearance of paranormal cognition phenomena in 
situations of high emotionality between such adults, 
or in situations where mutual 'trust' or feelings of 
'love' were pronounced. Emotional-type experiments 
along these lines would need to be ingenious constructions 
in which these stimuli would appear as naturally as 
possible.
b) Mental Age and adults
It would be of interest also to study results of 
paranormal cognition in adults paired on the basis of 
mental age. It would be predicted that Experiments with 
adults of very low M.A.'s would be most successful in 
this area, although one would predict that the conditions 
(e.g. inherited, brain damage, etc.) from which low M.A* 
arises would also be important variables to control.
c) 'Relaxation' and adults
The teaching of adults, via bio-feedback techniques, 
to 'enter into' specific brain states and then carry out 
paranormal cognition experiments is already a widely- 
employed experimental procedure in parapsychology. The 
success rate of these experiments seems to be quite high
, and it is of importance that such research proceeds in 
all its various systems (e.g. dream studies, hypnosis, 
Ganzfeld Effects, etc.). The proposed theory has 
already incorporated these findings into its general 
hypotheses and therefore would predict continuing success 
in this line of inquiry, if the underlying variable of 
interest were seen to be the subject's level of 
'relaxation* - i.e.: the minimisation of consciously 
directed internal thought.
4. Research into Animals
Animal parapsychology - or 'anpsi' experiments - 
although once regarded as parapsychology's final reply 
to the problem of replication, have not as yet proven 
to be as dramatic as predicted. One reason for this 
has already been pointed out - namely, that most anpsi 
experiments involve the use of both paranormal and 
normal cognition throughout the task. As has been 
shown in the experiments reported here, the active 
employment of both systems at the same time greatly 
lessens the effects of one, or both, of those systems. 
Secondly, the anpsi experiments thus far devised.all 
revolve around either precognitive or clairvoyant 
abilities in animals. A number of experiments 
involving the 'telepathy' paradigm might prove to be more 
successful especially if one were to use animals coming
from the same pack or litter, or even mother-sibling 
experiments. Were they not so gruesome, the reported 
Russian experiments between mother and infant rabbits* 
would be of great replicable importance. However, if 
experiments such as these are able to produce the avowed 
results promised, then surely experiments in which 
'positive' emotion-arising situations could emerge would 
hopefully be as successful. The important factor in 
anpsi experiments is, we believe, the 'naturalness1 of 
the experiments. The more contrived and 'unreal1 the 
experimental situation presented, the more the animal 
will need to rely on its mediative processes and therefore 
the fewer the expected appearances of paranormal cognition.
The observations and predictions reported in this 
section are the most obvious ones to spring directly 
from the proposed theory of paranormal cognition.
Certainly, because of the scope, any number of experiments 
could be made which would prove to be related to one or 
more of its tenets.
There are, however, several assumptions that have 
been made in employing this theory that must now be 
pointed out as such and which are subject to future
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experimental confirmation or invalidation. These 
assumptions are that:
a) normal cognition and paranormal cognition 
are both aspects of the same process.
b) 'mind' is the interaction between mental 
energy and the brain.
c) cognition is a sudden meaning connection 
and therefore not contained by the time- 
space continuum.
d) one of the main functions of the brain is 
to selectively filter both incoming and 
outgoing information.
The disproof of any one of these assumptions made 
would not justify the total dismissal of the theory 
proposed, although serious reconsiderations on various 
aspects of the theory would be necessary.
It is the view taken by the author of this thesis 
that while useful and of some value to researchers in 
parapsychology, the theory proposed herein, although it 
might lend itself to more constructive and consolidated
research in cognition, should not be seen as a final 
all-encompassing tract on paranormal cognition by its 
writer. It is believed that some of the ideas presented 
are novel and will be considered by other researchers; 
it is also believed that the proposed theory because 
it is able to accommodate so much relatively scattered 
theoretical and experimental knowledge will help to bring 
about much more unified research in parapsychology.
But, to use Jung's phrase, it should not be 
concluded that the author believes that paranormal 
cognition is nothing but what he has written. The 
field is still so uncertain and unknown that to make 
such a statement would be folly - both scientific and 
personal.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
The Instruction Script
Two s u b j e c t s  w o u l d  b o  l e d  i n t o  t h e  u p s t a i r s  ' e x p e r i m e n t a l  room b y  e i t h e r  
t h e  e x p e r i m e n t e r  o r  o n e  o f  h i s  a s s i s t a n t s .
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  n " p u p p e t  s k e t c h "  w e r e  g i v e n  
t o  e a c h  t e a m  .of. s u b j e c t s  f r o m  G r o u p s  A, B,  a n d  C.
EXPERIMENTER: H e l l o ,  my name i s  E r n i e  a n d  t h e s e  a r e  my t w o  f r i e n d s .
ASSISTANT ONE: I l e l l o ,  my name i s  A l a i s d a i r .
ASSISTANT TWO: And my name i s  S u e .
EXPERIMENTER: And we ' r e  a l l  h e r e  s o  t h a t  wo c a n  a l l  p l a y  a game t o g e t h e r . ...
B u t  f i r s t  I  m u s t  i n t r o d u c e  y o u  t o  t w o  v e r y  s p e c i a l  f r i e n d s  
o f  m i n e .
ASSISTANT TWO: ( b r i n g i n g  o u t  " S a l l y "  l i a n d - p u p p e t  a n d  s p e a k i n g  i n  a l i t t l e  
g i r l  v o i c e ) : H e l l o ,  I ' m  S a l l y !
ASSISTANT ONE; ( b r i n g i n g  o u t  " B i l l y "  l i a n d - p u p p e t  a n d  s p e a k i n g  i n  a l i t t l e  
b o y  . v o i c e :  And my name i s  B i l l y !
BILLY & SALLY: And w h a t  a r e  y o u r  n a m e s ?  ( w a i t  f o r  s u b j e c t s '  r e p l i e s )
Oh,  w h a t  NICE n a m e s !  L e t ' s  a l l  s h a k e  h a n d s  a g a i n  a n d  s e e  i f
we c a n  a i l  r e m e m b e r  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  n a m e s .
( s u b j e c t s  a n d  p u p p e t s  r e - i n t r o d u c e  e a c h  o t h e r ) .
EXPERIMENTER: W e l l ,  now t h a t  w e ' v e  a l l  met*, wo c a n  b e g i n  o u r  g a m e .  Now,
d o  y o u  r i l l  s e e  a n  o r a n g e  b o x  a n d  a b l u e  b o x  a t  o n e  e n d  of -  
t h e  room ?  ( W a i t  f o r  " y e s "  a g a i n ) . W e l l ,  t h o s e  b o x e s  a r e  
c a l l e d  " g u e s s i n g  b o x e s "  a n d  y o u  h a v e  t o  s i t  b e h i n d  o n e  o f  
th e m  t o  p l a y  t h e  g a m e .  So  c o u l d  ( S ^ )  g o  w i t h  B i l l y  a n d  
A l a i s d a i r  t o  t h e  o r a n g e  b o x  ( t h e  " o r a n g e  b o x "  w as  t h e  " m o s s a g e  
s e n d i n g "  m a c h i n e )  a n d  c o u l d  ( S g )  g o  w i t h  S a l l y  a n d  S u e  t o  t h e  
b l u e  b o x  ( t h e  " b l u e  b o x "  w a s  t h e  " m e s s a g e  r e c e i v i n g "  m a c h i n e ) . 
A t  t h i s  p o i n t  e a c h  s u b j e c t  was  s e n t  t o  e i t h e r  o f  t h e  b o x e s  a n d  was  g i v e n  
s e p a r a t e  i n s t r u c t i o n s .
A. SENDER'S INSTRUCTIONS:
575.
ASSISTANT
BILLY:
ASSISTANT
BILLY:
ASSISTANT
BILLY:
ASSISTANT
ONE: Do y o u  s e e  t h i s  l i g h t ?  ( p o i n t s  t o  s e l e c t i o n  s i g n a l  l i g h t )
Now w h e n e v e r  t h i s  l i g h t  co m es  o n  B i l l y  i s  g o i n g  t o  show
y o u  a  c a r d  w i t h  5 p i c t u r e s  o n  i t .
Y e s ,  t h e y ’ r e  a l l  n i c e  p i c t u r e s .
ONE: And t h e n ,  yo u  l o o k  a t  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h e  p i c t u r e s  a n d  p i c k
w h i c h  o n e  y o u  l i k e  t h e  b e s t .
And w hen y o u ' v e  p i c k e d  i t ,  y o u  p r e s s  t h e  b u t t o n  u n d e r n e a t h  
i t !  : ■
ONE:. T h a t ' s  r i g h t ,  B i l l y .  And t h e n  y o u  j u s t  t h i n k  a b o u t  t h a t
p i c t u r e  a n d  l o o k  a t  i t  b e c a u s e  ( S ^ )  i s  g o i n g  t o  t r y  t o
g u e s s  w h i c h  p i c t u r e  y o u  p i c k e d .
And i f  y o u  b o t h  g u e s s  t h e  same p i c t u r e  a  b e l l  g o e s  
" d i n g  d o n g "  d o e s n ' t  i t ?
ONE: Y e s ,  B i l l y .  W h e n e v e r  we h e a r  a  b e l l  t h a t  m e a n s  we a l l
g u e s s e d  t h e  same p i c t u r e .
BILLY: Oh,  t h i s  i s  g o i n g  t o  be  f u n !
B. . RECEIVER1£ 
ASSISTANT TWO:
SALLY:
ASSISTANT TWO: 
SALLY:
ASSISTANT TWO: 
SALLY:
ASSISTANT TWO: 
SALLY:
EXPERIMENTER: 
BILLY & SALLY:
EXPERIMENTER:
4 ‘
BILLY:
SALLY:.
B i l l y :
J INSTRUCTIONS:
D/o
Do y o u  s e e  t h i s  l i g h t ?  ( p o i n t s  t o  c h o i c e  s e l e c t i o n  
l i g h t ) .  When i t  conies  o n ,  S a l l y  i s  g o i n g  t o  show y o u  
a  c a r d  w i t h  f i v e  p i c t u r e s  o n  i t .
Y e s ,  s u c h  p r e t t y  p i c t u r e s .
And t h e n ,  y o u  l o o k  a t  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h o s e  p i c t u r e s  a n d  t r y  
t o  g u e s s  w h i c h  p i c t u r e  ( S ^ )  l i k e s  t h e  b e s t .
Oh,  n o t  t h e  p i c t u r e  we l i k e  t h e  b e s t  b u t  t h e  o n e  S ^ a n d  
B i l l y  l i k e  t h e  b e s t .  '
T h a t ’ s r i g h t ,  S a l l y .  Now when y o u ' v e  made  a g u e s s ,  y o u  
p r e s s  t h e  b u t t o n ,  r i g h t  u n d e r n e a t h  t h e  p i c t u r e  y o u  t h i n k  
S^ a n d  B i l l y  p i c k e d .
And i f  we a l l  g u e s s  t h e  same o n e  a  b e l l  g o e s  " d i n g  d o n g "  
d o e s n ' t i t ?
Y e s ,  S a l l y .  W h e n e v e r  we h e a r  a  b e l l  t h e n  t h a t  m e a n s  we 
a l l  g u e s s e d  t h e  same p i c t u r e .  .
Oh,  t h i s  i s  g o i n g  t o  b e  f u n !
Now d o  y o u  a l l  know w h a t ,  t o  do?
E r n i e ,  c o u l d  we t r y  i t  j u s t  o n c e  so  t h a t  we c a n  sh ow  S^
a n d  S 2  how t o  p l a y ?
T h a t ' s  a go o d  i d e a .  L e t ' s  d o  t h a t .
Oh b o y !  Now l e t ' s s e e ,  m y , l i g h t  i s  o n  s o  A l a i s t a i r
s h o u l d  g i v e  me a c a r d .
B i l l y !  We f o r g o t  s o m e t h i n g !  We f o r g o t  t o  p u t  o n  o u r  
t h i n k i n g  c a p s  1
Y o u ' r e  r i g h t  S a l l y !
EXPERIMENTER: D o n ' t  w o r r y ,  I  h; y e  t h i n k i n g  c a p s  f o r  a n d  S 2  a n d
B i l l y  a n d  S a l l y .  ' I t ' s  a  g o o d  t h i n g  y o u  r e m e m b e r e d  
b e c a u s e  t h i n k i n g  c a p s  h e l p  y o u  t o  g u e s s  c o r r e c t l y .
BILLY AND SALLY.:
EXPERIMENTER: 
ASSISTANT ONE:'  
BILLY:
SALLY:'
BILLY:
ASSISTANT ONE:
ASSISTANT TWO:
( S a l l y  m a k e s  p r e -  
SALLY & BILLY: 
EXPERIMENTER: ■
Oh y e s  t h e y  d o !  ( p o i n t i n g  t o  t h e i r  c a p s  an d  a d d r e s s i n g  
t h e i r  s u b j e c t )  W i l l  yo u  p u t  my t h i n k i n g  c a p  on?" ( w a i t  
f o r  s u b j e c t  t o  f i t  i t  o n )  L e t  me h e l p  y o u  w i t h  y o u r s .
A l r i g h t ,  w e l l  now yo u  c a n  b e g i n .
l i e r e ' s  y o u r  c a r d  w i t h  t h e  f i v e  p i c t u r e s  o n  i t  B i l l y .
Oh,  b o y !  What  p r e t t y  p i c t u r e s !  I  t h i n k  I ' l l  p i c k  -
S i l l y  B i l l y !  You c a n ' t  t a l k  when  we p l a y  o u r  g u e s s i n g  
game!  D o n ' t  y o u  r e m e m b e r ?  W e ' r e  s u p p o s e d  t o  p u t  a  h a n d  
o v e r  o u r  m o u t h  so  t h a t  we w o n ' t  w h i s p e r  o u t  a n y t h i n g !
G e e ,  I  f o r g o t .  S a l l y .  Y o u ' r e  r i g h t .  I ' l l  p u t  a  h a n d  o n  
my m o u t h  r i g h t  a w a y .
Now B i l l y ,  l o o k  a t  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h e  p i c t u r e s  f i r s t .  T h e n ,  
when  y o u ' v e  p i c k e d  y o u r  f a v o u r i t e ,  p r e s s  t h e  b u t t o n  
u n d e r n e a t h  i t .  ( P u p p e t  d o e s  s o ) .  Now t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e  
p i c t u r e  y o u  p i c k e d  so  t h a t  y o u r  t h i n k i n g  c a p  w i l l  w o r k  a n d  
h e l p  S a l l y  g u e s s  i t  r i g h t . . ’
Lo o k  S a l l y ,  t h e  r e d  l i g h t  i s  o n .  S o ,  h e r e  i s  y o u r  c a r d  
w i t h  t h e  f i v e  p i c t u r e s  o n  i t .  Lo o k  a t  e a c h  o n e  o f  t h e m  
v e r y  c a r e f u l l y .  T a k e  y o u r  t i m e ,  y o u  d o n ' t  h a v e  t o  g u e s s  
r i g h t  a w a y .  W hic h  p i c t u r e  do  y o u  . t h i n k  B i l l y  p i c k e d ?
a r r a n g e d  c o r r e c t  c h o i c e  t o  a l l o w  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  b e l l  c h i m e )
Oh! We g o t  i t  r i g h t !  We b o t h  g u e s s e d  t h e  same  p i c t u r e ! !
V e r y  g o o d !  B u t  r e m e m b e r ,  i t ' s  o n l y  a  game so  a l l  t h a t  
m a t t e r s  i& t h a t  we a l l  h a v e  f u n .  I f  we ma ke  m i s t a k e s ,  i t  
d o e s n ' t  m a t t e r .  I t ' s  j u s t  a  game f o r  f u n .
BILLY & SALLY: Y e s ,  i t ' s  l o t s  o f  f u n .  C a n  S x a n d  S2 p i n y  now? 
EXPERIMENTER: Y e s ,  l e t  me t a k e  o n e  o f  t h e  b o x e s  i n t o  t h e  o t h e r  ro o m
( c h o o s e s  e i t h e r  s e n d e r ' s  o r  r e c e i v e r ' s  a p p a r a t u s )  a n d  
t h e n  we c a n  b e g i n .
E x p e r i m e n t e r  s w i t c h e s  on  r o c r o d i n g  a p p a r a t u s  a n d  o x p o r i m e n t  p r o p e r  i s  
u n d e r w a y .
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The Apparatus
PHOTOGRAPH OF 'SENDER' MACHINE (FRONT)
(Note: Selection Indicator Light (red) in Upper Left
Hand Side, 5 Display Buttons (Black) and 
5 Display Lights (Yellow)).
______
PHOTOGRAPH OF 'SENDER' MACHINE (BACK)
(Note: Adjustable Target Positional Arrangement Plugs 
on Lower Right Hand Side).
PHOTOGRAPH OF RECEIVER MACHINE (FRONT)
PHOTOGRAPH OF RECEIVER MACHINE (BACK)
(Note: Adjustable Target Positional
Arrangement Plugs on Lower Right Hand 
Side and Bell Chime Attachment in 
Lower Middle Back),
PHOTOGRAPH OF SENDER MACHINE WITH 
TARGET CARD.
PHOTOGRAPH OF RECEIVER MACHINE WITH TARGET
CARD.
(Note: Different Positional Arrangement of
Target Stimuli for Sender and Receiver).
PHOTOGRAPH OF 10-TRACK RECORDER AND 
CHIME UNIT.
PHOTOGRAPH OF 10-TRACK RECORDER REGISTERING
A 'HIT'
(Note: Lights 3,5, 6 and 8 are lit
Lights 5 and 6 together signify 'Hit')*
THE PUPPETS (BILLY AND SALLY)
THE PUPPETS WITH THINKING CAPS.
LINES 1 - 5 REPRESENT SENDER CHOICES 
LINES 6 - 1 0  REPRESENT RECEIVER CHOICES
EXAMPLE CHART TWO
TRIALS LIKES 1 - 5
1 2 & 7 (5&6)
2 2 & 9 •
3 3 & 10 ‘
4 1 o: 8
5 5 & 8
6 4 & 9 05&6)
7 5 & 7
8 1 & 7
9 2 & 6
10 3 &. 9
11 3 & 6
12 1
0.o; 8
13 4 cc 9 (5&6)
14 2 d 8
15 1 & 10
16 5 & 10 (5&6)
17 4 & 6
18 2 & 9
19 3 & 7
20 5 & 10 (5&6)
REPRESENT SENDER 
CHOICES
LINES 6 - 10 REPRESENT1 RECEIVER 
CHOICES
Example Charts ONE and TWO contain twenty trials each* These 
trials represent one complete run for each of the two- dyads.
Pen lines 1 to 5 represent the target choices of the SENDER*
Pen lines 6 to 10 represent the target choices of the RECEIVER. 
Trials 4, ?.16, and 19 from EXAMPLE CHART ONE and Trials 1,6, 13, 
16, and 20 from EXAMPLE CHART TV/0 represent targdt ’hits’ indic­
ating that both sender and receiver chose the samettarget*
In order to simplify the tabulation of ’hits’, the choice of 
the same target by both the sender and receiver was further 
indicated by the simultaneous appearance of pen lines 5 & 6. 
However, the appearance of pen lines 5 & 6 on their own did 
not indicate a correct hit but, rather, the sender choice of 
target 5 and the, receiver choice of target 6 (which correseponds 
to sender target 1.
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APPENDIX C
Target Cards and Stimuli
CONCRETE SYMBOL TARGET CARD (EXAMPLE I)
CONCRETE SYMBOL TARGET CARD (EXAMPLE 2)
ABSTRACT SYMBOL TARGET CARD (EXAMPLE l)
ABSTRACT.SYMBOL TARGET CARD (EXAMPLE 2)
APPENDIX D
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APPENDIX E.
A Schematic Diagram of the 
Apparatus.
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APPENDIX F
Some (Hopefully) Useful 
aids in Parapsychological 
Research with Children#
APPENDIX F
SOME (HOPEFULLY) USEFUL AIDS IN PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
WITH CHILDREN
It is the Experimenter’s belief that much of the 
successful data reported in this thesis could not have been 
obtained had not a particularly relaxed 1 air’ pervaded 
the experimental proceedings# The seeming importance of 
Experimenter-Subject interaction as a variable in 
successful parapsychological (and psychological) Experiments 
has become in the past.year a topic of much interest and 
concern# While we are in full agreement with the 
importance of the ’effect*, it cannot be stressed that 
the number of variables involved in Experimenter-Subject 
interaction are practically infinite and while some of 
them might eventually be controlled, it would be wishful 
thinking to assume that a specific ’formula’ for successful 
E-S interaction will be discovered#
In working with the very high number of Subjects - 
both children and adults - that these Experiments have 
demanded, the author has found that no specific approach 
will satisfy all subjects# Some subjects wish to be 
•cajoled’ into the Experiment, others want the Experimenter 
to feel they are doing him a favour; some are highly 
inquisitive, others want to be given orders; some want to 
stay and chat, others want to leave as quickly as possible# 
In all these cases, a fixed interaction formula would be 
disastrous.
It is believed by this author, that more than a 
formula# an experimental attitude should be maintained 
throughout the research. What this means is that the 
Experimenter should always put the results of his 
Experiment second to any possible effects his Experiment 
might have on his Subjects. This cannot be too strongly 
expressed, especially for parapsychological research, 
and even more so when working with children.
If the Experimenter can adopt the attitude that 
while his research may be important, it is not so important 
that the attitudes and personality of its subjects must be 
stifled, if the Experimenter can ‘relax* in that he 
continues the Experiments each day only as long as he 
feels he wants to, if the Experimenter can feel free 
enough from his Experiments that the unexpected may be 
allowed to intrude, if the Experimenter can involve himself 
and his Subjects with the Experiment at hand, but detach 
himself from any results they might produce (note that 
this is in direct opposition to the supposed ‘scientific* 
method of experimentation), then the necessary attitude 
will have been adopted and the possibility of more 
successful E-S interaction will exist.
In working with children, such an attitude is of 
absolute necessity. Young children are very quick to
•read between the lines*, of the Experimenter*s*sugary* 
speech, as it were, and decipher what an Experimenter is 
. really demanding them to do.
Secondly, no matter how controlled an Experiment 
might be, child subjects seem to be especially capable 
of finding its weakest point, or of in some way making 
the data gathered null and void by either attempting 
trickery, planning (sometimes successful) alternative 
strategies, or of simply deciding to leave in the middle 
of the Experiment or, if not ’allowed* to, by refusing 
to continue their task. Any one or a combination of 
such unexpected events should leave a ‘rigid* Experimenter 
determined never to attempt any work with children again. 
The attitude must therefore always be open to the 
occurrence of Unexpected catastrophes. It is also 
imperative that proper pilot runs of the Experiment in 
question be carried out, not so much to see if the 
predicted results are appearing but, more to the point, 
to measure the child subjects* interests and/or strategies 
during the Experiment.
Young children are very easily distracted, the time 
span allotted to an Experiment must take this question 
into account. It was found that the 20-25 minutes spent 
with each team of child subjects (even though some 10-15 
minutes alone were actual testing time) was optimal for
most children. Some became bored towards the end and 
had to be ’encouraged* by the assistants to ‘give it 
another try* * Others wanted to stay on and on and 
various * good-bye rituals* had to be invented to get 
them back to their classroom. The majority found their 
20 minute break adequately long and were pleased both 
to have done the Experiment and to be leaving. Therefore, 
the time factor is a variable of some importance.
It is also of great importance in working with very 
young children (say, three year olds) that they do not 
feel frightened of the Experimenter or his assistants.
It was mainly for this reason that some two weeks before 
any testing took place, the Experimenter and assistants 
began to attend the nursery school and participate in 
the children’s games or lessons. Besides being invaluable 
for various experimental purposes, it also greatly 
diminished most of the children’s lack of trust, or even 
fear, of them and instead turned them into acceptable 
aspects of the school. Besides the children, this strategy 
also is very useful for the teacher or headmistress* 
attitudes to the Experimenter. By being in the classroom 
situation with them, you stop becoming an academic stranger 
who disrupts the day and instead someone who can help in 
their job and who will probably need help in his.
In relation to this, it is the author’s belief that 
* honesty is the best policy* and that teachers, headmistresses
and parents should be told exactly what the aim of the 
Experiment is. They should be shown the apparatus and 
actively encouraged to come and watch the Experiments 
being run. Besides creating a feeling of mutual trust 
and understanding between the teacher and the Experimenter 
it helps the teachers feel that they are more involved in 
the experimental work giving them a more positive 
attitude towards it. The danger of this policy is that 
a large number of schools will not allow researchers to 
conduct Experiments in paranormal cognition. Only one 
nursery school of the dozen or so that this author 
applied to was willing to even listen to what the author 
had in mind. As it turned out, however, the school was 
as perfect as could be expected in terms of size, number 
of subjects available, accessibility and, most importantly 
headmistress/teacher attitude toward the Experiments and 
the researchers.*
Having overcome child subjects1 attitudes towards 
the Experimenter and the assistants, it remains to attempt 
to interest them in the Experiment itself.
* It should be pointed out that the nursery school in 
question had a very /easy and accessible* teaching program 
Children were allowed a great deal of freedom of choice as 
to what to do for much of their time there. This might 
well in itself be a factor in the results obtained. It is 
hoped that comparative study between /modern* and 
•traditional* schools ESP scoring will be carried out by 
researchers.
The use of puppets, thinking caps, brightly designed 
apparatus, door chimes, etc. are obviously beneficial to 
keeping your subjects interested* Such 1 props1 can be 
used in any type of experiment and are of value* It is 
also useful to give any puppets, etc. a •personality' >- 
to make them humourous or silly while being instructive.
It was found that the youngest subjects related very 
closely to the puppets - wanting to know where they 
slept; if they were allowed to wear thinking caps (a 
strategy that was quickly incorporated into the 
experimental procedure), etc. It was found that the 
simple act of allowing the children to shake hands with 
the puppets, or put on their 'thinking caps', or even 
just the fact that the puppets knew the children's names, 
would instantly make the subjects much more willing and 
eager to participate in the Experiment.
Such props, however, while of initial value quickly 
fade away if the child is disinterested in the proceedings.
The first possible reason for disinterest might be 
in the style of the Experiment itself. If, for instance, 
within the Experiments reported the Subjects were never 
given any positive feedback, the youngest ones would not 
have participated. It was obvious that that was one of 
the main aspects of 'the game' that they grasped - if 
both members pick the same picture, the bell rings.
Their main aim was to make the bell ring and when it 
did, their excitement and enjoyment was obvious#
Similarly, the pictures they were called upon to choose 
also held interest - they were either recognisable or 
were considered funny (abstract shapes). The main 
apparatus was designed to give subjects as much dynamic 
participation in the Experiment as possible# The pressing 
of buttons, pointing to the signal light etc# were also 
of appeal#
Secondly, disinterest might be due to faulty 
understanding or the^lack of any understanding as to what 
they are supposed to do in the Experiment. The giving 
of instructions must be very slow paced, each one must 
stand out as strongly and obviously as possible. The 
idea of letting the puppets 'teach1 the children how to 
play by playing the game themselves once was very 
successful in that each Subject learned his role from 
the puppet whom he/she enjoyed listening to much more 
than either the Experimenter or his assistants.
Thirdly, the Subjects must believe that what you 
are asking them to do is possible. Once again, by having 
the puppets carry out a successful trial run, the children 
were able to see the desired event actually taking place 
and became more certain of their ability to perform.
Subjects were also told that success was 'not easy* and 
that 'their thinking caps would help them a lot'. This 
further created the feeling of possible success in the 
children and much more attention to the game#*
Lastly, the children should be made to feel as little 
pressure on them to 'perform' as possible. If the 
Experimenter tells them that a 'game' is being played 
then that must be his attitude to the Experiment. It 
is vital that all the controls he has designed are 
employed, but these must appear within the rules and 
boundaries of the 'games' and not stand out to the child 
as something 'extra' and secret. The actual results of 
each Experiment need to be as far in the background as 
possible, or if such an attitude is impossible to maintain, 
the Experimenter must segregate himself as much as he can 
from the Experiment leaving his assistants or less involved 
people to carry it out.
Working with child subjects can either be very 
enjoyable and rewarding, or a totally destructive exercise. 
Once again, the Experimenter's attitude towards both his 
Subjects and his Experiment are of utmost importance. It 
is hoped that these more obvious variables just mentioned 
will be assessed by future researchers in Experiments
* In some cases, this necessitated the re-charging of
thinking caps that ha<j. 'burnt themselves out* - or so 
the children would have us believe.
involving children.
Without wishing to moralise too strongly, three 
other possibly obvious but very important points should 
be noted.
Firstly, a subject - whether child or adult - should 
never be forced to undertake the Experiment. If there is 
no desire on the Subject's part to participate then he 
must be given the freedom to say no. Forcing a child to 
undertake the Experiment will be disastrous both for the 
child and the Experiment itself since one child's fear 
or crying will be noted by all the other subjects who will 
invariably become scared as well. It has been found that 
the best policy with regard to child subjects who say 'no' 
is to simply say "o.k., maybe later". Invariably, once 
they have seen a great number of children go away to 
'play a game* and come back excited and happy, they too 
will want to participate.
Secondly, with regards to parapsychology in particular, 
a child must never be made to feel that what he is 
attempting or is successfully able to perform, is in any 
way special or odd. The attitude of 'playing a game that 
anyone can play* must be kept with the child throughout the 
experimentation.
Thirdly, and most importantly, children are human 
beings. They have a right to express their opinions, 
ask questions, offer alternatives and argue. They should 
not be talked down to, nor is it necessary to adopt a 
high squeaking voice when addressing them or feel the 
need to speak only in monosyllables. If you are natural 
and normal with them, they will be natural with you - 
and hopefully you will both gain from the experience.
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APPENDIX G
TWO REPLICATIONS OF THE CHRONOLOGICAL AGE EXPERIMENTS
EMPLOYING VIDEO CAMERAS AND IN THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the very powerful evidence in favour of 
paranormal cognition presented by the present study, 
it is vital to ensure as far as possible that the 
experimental procedure, data collection^and analysis of 
the reported experiments can stand up to all possible 
criticisms from both critics of the reported 
experiments and sceptics of parapsychology as well as 
from interested unbiased scientists and researchers.
There would appear to be two possible main 
hypotheses alternative to the theoretical model 
presented which might be raised to account for the 
data reported.
Firstly, the results might be due to trickery 
or deceit on the part of the Experimenter, the 
assistants, or the subjects tested, either independently 
or in collusion with each other. While this suggestion 
is distasteful, the history of parapsychology demands 
that it should be considered.
Secondly, the data obtained is genuine, but its 
replication is likely only in the prescence of the
Experimenter (E.S.). In other words, the Experimenter 
himself is a ’psi source’ (i.e.: a psychically gifted 
individual who may or may not be aware of his psychic 
abilities) and the results obtained and reported in 
this thesis depend crucially on the Experimenter’s 
presence.
In an attempt to test both of these alternative 
hypotheses, it was agreed that a new short series of 
trials should be carried out in some cases with the 
Experimenter absent and that these trials should be 
video-taped so that a clear and durable visual account 
of the experimental proceedings would be made available.
Two separate attempts at replication were made.
2. THE FIRST REPLICATION ATTEMPT
Two new assistants (G.S. and C.P.) with no 
previous experience with or knowledge of the research 
were selected by the Experimenter’s supervisor 
(Professor T.R. Lee). In addition, a Departmental 
technician (M.L.) who was to be present throughout 
all experimental runs and whose main task was to 
video-tape proceedings, was also selected by 
Professor Lee. The two assistants were trained by 
the Experimenter to carry out the procedure in a way 
as similar as possible to the previous runs.
A two-morning (9 a.m. - 11 a.m.) testing period 
(April 25-27, 1978) was arranged with a Nursery School 
in Guildford during which a number of dyads between 
4.1 and 4.6 years of age were to be tested. The 
Experimenter was present through all of the first 
replication attempt as was the Departmental technician. 
Video-taping of the experimental procedure was limited 
to one morning session.
Twelve dyads were tested in all. The results 
obtained by the first dyad were void due to incorrect 
machine wiring. Two further dyads were able to complete 
only ten trials each due, in one case, to session time 
running out (i.e. the children were being called to 
lunch), and in the other to the extreme anxiety 
exhibited by one of the dyad members. In all then, two 
hundred (200) trials were completed during the two 
mornings.
All the trials were carried out in the prescence 
of the Experimenter (E.S.) and the technician (M.L#)• 
Three of the runs were video-taped in their entirety 
by two (2) video cameras which were set up and allowed 
to run automatically. Automatic chart recording was 
run continuously and all data was transcribed from the 
charts onto data sheet paper by the assistants (G.S. and 
P.C.), the Experimenter (E.S.), or, in some cases, by 
the technician (M.L.). Data sheets were checked
independently by both the Experimenter and each of 
the two assistants and then signed by them all.
TABLE A shows a breakdown of the Subjects 
employed throughout the first Replication Attempt. 
As can be seen, there were three (3) dyads made up 
of two female Subjects, seven (7) dyads made up of 
one male and one female Subject, and one (1) dyad 
made up to two male Subjects. All the Subjects 
tested were aged between 4.1 and 4.6 years.
TABLE A. : SUBJECT DYAD BREAKDOWN
Total No. 
of Ss
Age
Range
Dyad
Total
Dyads Made 
up of 2 M ’s
Dyads Made 
up of 2 F ’s
Dyads Made 
up of 1M/ 
IF
22
4.1 - 
4.6 11 1 3 7
At the end of each recorded run, the Experimenter 
(E.S.) and each of the two assistants (G.S. and C.P.) 
transcribed the data from the automatic data chart pen 
recorder onto data sheets, each working independently 
and alone.
The data sheets were signed by the Experimenter and 
by both assistants.
Finally, the two assistants and the technician 
signed statements testifying that they had not observed 
any attempts at trickery - either successful or un­
successful - on anyone’s part throughout the whole of 
the testing session.
Results
TABLE B gives a breakdown of the new scores and 
percentages.
As can be seen, the results obtained were once 
again far above chance prediction. A chi-square 
analysis of the data showed that the results obtained 
were highly significant (p<.001), comparable with those 
from the earlier experiments.
TABLE B. EXPECTED AND OBSERVED FREQUENCES OF HITS
Total No. 
of Trials
Expected Hits Observed Hits Above-chance 
Hits (0 - E)
200 40 (201) 76 (38%) 36 (18%)
On consideration of the above points, the hypothesis 
that data reported previously was due to deliberate 
attempts at cheating on anyone’s part becomes highly 
untenable.
An additional extremely noteworthy point concerning 
the level of paranormal cognition scoring obtained during 
the First Attempted Replication must also be raised.
The age group employed in the present experiment 
had not been previously studied by the Experimenter. In 
the experiments reported in the main body of the thesis 
the two youngest groups tested were aged either between 
3.3 - 3.7 years (Group A) or between 4.5 - 4.9 years 
(Group B). The percent hits obtained by Group A subjects
was approximately 45%. The percent hits obtained by 
Group B subjects was approximately 34%. The subjects 
tested in this replication experiment were aged 
between 4.1 and 4.6 and the per cent hits obtained by 
this group was 38% - almost exactly within the range 
one would predict by linear interpolation for such an 
age group given that the previous data was genuine.
(See Fig. IA)
In conclusion, the data obtained in this First 
Replication tends to confirm the validity of the 
previously reported results and provides powerful 
evidence to refute the hypothesis of trickery or 
deception on the part of the participants.
2. THE SECOND REPLICATION
A second replication was carried out in order 
to test the validity of the hypothesis which argues 
that the previously reported highly positive evidence 
in favour of the existence of paranormal cognition was 
due to the Experimenter himself (E.S.) acting as the 
true fpsi source1.
It was, therefore, necessary that the Experimenter 
(E.S.) should not be present during the experimental 
runs in the Second Replication Attempt.
In addition, it was considered to be highly
advantageous to have independent observers present 
throughout all trials to witness the proceedings 
and to ensure that no alternative methods to obtain 
’hits’ were being employed by the Subjects. All the 
observers were trained psychologists holding 
responsible positions in this profession and member­
ship of the British Psychological Society.
The observers present during the second 
replication were:
a) Dr. Robert Farr,
Psychology Department at University
College, London.
b) Mr. John Walker,
Chief Educational Psychologist,
Surrey County Council.
c) Mrs. Sonia Hinton,
Child Guidance Clinic, Guildford.
The experimental sessions took place on two 
separate occasions: May 3-4, 1978 and May 25, 1978.
Eleven dyads were tested in all although results 
obtained from one dyad had to be eliminated due to 
an error of target presentation on the part of one 
of the assistants. All dyad runs were video-taped 
in their entirety by a Departmental technician (M.L.) 
who set up two video cameras to run automatically 
throughout each session. All data collection was made 
by an automatic pen chart-recorder and all transcription 
of data collected onto data sheets was made by the 
technician who, in addition, signed each sheet on
completion. Random card arrangements and random 
target arrangements for the Subjects were made 
completely independently by a secretary (J.J.) in 
the Psychology Department and then transcribed onto 
data sheets specially prepared for each assistant. 
Both assistants (G.S. and C.P.) were given the same 
card presentation order for each dyad being tested, 
but only the ’SENDER* assistant was given information 
as to the pre-selected target position for that card.
TABLE C gives a breakdown of the Subjects 
employed throughout the Second Attempted Replication. 
As can be seen there were three (3) dyads made up of 
two male Subjects, three (3) dyads made up of two 
female Subjects, and four (4) dyads made up of one 
male/one female Subject. All the Subjects tested 
were aged between 4.1 and 5.3 years*
TABLE C SUBJECT DYAD BREAKDOWN
Total No. 
of Ss
Age
Range
Dyad
Total
Dyads made 
up of 2 M ’s
Dyads made 
up of 2 F ’s
Dyads made 
up of 1 M/ 
1 F
22 4.1 -
5.3
10 3 3 4
* The difference in age range between the First and 
Second Attempted Replications is due to an outbreak of 
illness in the school which necessitated the use of 
several older children in order to make up the necessary 
number of dyads.
Results
TABLE D gives a breakdown of the raw scores
and percentages.
The number of ^its1 obtained from the second 
replication were above those predicted by chance. A 
chi-square analysis of the data showed that the 
results were significantly above chance (p4«05).
The results were, however, less remarkable than those 
obtained in the first replication. Several possible 
reasons for this difference in the scoring rate will 
be considered later, but it remains that even without 
the presence of the Experimenter, statistically 
significant data were obtained.
TABLE D EXPECTED AND OBSERVED FREQUENCES OF HIT?
Total No. 
of Trials
Expected Hits Observed Hits Above-chance 
Hits (0 - E)
200 40 (201) 52 (261) 12 (6%)
Discussion
It may be helpful to reiterate the full list of 
cc -^tc.ol-, employed in the second replication:-
The trials were carried out Ca) by Assistants 
selected by someone other than the Experimenter;
(b) without the
presence of the Experimenter;
(c) in the presence 
of independent observers of standing;
(d) witnessed in 
their entirety by a Departmental technician;
(e) video-taped
in their entirety;
(f) with the use
of an automatic data chart pen recorder to collect 
all data; and
(g) the data were 
also directly hand-recorded in their entirety by the 
technician who transcribed it onto data sheets which 
he signed.
In addition: (h) the randomization
of card presentation order and target presentation was 
carried out independently;
(i) the target
presentation order was known only by the SENDER assistant 
(G.S.) who saw the order only at the start of each 
experimental run (data sheets containing card and 
target presentation orders were sealed in manila 
envelopes and opened by the assistants, in the presence 
of the technician and the observers, only at the start 
of each experimental run); and finally
(j) the two assistants 
and the technician signed statements testifying that
they had not observed any attempts at trickery - 
either successful or unsuccessful - on anyone's 
part throughout the whole of the testing session.
On consideration of the above points, the 
hypothesis that the positive evidence for paranormal 
cognition obtained in the main experiments was 
entirely due to the presence of the Experimenter, has 
been shown to be incorrect.
Although the results obtained in the second 
replication are not at the same highly positive levels 
as in previous experiments, several possible 
explanations for this difference may be offered:
a) On the session in which the bulk of the trials 
were carried out (May 25th 1978) it was a hot and 
sunny day. This had two effects on the Subjects: 
namely, it made them less willing to carry on with 
experiments because of irritation caused by the 
heat and/or by irritation at not being allowed to 
play outside.
b) On the afternoon of the May 25th, 1978, session, 
road repairs began on the street in front of the 
experimental area. Pneumatic drills were used and 
the noise caused by these repairs was extremely loud 
and distracting. It was agreed by the assistants and 
the observers that the noise was overpowering and
that under ordinary circumstances experimental attempts
would not have continued. The dyads tested in 
this session obtained lower scores than previous 
dyads.
c) The presence of observers who were virtual 
strangers to the child Subjects may have produced 
tension in some of the Subjects.
d) The assistants pointed out that the lack of 
presence of an Experimenter to oversee the situation 
and to take care of any arising difficulties added a lot 
of . pressure on them and that this pressure was 
further aggravated by the presence of observers who, 
although extremely co-operative, were an added source 
of tension for the assistants.
e) In three of the dyads tested there were large 
intra-dyad scoring differences, suggesting that 
differences either in C.A. or I.Q. between dyad 
members might be (as has been previously shown) a 
reason for lower scoring. It is necessary to recall 
that due to school illnesses, the age range of the 
Subjects tested was larger than in the previous 
replication attempt and this might well be a factor 
(see the I.Q. EXPERIMENTS) in reducing positive 
scoring.
Although it is not possible t.© CfsteLo.©*\cfci.cy 
state that all or any of these factors contributed 
to the lowering of positive scoring in the second 
replication attempt, it would be fair to state that 
these conditions are certainly factors to be
seriously considered in any conclusions drawn from 
the second replication attempt..
4. CONCLUSION
Two possible alternative hypotheses to explain 
the data obtained in the Observational Studies and 
Experiments have been raised:
1. The data was obtained by the employment of
trickery on the part of one or all the participants.
2. The data obtained indicates that the Experimenter
(E.S.) himself is a ’psi source’ who is the true 
’generator1 of paranormal cognition.
Two separate replication attempts were carried 
out to test these alternative hypotheses. The data 
obtained indicates that:
1. Strong positive evidence in favour of para­
normal cognition is obtainable under conditions in 
which trickery or deceit on anyone’s part is 
virtually impossible.
2. Positive evidence in favour of the existence
of paranormal cognition in child Subjects is 
obtainable under conditions in which the Experimenter 
is not present and when independent observers 
invigilate all proceedings.
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